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Abstract
Communication systems based on the peer-to-peer (p2p) paradigm present what is likely the most im-
portant development in Internet technology in recent years. In spite of the position of p2p systems as the
largest source of traffic on the Internet, their commercial success is still limited. The basic tenets of p2p
systems are cooperation among peers and completely decentralised communication. However, these can
result in nontransparent actions, as well as opportunistic behaviour of the individual peers.
Thus, the implementation of commercial p2p applications requires basic mechanisms to record trans-
actions in the systems, i.e. the resource and service consumption, which will be used for charging,
incentives, and control. These basic functionalities can be achieved by an accounting system that ideally
should be fully distributed in keeping with the p2p spirit of such a system. Furthermore, it needs to
be trustworthy so that the system cannot be misused by individual peers or groups of peers for gain-
ing an undue advantage. Therefore, linking distributed accounting with distributed trustworthiness and
distributed collaboration control presents a crucial challenge for the advancement of p2p systems.
This dissertation researches this challenge by demonstrating the feasibility of fully distributed, trusted
accounting in p2p systems with intrinsic automatic cooperation control by presenting and evaluating the
token-based accounting scheme.
The token-based accounting scheme’s framework introduces tokens as a combination of permission ob-
jects and receipts. Permission objects grant to peers the right to consume services and resources. When
a peer consumes them, it “spends” tokens, and tokens becomes receipts which contain accounting infor-
mation about the transaction. This process implements effective accounting with intrinsic cooperation
control.
The token-based accounting scheme’s system architecture is composed of four building blocks: Token
structure, transaction protocols, token aggregation, and detection of double spending.
The token structure ensures the authentication and integrity of accounting information, as well as the
non-repudiation of transactions.
The trustworthy transaction protocol introduces a novel transaction procedure that removes the benefits
of defrauding the transaction partner but does not require the use of a third trusted party.
Token aggregation swaps foreign tokens for new own tokens using a truly decentralised trustworthy
process. With this process, a quorum of peers establishes a novel distributed basis of trust for p2p systems.
This is achieved by applying threshold cryptography in combination with proactive secret sharing and
with novel mechanisms that ensure the random selection of the quorum peers. The quorum size affects
the scheme’s trustworthiness and is determined using a stochastic model.
Efficient detection of double spending is enabled by introducing aggregation accounts that store issu-
ing and usage information about tokens. Aggregation accounts are located at third party peers, called
account holder sets. Maintenance operations performed on the account holder sets prevent loss of data
and ensure consistency of aggregation accounts. Aggregation accounts are protected against attacks and
fraud attempts by concealing their location using a novel overlay routing mechanism. By using simula-
tions for several churn scenarios, the required account holder set size is determined. These simulations
prove the token-based accounting scheme’s efficiency and the robustness of the storage mechanisms.
The token-based accounting scheme was simulated in detail by varying the relevant parameters, i.e.,
quorum size, account holder set size, churn, and system size. The simulation results demonstrate the
viability and efficiency of the novel token-based accounting scheme. Its applicability is shown in two
application scenarios.
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Kurzfassung (Deutsch)
Kommunikationssysteme basierend auf dem Peer-to-Peer-Paradigma stellen die wohl bedeutsamste Wei-
terentwicklung der Internettechnologie in den vergangenen Jahren dar. Obgleich sie heute für den Groß-
teil des Datenaufkommens im Internet verantwortlich sind, ist ihre kommerzielle Nutzung noch gering.
P2P-Systeme basieren auf der Grundidee der Kooperation der teilnehmenden Peers und der vollständig
dezentralen Kommunikation. Allerdings bleiben dadurch Handlungen und Verhalten der einzelnen Peers
intransparent.
Zur Realisierung verlässlicher, kommerziell nutzbarer P2P-Applikationen werden daher grundlegen-
de Mechanismen benötigt, welche die Transaktionen im System, d.h. Ressourcen- und Dienstnutzung,
erfassen, und somit als Basis für Abrechungs-, Anreiz- und Kontrollverfahren dienen.
Diese Grundfunktionalitäten können durch ein so genanntes Accounting-System ermöglicht werden,
das aber vollkommen verteilt funktionieren muss, um die Vorzüge des P2P-Ansatzes aufrechtzuerhalten.
Weiterhin muss ein solches System vertrauenswürdig sein, d.h. einzelne Peers oder Peer-Gruppen dürfen
es nicht manipulieren können, um unerlaubte Vorteile zu erhalten. Daher ist die Kombination eines ver-
teilten Accountings mit verteilten Mechanismen zum Erhalt der Vertrauenswürdigkeit und verteilter Ko-
operationskontrolle eine entscheidende Herausforderung für die Weiterentwicklung von P2P-Systemen.
Die vorliegende Dissertation erforscht diese Herausforderung, indem die technische Möglichkeit eines
vollkommen verteilten, vertrauenswürdigem Accounting in P2P-Systemen mit inhärenter Kooperationskon-
trolle bewiesen wird, indem das neuartige Token-basierte Accounting-System vorgestellt und evaluiert
wird.
Das Rahmenwerk des Token-basierten Accounting-System benutzt sogenannte Tokens als eine Kombi-
nation aus Erlaubnis und Quittung. Ein Token verleiht dem Peer das Recht, ausgewiesene Dienste und
Ressourcen zu beanspruchen. Beansprucht er diese, gibt er den Token aus und der Token wird zur Quit-
tung, der Accounting-Informationen über die Transaktion enthält. Damit wird ein effektives Accounting
mit inhärenter Kooperationskontrolle umgesetzt.
Die Architektur des Token-basierten Accounting-Systems besteht aus vier Bausteinen: Token-Struktur,
Transaktionsprotokolle, Token-Aggregation und das Feststellen von mehrfachem Ausgeben.
Die Token-Struktur stellt die Authentifizierung und Integrität der Accounting-Informationen sicher
sowie die Nachweisbarkeit von Transaktionen.
Das vertrauenswürdige Transaktionsprotokoll benutzt einen neu entwickelten Transaktionsprozess, der
den Gewinn aus betrügerischem Verhalten innerhalb einer Transaktion eliminiert, ohne dabei auf eine
dritte Partei zurückzugreifen.
Im Token-Aggregation-Prozess werden fremde gegen neue Tokens in einem vollkommen verteilten,
vertrauenswürdigen Prozess eingetauscht. Dabei bildet ein Quorum aus Peers eine neuartige, verteilte
Vertrauensbasis für P2P-Systeme. Dies wird möglich, indem Schwellenwertkryptographie in Kombination
mit proaktiven Secret Sharing-Techniken und neu erforschten Mechanismen angewendet wird, die die
zufällig Auswahl des Quorums garantieren. Die effiziente Anwendung von proaktiven Secret Sharing-
Techniken in P2P-Systemen wird mittels Simulationen belegt. Die Quorumgröße beeinflusst die Vertrau-
enswürdigkeit des Accounting-Systems; sie wird mit Hilfe eines stochastischen Modells bestimmt.
Die Einführung von Aggregationskonten ermöglicht die effiziente Feststellung des mehrfachen Aus-
gebens von Tokens. Aggregationskonten speichern Informationen über Ausstellung und Nutzung von
Tokens und befinden sich auf dritten Peers, der sogenannten Kontohaltergruppe. Protokolle zur In-
standhaltung der Kontohaltergruppen vermeiden Datenverlust und stellen die Konsistenz der Aggre-
gationskonten sicher. Die Aggregationskonten sind gegen Angriffe und Betrugsversuche durch ein neues
Overlay-Routing-Verfahren gesichert, der ihre genaue Lage im P2P-System verbirgt. Die benötigte Größe
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der Kontohaltergruppe wird mittels Simulationen mit verschiedenen Szenarien für das Hinzukommen
und Wegfallen von Peers bestimmt. Die Simulation des Token-basierten Accounting-Systems beweißt die
Effizienz und Robustheit des Speichermechanismus.
Das Token-basierte Accounting-System wurde im Detail simuliert, wobei die relevanten Parameter
(Quorumgröße, Kontohaltergruppengröße, Dynamik des Hinzukommens und Wegfallens von Peers, Sys-
temgröße) variiert wurden. Die Simulationen belegen die Gültigkeit und Effizienz des neuartigen Token-
basierten Accounting-Systems für P2P-Systeme. Seine Anwendbarkeit wird in zwei Szenarien gezeigt.
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1 Introduction
In 1999 the Internet started to experience a revolution: Napster (Wik08c) was the first peer-to-peer
(p2p) application that allowed end users to directly exchange files. With it, it was no longer necessary for
users to first upload their files onto a server before others could download them. This simple illustration
explains the fundamental difference between the two dominating communication and systems paradigms
in the Internet today: client/server and peer-to-peer.
In traditional client/server systems, a client requests services from a server. The server hosts these
services, provides the resources for hosting and delivery, and controls the delivery process. Client/server
systems have been developed since the beginning of the Internet. In order to illustrate the characteristics
of client/server systems consider the following examples: The server farms of Google and Yahoo demon-
strate that client/server systems are highly scalable. Online banking demonstrates that client/server
systems can be highly secure. Content Delivery Networks demonstrate that a distributed network of
servers can be used to distribute large amounts of data to end users.
However, about 60% to 80% of the traffic in the Internet today originates from peer-to-peer applica-
tions (Has05). p2p systems involve direct communication and sharing of resources amongst end-user
computers called “peers”. The term “peer” stems from two main characteristics: viz. the equality of peers
in the sense that they provide services to other peers as well as consume services from other peers. Peers
are also autonomous. Therefore, as a sub-class of distributed system, p2p systems belong to the class
of autonomous distributed systems. Ideally, p2p systems are completely decentralised and organisation
follows self-organisation capabilities.
Today, the predominant amount of traffic in the Internet stems from p2p file sharing applications such
as Gnutella (Cli08), KaZaA (Sha04), eDonkey (Met04), and BitTorrent (Coh03), used by millions of
users world wide to share digital content. This demonstrates two major properties of p2p systems; they
are highly scalable, and they do not rely on central resources. These also constitute the main differences
between p2p and client/server when building highly scalable systems. When the load on a client/server
system grows, it has to be extended by adding resources. In contrast, while a p2p system grows, the
available resources also increase. Thus, due to the decentralisation p2p systems can be deployed and
operated at a fraction of the cost required for client/server systems (see e.g. (LPG+07)).
However, the disadvantage of decentralisation is a loss of control and loss of determinism with regard
to system state and behaviour. There is no entity in a p2p system where such information would be
available. Furthermore, there is no trusted entity available within the system, which commonly is re-
quired for providing secure services in the Internet. Therefore, today p2p systems are still limited in the
application field. Hence, the commercial success of p2p systems has been very limited.
The strong advantages the p2p paradigm brings about in terms of scalability, ease of deployment, and
operational costs compared to client/server systems motivates research to find new mechanisms that
enable p2p systems to enjoy the same overall performance as client/server systems have today.
1.1 Motivation
In p2p systems, the combination of decentralisation and strong autonomy of peers brings about a number
of difficult challenges.
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Due to the decentralisation, there is no information available about peers’ actions in the system, e.g.,
which user consumed which services or resources, and which user(s) provided them. Therefore, key
information required to charge customers for commercial services is missing; typically such information
is called accounting information.
Today, secure services are designed using central, highly trusted servers. Examples are charging and
billing services as used in electronic commerce. However, an ideal p2p system does not have any central
trusted component, since this would encumber the systems unlimited scalability. Hence, an accounting
mechanism for p2p systems also has to resolve the apparent contradiction of decentralisation and trust.
Another challenge that p2p systems face is closely related to the lack of information. p2p applications
rely on cooperation; the peers provide the resources required to operate the p2p system, and also provide
services to each other. However, due to the lack of information about resource and service provisioning,
people using p2p systems feel anonymous and unobserved, which leads to opportunistic behaviour, the
so called free-riding phenomenon (AH00). Peers try to maximise their own profit by providing as
little resources and services as possible to others. This obviously results in a reduced overall system
performance. Hence, high performing p2p systems require a mechanism for cooperation control.
Thus, the key motivating question for this dissertation is: Is it feasible to overcome these challenges
and design a fully decentralised, trusted accounting system with intrinsic decentralised cooperation control
while preserving the technical advantages of p2p at the same time?
1.2 Trust, Accounting, and Cooperation Control
The key challenges of this dissertation are to design a fully decentralised accounting scheme that is
trusted without relying on a trusted entity, and also has an inherent mechanism for cooperation control.
In novel p2p application scenarios such an accounting scheme provides trusted accounting information
that is used for charging and billing for commercial services, as basis for an efficient cooperation control
for free community services, or even as a combination of both.
To visualise the key challenges, trust in distributed systems as well as two different abstract application
scenarios are discussed.
The focus of the first application scenario is commercial p2p applications, for example, a commercial
p2p video distribution platform. As shown in (LPG+07), centralised distribution of large files like videos
bear high distribution costs in terms of traffic. Here the use of peer-to-peer systems can save up to 90%
of distribution traffic compared to the use of client/server systems.
The focus of the second application scenario is community applications where users collaborate in
order to achieve a common benefit, such as a distributed version of the Wikipedia encyclopedia. Due
to the central hosting in data centres, such community applications rely on donations. This would be
superfluous with a change to p2p.
1.2.1 Trust, Accounting, and Cooperation Control in P2P Application Scenarios
In order to provide highly trusted services, such as charging, billing, or online banking, the state-of-the-
art in distributed system relies on central trusted entities. Obviously, trust is related to security, however,
both are defined differently. Typically, in information systems the term “security” refers to information
security. Information security comprises the three protection objectives authentication, integrity, and
non-repudiation (Sch96), which are also relevant for an accounting mechanism. A trusted entity typi-
cally provides these protection objectives; however, this is incomplete, as the term trust comprises more.
(see also Appendix C.1).
The trustworthiness of information systems comprises in addition to information security also func-
tional security and “benevolence” (cf. (BHS02)). Functional security is the attribute of a system that the
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realised as-is functionality of the system components is consistent with the specified to-be functionality.
Benevolence is the extent to which the users believe that the application provider intends to do good
things rather than just act out of profit interest (see also Appendix C.1). This is an important addition for
p2p systems, since the good intentions of all participating peers cannot be assumed. Thus, the challenge
for p2p systems is to design a system that offers benevolence, although its components (peers) might not
be trustworthy. Hence, potential cheating and collusion of peers must be considered in the design. In
consequence, to design trusted p2p systems the application of state-of-the-art security mechanism will
probably not be sufficient.
The processes executed when conducting commercial transactions over the Internet partition into five
phases (Sch04) (see Figure 1.1). Using the example of a commercial video delivery platform these
phases help to understand the tasks of accounting in commercial applications.
In Phase 1 and Phase 2 the consumer finds a video he would like to watch, which is offered by the
provider. In p2p systems this functionality is typically provided by the p2p overlay network.
In Phase 3, the negotiation phase, provider and customer negotiate a tariff for the video delivery, as
well as the applying terms and conditions. The price of a video could depend different parameters, for
example, on the download time or the file size. A contract to purchase, often in form of a Service Level
Agreement (SLA), is created between service provider and customer.
In Phase 4, the video is delivered and the consumer pays the agreed price. In order to calculate the
price according to the negotiated tariff, the charge must be calculated and a bill needs to be created
stating the required payment. Billing functionality is often provided by the applied payment system. For
calculating the charge, it is important that it is correctly recorded if the provider provided the service
according to the SLA. The customer must not be able to dispute a correctly provided service provisioning.
Equally, the provider must not be able to dispute a received payment. The required mechanism is a
trusted accounting system. It accounts for the provided services and payments. Furthermore, in a p2p
video deliver platform a video would probably be provided to the consumer by a set of peers. Hence,
for cooperation control also the cooperation of peers is to be recorded. This information is important in
order to achieve a high performance of the p2p system.
During Phase 5, the customer uses the acquired service or good. For example, the customer watches
the video. During this phase, providers can perform customer support and customer relationship man-
agement.
Communities require participation of individual members. This is especially true for p2p applications,
for example p2p file sharing communities.
In order to participate in a community, users must feel that their benefits outweigh their costs of
participation. This can be reached by two alternative behaviour strategies. Either a user fully participates
in the community and receives in return some reward that outweighs the costs; or a user abuses the
community by using the benefits offered but providing no services in return. In (Gal02, MMA04) the
so-called “Carrot and Stick” approach is presented in order to motivate users to fully participate in a
community (this also means a user will act according to the rules of the community) and not abuse the
privileges.
The “Stick” approach focuses on making users accountable for their actions. The “Stick” implies that
users will also be punished for actions that violate the community’s norms. This requires that abuse can
be detected and users can be punished. Detection of abuse can either be by technical means or by other
community users. Technical detection requires accountability of user actions. Misbehaviour detected
by users will be fed into a reputation system. Punishment can be any combination of psychological
deterrents, like negative reputation made public, or loss of access to community services, which requires
access control.
The “Carrot” approach is concerned with aspects that reward people for participation in a community,
that is, conform to the community’s norms. A reward can be for example, premium access to services or
an improved service quality, as well as an enhanced status within the community. Thus, for measuring
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and expressing a persons contribution within a community, an accounting systems as well as a rating or
reputation system is needed.
The technical functionality realising the “Carrot and Stick” approach can be characterised as a cooper-
ation control mechanism.
1.2.2 Accounting as Functional Core
A strong overlap between commercial and community application scenarios on the required mechanisms
for p2p systems can be observed. Accounting is a core component in both cases. Accounting provides the
fundamental information other functions (such as charging, reputation, and norms) rely on. Accordingly,
accounting is defined as follows:
Accounting is the process of tracing relevant IS activities to a responsible source. Relevance is defined by
the application applying accounting (see Appendix 2.1.2).
It is crucial that accounting is trustworthy.
Figure 1.2 shows the interdependencies of application functions with accounting. Commercial appli-
cations require trusted accounting information in order to compute the charge for a service (which is
required for billing and payment). Any reputation mechanism requires accounting information in order
to ensure that ratings are given only when a transaction has happened, and only once per transaction.
Communities require norms or rules. Compliance with rules can be detected by technical means using
accounting information. Finally, accounting is central to build trust, as it delivers the basic information
on the trustworthiness of other users. It is important to note that accounting requires user identification.
4 1.2. Trust, Accounting, and Cooperation Control
From this discussion, the basic requirements for an accounting scheme for p2p systems can be derived.
A p2p accounting scheme should be a) fully decentralised and b) maintain a system-wide record of
the information needed by other components like charging and billing about every transaction in the
p2p system. In order to use accounting information for other purposes, accounting information must
be efficiently and fully retrievable. c) It is especially important that an accounting scheme provides
trustworthy information. As accounting is used for abuse detection as well, it should be d) combined
with means for cooperation control. The preferred means of cooperation control is to constrain access to
services for the users abusing the p2p system.
1.3 Challenges for Trusted Accounting and Cooperation Control in P2P
Environments
Due the complexity resulting from the decentralised character of p2p systems and the autonomy of the
participating peers, accounting and cooperation control are still open challenges in p2p systems.
In the context of Tanenbaum’s model of the Internet (Tan03), p2p systems are placed within the
application layer, just as client/server systems. They form an overlay network above the transport layer in
order to interconnect the participating peers. The functionalities of trusted accounting and cooperation
control lie above the overlay network and are accessed by actual applications. Trust, accounting, and
cooperation control use the overlay network in order to find peers, services, and resources they require.
In order to perform its functionality p2p mechanisms may not use or rely on any centralised component,
e.g. a trusted server.
Specific research challenges for decentralised trust, accounting, and cooperation control mechanisms,
especially compared to client/server-based solutions, are discussed following.
1.3.1 Decentralised Accounting
Both, requirements and challenges for building an accounting mechanism, differ fundamentally between
client/server systems and p2p system. In client/server, a server provides the resources required for
providing services and controls the provisioning of services. All relevant accounting information accu-
mulates at the server, and is often stored in form of log-files. Accordingly, access to the accounting
information is relatively simple.
In decentralised systems such as p2p, there is no central entity where accounting information is stored
and can be accessed. Accordingly, accounting information must be collected in a distributed way across
the complete p2p system. A peer interacts with many different peers in order to consume and provide
many services. Therefore, accounting information about a single peer might also be distributed across
the complete system. Accordingly, efficient access to accounting information becomes a challenge in p2p
systems. For example, for billing purposes, it should be possible to access information about all relevant
interactions of a specific peer that have taken place across the whole p2p system.
Thus, the main challenge is to access accounting information about the relevant actions of peers in an
efficient way1 such that all relevant information can be retrieved, although it is potentially distributed
over the complete p2p system. This is referred to as the global view. For example, it is inefficient to query
the complete p2p system in order to find all relevant information. Further, due to churn, all information
might not be retrievable.
Another challenge is the storage of accounting information in a p2p system. Due to churn, information
could be unavailable for a specific period of time or even completely lost. Therefore, a persistent storage
1 According to (SHL+06) efficiency is understood as the ratio of performance to costs. The most important cost factor in
p2p system is the generated traffic. Here, as the required performance is determined, in order to achieve efficiency the
costs for accessing accounting information should be as low as possible.
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mechanism for accounting information is required. If this mechanisms relies on replication of accounting
information to several peers, the consistency of the replicas must also be ensured.
1.3.2 Decentralised Trusted Accounting
Typically in distributed systems in the Internet trust is established by applying a trusted entity, often
a central trusted server. This server controls the service sessions in order to ensure that the provided
functionality does not deviate from the intended one. This is achieved by taking in to account potential
adversaries. Mechanisms that are used in order to ensure system conform behaviour are authentication,
authorisation, access control, and further security protocols, e.g. encryption. For an accounting system
such a server would collect and store the accounting information and provid it to other functions, e.g.
charging.
In p2p systems such a central authority does not exist. Accounting information is collected and stored
in a distributed fashion by potentially untrustworthy peers. They may have direct interest in manipu-
lating their own accounting information (e.g., in order to reduce the price of a received service). This
is called cheating. Furthermore, peers can collude in order to defraud the system. Hence, in order to
achieve trust in a p2p accounting system, two different properties have to be achieved.
First, when collecting the accounting information, it has be ensured that the information is complete
and correct. Here, often third party peers are used for observing a transaction; however, due to potential
collusion this solution is not fully trustworthy.
Second, while storing the accounting information its integrity and correctness is to be ensured. That
is, the information is to be secured against unauthorised access; e.g. a peer should not be able to inject
false information or to remove (parts of) it.
1.3.3 Decentralised Cooperation Control
Decentralised rule enforcement faces similar challenges than distributed accounting. Without a central
controlling instance in the p2p system a decentralised cooperation control mechanism must be executed
by all peers, i.e. each peer must restrict the access to its local resources and services for rule violating
peers. Accordingly, decentralised cooperation control consists of three parts: First, each peer has access
to the accounting information about all other peers. Second, each peer is able to make a clear decision
based on the accounting information, if another peer complied with the rules. Third, each peer must
have an interest in restricting the access to its resources and services for rule violating peers. Otherwise,
an enforcement mechanism becomes ineffective and will fail to fulfil its purpose. The first part, access to
accounting information, was discussed above.
The second part bears the challenge that the accounting information should be clear and easy to
evaluate. Based on this, the decision about potential rule violation should be unambiguous.
The third part is the most non-trivial to implement since punishment for granting prohibited access
is hard to enforce. This would require that some other entity in the p2p system observed this action,
and can clearly decide that it was not in compliance with the rules. However, this cannot be assumed.
Therefore, each peer must have a clear incentive for complying with the rules about restricting access to
its resources and services. Thus, a peer should feel a loss when it does not comply with the rules about
restricting access. An example is a p2p system where cooperation of peers is measured, like a file sharing
application. Providing undeserved access to a peer, i.e. uploading a file to a peer not deserving it, should
not be measured as cooperation.
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1.4 Goal and Objectives of the Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the feasibility of a fully distributed, trusted accounting scheme
for p2p systems with intrinsic automatic cooperation control.
In order to achieve this goal a number of objectives have to be fulfilled. They can be grouped into
functional (respectively design) objectives and objectives related to the feasibility and assessment of the
developed concepts. The objectives are:
• The design of a fully distributed accounting scheme for peer-to-peer systems.
• The design of a fully decentralised mechanism that allows automatic cooperation control based on
the accounting scheme.
• To design fully distributed mechanisms that achieve the trustworthiness of the accounting scheme
without having to rely on a single trusted entity in the system.
• Showing the feasibility of the scheme by demonstrating its viability, trustworthiness, scalability, and
efficiency using analytical assessments as well as simulations.
– The viability of the accounting scheme with intrinsic cooperation control is shown by de-
signing the required protocols in detail and implementing them in the peer-to-peer simulator
“PeerfactSim.KOM”.
– The scheme’s trustworthiness is demonstrated by analytical assessments. Values for parame-
ters that configure the accounting scheme’s trustworthiness are determined.
– The scheme’s efficiency is demonstrated by evaluating the generated traffic using simulations.
The influence of the accounting scheme’s parameters on the generated traffic will be analysed.
– The scalability of the scheme is evaluated by simulating different models of churn and systems
sizes.
• Discussing the applicability of the researched accounting mechanism with intrinsic cooperation
control in different application scenarios.
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured into seven chapters.
After this introduction, Chapter 2, “Related Work”, gives basic definitions used within this dissertation
and surveys the literature in the three relevant areas. The first part of the literature survey discusses
accounting mechanisms in distributed systems. The second part reviews the related work specifically in
the area of p2p accounting mechanisms. The third part surveys security mechanisms that use groups of
entities to build trust than rather using a central trusted entity.
Chapter 3 “Token-Based Accounting Principles And Architecture” introduces the concept, framework,
and architecture of the token-based accounting scheme by elaborating the design decisions step-by-step.
The resulting building blocks – token structure, transaction protocols, token aggregation, and detection
of double spending are described. The building block are an integrated set of mechanism that provide
the required functionality and basic trustworthiness.
Chapter 4 “Relevant Details About Protocols” describes the details of protocols of the token-based ac-
counting scheme. Strong focus is given in this chapter to the mechanisms that ensure the trustworthiness
of the token-based accounting scheme. The protocols ensuring the availability and trustworthiness of ac-
counting information stored in remote account holder sets are described in detail. Further, the concept
and organisation of trusted peers is elaborated. A trustworthy aggregation protocol is presented that
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implements a trusted token aggregation process. The protocols ensuring the secrecy of the system-wide
private key used within token aggregation are described. Also, distribution strategy alternatives to up-
date shares of the key are investigated. Finally, it is discussed how failures within transactions can be
recovered.
Chapter 5 “System Evaluation” presents the evaluation of the token-based accounting scheme. First, the
relevant evaluation criteria and evaluation methodology are presented. Then, values for the accounting
scheme’s parameters (quorum size and account holder set size) required to achieve trustworthiness are
determined using analytical and simulation studies. The third part presents a message-based traffic
analysis of the most relevant protocols. The fourth part presents the simulation model and simulation
results about the traffic generated by the token-based accounting scheme. After this the simulation model
and simulation results for system key management are presented. Finally, the traffic generated by the
token-based accounting scheme is compared to the most relevant related work.
Chapter 6 “Deployment Issues” deals with issues that arise when the token-based accounting scheme
is applied in practise. It describes bootstrapping strategies and discusses application examples for com-
mercial scenarios as well as a file sharing scenario.
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation. It summarises the results and outlines the contributions to
accountability in peer-to-peer systems and the application of distributed security mechanisms in peer-
to-peer systems. Furthermore, an outlook to future work resulting from the dissertation’s research is
given.
Subsequently, the appendices to the dissertation are presented.
8 1.5. Structure of the Dissertation
2 Related Work
In this chapter the related work relevant for the goal of this dissertation – development of an
accounting system with intrinsic cooperation control in autonomous distributed systems – is
summarised. As stated in Section 1.3 the trustworthiness of the accounting records created
by such a system is a core requirement. Accordingly, the related work is structured into the
two parts. First, relevant accounting mechanisms in computer networks are presented with
focus on accounting mechanisms for peer-to-peer systems. Then, security schemes designed
for distributed systems are discussed, since such mechanisms are applied in the token-based
accounting mechanism.
2.1 Definitions in Context
Within this dissertation the main concepts are peer-to-peer, accounting, and cooperation control. In
order to establish a common understanding throughout this dissertation, they have to be defined in
more detail.
2.1.1 Definition of Peer-to-Peer
Peer-to-peer is a communication paradigm in the Internet. The term peer-to-peer (p2p) was created
in the year 2000. According to an initial definition given by Clay Shirky in (Shi01) p2p is “a class of
applications that takes advantage of resources - storage, cycles, content, human presence - available at the
edges of the Internet. Because accessing these decentralised resources means operating in an environment
of unstable connectivity and unpredictable IP addresses, peer-to-peer nodes must operate outside the DNS
and have significant or total autonomy from central servers.” Shirky also provides a litmus test, according
to which an application is peer-to-peer if (1) it allows for variable connectivity and temporary network
addresses and (2) it gives the nodes at the edges of the network significant autonomy.
The IRTF Peer-to-Peer Research Group applies two definitions: in its charter the group defines p2p as:
“... a way of structuring distributed applications such that the individual nodes have symmetric roles.
Rather than being divided into clients and servers each with quite distinct roles (such as Web clients vs.
Web servers), in p2p applications a node may act as both a client and a server. p2p systems are in general
deployable in an ad-hoc fashion, without requiring centralised management or control. They can be highly
autonomous, and can lend themselves to anonymity.”
Additionally, in (RM06), a p2p network is defined to exhibit the three characteristics self organisation,
symmetric communication, and distributed control. This definition is taken from (RBR+04). Further-
more, a self organising p2p network is defined according to (RD01) as network that “automatically
adapts to the arrival, departure, and failure of nodes.”
The term “p2p network” is somewhat confusing as also overlay networks are a very important part of
p2p. Accordingly, Mahlmann and Schindelhauer (MS07) state that the research community has agreed
roughly that a p2p network is an overlay network where the participating computers communicate as
peers without central coordination in order to provide an application jointly.
In this dissertation, in order to distinguish the overlay network from a system that fulfils the p2p
definition and provides additional functionality than an overlay network the term p2p system will be
used.
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The peer-to-peer working group of the Internet2 consortium defined p2p computing as “... sharing of
computer resources and services by direct exchange between systems. These resources and services include
the exchange of information, processing cycles, cache storage, and disk storage for files.” (see (SF02)).
The working group seems to be inactive since April 2004. In a similar way Barkai (Bar01) defined p2p
computing as “... a network based computing model for applications where computers share resources via
direct exchanges between participating computers.”
In research, several people have also defined p2p systems. According to Yang and Garcia-Molina
(YGM02) “Peer-to-peer (p2p) systems are distributed systems in which nodes of equal roles and capabili-
ties exchange information and services directly with each other.” Aberer and Hauswirth (AH02) extract
from Shirky’s definition three underlying principles: The principle of sharing resources, the principle of
decentralisation, and the principle of self organisation.
In a later work, Hauswirth (HD05) modifies this definition by ascribing the following characteristics to
p2p systems: symmetry of roles, decentralisation (no central coordination, no central data base, no peer
has a global view of the system), self organisation, autonomy of peers, unreliability of peers and network
links, availability of data stored in the system in the presence of distributed storage, unreliability, and
unknown trustworthiness of peers, etc.
Summarising all these characteristics, one of the most complete definitions was composed by Stein-
metz and Wehrle in (SW04, SW05a) where they summarise nine important characteristics of p2p sys-
tems. This definition will be applied in this dissertation.
Steinmetz and Wehrle first gave as a basic definition of p2p systems (SW04): A Peer-to-Peer system
is a self-organising system of equal, autonomous entities (peers) aims for the shared usage of distributed
resources in a networked environment avoiding central services.
Further, they group the nine properties that characterise p2p systems into the two categories - decen-
tralised resources usage and decentralised self-organisation (though a single system rarely exhibits all of
these properties).
• Decentralised Resource Usage:
– Resources of interest (bandwidth, storage, processing power) are used in a manner as equally
distributed as possible and are located at the edges of the network, close to the peers.
– Within a set of peers, each utilises the resources provided by other peers. The most prominent
examples for such resources are storage and processing capacity. Other possible resources are
connectivity, human presence, and geographic proximity.
– Peers are interconnected through a network and in most cases distributed globally.
– In order to deal with variable connectivity of peers p2p systems to introduce new address
and name spaces above of the traditional Internet address level. Hence, content is usually
addressed through unstructured identifiers derived from the content with a hash function.
Consequently, data is no longer addressed by location (the address of the server) but by the
data itself.
• Decentralised Self-Organisation:
– In order to utilise shared resources, peers interact directly with each other. In general, this
interaction is achieved without any central control or coordination.
– Peers directly access and exchange the shared resources they utilise without a centralised
service.
– In a p2p system, peers can act both as clients and servers
– Peers are equal partners with symmetric functionality. Each peer is fully autonomous regard-
ing its respective resources.
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– Ideally, resources can be located without any central entity or service.
A wide overview over the state-of-the-art in p2p research gives e.g. (SW05b).
2.1.2 Definition of Accounting
Accounting is the mechanism (of an information system) that provides accountability. There exist several
definitions for accountability in information systems (IS).
In (Car08) it is defined as “... the ability of a system to keep track of who or what accessed and/or made
changes to the system.”
In (Nat99) accountability is defined as “... the process of tracing IS activities to a responsible source.”
Both definitions agree and express the meaning of accountability used in this dissertation. Important to
note is that in p2p systems, not all IS activities will be accounted for. The size and potentially numerous
activities in p2p system require limiting accounting to relevant IS activities. Relevance is defined by
the application provider, and depends on the application scenario and the goal the application provider
hopes to achieve using an accounting functionality. In this dissertation, in accordance with the above
definitions, the following definition is used:
Accounting is the process of tracing relevant IS activities to a responsible source. Relevance is defined by
the application applying accounting.
Accordingly, accounting is a mechanism that builds the foundation for other mechanisms that use
accounting information as input. Example mechanisms are charging and billing.
Further, accounting has to be distinguished from incentive systems. An incentive system gives incen-
tives to peers for stronger cooperation. It may use accounting information in order to measure the peers’
contribution, however different alternatives exist and most incentive systems use considerably less de-
tailed information than data an accounting system conventionally provides. Example incentive systems
are upload traffic measurement in KaZaA (Sha), bandwidth allocation in eMule (eMu04a), or the use of
virtual currencies like MojoNation (Wik08b).
An accounting system is not a virtual currency system. Currencies are typically impersonal, in the sense
that a unit of currency does not contain information about ownership, usage, etc. Furthermore, currency
systems (as well as virtual currency systems) are complex systems with mechanisms like management of
money supply. Therefore, accounting in information systems and virtual currencies are separate mecha-
nisms.
2.1.3 Definition of Cooperation Control
p2p systems are built in cooperation with the participating peers. Therefore, it is meaningful to define
rules about cooperation with the goal of increasing the system’s performance and achieving fairness.
According to the “Carrot and Stick” approach (Gal02) presented above, cooperation control consists of
three parts: definition of rules, compliance check, and infliction of consequences for violating the rules.
This will be described using the following example.
Known rules for file sharing applications exist, for example, to provide a specific upload/download
bandwidth or traffic ratio. For example, KaZaA implements such a rule (Sha).
When rules are defined, the compliance with the rules must be controlled. Otherwise it cannot be
determined if peers follow the rules. The basic data to inform this decision is accounting information.
According to the example, KaZaA, the p2p file sharing client measures the upload traffic the peer provides
(Sha).
There is no need to behave in compliance with rules if there are no consequences for peers that do not
follow the rules. So the KaZaA-client will limit the available download bandwidth if the peer does not
contribute enough upload bandwidth (Sha).
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In conclusion, the rules contain a mechanism for controlling compliance, and a mechanism for en-
forcing rules by inflicting consequences on peers that do not follow the rules. Within this dissertation,
cooperation control consists of these three parts: definition of rules of cooperation, control of compliance
with rules using accounting information, and infliction of consequences for violating the rules.
2.2 Accounting in Distributed Systems
Before reviewing the related work in the context of p2p systems, this section discusses the how account-
ing functionality is implemented more generally in distributed systems (CDK02).
In the context of implementing quality of service in computer networks, it is discussed how network
providers can implement different quality of service classes (see, e.g., (Sch00)), and charge for them
using a signalling and charging architecture (see, e.g., (SFPW98b, SFPW98a, SBGP99, Kar00, BDH+03,
KRS03, SRG+03)). These mechanisms are not applicable to the p2p domain, since accounting is per-
formed on the transport layer. Similar, work in the area of accounting in UMTS and WLAN networks such
as (RFS07) cannot be applied. Accordingly, this section discusses accounting mechanisms implemented
on the application layer in centralised and distributed systems.
First, accounting in distributed systems research in general is reviewed. Then, two special instances
of client/server systems is given special attention; these are Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) and
Radius. Then, accounting mechanisms for Grids and micropayment schemes are reviewed for concepts
that can be transferred to p2p systems.
2.2.1 Accounting in Distributed Systems Research
In distributed systems research, authorisation has received a lot of attention. However, there are only
very few papers also concerned with distributed accounting mechanisms for distributed systems.
In (Var91), Varley summarises the requirements and issues of accounting management in distributed
systems. In (Neu93), Neuman describes a model for authentication, authorisation, and accounting
that is based on so-called restricted proxies. A proxy is a token that grants rights and privileges to the
owner. Authorisation and accounting are interdependent. Accounting depends on authorisation in order
to control the transfer of resources from one account to another. Authorisation requires from accounting
a verification for allocated resources. Accounts are maintained at accounting servers. Each account
holds an access control list and accounting records each for a different resource type or currency type.
Clients may have their accounts located at different accounting servers. The basic concept uses quotas,
which are implemented by transferring funds of the appropriate currency out of a client’s account when
resources are allocated to the client. When the user releases the resources, the funds are transferred back
into its account. If a client C requests resources from a server S, C sends a signed check to S, stating the
requested resources and the resource provider, as well as a unique check identification number. This way
C cannot re-use the same check in order to double spend. When C ’s request is completed, S endorses
the check, and deposits it with its accounting server $S. If C uses a different accounting server, $S
forwards the check to C ’s accounting server $C. As these messages are out-of-band to the resource
usage, accounting servers also deal with checks returned due to insufficient funds, forged checks, or
misdrawn checks.
Summary
Neuman’s work comes close to the requirements of an accounting mechanism for p2p systems. Al-
though in the presented system, accounting does more then recording the usage of resources - it also
takes care of payment for resource usage. Accordingly, there is also a mechanism present to deny access
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Figure 2.1: Components of CDNs (cf. (BEH+01))
to further resources for clients that do not have enough currency available. However, Neuman assumes
the existence of trusted accounting servers. This cannot be assumed within p2p systems.
2.2.2 Accounting In Client/Server Systems
Accounting has never been a major research issue in client/server systems. The reason is that accounting
in such systems was intuitively easy, as two clients never communicate directly, so all communication
is controlled by the server. Therefore, the server can log every access activity of the clients and create
trustworthy accounting records. In order to show accounting solutions in more complex client/server
based systems, accounting in content distribution networks (CDN) and in Radius (RAD00a) is discussed.
2.2.2.1 Accounting in CDNs
Accounting in Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) is described in (TOC+00). The components of a
CDN are depicted in Figure 2.1. Accounting in CDNs has the primary purpose of accounting for proxylet
functions in order to allow for the billing of services that are used by clients or publishing servers. It is
required at hosts that act as remote callout servers. As a secondary purpose, accounting information is
used to aid in operations, billing, and SLA verification. Accounting information typically is provided in
the form of log files created and stored at a server, either in aggregated or in detailed form. Accordingly,
all servers of a CDN are trusted entities.
Accounting information is collected by the remote callout server and the caching proxy server. If
there is a central administrative server (administrative server model), both the remote callout server
and the caching proxy server will send collected accounting information to the administrative server.
The remote callout server might exist in a different domain than the administrative server. Therefore,
mutual authentication between these servers is required. It is assumed that the accounting information
is collected and stored in a secure and trustworthy manner at these servers.
When CDNs are interconnected, different interconnection agreements can be applied. Independent
any interconnection agreement, accounting information from foreign domains must also be exchanged.
This requires a generalised standard process that supports different current and potential future business
models.
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Figure 2.2: CDN accounting peering architecture (cf. (BEH+01))
In CDN peering, so called Accounting CDN Peering Gateways (CPGs) exchange accounting data col-
lected by the internal accounting servers. In order to achieve scalability, CPGs can aggregate accounting
information before it is transferred. Figure 2.2 depicts such a CDN peering system.
Another approach to authentication, authorisation, and accounting for CDNs is suggested in (CLM03).
Here, accounting is performed by a central server. Accounting peering is not considered.
Summary
In summary, accounting in CDNs is not concerned with secure accounting information collection, but
with secure and authenticated access to accounting information from different domains. A different set
of issues must be addressed than those in decentralised autonomous systems like p2p.
2.2.2.2 Accounting in Radius
The Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) standard describes its accounting functionality
in (RAD00b). RADIUS implements the function triple authentication1, authorisation2 and accounting
(AAA). The purpose of accounting is to provide data for billing users and generating statistics.
The RADIUS accounting protocol delivers accounting information from the Network Access Server
(NAS) to a RADIUS accounting server. The basic concept is that the client computer sends at the be-
ginning of a service delivery an Accounting Start packet to the RADIUS accounting server. The packet
describes the type of service being delivered, and the user service is being delivered to. The accounting
server responds with an acknowledgement. At the end of the service delivery, the client will send an
Accounting Stop packet to the Radius accounting server. This packet describes the type of service that
was delivered and optionally statistics, such as service duration, and input and output traffic. Again the
accounting server responds with an acknowledgement.
All these tasks are executed by a centralised Radius server. There are mechanisms that can redirect
the accounting traffic. This is used, for example, when the accounting server fails.
1 Authentication: the process of establishing the digital identity of one entity to another entity (RAD00a).
2 Authorisation: the process of the granting specific types of privileges (including "no privilege") to an entity or a user, based
on their authentication (RAD00a).
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Summary
RADIUS accounting is fully centralised and relies on trusted servers. Hence, its concept cannot be
transferred to the fulfilling the objectives of this dissertation.
2.2.3 Accounting in Grids
In the Grid community, accounting for provided services was first considered in (THMA02), followed by
(BB03).
Thigpen et al. suggest in (THMA02) an “accountless accounting” method for Grid environments,
because local user accounts are not feasible. Their concept suggests that each Grid entity autonomously
sets rates for the use of its resources. Consumers have to bid for resources and it is envisioned that
a market for resources develops. When a service is provided, a receipt for the consumed resources
is created by the supplier and sent to the consumer. In order to build the market, each participating
site should try to maintain a zero balance. In order to calculate a balance, each site uses a formula
the weighs the different resources in order to aggregate them to a uniform resource. Sites that cannot
provide resources themselves should establish a partnership with resource providing sites in order to
achieve a zero balance. In summary, the whole concept is still abstract and an accounting functionality
has not been explicitly designed.
Barmouta and Buyya present in (BB03) the concept of Gridbank, which is an accounting and micro-
payment handling system. It is thought to establish an economy with a Grid environment, as well as for
usage in e-commerce applications. GridBank is designed as just another resource provider in the Grid.
Both consumers and suppliers in a Grid environment can open an account with GridBank. There is a
Grid Trading Service or a Grid Market Directory that establishes prices for resources. When a provider
requests a resource from a supplier, either the consumer informs the supplier with its account details,
along with the resource request, or the provider uses a GridCheque purchased at GridBank. During the
resource provisioning, the Grid Resource Meter measures the actual resource usage. After the job is
finished, the providers Charging Module contacts GridBank and requests a transfer of funds. It also send
an accounting record with the request. GridBank is designed as a client/server architecture. In summary,
GridBank sets a focus on how to build a market in a Grid environment, where many different kinds of
resources are offered. It uses a centralised, trustable bank, which is not applicable to p2p systems.
Another bank-based approach to accounting in Grid environments is presented in (SGE+04). It also
uses a centralised, trustable bank. In order to achieve scalability, accounts can be distributed across
several bank instances. Similar to the previous concept, this one is also not applicable to p2p systems.
In (YLLH04), an economy-based accounting system for Grid environments is presented, that is it uses
a centralised accounting server and set a focus on resource pricing.
Göhner and Rückemann present in (GR06) the concept of accounting in Grid environments with
a detailed monitoring concept, in order to create accounting records. Monitoring is performed as a
decentralised function, however, accounts and accounting data are stored at accounting servers, which
are assumed to be trusted. In (GWG+07), Göhner et. al. present the concept of an accounting model
for dynamic virtual organisations in the Grid that focuses on economic and business aspects.
An architecture for secure resource peering is SHARP (FCC+03). SHARP was not directly designed for
Grid, but for Grid-like distributed resource sharing systems. SHARP is used, for example, in PlanetLab.
SHARP uses a ticket system to book resources. Tickets are issued by resource providers by signing the
ticket with the resource consumer’s public key. Ticket owners can also delegate part of the resources
to other users. Also, similar to airlines, overbooking is supported in order to facilitate better resource
usage.However, there is no mechanism that ensures global fairness of resource usage. All mechanisms
are meant to ensure that a site is not overbooked, potentially by forged ticket. Accordingly, there is no
global accounting mechanism existing in SHARP.
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Charging for Grid services based on accounting information is, for example, presented by Stiller in
(SGF+01).
Summary
In conclusion, accounting in Grid environments has some similarities to p2p environments. Services
are supplied and consumed in a decentralised manner. For accounting, the concepts differ in their mon-
itoring styles. Some concepts use explicit monitoring services provided as Grid services, other concepts
use decentralised monitoring. Accounts for participating sites in a Grid are always hosted on centralised
servers. In the context of trust, authentication is observed, however monitoring and account holding
instances are assumed to be trustworthy. Therefore, accounting solutions for Grid environments cannot
be transferred to p2p systems.
2.2.4 Micropayment Systems
There exist a wide variety of micropayment and macropayment systems for the Internet; to discuss them
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. An overview can be found at (Pei01). Typically, these systems
were designed to accomplish small payments over the Internet, e.g., paying services that are worth a few
Euros in the case of macropayment systems or fraction of a cent in the case of micropayment systems.
Because these systems have a counter value in a real world currency, these systems require a high level
of security. Therefore, most of them are designed as a client/server system, where the server is well
protected and trusted. Two basic types of micro/macropayments can be distinguished. One system uses
only accounts hosted at the server. If a payment is to be made, funds are transferred from one account to
another. Accordingly, the server must be reachable for all participants anytime. This solution is typically
used for macropayments, because the effort is too expensive for micropayments. The second type uses
anonymous objects, like electronic coins, that are issued by the central server. The objects are anonymous
and can be handed over to another participant. They behave like a coin or bank note in the real world.
In order to achieve security in such a system, the objects are enriched with cryptographic mechanisms
that enable them to be traced in order to detect double spending (see e.g. (CFN90)). Therefore, these
coins grow in size when they are handed over to another peer, due to the added information.
Summary
For accounting in p2p systems these systems are not adequate for several reasons. First, micropay-
ments are anonymous. This is a basic characteristic of currency. Secondly, accounting information
cannot easily be collected and stored. Third, these systems are highly centralised in order to build a
central trusted authority to give the systems trustworthiness in the Internet environment.
2.2.5 Summary
Accounting in distributed systems typically relies on trusted, central servers; in most systems it is one
single accounting server used. This assumption is contrary to the concept to p2p systems. Hence,
accounting concepts from these system cannot be transferred to build an accounting scheme for p2p
systems. Grid environments have some similarities to p2p environments. Here, distributed monitoring
is applied to collect accounting information. This is a concept that could be transferred to p2p systems.
However, the collected information is stored on trusted servers.
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2.3 Accounting in Peer-to-Peer Systems
In peer-to-peer systems, the topic of accounting has been often discussed in context of other topics, espe-
cially incentives and preventing free-riding. These works require the collection and storage of accounting
related information. However, the focus of most of these papers is the correct design of incentives (see
e.g. (ACM04, ACS05)), and not the design of an efficient and trustworthy accounting scheme, which is
an objective of this dissertation.
2.3.1 Classification of Peer-to-Peer Accounting Schemes
This section outlines the different design parameters for building an accounting system that meets the
described requirements. The problem can be structured into two main parts: Type of information collec-
tion covers the options as to how and in what form information is collected. Information storage location
concerns the options of where the collected information can be stored.
2.3.1.1 Type of Information Collection
In p2p systems, there are few options as to where accounting information can be collected. Assuming
real p2p connections (without a third peer in the middle as a ”trusted party”), the information can only
be collected at the service provider peer, at the service receiver peer, or at both peers. This collection
process usually consists of a metering process and an evaluation process. The metering process measures
the used bandwidth (the amount of data received/sent), time (the duration of the service), or some
service specific signal like ”file complete”. The evaluation process interprets this information to generate
accounting events. These events determine when an accounting record is created.
Accounting records contain accounting information and can take several forms.
Pure Numbers: The simplest form is pure numbers. For every peer, there exists an account balance
stored somewhere in the p2p systems. For example, for each MByte uploaded, the peer’s account balance
is increased by one. Pure numbers can be changed very easily. Therefore, this kind of accounting record
is especially vulnerable to fraud. Nevertheless, this form of information consumes very little space and
bandwidth when it is transferred between peers.
Receipts: Receipts are documents of fixed form that can contain all kinds of accounting information,
e.g., transaction partners, transaction object, metering information, and an evaluation of it. This evalu-
ation could be the information about how this receipt modifies the peer’s account balance. This part of
information would be similar to pure numbers. In comparison with pure numbers, the additional infor-
mation of a receipt adds some trustworthiness to the accounting information, because more information
is available, which could help to detect fraud.
Signed Receipts: Signed receipts are normal receipts with a signature to add integrity to the informa-
tion contained in the receipt. This is a very important step to achieve trustworthiness of information.
Additionally, a signature authenticates a receipt. Working with signed receipts requires that every peer
own a private/public key pair. Such a key pair can, for example, be issued by a central authority, or peers
could create the key pair themselves and using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) the keys would be certi-
fied. For example, JXTA (Sun04) uses self-signed certificates. The disadvantage to this approach is that
the keys are not persistently associated with a peer. A peer can easily create a new key pair if it wants
to revoke its identification. This problem can be ameliorated by using a Web of Trust as implemented
by PGP (Sch96) or the cryptoID-project of JXTA (JXT04). A central authority implementing a PKI does
not have this disadvantage, though its usage seems contrary to the p2p paradigm. Nevertheless, the
responsibilities of a central authority within the p2p system could be reduced to issuing certificates with
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keys, and approving the validity of keys. Apart from these tasks all the other parts of a p2p system could
still be delivered according to the p2p paradigm.
Receipts are normally signed by the author of the contained information. Indeed, receipts could also
be signed by the transaction partner to include an agreement about the information in the receipt. This
can also be accomplished by bilaterally signing a receipt. However, one should bear in mind that each
signature increases the size of the receipt. And size matters for the efficiency of the accounting system
in terms of created overhead. Depending on the cryptography mechanism used, the size of the signature
could be large. For example, today’s RSA signatures are typically found to be not smaller than 1024 bits.
The information types pure numbers, receipts, and signed receipts are aggregated in Figure 2.3 into the
term receipts, because these are not issued. The following information types have to be issued before
they can be used for accounting.
Tokens: In the context of this chapter the term token is used for any kind of issued document. An
issuer releases a specific number of these documents (tokens). Thus, the number of tokens available in
a p2p system can be limited. This results in a specific characteristic that is otherwise hard to achieve
- through issuing a limited number of tokens, they become a scarce resource. Accordingly, tokens can
represent other scarce resources. However, they are not as easy to handle as normal receipts, due to two
major problems - Forgery and Double Spending. With respect to double spending, a token must be clearly
identifiable, and must therefore contain a unique identifier. Also, there must be a mechanism built into
an accounting system to check for double spending. To avoid forgery, it must be ensured that only the
issuing authority can create a token and therefore, a token must be signed by the issuing authority with
its private key.
There are several options for the token issuing authority in an accounting system. For example, in
digital cash systems, a central bank issues the tokens (e.g. (Sch98)). This option ensures trustworthiness
and control, but it does not conform to the p2p paradigm. In (YGM03), a micropayment scheme for p2p
systems is presented that relieves the central bank many of its responsibilities. The second option is that
each peer issues its own tokens. Here tokens are very similar to signed receipts. It is notably difficult to
control the number of tokens issued by every peer. Therefore, determining the economic value of a peer’s
token is difficult, too. The third option is a hybrid of the first and second concepts. It is issuing tokens
by a subgroup of peers, and controlling the subgroup’s actions in order to control the total number of
tokens in the system.
Token-based accounting systems can further be distinguished by the usage of the tokens. Tokens can
either be used as a kind of micropayment system or as receipt, i.e. a token represents a very specific
part of a provided/consumed service (e.g. 1 MByte data transfer). Tokens become receipts by adding
accounting information to the token. Thus, a token can represent all kinds of transactions or parts of
transactions.
Proof of Work: Proof of Work (PoW) is another micropayment concept where a user has to show
that he performed some computationally difficult problem to be eligible to receive a service (DFM01).
Nevertheless, PoW cannot be redeemed by the receiver for something of value to him. Therefore, they
can be used to avoid denial of service attacks or flooding attacks. Further, they do not present an
economic measure (DFM01). Also, to create a PoW, limited CPU cycles that could be traded in the p2p
system (and will then represent a scarce resource themselves) are needed.
In (RS96) two micropayment systems based on Proof of Works are presented. In both systems, each
participant issues his own secrets. As previously mentioned, using such systems poses a problem for users
in determining the economic value of another user’s virtual currency. In order to overcome the need to
identify the exchange rate of two users’ virtual currency in (JJ99) Proof of Work-based systems are
extended to work with a central broker that issues secrets centrally. This way only one virtual currency
exists in the system.
Further, for accounting PoW can be seen as a special form of receipt or self issued token. Further
concepts about storing used PoW are not described. Thus, PoW in general can be regarded as improper
for accounting systems.
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Summary
Micropayment systems as well as Proof of Work systems are not applicable to accounting mechanisms.
Tokens have some advantages and some disadvantages of receipts. Receipts are created by each peer.
Therefore, their number is unlimited. Tokens are issued; here an additional mechanism is available that
can be used to limit number of tokens the available to a peer. This could be used, e.g., to limit access
of peers to services and resources. The disadvantage of tokens is the additional overhead created by
the issuing process. Also due to the issuing information tokens are larger in size than tokens, which
enhances the traffic overhead of the accounting system.
2.3.1.2 Information Storage Location
In whichever form accounting data is collected, it must be stored at some place in the network - an
account. The account location is an important design parameter because it strongly influences the traffic
overhead of an accounting system. For every transaction, one or more accounting records accumulate
and must be transferred to the account. Also, the location influences how easy it is for a peer to ma-
nipulate accounting records and defraud the system. There are three basic alternatives for the account
location: accounts can be located locally at the peer that collects the data, at a central server, or re-
motely at a peer other than the collecting peer. Centrally held accounts obviously are contrary to the p2p
paradigm. For every transaction, communication with the central entity would be necessary to transfer
the record. Therefore, this solution is out of the question. The advantages and disadvantages of the two
other alternatives will now be elaborated.
Local Accounts : Storing accounting records at the place where they accrue has the obvious advan-
tage of reduced traffic, because the records do not need to be sent to the account holder. However, using
local accounts poses an important trust problem. Using pure numbers or self-signed receipts to store
information enables users to easily change the contained information in order to defraud the accounting
system. The appearance of KaZaA Lite as competitor to KaZaA is an example to this behaviour (Wik08a).
3 Therefore, receipts should be signed either by the transaction partner or a third party. Alternatively,
tokens could be used. With tokens, accounting records need to be transferred between the transaction
partners. Therefore, in terms of bandwidth usage, storing accounting records locally is only advanta-
geous in comparison to other storage location, if the transaction partner needs to get the records for
some reason. For example, both transaction partners have to agree on the contained accounting infor-
mation. Further advantages are that users have immediate control over the collected accounting records.
No redundancy need be built into the system, because a peer’s accounting records are not needed when
it is offline. Also, users are themselves responsible for backing up their data.
Remote Accounts: The alternative location for storing accounting records is third peers. Using third
peers, hence separating account holders from account owners, clearly makes it more difficult for any one
peer to fraudulently manipulate accounting records. Depending on the p2p application’s requirements,
special mechanisms to ensure information integrity such as signing might not be needed.
However, using remote accounts requires the exchange of more administrative messages between
peers. This stems from the need for redundancy. Because the account holder is not always available,
several account holders per peer, each holding a replication of the account, are required. All replications
of an account need to be kept consistent. Therefore, mechanisms to detect potential inconsistencies as
well as mechanisms for determining the actual account status in a situation of disagreement are required.
A Byzantine quorum (MR97) is an example of a mechanism that might be used in that case.
3 KaZaA limits a peer’s download bandwidth according to its ratio of performed upload to received download. Because the
download limit is local rule based on local accounts, users can also run a modified application, e.g., KaZaA Lite, that does
not collect accounting information and does not enforce the rule.
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Figure 2.3: Classification of accounting systems for autonomous distributed systems
Summary
Local accounts are to be preferred to remote accounts, because they do not involve a third party during
transactions in order to generate and store the accounting information. However, local accounts have a
trust issue. A peer storing accounting information about its own actions has a strong incentive falsifying
this information. Thus, cryptographic mechanisms need to be applied in order to ensure integrity of
accounting information. Still, peers could omit or erase the latest added part of information by not
updating the account information or reverting it to an earlier version of the account. Thus only such
information should be stored locally, where a peer does not have this incentive.
On the other hand remote accounts also do not offer full trustworthiness, as remote accounts can be
attacked by an adversary. Also collusion of the third party peers storing an account and the account
owner is possible. Thus, if remote accounts are used further mechanisms are required that ensure the
security of the stored information.
Figure 2.3 depicts this classification of p2p accounting systems and maps existing p2p accounting
solutions to the classes. These solutions are presented now. Solutions with central information storage
have been discussed above.
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2.3.2 Existing P2P Accounting Systems
Today, most mechanisms that accomplish the task of accounting are built into systems that have an
objective that requires accounting. Most of these systems are incentive systems or economic frameworks
that aim at preventing free-riding or at establishing a market for resources or services in p2p systems. In
the following, the related work that implements some form of accounting according to the classification
is discussed. A work that presents a general software architecture that can be used to implement many
different kinds of accounting schemes is presented in (HGS05).
2.3.2.1 Systems Without Receipts Using Local Accounts
File Sharing Applications “KaZaA” And “eMule”
Currently the two most widely used p2p accounting mechanisms are KaZaA’s participation level (Sha)
and eMule’s credit system (eMu04b). Both systems account for the amount of data uploaded and
downloaded, and store the collected information locally in form of a pure numbers. KaZaA’s system uses
the ratio of uploads to downloads (measured in amount of data transferred) to calculate a peer’s actual
maximal allowed download speed. The higher this ratio is, the higher the maximal allowed download
speed. This is a typical incentive mechanism for file sharing systems. However, KaZaA’s system is easy
to cheat because the accounting information is stored locally. In fact in the KaZaA clone KaZaA Lite
(Wik08a), the participation level is removed. In contrast, eMule’s credit system is used to determine a
requester’s position in the provider’s download queue. The position is determined by the amount of data
the requester uploaded to the provider. This system has the obvious advantage, that it cannot be cheated.
The provider keeps his accounting records that only influence his own behaviour. The disadvantage is
that this system only accounts for local observations. A peer could have uploaded to the system much
more than it downloaded. However, if it downloads from a peer to which it did not upload before, it will
receive an unfavourable position in the provider’s download queue.
Summary: In sum, using receipts stored in local accounts has the disadvantage, that it is only appli-
cable to local accounting information; that is, a peer records the actions of other peers with itself. This
information is only used for local system administration. Gobally collected accounting information can-
not be stored in a trusted way in local accounts, because peers could always chose to not update a local
account or to even erase it, which results in whitewashing.
Swift
Another system that uses local accounts to store pure numbers as accounting information is Swift
(TPM04). In contrast to the previously mentioned systems , it is not used in practise yet. Swift basically
is a behaviour model for p2p file sharing to support fair and fast large scale distribution of files. Each
peer maintains a credit for every other peer it is connected to. A peer will only upload to a peer with a
positive credit balance. Because the accounting data only affects the local peer behaviour, peers have no
incentive to falsify the collected information.
Summary: Swift’s basic concept is similar to eMule, however its participation rules are more complex.
Accordingly, it does not provide a global view about peer’s actions.
Incentive-compatible P2P Systems
In (NNS+04), Ngan et al. present two systems that use local accounts for storing accounting data. The
schemes include incentives for storing fraudulent entries in accounts. This is achieved by the auditing of
accounts by other peers.
The first system is a p2p remote file storage system. Each peer keeps records about the foreign files
it stores locally in a “local list”, and about its own stored files in the p2p system in a “remote list”. A
peer B storing a file for peer A can audit A’s remote list to check if A lists that storage. If not, B
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can remove the file. Accordingly, A has no incentive to lie about the services it receives from the p2p
system, because then the service would be stopped. The second kind of audit checks A’s local list - if the
mentioned remote peer stores the corresponding record in its remote list. If fraud is detected the auditor
can present the case to all other nodes storing objects for A. They would then delete A’s files. If this
audit is reliable, peers do not have an incentive to commit fraud.
The other suggested system is used for trading bandwidth in a file sharing scenario. Peers store locally
a list of peers they have shared files with - how much a peer uploaded to, and downloaded from that
peer. Peers can reject sharing requests if the requester has already a negative bandwidth balance with
that peer. In order to request files from a peer that is unwilling to serve due to a negative balance, a
debt path is created. In the debt path each peer has credit with the next peer. Then the requested file is
split into fixed size blocks. Now the requester then requests specific blocks from the provider while the
request messages are sent along the debt path. The requested block is sent directly from the provider to
the requester, however the credit of each individual peer is adapted according to the requests sent over
the debt path. Accordingly, peers have an incentive in helping to maintain a dept path.
Summary: In sum, both systems are very specific use cases. The two very different concepts show that
it is hard to transfer them to other scenarios. Furthermore, they concepts are not applicable to scenarios
that require trustworthy accounting records, as malicious behaviour is not considered.
SeAl
SeAl (NT04) aims at resolving the free-riding problem in p2p systems. Its basic means of accounting
information are so-called “favours”. When a consumer receives a service from a provider, both peers
store locally a favour about the transaction. A favour is a mutually signed transaction receipt stating the
consumer, the provider, the value of the transaction, and a time stamp. Each peer posses a private/public
key pair. The time stamp is used to devalue a favour over time. Favours have to be redeemed. If a peer
A receives a service request it can reroute the request to a peer B that owes A a favour.
SeAl employs a black list to publish selfish behaviour. When a peer does not return a favour when
this is requested, it is considered selfish behaviour. Also being offline is considered selfish behaviour.
The black list is hosted in a distributed hash table (DHT). The black list identifier for the DHT is a hash
value of the String “BLR” concatenated with the peer ID of the black listed peer. The black list stores
transaction receipts of transactions where the peer acted selfish. When a peer requests a service, the
provider requests the black list of the requester. Using the black list records, a score is computed that
determines the request’s position in the providers upload queue. The provider can also chose to ask the
requester to provide a limited list of favours it provided, in order to compute the score determining the
upload queue position. It is assumed that all peers verify transaction receipts that are black listed in
order to avoid malicious behaviour.
Summary: The concept of SeAl has the disadvantage that it requires that all peers are online all the
time; otherwise transaction receipts cannot be verified. This verification is the core security mechanism,
apart from signatures SeAl relies on. As the frequency of transaction record verification is unknown,
it is hard to assess the traffic overhead created by SeAl. However, it is obvious that the verifications
increase with the transaction frequency in the system. Furthermore, peers can easily collude and claim
they provided each other services although they did not. This way they can influence their upload queue
position at other peers. Finally, SeAl does not provide an objective view about the globally provided
services of a peer, as each peer stores the transaction records locally and can choose which receipts it
presents for verification.
Counteracting Free-Riding in Unstructured P2P Overlay Networks
In (KIKOU08), a system is presented by Karakaya et al. that aims at reducing free-riding in unstruc-
tured systems. This is especially interesting, as the systems presented so far are either storing information
locally and are therefore independent of the used overlay network structure (see KaZaA (Sha04) and
eMule (eMu04a)), or use a structured overlay to store accounting information remotely.
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Figure 2.4: Concept of “Karma” and “Bucking Free-riders” (cf. (VCS03, ABOS03),
Karagaya et al. use monitoring of a peer’s neighbours in order to collect relevant information. Each
peer counts messages of five different types it receives or forwards to the monitored node. Based on the
ratio of the counted messages, it is judged if a peer is a free-rider or not. As a punishment of free-riders,
their query messages are either ignored or reduced in scope, that is their time-to-live is reduced.
Summary: The system’s design is very elegant as it does not introduce additional traffic for moni-
toring. However, it is also not able to record real accounting information and to provide it globally.
Therefore, it is not useful to accounting in p2p systems.
2.3.2.2 Systems Using Receipts and Remote Accounts
Karma
A system taking into account a peer’s actions in the overall system is Karma (VCS03). It is assumed
that the peers are organised in a distributed hash table (DHT). Karma stores for every peer in the system
a value that represents its balance of uploads against downloads. This balance is stored at remote peers.
These remote peers are called a peer’s bank set. The bank set consists of multiple peers, for redundancy
reasons. The bank-set of a node A is located at the leaf-set of the node closest in the nodeID-space
to HASH(nodeId(A)). A peer’s balance must not be lost. Accordingly, a bank set is rather large - a
suggested size is 64 peers. In a transaction where a peer A requests a service from peer B, first A
informs its back set about the planned transaction. Then, the bank sets of the provider and receiver peer
communicate in a any-to-any fashion in order to adjust the peers’ balance according to the transaction
value. Now B’s bank set informs B that it can provide the service (see Figure 2.4 a)). Karma puts
the focus on secure transactions. The maintenance of the bank sets is not explained. Further, Karma
includes the concept of an epoch. At the end of each epoch all peers exchange messages about their
account balance. Using this information the account balance is multiplied with a factor that prevents
inflation. This requires O(N2) messages.
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Summary: Karma is a fully decentralised accounting mechanism for p2p systems applying receipts
and local accounts. Further, it provides a global view on the actions of peers. Therefore, it is the first
systems that fulfils the core requirements of a p2p accounting mechanism.
However, Karma has three major drawbacks. The bank set of peers is known in the system. Therefore,
it can be attacked by an adversary. Further, a peer could try to collude with the majority of its bank peers
in order to change its account balance. The second drawback is the requirement that the bank set is
always available. If all peers in a bank set go offline, the corresponding account owner cannot perform
any transactions. There are two extensions of Karma, that resolve this; they will be discussed later in the
respective section. The third disadvantage is the high transaction costs due to the complex transaction
protocol.
Distributed Rating
In (DGGZ03), the concept of a distributed rating scheme is presented with the goal to prevent free-
riding. Each peer in the network has k supervisors. In the ring-topology of a distributed hash table
(DHT) each peer supervises its k immediate successors. There is one main supervisor and k − 1 backup
supervisors. After a transaction, the consumer peer rates the provider peer and sends this rating to
the provider’s main supervisor. The backup supervisors just keep a backup of the records, which they
update periodically. When Chord is employed, a peer never has to route messages with its supervisor as
destination, because its supervisors are located backwards in the Chord ring. Therefore, it is hard for
a peer to manipulate its own rating; this would be discovered by the peers that route the message. In
addition, a lightweight verification scheme is employed to ensure the correctness of peer ratings. When
a peer requests a service, it sends with the request some of its accounting records where it provided a
service. The potential service provider can now check the received records by querying the contained
service receivers, and ask if these records are correct.
Summary: The distributed rating scheme stores receipts locally and remotely at supervisor peers.
There are no further security mechanisms that ensure the trustworthiness of these receipts. The trust-
worthiness is achieved by the lightweight verification scheme. However, a peer can select which receipts
it presents for checking. Also the concept for selecting the supervisors enables a peer easily to contact
them directly. Overall, the scheme is not well elaborated and not useful for trusted storage of accounting
records.
Bucking Free-riders
In (ABOS03), another system using remote accounts is presented. It is assumed that the peers are
organised in a distributed hash table (DHT), and accountants store a peer’s balance. Like in Karma, the
accountants are a set of third peers. Peer accountants are determined using well known identifiers, which
are computed using a hash function. Each peer can look up the accountants of all other peers. The set
of accountants is maintained by each accountant doing periodical lookups for all accountant identifiers.
With every transaction, the balance of the two transaction partners is updated to the new value.
Consistency among the accountants is achieved using the Small Byzantine Quorum (SBQ) protocol
(MAD02). A non-mediated and a mediated settlement protocol are presented, where the mediated
protocol can deal with some protocol violating behaviour. The mediated transaction protocol is depicted
in Figure 2.4 b). The mediator is selected randomly. The mediator checks the buyers account balance
and verifies it to the seller. The seller will provide the selected server encrypted with a randomly selected
key, along with the key encrypted by the mediator. The buyer sends the encrypted key to the mediator
as a means of notification that he received the service. Now the mediator initiates the transfer of the
payment between the accounts. Each accountant of the seller confirms the receipt of the payment to the
mediator. The transaction is completed when the mediator sends the first encryption key to the buyer, so
he can decrypt the service.
Summary: Figure 2.4 b) shows that this model requires heavy communication for one transaction.
Furthermore, the trust issue is projected to a mediator, which could potentially be controlled by one
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of the parties. Because the accountants are publicly known, they could be also easily attacked by an
adversary. The SBQ protocol can maintain account consistency if not more than k−13 accountants are
subverted, where k is the number of accountants.
PeerMart
In (Hau05) Hausheer researched PeerMart, which is a system establishing a decentralised market
place consisting of a decentralised auctioning mechanism (see also (HS05b)) and a decentralised ac-
counting mechanism “PeerMint” (see also (HS05a)). PeerMint stores the peers’ account in a distributed
hash table. All messages sent are signed by the sender. Therefore, it belongs to the class of remote
accounts with signed receipts. Also, PeerMint uses so-called session mediation peers to maintain session
information about transactions. Although the session mediation peers are not trusted, it is assumed
that they do not have an incentive to act dishonestly. PeerMint uses two kind of accounts. Session ac-
counts hold accounting information about one specific transaction. In a transaction the session mediator
holds the session account. Peer accounts hold aggregated accounting data of a peer, e.g., the amount
of uploaded and downloaded traffic. Peer accounts are stored at remote peers. Tariffs bridge the gap
between accounting events and balance updates. They are used to evaluate accounting events during a
transaction (session). At the end of a transaction, a balance update is created by the session mediator
and is then forwarded to the remote peers holding the transaction partner’s accounts. This mechanism is
thought to avoid a situation where the providers account receives an update but the consumers account
is not debited. Also, if the session mediator observes a difference between the accounting events sent by
provider and consumer peer to it, the transaction can be terminated immediately. For increased robust-
ness, in each transaction m session mediator peers are used and all accounting messages are sent by both
the consumer and the provider to all of them. Peer accounts are also replicated. Consistency between
the peer accounts is achieved using majority decision. The location of the peer accounts is determined
by the hash value of a peer’s peer ID. The peer responsible for this value in the DHT is the so called root
peer for this peer account. Its leaf-set is used to hold the peer account. Session accounts are identified
using the hash value of the transaction’s session ID. The responsible session mediation peers are again
the session account’s root peer’s leaf-set. Messages sent to an account are first sent to the account’s
root peer, which forwards the message to the account holders. Maintenance of peer accounts is handled
together with the maintenance of the DHT, i.e., when the leaf set changes, the peer account locations are
updated. PeerMart uses Pastry (RD01) in its prototype implementation.
Summary: In conclusion, PeerMint is a fully distributed accounting mechanism for p2p systems. How-
ever, there are characteristics of PeerMint that create drawbacks. During a transaction, there is out-of-
band traffic generated with several involved peers, the session mediation peers. This traffic scales linearly
with the number of mediation peers m used. At the end of a session a the peer accounts have to be up-
dated which has a message complexity of O(mp), where p is the number peers holding a peer account.
There are also trust issues with PeerMint: The account holding peers for a specific peer can easily deter-
mined by an adversary. An adversary needs to control only half of an account’s account holding peers in
order to manipulate the account. This enables also potential collision between one transaction partner
and the mediation peers. A special weakness is the result of the root peers. If the root peers are malicious
or controlled by an adversary, the peers can avoid that messages are forwarded to the account holders. A
concrete scenario for an attack is that a peer A controls the root peer for its account, so in a transaction,
peer A can avoid having its account debited for services rendered.
2.3.2.3 Token-based Systems with Remote Information Storage
Oﬄine Karma
Offline Karma presented in (GH05) extends Karma (VCS03) such that it can operate even when
bank sets are offline. In order to achieve this, electronic coins are introduced. Each peer can mint coins
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by computing hash collisions. A coin consists of the minter’s ID, a serial number, the issuing date, and
the minter’s signature. Each peer possesses a private/public key pair. Peers spend coins by adding the
receivers ID to it, signing it and sending it to the receiver. The receiver can re-spend tokens as well,
causing the size of the coin to grow over time. In order to detect double spending and reduce a coins
size, it has to be reminted. That is, there is maximum amount of time a coin can exist, and it has to be
reminted at least once in its lifetime.
Reminting is performed by a set of peers. The set is composed such that at least one peer is a non-
corrupted node and all honest reminters possess the reminted coin’s history of previous remints. The set
of peers responsible for reminting a specific coin is randomly selected and predetermined. That is, for
a coin the responsible reminter set are the closest neighbours of the hash value of the coins identifier.
This ensures that the reminter set is not manipulated by measuring the density of peers in the DHT. The
reminter set peers must not be outside a specific range within the DHT. The maintenance of reminter
sets is not further elaborated on.
For reminting, the coin is sent to each peer in the reminter set that verify the correctness of the coin.
Then the reminters create a multisignature for the new coin with the same coin identifier and owner, but
with a new time stamp. If verification fails, the dishonest peer is identified and blacklisted.
Summary: Offline Karma presents an interesting concept for a decentralised virtual currency scheme.
Attacking the scheme at the reminting requires a lot of effort for an adversary with little gain. A peer
planning to defraud the system has to control a different set of peers for each coin it wants to gain. Not
explained is the permanent storage of coin history in order to detect double spending. However, this is a
very important functionality.
Overall the scheme does not present a solution for accounting. With Offline Karma transaction re-
ceipts for a specific peer cannot be determined. transaction records could be only collected on a per
coin basis. Modifying the scheme to store information on a per peer basis would raise further security
concerns. Then an adversary could gain much more from attacking a reminter set. Therefore, changing
this characteristic would require additional security mechanisms.
In summary, although an interesting and probably efficient approach for a virtual currency, Offline
Karma cannot be applied for accounting.
Running on Karma
Running on Karma (Cho07) is a modification of Offline-Karma (GH05) and presents a reputation
mechanism as well as a virtual currency system. Here, the virtual currency system is discussed, as it is
closest to an accounting functionality.
Minting of coins happens like in Offline Karma. Also, like in Offline Karma for each coin a neighbour
set of peers exists that store information about that coin, especially its current owner. Accordingly, the
neighbour set is the coin’s “bank-set”. It differs from Offline Karma, in that here a coin does not expire.
The first time a coin is used, it is sent to its bank-set in order to register it. Then the new owner and a
timestamp are added to the coin, the current owner signs the coin, and then sends it to the new owner.
Similarly, a coin can be re-spent by a user. The current user informs the coin’s bank-set about the new
user. When the new user receives the coin it will also check with the coin’s bank to verify that the sender
was the previous owner. This way, double spending can be detected and prevented.
Summary: Running on Karma presents an efficient approach for a virtual currency for p2p system. It
is especially interesting because it does not require reminting like in Offline Karma; therefore Running
on Karma does not require complex security mechanisms. This is enabled by storing the coins ownership
in the bank-sets. In contrast to Offline Karma, these bank-sets have to be available all the time and have
to reliably store the coins owner. The maintenance mechanisms for this are not elaborated.
For using Running on Karma as an accounting scheme the same constraints apply as for Offline Karma.
Unfortunately, it cannot be employed for this purpose.
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2.3.2.4 Token-Based Systems with Central Information Storage
Into this category also some micropayment schemes fall. For p2p systems MojoNation (that was renamed
MNet after the MojoNation stopped to exist) is an example, where tokens were used as an incentive
system.
MojoNation/MNet
MojoNation (Wik08b, Moj00) was one of the earliest Peer-to-Peer systems to use a payment protocol.
Users had to use a virtual currency called Mojo to obtain a service from another peer. MojoNation still
required a centralised trusted third party to issue the Mojo and to resolve double-spending issues.
Every action in MojoNation had some price in Mojo; this was thought to prevent denial-of-service
attacks. When a consumer requested a file from provider, the consumer sends an “I-Owe-You” message
to the provider. The provider will give the consumer credit until the credit is worth at least one Mojo;
then, the Mojo is transferred from the consumers account to the providers account at the central token
server. This concept reduces the load of the central server. Due to the “I-Owe-You”-concept trading is
possible even if the central server is offline.
After MojoNation was discontinued, the open source project MNet (mne05) continued MojoNation’s
basic ideas. The MNet project was discontinued in August 2005.
Summary: Overall, the MojoNation concept received a lot of attention when it was released, because
it was a completely new concept for file sharing. However, it missed a concept for decentralising the
issuing and administration of Mojos. Therefore, it is not applicable to p2p systems.
2.3.2.5 Token-Based Systems with Local Information Storage
Trading In Stamps
A system using stamps for peers’ “evidence of participation” is presented in (MT03). Every peer issues
personalised stamps and trades them with other peers. If peer A requests a service from peer B, peer
A has to pay a specific number of peer B’s stamps back to B. In such a community, a market for stamps
should develop. There is no limit how many stamps a peer issues. The author envisions that if a peer
issues too many stamps in comparison to its offered services, their stamps will devalue due to market
rules. Thus, the peer will have difficulty obtaining other stamps, as rational nodes will not wish to
purchase its stamps. This way the stamps protocol shall combine a virtual currency and reputation.
Summary: It is questionable if this concept is viable, because for a market to develop there are some
prerequisites missing. For example, there is no information on the quality of the the services traded.
A user would also have to establish an exchange rate for each users stamps he encounters. Without
sufficient information, which the system does not provide, a user cannot estimate a stamp’s value. More
important, there is no global accounting information available, because the stamps are traded.
PPay
As mentioned before, micropayment systems use a central broker or bank in order to host accounts
or to issue virtual currency. Thus, they are not appropriate for Peer-to-Peer systems. A micropayments
system tailored to Peer-to-Peer systems is presented in (YGM03). It relieves the broker of some tasks
and gives them to the peers to be facilitated. As a result the broker can go off-line for short time periods
and the system can still continue to operate. PPay uses electronic coins that are issued by a central
broker, to a specific peer. In order to pay for a service, a peer adds the receiver and a sequence number
to the coin and signs it with its own private key. The receiver has the alternative to either cash in the
coin at the central broker or to re-spend the coin with another peer. In order to do that, it contacts the
coin’s owner and requests a reassignment. That is, the owner replaces information on the old receiver
with information on the new receiver, increases the sequence number, and then sends this coin to both
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receivers. Therefore, the coin does not grow in size when it is reassigned4. The central broker charges
a small flat fee per caching request, regardless of the number of coins being cached, giving peers an
incentive to reassign received coins instead of caching them. This releases the broker of load.
Like other micropayment schemes PPay is subject to fraud; peers cannot forge coins, because they do
not have knowledge of the broker’s private key. However, peers can double spend coins. Double spending
control in PPay is performed by the broker or the coin’s owner. When the coin’s owner double spends a
token, the broker will realise it when the coin is cashed the second time. When a coin holder reassigns
a coin more than once the coin’s owner will recognise this, as he has to sign the reassignment. Further,
a coin owner cannot claim a reassignment is invalid, as he signs each reassignment and increases the
serial number.
Summary: Overall, PPay is a very elegant system that releases the central broker of load by allowing
electronic coins to be respent in a p2p system. The design even moves part of the security mechanisms
for fraud detection to the peers allowing the system to operate if the broker is offline. However, a central
broker is still required.
2.3.3 Summary
There exist different mechanisms in p2p systems that provide accounting functionality. A classification
for these mechanisms is presented that distinguishes the mechanisms according to the type of accounting
information stored, the location where the information is stored, and (for mechanisms that use pre-issued
documents (tokens)) how these tokens are issued. In Figure 2.3 the existing p2p accounting mechanisms
are classified accordingly.
The discussion of the existing systems shows that some of those mechanisms cannot be applied to p2p
systems, either because they rely on a central trusted entity (e.g., accounting in grids, CDNs, RADIUS,
micropayments) or because they are not suited to provide accounting information (e.g., Proof of Work,
micropayments). The remaining p2p accounting systems can be classified into four different types of
mechanisms (see Table 2.1).
The first type (receipt based, local accounts) is well known from existing file sharing applications. At
the peer, a balance of upload traffic and download traffic is stored locally. In eMule (eMu04a, eMu04b)
the information is used only to manage the local upload queue. Therefore, this system does provide a
local view about the provided resources and services. Here, a peer does not have incentives to cheat.
In KaZaA (Sha04) global accounting information is stored in local accounts. This can be bypassed by
using a manipulated client software (Wik08a). This shows, that using local accounts global accounting
information cannot be stored in a trusted manner. Accordingly, this design alternative is not suited for
trusted accounting in p2p systems.
The second type uses remote accounts in order to store global accounting data per peer. A bank set
can offer accounting information about all transactions a peer performed system-wide. In order to deal
with churn of peers, these accounts are replicated over a set of peers. This requires further mechanisms
to maintain the sets, which are seldom explained. During transactions, these systems require messages
between the transaction partners and their account holding peers. Often, this traffic has a message
complex of O(k2), where k is the size of the set of peers holding an account. In this class of accounting
systems, Karma (VCS03) and PeerMart (Hau05) offer the characteristics that are closest to the goal
of this dissertation. Both mechanisms also offers efficient cooperation control. However, these systems
include trust issues, because they only rely on the remote accounts. Storing the accounts at third party
peers does not provide trustworthiness, if these peers can be attacked or these peers can collude. Hence,
a trustworthy accounting mechanism cannot rely on remote accounts alone. Additional mechanisms are
required. Further, during transactions a message complexity of the traffic overhead lower than O(k2) is
desirable.
4 Typically in coin based micropayment system the coin grows in size because the new receiver is simply added to the coin.
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Table 2.1: Overview Existing P2P Accounting Mechanisms
Local Account Remote Accounts
Receipt
based • eMule (eMu04a)
• incentive compatible p2p
(NNS+04)
• KaZaA (Sha04)
• SeAl (NT04)
• Swift (TPM04)
• Bucking Freeriders
(ABOS03)
• Distributed Rating
(DGGZ03)
• Karma (VCS03)
• PeerMart (Hau05)
Token
based • Stamps (MT03) • Offline Karma (GH05)
• Running on Karma
(Cho07)
The third type of accounting mechanisms uses self issued documents (tokens) which stored in local
accounts. An example system is Trading in Stamps (MT03). Here, peers trade their tokens against
services. Thus, message complexity during transaction is O(1). Because tokens are traded, accounting
information is not stored. It is only an incentive system. Also its effectiveness is questionable. Further-
more, there is no effective cooperation control possible, because peers can issue an unlimited number of
tokens.
The forth type of accounting mechanism also uses self issued tokens, but stores these in remote ac-
counts. These mechanisms are “Offline Karma” (GH05) and “Running on Karma” (Cho07). In these
systems each remote account is responsible for only one token. Therefore, attacking a remote account
or collusion has a very limited gain for the adversary. Thus, attacks do not pay off. Message overhead
during a transaction has a complexity of O(k). However, both systems do not provide the functionality
to query accounting information about a specific peer. Therefore, they are not applicable to accounting.
In sum, Karma (VCS03) and PeerMart (Hau05) are the two accounting mechanisms which are closest
to the requirements for trusted accounting in p2p systems with intrinsic cooperation control. Unfortu-
nately, both mechanisms still raise trust issues.
In order to design an accounting mechanism that fulfils all requirements, a gap in the solution space
could be identified. No system currently exists that combines local storage of accounting information
with decentralised issuing of tokens. However, this promises to be the most efficient solution for a p2p
accounting mechanism, as combines a message complexity of O(1) during transactions with the p2p
approach. Also, transactions could be performed in such a system, even if specific third peers are offline
or specific accounting information, e.g., bank account information, is currently not available due to
churn. In the next section security mechanisms are discussed that allow decentralising a broker.
2.4 Distributed Security Mechanisms
A main objective of this dissertation is to build a trustworthy accounting scheme for p2p systems without
usage of a trusted entity in the system, so a distributed basis of trust required. This section introduces
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security mechanisms that can be applied to autonomous distributed systems, as they do not rely on a
centralised trusted entity.
2.4.1 Multisignatures vs. Threshold Cryptography
There are two different types of security mechanisms that allow for the creation of a document that can
be signed by several signees, that is, a central trusted entity is not a requirement. These are multisigna-
ture schemes and threshold cryptography schemes that build on secret sharing.
In multisignature schemes (Oka88, MOR01, Bol03) multiple peers sign a message sequentially; the si
is computed using the si−1 signature and the signees private key. The resulting signature has the length of
a single signature. To verify the signature all public keys of the signees are required. Many multisignature
scheme support a verification independent of signature sequence. However, for verification the signee’s
public key must be known. As signees can be offline when a verification is required, multisignature
schemes require the availability of the certification authority that issued the peers’ key pair. This would
heavily rely on the use of a central trusted entity in order to establish trust in p2p systems. Therefore,
multisignature schemes are not a valid solution for building a fully decentralised trustworthy accounting
scheme for p2p systems.
The second alternative for creating signatures using several signees is threshold cryptography. Thresh-
old schemes use secret sharing to split a key into many parts, called shares. A specific threshold of
signees is required to create a signature with the key. Each signee creates a partial signature with its key
share and all signatures are then combined by the peer requesting the signature. The created signature
is anonymous. The signature verification is performed with the corresponding public key to the shared
private key. Furthermore, key pairs can be generated and managed in a completely decentralised way
using proactive secret sharing.
In conclusion, threshold cryptography can be applied in p2p systems without relying on a certification
authority, as multisignature schemes require. The process reviewed below includes how to share a secret,
i.e., a secret private key, among the participants of the distributed autonomous system (or among a
group of its participants) and how to apply the shared secret in order to sign documents in a distributed,
trusted manner. It is of utmost importance that the secret is never compromised nor known to a single
participant. Otherwise, it would be necessary for the participant to be trusted, which we cannot assume.
This section starts with the introduction of secret sharing and extends the concept to threshold cryp-
tography and proactive secret sharing.
2.4.2 Secret Sharing
A main objective of this dissertation is to build a trustworthy accounting scheme for p2p systems without
usage of a trusted entity in the system, so a distributed basis of trust required. This section introduces
security mechanisms that can be applied to autonomous distributed systems, as they do not rely on a
centralised trusted entity.
2.4.3 Multisignatures vs. Threshold Cryptography
There are two different types of security mechanisms that allow for the creation of a document that can
be signed by several signees. These are multisignature schemes and threshold cryptography schemes
that build on secret sharing.
In multisignature schemes (Oka88, MOR01, Bol03) multiple peers sign a message sequentially; the si
is computed using the si−1 signature and the signees private key. The resulting signature has the length of
a single signature. To verify the signature all public keys of the signees are required. Many multisignature
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scheme support a verification independent of signature sequence. However, for verification the signee’s
public key must be known. As signees can be offline when a verification is required, multisignature
schemes require the availability of the certification authority that issued the peers’ key pair. This would
heavily rely on the use of a central trusted entity in order to establish trust in p2p systems. Therefore,
multisignature schemes are not a valid solution for building a fully decentralised trustworthy accounting
scheme for p2p systems.
The second alternative for creating signatures using several signees is threshold cryptography. Thresh-
old schemes use secret sharing to split a key into many parts, called shares. A specific threshold of
signees is required to create a signature with the key. Each signee creates a partial signature with its key
share and all signatures are then combined by the peer requesting the signature. The created signature
is anonymous. The signature verification is performed with the corresponding public key to the shared
private key. Furthermore, key pairs can be generated and managed in a completely decentralised way
using proactive secret sharing.
Summary
In conclusion, threshold cryptography can be applied in p2p systems without relying on a certificate
authority, as multisignature schemes require. The process reviewed below includes how to share a secret,
i.e., a secret private key, among the participants of the distributed autonomous system (or among a
group of its participants) and how to apply the shared secret in order to sign documents in a distributed,
trusted manner. It is of utmost importance that the secret never be compromised nor known to a single
participant. Otherwise, it would be necessary for the participant to be trusted, which we cannot assume.
This section starts with the introduction of secret sharing and extends the concept to threshold cryp-
tography and proactive secret sharing.
2.4.4 Secret Sharing
This section presents basic secret sharing schemes and evaluates their usefulness for application in au-
tonomous distributed systems like p2p.
Secret Sharing can be defined as follows: A trusted dealer TP gives each player Pi a secret share ssi
of the secret s in such a way, that any group of t or more players can together reconstruct the secret, but
no group fewer then t players can do this. Here, t is denoted the threshold and n is the total number of
players.
A simple secret sharing technique is so-called XOR Secret Sharing. Here, the secret s is split into n− 1
random parts and part sn is the result of combining all the parts s1, s2, . . . , sn−1 using the XOR-function.
It is not applicable for signing messages, but can be used to explain the basic concept of secret sharing.
Further details are given in Appendix C.2.1.1.
Another often used secret sharing technique is called “additive secret sharing”. This secret sharing
scheme is often used in threshold cryptography scheme. In additive secret a secret s is split into n
parts, and part sn is computed from the other n − 1 parts. When a secret key is created and shared
among peers, all shares have to be created at the same time. Additional shares cannot be created later.
Therefore, additional secret sharing is not applicable to p2p system, where membership is dynamic.
Additive secret sharing is used and presented in (Rab98) and (JS05). Further details about additive
secret sharing are given in Appendix C.2.1.2.
Another secret sharing scheme was developed by Blakely et al. in (Bla79). Its major disadvantage is
that the secret has to be completely reconstructed in order to create signatures. In p2p systems a peer
would then learn the secret key, which is not acceptable. Further details are given in Appendix C.2.1.3.
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2.4.4.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is one of the most important secret sharing schemes. It is presented in
(Sha79). Many other secret sharing schemes are based on it. The goal of (Sha79) is to divide a secret s
into n pieces s1, ..., sn(called shares) in such a way that:
1. knowledge of any k or more si pieces makes s easily to computable;
2. knowledge of any k − 1or fewer pieces leaves s completely undetermined (in the sense that all its
possible values are equally likely). (cf. (Sha79))
In the literature, such a scheme is called (k, n)-threshold scheme. This means that one needs at least k
shares to reconstruct the secret and that it is not possible to reconstruct the secret with at most k − 1
shares. To obtain a robust threshold scheme, Shamir proposed creating at least n = 2k − 1 shares. If
k− 1 shares are corrupted, it is guaranteed that at least k shares are not corrupted and the secret can be
reconstructed correctly.
For reconstruction polynomial interpolation is used. With polynomial interpolation it is possible to
reconstruct a polynomial f(x) of degree k − 1 with k points of the function. In general, a dealer creates
a function f(x) that represents the secret s at f(0) (f(0) = s) and distributes points of the function to
the different shareholders. k of this points are then used for reconstruction of the secret s. The details
are described in the next section, and follow the work of Shamir (Sha79).
Initialisation Phase
In the initialisation phase, a dealer generates the shares of the secret s and transmits these shares to
the different shareholders. The following steps are performed:
1. The dealer D creates a function f(x) of degree k − 1 with f(0) = s (using Equation 2.1)
f(x) = s+ α1x+ α2x2 + ...+ αk−1xk−1 mod q = s+
k−1∑
i=1
modq (2.1)
whereas α1, ..., αk−1 are random numbers modulo a prime q. The prime q has to greater than the value
of the secret s and the maximum index (xi) used to generate a share.
1. D computes n = 2k − 1 points (xi, yi);
{yi = f(xi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ xi 6= xj for i 6= j} (2.2)
These points represent the shares (s1 . . . sn) of the secret s.
2. These shares (s1, . . . , sn) are then distributed secretly to the corresponding shareholders.
Reconstruction Phase
To reconstruct the secret, at least k shareholders have to cooperate. Like mentioned above, recon-
struction is based on polynomial interpolation. The Lagrange interpolation is presented in Equation 2.3
(from (BAM00)). yj represents the shares of the shareholder Pj and xj is value of the variable used to
generate yj . In the following xj is called index, because it is assumed that xj = j for shareholder Pj .
f(x) =
k∑
j=1
yj
k∏
i=1,i 6=j
x− xi
xj − xi mod q (2.3)
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Figure 2.5: Classical reconstruction of a secret
A simple approach to reconstruct the secret, is to send at least k shares to a shareholder that reconstruct
the secret using Equation 2.3 (see figure 2.5).
Since the complete reconstruction of the secret s offers the possibility to an attacker to get s other
approaches were developed. Some approaches to use the shares for a distributed generation of a RSA
signature are presented in Section 2.4.7.1.
2.4.4.2 Summary
In order to apply secret sharing within the autonomous distributed systems space (more specifically p2p)
a secret sharing scheme should fulfil a set of requirements.
In autonomous distributed systems nodes join and leave the system in an unpredictable manner. So,
it can not be assumed that all nodes will be online at a specific time. Therefore, (n, n)-secret sharing
schemes can not be applied, but only (k, n)-secret sharing schemes. Thus, XOR-sharing is not suited for
autonomous distributed systems.
Further, new nodes might join the system after the initial sharing of the secret and such nodes should
also receive a share. Accordingly, when in the initialisation phase a specific share should not be calculated
based on all other shares created. This would mean that no new shares could be created after the
initialisation phase. Therefore, additive sharing is also not suited for autonomous distributed systems.
As a last requirement, it is important that no single node can learn the secret when the shares are used
either to sign a message or to encrypt a message. Shamir’s secret sharing offers this ability, however,
Blakely’s scheme doesn’t. This ability is explained in further detail in the following section.
In conclusion, the secret sharing discussion, there is only Shamir’s secret sharing scheme that is suited
for autonomous distributed systems. Therefore, in the following, only security mechanisms applying
Shamir’s secret sharing are discussed.
2.4.5 Verifiable Secret Sharing
In order to increase the security of the classical secret sharing schemes, verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
schemes were developed. These schemes offer the shareholders the possibility of verifying the shares
that are distributed by the dealer. The schemes presented above do not offer such possibilities and thus,
a malicious dealer can destroy the secret s by distributing malicious shares.
Only Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme is presented here because it is employed in the
threshold cryptography scheme selected later for usage in p2p systems. A comparison and evaluation of
different Verifiable Secret Sharing schemes is given in Appendix C.2.2.
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2.4.5.1 Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme
Petersen’s scheme presented in (Ped91b) is based on Sharmir’s secret sharing scheme and uses a slightly
different approach than Feldman et al. It differs from Feldman et al. in that it is based on two constants
g, h.
Initialisation Phase
The dealer chooses two prime number p, q, with p = mq + 1 (m is a small integer), and chooses
two g, h ∈ Zp of order q. These constants are known by all participants of the verifiable secret sharing
scheme. It is assumed, that logg(h) is not known. Then the dealer D performs the following steps:
• D generates two random polynomials f(x), g(x) of degree k − 1, so that f(0) = s and g(0) =
random (see Equation 2.1) and computes the k verification values Fi for the coefficients (fi, gi|i ∈
{1 . . . k}) of these polynomials f(x), g(x) using Equation 2.4. These verification values are then
broadcast to the shareholders.
Fi = gfi ∗ hgi ; i ∈ {1 . . . k} (2.4)
• Then the shares are computed using f(x) and g(x) and Equation 2.2. The share tuple (si, ti) =
(f(i), g(i)), is transmitted secretly to the corresponding shareholder Pi,
Each shareholder then checks the correctness of the received share using Equation 2.5
gfi ∗ hgi =
k−1∏
j=0
F i
j
j = g
∑k−1
j=0 fj∗ij ∗ h
∑k−1
j=0 gj∗ij (2.5)
If the check of shareholder Pi fails, the shareholder broadcasts an accusation against the dealer and
the dealer has to defend itself. Therefore, the dealer publishes the share sent to shareholder Pi. Now,
the other shareholders have the task of determining whether the dealer D or Pi is malicious. If more
then k accusations are broadcast, the dealer is malicious.
Reconstruction Phase
The reconstruction of the secret s is based on the shares si and is similar to the reconstruction phase
presented in Section 2.4.4.1. At least k shares are sent to one shareholder that verifies the received
shares using Equation 2.5. If the equation holds for at least k shares, these shares are used to reconstruct
the secret. Otherwise an accusation is broadcast that has to be resolved by revealing the corresponding
share. Additionally, it is possible to generate partial signatures.
Summary
Verifiable secret sharing adds an important property to secret sharing techniques. Verification values
are published that each participant can use to check the validity of its share. Further, no information
about the secret is revealed. However, Pedersen still assumes a central dealer for creating the secret.
2.4.6 Secret Sharing Without a Dealer
The previous Section showed how a secret can be shared by a dealer that can behave maliciously. How-
ever, in autonomous distributed systems we cannot allow one peer to have the knowledge of a system-
wide secret key. Therefore, other methods will now be presented to generate and share a secret in a
decentralised way such that no participant learns the secret.
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2.4.6.1 Distributed Generation of Random Values
Pedersen presents in (Ped91a) Joint Secret Sharing, which enables Shamir’s Secret Sharing without the
need of a central dealer. The basic concept is to share the polynomial such that f(x) = f1(x)+ ...+fn(x),
where fi(x) is the polynomial of participant Pi. The generating parties have to agree on the threshold
t and further prerequisites, depending on the purpose of the random value to be generated. Then each
participant Pi chooses a random polynomial of degree t− 1such that fi(0) = si, where si is the random
secret that Pi selects. Each Pi computes P
(i)
j ’s shares sˆ
(i)
j = fi(idj) and sends it over a secure channel
to Pj . Each Pi is doing this for all other participants Pj . Once Pj receives all shares sˆ
(i)
j it computes its
share sj =
∑n
i=1 sˆ
(i)
j . During this process Verifiable Secret Sharing can be applied in order to check the
validity of the shares sj . Once each participant has its own share sj , the secret can be recovered jointly
using Lagrange interpolation as in Shamir’s Secret Sharing.
A variant of Joint Secret Sharing where the secret is zero is called Joint Zero Secret Sharing (JZSS). It
was presented in (HJKY95) and is use in Proactive Secret Sharing, which will be discussed later.
A variant of (Ped91a) is presented in (GJKR99, GJKR07). It resolves security holes where an attacker
controls a small number of participants. It uses two broadcasting rounds during the key generation.
Summary
Distributed generation of random values is a well understood and secure technology. It extends
Shamir’s Secret Sharing in order to generate a random value (the secret) in a group of participants
in such a way, that no participant learns the secret but all participants receive a valid share. Hence, dis-
tributed generation of random value is a base technology for applying distributed security mechanisms
in systems without a trusted entity, such as p2p systems. Here, distributed value generation can be used,
e.g., to generate a system-wide secret in a secure way. This can e.g. be applied to generate a distributed
system-wide DSA key. RSA keys require specific characteristics of the random values the keys are based
on. The next section presents an algorithm how to generate RSA keys in a fully distributed manner.
2.4.6.2 Distributed RSA-Key Generation
RSA is based on secret prime numbers. Therefore, the methods presented above cannot be applied
to generate a secret RSA shared key in a decentralised manner. Boneh and Franklin presented such
a mechanism in (BF01).This mechanism enables the generation of an RSA modulo N = pq and a
private/public key pair with exponents d and e, where d · e = 1 mod ϕ(N). At the end of the mechanism
N and e are public and d is shared among the t participants.
The mechanism applies the scheme for distributed generation of a random number in order to generate
two random numbers p and q. The challenge is that p and q should be prime numbers. In order to check
this, another participant is selected testing whether the numbers are not divisible by a prime less than
some bound B1. If this fails, the random number generation is repeated. When the test succeeds, the
t participants calculated N = (p1 + ... + pt)(q1 + ... + qt). Now, using the so called biprimality test the
participants have to test, if N is the product of two primes. If not, the protocol is restarted from the
beginning. If so, the keys can be generated.
Summary
From this overview it becomes obvious that the mechanism has the disadvantage of generating distinct
traffic between the participants, because due to the randomness it parts of the protocol have to be
repeated many times. In (ABF+99) the results show that depending on the desired key length the
required traffic grows exponentially. With 3 participants for a key length of 768 bits traffic of 1,02
MBytes, for a key length of 1024 bit traffic of 3,58 MBytes, and for a key length of 1536 traffic of 9,94
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MBytes were generated per participant. Thus, compared to distributed DSA-key generation, distributed
RSA-key generation is very expensive in term of traffic.
In (FMY98) a modification of the mechanism from Boneh and Franklin was presented, making the
mechanism robust against a minority of adversaries among the Partial Signing Servers. It enables the
identification of those parties who try to cheat during the key generation.
2.4.7 Threshold Cryptography
The approach to reconstructing the secret s is not secure, if it is not reconstructed at a trusted entity.
Therefore, other approaches were developed. These approaches enable the generation of distributed
signatures. This means that a coalition of shareholders generates partial signatures using their shares
of a shared private key and send these partial signatures to the signature requester. The requester com-
bines these partial signatures to get the final signature. Some approaches are presented in (FGMY97b,
FGMY97a, JS05, Sho00, Rab98, GJKR01, HJJK97). A few of these ( (FGMY97b, JS05, Rab98)) apply ad-
ditive sharing. However, this would imply that all private key shares must be generated at system setup.
This is not applicable to peer-to-peer systems, where no trusted central authority exists. Therefore, such
schemes are not further considered.
Threshold cryptography is specific to the example cryptography scheme previously presented in this
chapter. We now turn to a different scheme, the frequently discussed RSA-based threshold signature
scheme.
2.4.7.1 RSA Threshold Cryptography Fundamentals
The assumption is that some shareholders share a private RSA key using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
and have to sign a message m. Therefore, the following steps are performed.5
• The shareholders are requested to sign a message m, requiring a coalition of k shareholders com-
municate and distribute their indexes.
• Each shareholder Pi computes a partial key ki using the summand of Equation 2.3 (see Equa-
tion 2.6).
ki = si
k∏
j=1;j 6=i
−j
i− j (2.6)
• With these partial keys ki each shareholder computes a partial signature sigsi = m
ki mod N and
sends this message secretly to the requester of the decryption task (see figure 2.6).
• The requester receives the k partial signatures sigsi(m) and multiplies them to decrypt the message
(see Equation 2.7).
sig(m) =
k∏
i=1
sigsi(m) mod N =
k∏
i=1
mki mod N =
k∏
i=1
m
si
∏k
j=1;j 6=i
−xj
i−xj mod N
= m
∑k
i=1 si
∏k
j=1,i6=j
−xi
i−xi mod N = md mod N (2.7)
It is possible that the shareholders only compute the partial signed message msi . These message are
then sent together with the indexes i to the requester. The requester can then choose any k messages to
5 Note that the scheme described below does not work for RSA.
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Figure 2.6: Threshold signature without revealing the secret
generate the final decrypted message. Just the product λi =
∏k
j=1;j 6=i
−j
i−j of the corresponding partial
message msi has to be generated and the ms can be created.
ms =
k∏
i=1
(msi)λi mod N (2.8)
For many years, threshold cryptography seemed unable to be applied to RSA-based cryptography. This
is due to the negative numbers or non-natural numbers in the exponent of the RSA-threshold signature
that are created by the Lagrange interpolation (e.g. see (DF89)).
If the Lagrange coefficient is negative, one has to compute the inverse modulo of m. This can be done
efficiently, if the message m and the RSA modulo N are relative prime (see (Buc03)). However, to
compute the exponentiation of a message m
a
b mod N , one has to compute the root modulo N . The only
way to compute this root is to know ϕ(N) = (p−1)(q−1) (see (Buc03)). This requires knowledge of the
primes p and q that must remain secret. Therefore, one has to avoid fractions in the exponent. Several
possibilities to accomplish this exist ( (FGMY97a, Sho00, LKZ+04)). However, these options generate
additional problems. Either they apply additive secret sharing, or they use a different method, which
was first presented by Frankel et. al in (FGMY97a), presented below.
2.4.7.2 Frankel’s RSA-based Threshold Cryptography Scheme (Summary)
The scheme of (FGMY97a) can be applied to both polynomial secret sharing (Section 2.4.4.1) and
additive secret sharing (Section C.2.1.2). The principle is to avoid the non-natural numbers of the
Lagrange coefficients by extending the exponent by the factorial n!, where n is the total number of
shares issued. This way, non-natural numbers in the exponent can be reduced. Details about Frankel’s
threshold scheme are given in Appendix C.2.2.5.
Summary
Although this scheme circumvents the problem of negative numbers or non-natural numbers in the
exponent, it has a limitation that prohibits its application large distributed anonymous systems. In order
to avoid non natural numbers in the Lagrange coefficients, one has to compute the factorial of the
number of shareholders. This is feasible for threshold groups with around up to 100 shareholders, but
not for threshold groups with thousands of shareholders. Accordingly, this scheme can be applied in
server-based environments like COCA (ZSvR02). However, it is not suited for large p2p systems.
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2.4.7.3 Further RSA-based Threshold Signature Schemes
Like in (FGMY97a), the same problem exists in the RSA-based threshold cryptography scheme presented
in (Sho00). This scheme also enables the verification of the shares.
The only scheme that seems applicable to large autonomous distributed systems was presented by Luo
and Kong in (KZL+01, LKZ+04). This scheme will be called “URSA” in the following.
2.4.7.4 USRA: RSA-based Threshold Cryptography Scheme
A protocol to provide ubiquitous and robust access control (URSA) in mobile ad hoc networks without a
centralised authority is presented in (LKZ+04).
Initialisation Phase
The dealer D generates the RSA parameters (RSA modulo N , public key e, private key d) and creates a
random polynomial f(x) of degree k− 1 with f(0) = d. Then the shares si = f(i) mod N are computed.
In general this phase is similar to Shamir’s secret sharing (Section 2.4.4.1) except that the shares are
reduced modulo in the RSA modulo.
Reconstruction Phase
In contrast to the RSA sharing schemes presented in Section 2.4.7.1, this scheme is not limited to a
small number of shareholders. This is achieved by introducing the “k-bounded offsetting algorithm” to
reconstruct the secret.
To create a signature, k shareholders have to cooperate and generate the partial signatures using
Equation 2.9 and then send these signatures to the signature requester.
sigsi(m) = m
si
∏k
j=1;j 6=i
−j
i−j mod N mod N (2.9)
To reconstruct the final signature the requester multiplies the received signatures. However, Equa-
tion 2.10 shows, the resulting signature is not equal to the final signature, because the summation of the
exponents is not reduced modulo N .
sigs(m) =
k∏
i=1
sigsi(m) mod N (2.10)
= m
∑k
i=1(si
∏k
j=1;j 6=i
−j
i−j mod N) mod N
= md+tN mod N 6= md mod N
To eliminate the part mtN the range of values of si
∏k
j=1;j 6=i
−j
i−j mod N has to be viewed. These
values are in the interval [0, . . . , n − 1] and thus, the value of parameter t is in the set {0, 1, . . . , k}. To
reconstruct the final message, the requester multiplies md+tN with m−N as long as the resulting message
can be decrypted with the public key e to the original messagem (see Equation 2.11). At most k attempts
are needed (α = {0, 1, . . . , k}), otherwise a partial signature is false.
m ≡ (mtN+dm−αN )e mod N (2.11)
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Summary
URSA circumvents the issues of other RSA-based threshold cryptography schemes by introducing the
“k-bounded offsetting algorithm”. Thus, this is the first threshold cryptography scheme which is actually
applicable in large p2p systems. Still, for RSA keys the distributed generation of a new key is very
expensive in terms of traffic. Thus, next DSA-based threshold cryptography scheme are discussed, as
here distributed key generation is much more efficient (see above).
2.4.7.5 DSA Threshold Cryptography
Basics
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), also known as Digital Signature Standard (DSS), is based
on the El Gamal signature scheme (Gam85) and was approved in 1994 by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) (Nat94).
DSA uses three system-wide parameters p, q, g. Parameter q is a 160-bit prime number, p is a large
prime number such that q divides (p− 1), and g in an element of order q in Z ∗p . As the private key, users
select a random integer x ∈ Zq. The corresponding public key computes to y = gx(mod p).
For signing a message m the signee picks a random number k ∈ Zq and calculates as his signature the
pair (r, s) with r = (gk
−1
(mod p)) mod q and s = k(m+ xr) mod p.
In order to verify a signature the verifier computes r′ = ((gms
−1
yrs
−1
) mod p) mod q. The signature
verifies if r′ = r.
Threshold DSA
Threshold DSA was presented by Gennaro in (GJKR01). Similar to threshold RSA Shamir’s secret
sharing is applied. A trusted dealer selects the system parameters p, q, g and a random polynomial
f(x) = s+α1x+α2x2 + . . .+αk−1xk−1 over Zq, where s = x. For each participant Pi the trusted dealer
computes the secret shares xi with xi = f(idi) mod q.
If VSS should be applied, the trusted dealer publishes the verification values Vk = gαk for k ∈ [0, t−1].
Using Joint Secret Sharing this process can be performed without a trusted dealer. In that case, 3t− 2
founding members are required.
To generate a threshold DSA signature for a requester R using 2t signees, the signees will first run two
instances of Joint Secret Sharing, which is a variant of Pedersen’s Secret Sharing (see Section 2.4.5.1).
in order to generate individual shares ki and ai of the random numbers k and a. Then, the signees run
two instances of Joint Zero Secret Sharing in order to generate shares bi and ci of the 0. Verification
values are calculated and distributed in order to apply Verifyable Secret Sharing and ensuring that all ki,
ai, bi, and ci are consistent.
Now each Pj computes vj = kjaj + bj mod q and wj = gaj mod p and sends these values to the
other signees. Each signee then computes locally µ =
∑2t
i=1(kiai + bi)
∏2t
j=1,j 6=i
−xj
xi−xj mod q and β =
ga mod p =
∏t
i=0w
∏2t
j=1,j 6=i
−xj
xi−xj
i . With this they compute r = β
µ−1 mod p mod q and send the partial
signatures si = ki(m+ xir) + ci mod q and r to the requester R.
The requester computes the s =
∑2t
i=1 si
∏2t
j=1,j 6=i
−xj
xi−xj mod q.
Evaluation
Distributed key generation of DSA keys is much more efficient than of RSA keys. However, it is obvious
that threshold DSA will generate significantly more traffic for signing a document then threshold RSA. In
DSA, at least 2t signees have to participate, because two polynomials of degree t− 1 are multiplied with
each other. Therefore, the communication complexity between the signees is O((2t)2), where it is for
RSA based signing O(t). Thus, for p2p systems this trade off has to be evaluated carefully and depends
on the number of required signees.
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2.4.7.6 Threshold Schnorr
The Schnorr signature scheme (Sch91) is a variant of the El Gamal scheme, which is also being applied
in DSA. The corresponding threshold scheme was presented in (GJKR03). It is more efficient than
the DSA threshold scheme. However, the proof of security requires additive secret sharing rather then
polynomial secret sharing. Thus, Schnorrs scheme does not meet the requirements of this dissertation.
2.4.7.7 Threshold BLS
A signature scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption was presented in (BLS01,
BLS04) (BLS01, BLS04) by Boneh, Lynn, Shacham (BLS). The BLS-scheme produces half the length of
DSA signatures. The corresponding threshold scheme was presented in (Bol03).
BLS Signature Scheme Basics
The BLS signature scheme is a short signature scheme and is based on Elliptic Curves and Pairing-
Based Cryptography. This is based on the concept of bilinear maps with two groups G1 and G2 of prime
order q. G1 is generated by g. A private key is a number x ∈R Z∗q . The corresponding public key is given
by y = gx, an element in group G1. Further, H is a hash function with H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 that maps
binary strings to non-zero points in G1.
The signature σ on a message m is H(m)x (in G1).
In order to verify a signature it must be checked if (g, y, H(m), σ) is a Diffie-Hellman quadruple. This
is the case if e(g, σ) = e(y,H(m)), where e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is a bilinear mapping.
Threshold BLS
The Threshold BLS scheme presented in (Bol03) applies (GJKR99) (see Section 2.4.6.1) to generate
the shares xi of the private key x. For each xi the validation values Bi = gxi can be calculated in order
to verify the shares.
To generate a signature for a message m, each of t participants Pi computes σi = H(m)xi and sends
it to the requester. The requester can verify the received partial signatures by checking the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman 6 VDDH(g,Bi, H(m), σi) = 1. The requester then combines the partial signatures to the
final signature by computing σ =
∏t
i=1(σ
Li
i ), where Li is the Lagrange coefficient.
Summary
Threshold BLS is another threshold cryptography scheme that can be applied to p2p systems. It has
several advantages compared to RSA-based and DSA-based threshold schemes. Like in RSA the signing
process has a message complexity of O(t); thus it is significantly more efficient than threshold DSA
during the signing process. Further, BLS keys are based on simple random numbers; thus the distributed
key generation is significantly more efficient than for RSA keys. However, there is a drawback. Another
advantage is its short signatures. Therefore, its signatures create less traffic overhead RSA and DSA
signatures. Threshold BLS is computational intensive (cf. (STY07)), i.e., it is not suited for small
devices with little processing power.
2.4.8 Proactive Secret Sharing
Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) schemes were introduced to protect long-lived shares of cryptographic
keys. Threshold cryptography increases the availability and the security of a secret key, but it is still
6 see (Bon98)
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possible to attack enough shareholders to reconstruct the secret. Shares can become corrupt, so there is
no guarantee that the secret can be reconstructed.
PSS solves the most problems for long-lived shares of keys. The principle of PSS is to introduce time
periods. In each time period the shares of the shareholders are updated, and potential attackers are
not able reconstruct the secret with shares from different time periods. Thus, the time periods have to
be adapted, so that an attacker cannot gain access to more than k shares. Furthermore, PSS offers the
possibility of identifying and recovering corrupted shares or shareholders.
In order to further explain the principles of PSS, the scheme of Herzberg et al. (HJKY95) is illustrated
in more detail. This PSS scheme is modified by the URSA scheme (see Section 2.4.7.4) in order to work
with RSA signatures.
2.4.8.1 Herzberg’s Proactive Secret Scheme
Initialisation Phase
In initialisation phase a dealer D is needed to distributes the shares of the secret s. Therefore, the
dealer follows Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing scheme (Section C.2.2.1). If the initialisation phase
is performed correctly, each shareholder has a valid share and no accusations against the dealer are
broadcast. If an accusation is broadcast, some responses are required as described later in this section
(2.4.8.1).
Reconstruction Phase
The reconstruction phase is similar to the phase presented in Section 2.4.4.1. k shares are sent directly
to the secret requester, who can now reconstruct the secret. This approach can be adjusted to suit RSA
secret sharing (see Section 2.4.8.2).
Update Phase
After initialisation phase, all shares are distributed to the different shareholder. To increase the security
of these shares, they are updated at predefined time intervals. At the end of such an update phase, each
shareholder has a new share, but the secret s remains the same. To successful update all shares, all
shareholders have to participate in the update process. The following steps are performed in the update
phase between time period t and t+ 1:
• Each shareholder Pi (i=1..n) picks k−1 random numbers and creates a polynomial di(x) of degree
k-1, where d(0) = 0, following Equation 2.12.
di(x) = d1x+ d2x2 + . . .+ dk−1xk−1 =
k−1∑
j=1
djx
j mod q (2.12)
• Pi creates the updated shares uij = di(j) and computes the verification values guij . The share
uij and the verification value are sent secretly to shareholder Pj . The verification values of the
coefficients of the update function (gdi , i = {1 . . . k − 1}) are broadcast to all shareholders.
• If shareholder Pi has received the updated shares and verification values from all shareholders (that
are participating the update process), it checks the correctness of the shares (using Equation C.13).
If some failures occur, shareholder Pi broadcasts an accusation against the corresponding share-
holder. If the equation holds, shareholder Pi adds the received shares to its old share s
(t)
i and
obtains the new share s(t+1)i (Equation 2.13).
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Figure 2.7: Graphical representation of the update phase
s
(t+1)
i = s
(t)
i +
n∑
j=1
uji (2.13)
• To protect the secret, all received updated shares and old shares are erased completely.
A graphical representation of these steps is shown in figure 2.7. The graph in the upper left represents
the function used to reconstruct the secret s in time period t. The graph in the upper right shows the
update functions of two shareholders used to compute new shares without changing the secret s. Thus
these functions are zero in the point of origin. If these two functions are added to the first function, the
third function is created (shown in the graph in the lower middle).
Recovery Phase
In recovery phase, corrupted shareholders are identified and recovered. This is necessary to provide
the continuous number of shareholders that have to be available to reconstruct the secret s. Otherwise,
an attacker can consecutively destroy or corrupt the shares of the shareholder to inhibit the reconstruc-
tion of the secret.
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To identify and remember a corrupted share, each shareholder generates a list of good and bad share-
holders. This list is generated after the initialisation or update phase and contains all malicious share-
holders identified after resolving the accusations. Additionally, the shares of all shareholders not involved
in the last update phase have to be recovered.
In addition to the obviously malicious shareholders, the shareholders attacked in the last time period
have to be identified. Herbage et al. proposed that all shareholders store the public verification values
of the shares (gsi , i ∈ {1 . . . n}) broadcast during initialisation phase. If the shares are updated, these
verification values will be updated too by using Equation 2.14.
gs
(t+1)
i = gs
(t)
i
n∏
j=1
guji (2.14)
whereas s(t+1)i is the share from time period t+ 1 and uji is the updated value that is added to the share
s
(t)
i by shareholder Pi.
To identify a malicious shareholder, each shareholder broadcasts the verification value of its actual
share. Then all shareholders can decide by majority count which shares are valid. This results in a list of
malicious shareholders that is the same for each shareholder.
To recover the corrupted shares the share recovery protocol is performed. In the following, B indicates
a set of malicious or bad shareholders that are identified by the correct shareholders located in the set
A (A ∩ B = ). At least k correct shareholders are needed to recover the secret and the following steps
must be performed.
• Each shareholder Pi ∈ A chooses for each malicious shareholder Bk ∈ B a random function d(x)
of degree k − 1 with d(k) = 0. This can be achieved with Equation 2.15
dk(x) = d1x+ d2x2 + . . .+ dk−1xk−1 −
k−1∑
i=1
dik
i mod q (2.15)
whereas k is the variable of the malicious shareholder Bk used to generate its share and di (i =
{0, . . . , k}) are the coefficients of function dk(x).
• Then Pi send the value uk:ij = dk(j) secretly to each shareholders Pj ∈ A.
• Pj uses the received shares uk:ij from each Pi ∈ A to compute a share for Bk using Equation 2.16.
sjk = sj +
∑
i∈A
uk:ij (2.16)
where sj is the share of shareholder Pj and uk:ij is the recovery value generated by shareholders
Pi ∈ A for Pj . The resulting share sjk is transmitted secretly from Pj to Bk.
• The malicious shareholder Bk ∈ B receives the shares sjk from at least k shareholder Pj ∈ A and
uses Lagrange interpolation to recover its share (see Equation 2.17)
sk =
k∑
j=1
sjk
k∏
i=1;i 6=j
k − i
j − i (2.17)
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Resolving Accusations
If during initialisation, update, or reconstruction phase one or more accusations are broadcasted, the
malicious participants must be identified. Two possibilities exist:
• Discard all shares from the accused shareholder
• Try to identify the malicious participant (the accused shareholder or the accuser)
In the first case, all shareholders ignore the messages send by accused shareholders and the shares of
the shareholder are reconstructed like in reconstruction phase. But this offers an attacker the possibility
to accuse any shareholder and to make the reconstruction of a secret impossible. In the second case
the accused shareholder defends itself by showing that its share is correct. Therefore, the accused
shareholder publishes the accused share and maybe additional information, to demonstrate that this
is the same share that was sent to the accuser. Now, all shareholders can check the correctness of this
share. If the shareholders decide that the published share is correct, the accused shareholder defended
itself successfully and the accuser is marked as bad and thus is added to a list of bad shareholders (B).
Then the bad shareholders are recovered in the recovery phase.
In the following proactive secret sharing for URSA and for Threshold BLS are discussed.
2.4.8.2 Proactive Secret Sharing Using the URSA Scheme
Update Phase
The URSA scheme (LKZ+04) uses the previously presented update phase of (HJKY95). To differenti-
ate between the various updated shares, version numbers are introduced.
Recovery Phase
The recovery phase is based, in part, on (HJKY95) (see Section 2.4.8.1). To recover a lost share k
shareholders cooperate and use Lagrange interpolation (see Equation 2.18). Whereas si:r is the share
that is sent from shareholder Pi to Pr.
sr =
k∑
i=1
si
k∏
j=1;j 6=i
r − j
i− j =
k∑
i=1
si:r (2.18)
To avoid a situation where shareholder Pr is not able to compute the distributed secret (the private
key), the k shareholder communicate in advance and add random numbers to their shares. This is the
difference from (HJKY95). Herzberg proposed generating recovery functions that are zero at the index
of the shareholder (see Section 2.4.8.1). (LKZ+04) proposed using random numbers. Each shareholder
communicates with the k − 1 other shareholders and they exchange random numbers. The shareholder
with the higher ID treats the random number as positive, the shareholder with the lower ID as negative.
So each shareholder gets k − 1 random numbers and sums them to its own share si:r. These shares are
sent to Pr that uses Equation 2.17 modulo N to recover its share.
Verification of Shares
In (LKZ+04) it is written that the verification methods proposed by (Fel87) or (Ped91b) can be used.
However, one important limitation exists, because of the fact that the shares are computed modulo N .
Let f(x) = f0 + f1x+ . . .+ fk−1xk−1 mod (N) be the function used to generate update shares si = f(i).
The verification values of this function are gf0 , gf1 , . . . , gfk−1 and the verification values of the shares are
gsi . With regard to Equation C.13, the share si can be verified by checking gsi mod N = gf(i) mod N =∏k−1
j=0 (g
fj )i
j
mod N . This is not applicable to the scheme presented above, since fiij 6= fiij mod N .
Especially gsi mod N = g
∑k−1
j=0 fji
j mod N mod N 6= g
∑k−1
j=0 fji
j
mod N .
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Security
For the URSA-scheme, the potential for an attack exists when proactive secret sharing is applied,
because there is information leakage during the update phase. The attack is described in (JSY04, Sax06).
The attack is successful if an adversary compromises any set of at most t members in the update group
in every update round. When compromised, the adversary learns the corresponding private key share
and can control the participants’ behaviour during the update phase.
The attack can be applied if the attacker has successful attacked k − 1 shareholder (in set B) and is
able to compute the value S =
∑
i∈B si. Then the attacker requests a signature. By constructing the
final signature, the attacker gets the value of α (c.p. Equation 2.11) and learns if the value of the private
key d is greater or less than S mod N . This is because S < αN if and only if d < S mod N . Otherwise
d ≥ S mod N if and only if S ≥ αN . By choosing an appropriate update function, the shareholder can
control the value of S and can isolate the value of the secret. Therefore, the attacker has to be the last
shareholder that distributes update shares. Based on the update shares received from other shareholder
he can choose his own update values and generate a value of S at will.
At first blush, this attack seems to be very dangerous. But in practise, it is very unlikely that the same
group of k−1 attacked shareholders will be chosen multiple times to generate a signature in cooperation
with only one good shareholder. However, to avoid this attack or problem, one has to change the group
that generates the signatures randomly. Additionally, the threshold can be increased so that we have an
(b, k, n) threshold scheme with b < k.
In (Sax06) the efficiency analysis of the attack shows that the private key can be compromised after
163 rounds for 1024-bit N , e = 65537 and t = 7, if (1) t members of the update group are corrupted
and one of them speaks last during the update phase; and if (2) in every update phase some h honest
participants participate in a signature process.
In (Sax06) a solution to the information leakage is presented. However, this solution relies on additive
secret sharing, which is why it cannot be applied for autonomous distributed systems with a dynamic
number of participants.
Summary
2.4.8.3 Proactive BLS-Scheme
The BLS-scheme satisfies the requirements for secure proactive secret sharing stated in (HJJK97) and
(HJKY95), which have been described in Section 2.4.8.1. Therefore, these schemes can be applied.
Threshold BLS applies Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (Section 2.4.5.1) within the proactive secret
sharing phases.
Summary
Proactive Threshold BLS offers all mechanisms that are desired for an application in p2p systems.
These are distributed key generation and verification of update shares. Further the signing process of
Threshold BLS is efficient. Accordingly, it is the best choice if signatures are to be created in a fully
distributed manner in a p2p system.
2.4.9 Conclusion Security Mechanisms for Distributed Systems
The discussion of security mechanisms for distributed systems presented the basic concepts of secret
sharing, distributed key generation, threshold cryptography, and proactive secret sharing.
As a basic requirement, it can be concluded that for autonomous distributed systems with a dynamic
number of participants, it must be possible to generate additional shares even after the initialisation
phase. Thus, additive secret sharing cannot be applied, and any applied scheme should be based on
Shamir’s polynomial secret sharing.
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Further, as it must be taken into account that if an adversary tries to get knowledge of the shared
private key, proactive secret sharing should be applied. Three different kinds of proactive secret sharing
schemes exist:
RSA-based proactive threshold schemes are the most discussed in the literature. However, for large
systems only the URSA-scheme can be applied. The URSA has security hole that would require generating
a new key pair after a specific number of update rounds. The distributed key generation is very traffic
intensive due to the requirement to generate prime numbers in a distributed way. Its advantage is the
efficient signature protocol that requires only a linear number of messages with growing threshold t.
DSA-based schemes do not have these disadvantages. The distributed key generation is much more
efficient than distributed RSA-key generation, as no prime numbers need to be generated. However, its
disadvantage is that the signature protocol requires several broadcasting phases. Further, 2t participants
are required for signing a message.
The most efficient scheme seems to be the BLS-threshold scheme. The key pair can be initialised using
(GJKR99, GJKR07). Furthermore, the signature protocol requires a linear number of messages with
growing threshold t. Also, its security has been proved to be without significant faults.
Verification of shares and partial signatures is an important feature of proactive secret sharing. For
distributed generation of a key pair, the participants have to broadcast individual verification values for
each participant to all participants. URSA does not provide this mechanism, however Threshold DSA
and Threshold BLS do. An evaluation of the BLS-threshold scheme in terms of produced traffic and
computational requirements is presented in (STY03). This shows that the computational complexity of
the BLS-scheme is higher then for the other schemes.
When applying proactive secret sharing to autonomous distributed systems, boot strapping a single
server for generating a system-wide key pair should be avoided. Therefore, proactive threshold schemes
that allow a distributed key generation are required. For RSA-based threshold systems the distributed
key generation presented in (BF01) and optimised for efficiency in (FMY98) can be applied. This
was already discussed in Section 2.4.6.2. For discrete-log based schemes like DSA and BLS the method
presented in (GJKR99, GJKR07) should be applied, as it represents the most actual findings. This was
discussed in 2.4.6.1.
In conclusion, for applying a proactive secret sharing scheme to autonomous distributed systems, the
BLS-scheme is the best suited scheme, as it offers all characteristics desired for an application in p2p
systems. It scales to an unlimited number of peers, it provides verifiable secret sharing, and it allows
efficient distributed generation of keys. However, should proactive secret sharing be applied on devices
with low computational power, the URSA-based scheme can be more appropriate. In that case, it is
important to pay close attention to the constraint that after a specific number of update rounds a new
key must be generated.
2.5 Summary
To fulfil the goal of demonstrating the feasibility of a fully distributed accounting scheme for p2p systems
with intrinsic automatic cooperation control, this chapter has reviewed the related work.
The first section gives the relevant definitions in context of this dissertation. An overview on the
different definitions of p2p systems is given and the definition of Steinmetz and Wehrle (SW05a) is
selected as the most relevant for this dissertation. Accounting in information systems is defined as the
process of tracing relevant IS activities to a responsible source. Cooperation control is understood as a
three part process consisting of definition of rules, control of rules, and enforcement of rules. Finally,
security and trustworthiness are circumscribed. A trustworthy system is designed with good intentions,
has the ability to perform the functionality it was designed for, and is secure. Secure refers to information
security and data protection.
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The second section reviews accounting functionality in computer networks, apart from p2p systems.
All solutions for accounting in centralised systems, decentralised systems, in the Grid, as well as micro-
payment schemes apply a central trusted entity. Therefore, these solutions cannot be applied to p2p
systems.
The third section reviews mechanisms presented in the context of p2p systems that could be applied to
p2p systems. First, a classification is given for accounting in p2p systems. It structures the solution space
according to the type of information collection, the information storage location, and the type of issuer
for systems that use an issuing process. All relevant works are classified and discussed in detail. It was
concluded that the most efficient solution for trusted accounting in p2p systems uses local information
storage, because this allows a message complexity of O(1) during transactions. However, there was no
existing trustworthy solution found that applies this design decision. Karma (VCS03) is closest to the
goal of this dissertation. However, it relies completely on the availability of bank sets and the correctness
of information the bank sets store. There is no analysis presented that concludes the required bank set
size in order to guarantee availability and trustworthiness of information.
The final section reviews the related work in the field of security mechanisms that can be applied in
decentralised autonomous systems. Threshold cryptography is an especially well suited mechanism that
allows delegating the signing of a document with a private key to a group of peers. Each peer possesses
a share of the private key and no peer possesses the knowledge of the complete key. Using proactive
secret sharing, the secrecy of the shared key can be achieved over time. However, the intensive study of
threshold cryptography mechanisms revealed that most schemes cannot be applied to p2p systems due
to various limitations. Using additive sharing all key shares have to be created when the key is created
and no additional key shares can be created afterwards. Using Shamir’s Secret Sharing this limitation
does not exist, however most solutions cannot be applied in large systems. Finally, two threshold schemes
could be identified that fulfil these requirements. Threshold BLS presented in (Bol03) is a short signature
scheme, however it has computationally high requirements. It is not yet suited for application in systems
with low computational capabilities. Therefore, the URSA threshold scheme (LKZ+04) was selected as
a second choice. However, it has a security leak and requires the generation of new shares after 160
update phases. Furthermore, it does not support verifiable secret sharing yet.
After giving the relevant definitions in context of this dissertation, reviewing the related work, and
laying the technical foundations for establishing a distributed basis of trust in p2p systems using thresh-
old cryptography, all of the basics for designing a fully decentralised and trusted accounting mechanism
with intrinsic cooperation control for p2p systems are worked out. The following chapter presents the
framework, system architecture, and basic protocols of such a system, the novel token-based accounting
scheme.
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3 Token-Based Accounting Principles and Architecture
This dissertation presents the token-based accounting scheme that enables accounting with
intrinsic cooperation control in autonomous distributed systems. The requirements for ac-
counting and cooperation control have been stated in Chapter 1.
In this chapter the basic framework and system architecture of the token-based accounting
scheme are derived from the identified requirements. All fundamental design decisions are
explained. The result is a framework that allows efficient collection of accounting informa-
tion and effectively control cooperation using the accounting information. The token-based
accounting scheme consists of four closely interlinked building blocks. Removing one block
would compromise the provided functionalities or characteristics of the other blocks.
After the framework is derived the token-based accounting schemes architecture is described
by elaborating each of the four building blocks: token structure, transaction protocols, token
aggregation, and detection of double spending. Token aggregation implements fully decen-
tralised token creation and administration. Tokens are used to control cooperation, therefore
an efficient decentralised control of double spending is provided by the system. Finally, a trust-
worthy transaction is offered to peers, which removes the incentive to defraud the partner in
a transaction.
3.1 Assumption
For designing the token-based accounting scheme the following assumption have been taken into con-
sideration:
User Identification
The token-based accounting scheme requires that actions can be clearly attributed to users. For the
accounting system presented here, it is assumed that each user can clearly be authenticated using its
private/public key pair.
Certification Authority
In order to authenticate a user with its key pair, functionalities like those offered by a public-key
infrastructure (PKI) must be available in the system. This will clearly attribute a key pair to a user. There
is no restriction requiring all users to use the same PKI; each peer can use the PKI of its choice. The
architecture of the PKI is beyond the scope of the dissertation, as it does not further affect the accounting
system’s design.
Peer Identification
The token-based accounting scheme assumes that users can clearly be identified through a permanent
identification (ID) in the overlay network. A permanent ID can be obtained as hash value of a users
public key, like in (Wal02, JXT04).
Permanent peer identification in combination with user identification issued by a certification authority
eliminates potential Sybil attacks (Dou02) or Whitewashing attacks1 in the p2p system.
1 see Appendix C.1.3 for a definition.
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Reputation Mechanism
The token-based accounting scheme does not rely on a central trusted entity. Therefore, in order to
detect dishonest behaviour, all system participants must observe other peers behaviour. That is, if peers
are interacting with other peers and detect dishonest behaviour, there must be a mechanism to report
and to punish such behaviour.
It is assumed that there exists a decentralised reputation system, where peers can report dishonest,
fraudulent behaviour, which cannot be detected and prevented by other technical means. It is assumed
that each peer has a reputation value that reflects the honesty of its past actions in the system.
Several possible solutions for such a decentralised reputation mechanism have been proposed. See,
e.g., (YS00, KSGM03, XL04, DA06). The design of the applied decentralised reputation mechanism is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
These assumptions do not restrict the design of the accounting system. Rather, these assumptions form
the basis the accounting system is built on and are required in order to clearly focus the research on the
design and the evaluation of an accounting system for autonomous distributed systems.
3.2 Design Decisions and Resulting Framework
As the related work in Section 2.2 shows, to design an accounting scheme for autonomous distributed
systems is a complex task, as a central trusted entity is missing. In the following, the basic system design
is derived from the design goals stated in Chapter 1.
3.2.1 Accounting Objects
As described in Chapter 1, the primary goals of the proposed system are
1. to globally collect accounting information about resources and services provided and consumed by
the peers in a p2p system.
2. to enforce norms about cooperation based on the collected information by constraining access to
resources and services accounted for.
Required System Characteristics
These goals imply five characteristics the system requires to achieve:
• The system collects receipts of the transactions the system accounts for. These collected receipts will
be referred to as accounting information.
• The accounting information is collected system-wide and per peer.
• When accessing the collected accounting information it is available in a complete, correct and prompt
manner.
• In order to enforce norms of cooperation, there is a mechanism to deny access to services or resources
for entities that do not comply with the norms.
• There is a clear, apparent, and unforgeable flag showing, if a peer is permitted to access services or
resources.
Another general requirement is the trustworthiness of the accounting scheme. Due to the assumptions
the scheme is built on, Sybil attacks (Dou02) as well as Whitewashing attacks are prevented. When
designing the system potential cheating and collusion of peers has to be taken into special consideration.
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Hereafter, peers not behaving according to the rules will be called “misbehaving peers”.
The complexities of the researched solution are completely different than in client-server oriented
systems with a central trusted entity that administers accounting information. How the remaining char-
acteristics can be realised in a distributed autonomous system will now be addressed.
Accounting Receipts
The first characteristic is obvious to achieve. A receipt must be created that contains the required
accounting information about each transaction, be it a service or resource usage. The information au-
thentication, integrity and non-repudiation must be ensured.
As an example, peer A downloads a media file from peer B. Here, A has to certify that it received
a service from B in form of a receipt. Both transaction partners should state their agreement to the
information contained in the receipt.
Basic Cooperation Rule
In order to coordinate resource and service usage, a balance between offered and demanded resources
and services must be achieved. Demand for free-of-charge resources and services will always exist. In
contrast, free-of-charge resources and services will only be offered by altruistic system entities, which
must be assumed to be the distinct minority of peers in the system. Thus, a balance between offer and
demand can only be achieved if resource and services usage requires to reciprocation.
In conclusion, a basic behaviour rule to be supported by the accounting system is that in order to use
accounted resources or services, a peer also has to provide resources and services.
Enforcing Cooperation in Distributed Autonomous Systems
In distributed autonomous systems, it is hard to enforce cooperation, as no central entity exists that
can deny access to the distributed resources or services. The problem can best be observed from the
opposite direction. Each peer that wishes to participate in the distributed autonomous system must have
the permission to do so. This permission can be bound to an object. Only if the peer is in possession of
such an object, can it use resources and services.
There are two alternatives for such a permission object. In the first alternative, a permanent permission
object could be issued to peers. When a peer is not permitted to consume services or resources anymore,
the permission will be revoked, and the peer will be black-listed. This implies that for each transaction in
the system, the service provider first must check the black-list. The second alternative issues a permission
object to peers that can be used only once. Here, the behaviour enforcement is more fine grained.
However, there must be controls ensuing that permission objects are not used more than once. This is
called Double Spending.
An accounting system requires a receipt per transaction. This could be combined with a corresponding
permission object per transaction. Therefore, the second alternative presented above, using a permission
object with onetimeuse is the preferred solution.
As a permission object should be used only once, there must be a way to use it up. The solution is to
design it as “fading”. That is, if the permission object is used, it “fades” and cannot be used again. But it
can be renewed if the peer acted according to the rules.
The result of these considerations is to introduce objects in the distributed autonomous system that
represent the things that should be accounted for, i.e. they represent the right to use the services and
resources that are accounted for. These objects should be scarce in order to enable behaviour rule
enforcement. From this it follows that in order to ensure the scarceness of the permission object they
must be issued by some decentralised process. This process must be governed by rules about when
permission objects should be issued. The compliance with the rules must be checked by the system’s
peers. They have a motivation to do so because, as previously described, it is assumed that the system
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entities have an interest in a system that accounts for resource and service usage. Otherwise, they would
move to a different system.
Tokens as Accounting Objects and Permission Objects
The accounting system for autonomous distributed systems with the described goals requires two
types of objects: objects that hold accounting information and permission objects. One type of objects
is required before a transaction takes place (permission), the other type is required after the transaction
took place (accounting). Therefore, both objects can be combined into one object that is used throughout
all phases of the transaction. An advantage is that identity information must be proved only once in a
transaction, because both type of objects require that information.
Objects that hold accounting information typically are receipts. As the permission objects must be
issued, the accounting system requires pre-transaction issued receipts. This special type of object is
called a Token throughout this dissertation.
Renewing Permission Objects
Tokens are “fading” permission objects. A peer will loose tokens when consuming resources or services.
This will be called spending tokens. However, when behaving according to the rules a peer should get
the tokens “re-newed”. “Re-newing” tokens means, new tokens should be issued to the peer. According
to the basic behaviour rule tokens should be issued when providing resources or services. As proof for
provisioning also tokens are used, as they are the receipts. Thus, system must support a mechanism
where peers can swap “receipt-tokens” against new “permission-tokens”.
Basic Accounting Scheme Concept
In conclusion, every participant in a system applying the accounting mechanism has a limited number
of tokens they can use in transactions. The service provider keeps the accounting records about transac-
tions. A participant who runs out of issued receipts is not allowed to consume any further services. This
mechanism enables the enforcement rules. Participants will collect tokens when providing accounted
resources or services. These “token-receipts” they can swap for new tokens. This mechanism enables to
coordinate resource and service usage in the distributed autonomous system.
As example, Peer A requests a media file from Peer B. When B uploads the media file to A, A will
take one of its tokens and fill in accounting information required for that service. Then it will send the
token over to B. B receives a used token and will swap it for a new token. Thus, A spent a token and B
earned a token. B keeps the accounting record about the transaction stored in the used token.
As a consequence, potential forgery and double spending of tokens must be addressed in the design of
the accounting scheme 2.
Figure 3.1 depicts the concept. Note, that the location where new tokens and used tokens are stored
has not yet been decided. Furthermore, note that the decentralised reputation system is separate from
the token-based accounting scheme (see Section 3.1) and its design is beyond the scope of this disserta-
tion.
3.2.2 Issuing Tokens
When designing the process for issuing tokens, two basic design decisions must be made. Which entities,
i.e. peers, are responsible for issuing tokens, and how can a correctly issued token be signed.
2 see Appendix C.1.3 for definitions.
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Responsibility for Issuing Tokens
As described above, each token must be issued. However, in a distributed autonomous system there
exists no trusted entity that could take on this functionality. Therefore, a trustworthy solution must be
found that is feasible within the peer-to-peer paradigm. Figure 3.2 depicts the solution space.
If a single peer should be permitted to issue tokens, either each peer can have this permission or
only selected peers. The selection can be performed by trust. However, for the token-based accounting
scheme, it cannot be assumed that a single peer can be trusted to issue the tokens. Token-issuing is a too
important a task. Therefore, the second alternative, a group of peers issuing tokens, must be selected.
If a group of peers shall issue tokens, this could mean all system peers or a sub-group of all system
peers. If all peers potentially can take part in token issuing, that means that potentially fraudulent peers
take part in this process. This must be minimised. As a reputation mechanism is assumed to exist that
provides an assessment of the peers’ trustworthiness, a sub-group consisting of the most trustworthy
peers will be the better design choice.
If a group of peers has to make a decision if tokens should be issued or not, this decision can be based
on different forms of majority or on unanimity. Unanimity has the advantage that in a decision group,
only one honest peer is required to avoid issuing tokens against the accounting scheme’s rules. The
disadvantage is that a single malicious peer can prevent tokens from being issued although this would
not violate the accounting scheme’s rules. If such malicious behaviour is detectable it can be reported to
the reputation mechanism. Then, the token issuing could be repeated with a different group of peers.
The trustworthiness of the token-based accounting scheme has priority the concern about tokens being
wrongly withheld. Therefore, a group of peers should issues tokens based on a unanimous decision. This
is the most trustworthy solution in order to avoid fraud. The group of peer deciding about issuing tokens
is called quorum .
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Sign for Valid Tokens
Typically, in order to state a documents authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation it is signed with
some kind of signature. In the token-based accounting scheme, issuing a token means creating a valid
signature under a token.
There exist three alternatives for this signature:
1. In this option, there would exist a scheme’s private/public key pair. Each of the quorum peers
has the knowledge of the scheme’s key and can sign tokens with it. A token requires at least t
signatures of quorum peers with the system key. However, the signatures of the different quorum
peers cannot be distinguished. Therefore, the signatures could also be created by a single peer.
Accordingly, this solution cannot be applied.
2. The quorum peers sign tokens with their private key. If a token is signed with at least t signatures,
it is valid. Here, if a peer plans to defraud the system, the quorum peers could be exchanged for
others until a quorum consists only of peers who are willing to defraud the system. Furthermore,
the token size would increases due to the number of signatures. This would increase the total
traffic introduced by the accounting scheme.
3. Proactive threshold cryptography is used with a system-wide key that is shared among the quorum
peers. The quorum that signs a token must be pre-selected due to the cryptographic requirements.
More specifically, the Lagrange coefficient avoids exchanging peers in the quorum , which aggra-
vates collusion. Only one signature is created under a token. That reduces the traffic introduced
by the token-based accounting schemes. On the other hand, additional traffic is introduced for key
management.
In conclusion, the third alternative is the most trustworthy one. Therefore, it is selected for the token-
based accounting scheme.
From the discussion of the related work, the BLS-threshold scheme (BLS01, BLS04, Bol03) is best
suited for the token-based accounting scheme. However, this scheme is computationally the most de-
manding, as (STY03) shows. Therefore, the URSA-threshold scheme could also be applied, when small
devices with low computational power may be involved in the signing process. However, close attention
must be paid to the security limitations of the proactive URSA protocol. After a specific number of update
rounds, a new key must be generated (see (Sax06)).
Fortunately, for creating signatures using either the BLS-threshold scheme or the URSA-threshold
scheme the required message flow is the same.
Figure 3.3 shows the includes the resulting issuing process into the basic concept of the token-based
accounting scheme.
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3.2.3 Location of Token Storage
Tokens are spent by peers and spent tokens can be swapped for new tokens. Accordingly, there are two
types of tokens, new tokens and spent tokens. A storage location must be determined for both types.
There exist two alternatives of where tokens could be stored. Either token can be stored locally at the
peer owning the tokens, or remotely with other peers. The object where the tokens are stored will be
referred to as an account .
If accounts are stored with other peers, this can have the advantage of being housed with peers who
might not have an incentive to falsify account information. However, the disadvantage is that in each
transaction, the account holding peers are involved and therefore must be available. This introduces
additional traffic. Furthermore, account information must not be lost, otherwise the account owning
peer will not be able to perform any transactions.
If accounts are stored locally at the owner peer it must be ensured that the account information is
secure. That is, a peer has a direct incentive to falsify the account information for its own advantage.
Thus, token integrity must be ensured, and forgery of tokens must be prevented. If these requirements
can be fulfilled, local storage is to be preferred, because compared to account storage at remote peers,
network traffic is lower and the availability of accounts is not an issue. Due to the design decision to issue
tokens, for new tokens, information integrity and security against forgery is given. Therefore, new tokens
can be stored locally at the owner peers. Spent tokens contain additional accounting information. For
this information integrity must also be ensured. This can be done, if an owner peer signs the accounting
information using its private key before spending it. As this procedure is required for an accounting
system, spent tokens can also be stored locally at the receiving peer.
If tokens are stored locally, a further issue is double spending of tokens. Peers could copy tokens and
use the same token repeatedly for consuming resources or services. If tokens are stored locally, there
must be a mechanism to identify tokens clearly and to detect if a token was used more then once. In the
system design selected so far, the best option for controlling how often a token was spent seems to be
the time when spent tokens are swapped for new tokens.
3.2.4 Double Spending Detection
The token-based accounting scheme requires that tokens can be used only once. In order to detect if
a tokens was used more then once, each token must possess a unique identity. There must also be
an instance where it is recorded which tokens have been used. In distributed autonomous system this
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instance is a distributed index. In peer-to-peer systems an efficient way to implement a distributed index
is a distributed hash table (DHT).
There are two alternatives, as to how double spending can be detected. A DHT is built among the
trusted peers or among all peers. If the DHT is built among the trusted peers, double spending can be
detected when used tokens are swapped for new ones. When the DHT is built among all peers, it is also
possible to store and retrieve information during a transaction. As this solution offers more freedom, it
is selected.
3.2.5 Resulting System Architecture Overview
The resulting design of the accounting scheme for distributed autonomous systems uses tokens to accom-
plish its goals. These goals are primarily to collect accounting information, and to enforce norms about
cooperation system-wide. Figure 3.5 a shows the resulting framework of the token-based accounting
scheme. Note that the decentralised reputation system is a separate mechanism and its design is beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
Issuing Tokens
Tokens will be issued to individual peers using proactive threshold cryptography in a decentralised
process. A sub-group of peers will be responsible for issuing tokens. The sub-group is selected using the
peers’ reputation value. These peers are called trusted peers . From the trusted peers a quorum of peers
will be selected to create a signature with the system’s shared private key using threshold cryptography.
Thus, a (t, T )-threshold scheme is applied, where the threshold t determines the required quorum size
and T denotes the total number of trusted peers. Each trusted peer has to receive a share of the private
system key.
Tokens contain a basic set of information. The owner’s identification enables it to clearly attribute a
token to a peer. A unique token identification allows the detection of double spending. A signature with
the scheme’s private key proves the tokens’ validity, ensure its integrity, and prevent forgery.
Due to these security features, it is possible to store tokens locally at the owner peers. Furthermore,
tokens cannot be stolen by other peers.
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Usage of Tokens
Peers will use tokens in transactions for consuming resources and services. Then the token will become
a transaction receipt. The consuming peer (consumer) will add accounting information, sign it with its
private key, and hand over the token to the transaction partner (resource or service provider). Spent
tokens cannot be stolen, because the receiving peer’s information is stored in it. As a basic mechanism
for coordinating consumption of resources and services in the system, service providers can swap such
received tokens for new tokens. The new tokens are created according to the process for issuing tokens.
This overall process will be called Token Aggregation.
Furthermore, such received tokens will be called foreign tokens , in contrast to own tokens , which
have not been used in a transaction. Token aggregation swaps foreign tokens for own tokens. Hence,
tokens are transient objects and represent the system status.
When tokens are used, there must be a mechanism that detects potential double spending of tokens.
Double Spending Detection for Tokens
In order to detect double spending, there is a distributed hash table (DHT) built by all peers in the
system. As tokens are issued to specific peers, for each peer there is a remote account in the DHT where
information is stored regarding which tokens the peer spent. These remote accounts are called aggre-
gation accounts. Aggregation accounts have to be replicated in the DHT in order to avoid information
loss due to churn of peers. Furthermore, a peer should not be able to modify information in its own
aggregation account that would defraud the system, e.g., a peer should not be able to remove tokens
from the spent-tokens-list in order to double spend.
Accounting Information
Accounting information about a transaction is stored in foreign tokens at the providing peer. At the
requesting peer, accounting information can be stored through copies of spent own tokens. This infor-
mation can be verified by the information stored in the requesting peer’s aggregation account, as well as
by querying the providing peer.
Token-based Accounting Architecture
The token-based accounting framework translates to the architecture depicted in Figure 3.6 a. Service
and resource management generate accounting events and send them to the token-based accounting
module. This can also send control messages to service and resource management; for example, if a
service provider does not receive further tokens from the receiver, the service delivery can be stopped.
The three basic architecture components, Token-based Accounting Core, Check for Double Spending,
and Token Aggregation do not interact within one peer but only with remote peers using the Send Mes-
sage Interface. The inter-peer communication is depicted in Figure 3.6 b. All architecture components
can directly communicate with the reputation system, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Furthermore, the token-based accounting module has an interface to the structured p2p overlay network
that connects the peers. It is used to find peers, e.g. in order to send a message to an account holder set.
The token-based accounting core component implements the account for own and foreign tokens, the
transaction protocols, as well the required functionality to swap tokens. Transaction protocol as well as
swap tokens both access the account for storing and retrieving tokens. The Double Spending Detection
component implements the aggregation accounts a peer is responsible for, as well as the aggregation
account maintenance mechanisms. The Token Aggregation component is only instantiated at trusted
peers. It has its own interface to the trusted peer overlay used for maintenance mechanisms for the sys-
tem trusted peer, such as proactive threshold mechanisms. Both components, System Key Maintenance
and interface to the trusted peer overlay network are also only instantiated at trusted peers.
In conclusion, the token-based accounting scheme consists of four building blocks: the three basic
protocols Token Aggregation, Double Spending Detection, and Transaction. Additionally, a core part of the
token-based accounting scheme is the Token Structure, which is the first of these four building blocks
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discussed. The building blocks mesh closely. Removing one block neutralises the functionality of the
whole system. Each of the four blocks are now discussed in more detail.
3.3 Token Structure
In Section 3.2 the core functionality was described, and some of the required information that should be
contained in a token was derived. In this section the token functionality is examined in more detail and
the final structure of a token is deduced.
3.3.1 Token Functionality
Tokens serve two functions. They act as both a permission object and a transaction receipt. The per-
mission object is issued to a specific peer and when used to consume resources or a service, the token is
extended by the inclusion of receipt information. So, it is meaningful to structure the token into these to
core parts - permission object and transaction receipt.
Permission Object
The permission object can only be issued directly to its owner. The issuance of a document requires
a valid signature. Furthermore, a permission object should be restricted to a one time only usage.
Accordingly, forgery and double spending must be at least detectable. If forgery and double spending
can be detected at the time such an object is used, forgery and double spending could even be prevented.
This is the preferred result. Detection of double spending requires that a token can clearly be identified.
Protection from forgery requires that the signature validating a token is strong.
Transaction Receipt
A transaction receipt requires all relevant information about a transaction, include the transaction
partners, the transaction object, and further information relevant about the delivery process of the trans-
action. All transaction relevant information must be authenticated and its integrity and non-repudiation
must be ensured. This can be done by a signature of the peer generating the transaction receipt infor-
mation.
Peer Identification vs. Anonymity
The functionality of tokens is somewhat similar to the functionality of a virtual currency. An important
characteristic of currency is its anonymity. However, tokens are used primarily as issued receipts and
not as a virtual currency. Thus, tokens must not have the characteristics of virtual currency, namely
anonymity and untraceability (CFN90). Therefore, tokens have a clear owner that is contained in the
token. However, using another layer of encryption like in (CFN90), tokens can be made anonymous.
3.3.2 Resulting Token Structure
Figure 3.7 shows the information contained in a token.
New Token Information
A new, unused token contains the top five information fields. The owner id determines the owner of
the token. It is the owners public key.
The issuing date and the time in milliseconds, together with the serial number and the owner id, serve
as the unique identification of a token. This unique identification is required to enable the detection of
double spending, and allows double spending can be traced to the owner.
Chapter 3. Token-Based Accounting Principles and Architecture 59
Owner’sSignature
Service Provider ID
QoS-Information
Transaction Object
Transaction ID & Date
SignatureSK
AccountID
Owner ID
Serial Number
Issuing Date
Avg.
Bandwidth
#
Interruptions
R
eq
u
ir
ed
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
fo
r
T
ru
st
w
o
rt
h
in
es
s
O
p
tio
n
alIn
fo
rm
atio
n
New Token Fields
Used Token Fields
Figure 3.7: Token structure
During the creation of a batch of new tokens, the serial number is randomly selected for every token.
Thus, guessing which tokens exist in the system becomes hard.
The account id is used to allocate a token clearly to a specific application. Cross application usage and
trade of tokens can be permitted by application providers. The account id field is optional.
The fifth field contains the signature of the information contained in the first four fields, signed with
the scheme’s private key. This prevents forgery and ensures the information’s integrity.
Used Token Information
A used token is basically a receipt, meaning it contains further information about the transaction a
token was used for. The service consumer is the token owner.
Before the owner sends the token to the service provider, it adds the service provider’s id to the token
as well as information about the transaction (such as transaction object, date and information about the
quality of the service provisioning). The owner finally signs the complete token using its private key.
Subsequently, the contained information cannot be changed by the service provider.
The required information in a token is the information needed for unique identification, i.e., the
system signature, the service provider, and the service provider’s signature. This prevents tokens from
being stolen. Because unused tokens contain the owner, only the owner can spend them. Used tokens
are signed and contain the receiver of the token. Only the receiver is allowed to swap used tokens for
new, own tokens. A token has no intrinsic value, but rather represents an accounting event. The value
of a token is determined in the token aggregation process.
3.4 Basic Transaction Protocol
During transactions, the token-based accounting scheme accounts for resource usage, service usage, or
a combination of both. Service usage is valued differently than resource usage. For example, a service
detects watermarks in pictures. Since special software is needed to provide such a service, it is valued
higher than the sum of the used resources. A token can contain information about the used resources and
value information of the service itself. The information is added to a token before it is sent to the service
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Figure 3.8: Basic transaction procedure
provider. By this means, information contained in a token can be used as basis for external charging and
payment mechanisms.
The standard transaction process is shown in Figure 3.8. After a service has been requested by the
service consumer C , the service provider P informs C about the terms and conditions of the service,
including the number of tokens it expects in return for the service. If C accepts the terms and conditions,
the service provisioning phase begins.
During this phase tokens can be transmitted before, after, or during the service provisioning. For
example a token can be transmitted after 1 MB transferred or after 1 minute service received. Before
a token is transmitted, C fills in the required accounting information. C has no incentive to falsify this
information, because it influences only the token aggregation of P. Then C signs the token with its own
private key and sends it to P. P checks the signature of the received token using C ’s public key, which
can be contained in the token as the owner id or transmitted with the service request. Thus, it can be
verified, that the token sender is actually the token owner. In case the accounting data is incorrect, P
can choose not to continue to provide the service. Now with each transaction, CS own token balance
decreases and PS foreign token balance increases.
Transaction partners could try to gain tokens by not paying tokens after receiving a service or by not
delivering the service after receiving tokens. In order to avoid that, transactions can be split into several
parts. Then C sends a signed token to P after P delivered a part of the service; for example, C sends a
token after each MByte data received of a 5 MBytes file transfer.
A further approach that eliminates the incentive for transaction partners to cheat on the other partner
is presented in Section 3.7.
3.5 Aggregation Protocol
The Token Aggregation process is used to swap foreign tokens a peer has collected for new tokens issued
to that peer. As described in Section 3.2, only trusted peers are allowed to participate in the issuing
of new tokens. Trusted peers are selected among all peers according to their reputation value. Trusted
peers are in possession of a share of the secret scheme’s private key. The Aggregation Protocol is built
according to the BLS-threshold scheme (BLS04, Bol03) and the URSA-threshold scheme (LKZ+04) (see
Section 2.4).
The ten-step Token Aggregation procedure is shown in Figure 3.9.
First the swapping peer SP locates a trusted peer TP (step 1). SP sends its n collected foreign tokens
(Fn1, ..., Fnn) to TP using a signed message (step 2). TP checks the foreign tokens for their validity
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Figure 3.9: Token aggregation
(step 3). Only tokens signed by the owner and spent only once are valid for aggregation. The protocol
checking tokens for double spending is described in the following section.
Using the aggregation function M = A(Fn1, ..., Fnn), TP calculates the number M of new tokens
SP must receive in return for the foreign tokens. The aggregation function is public and can take any
form. TP now creates m fresh, unsigned tokens (Un1, ..., Unm) (step 4).
To sign the fresh tokens with the scheme’s private key using threshold cryptography (the BLS-scheme
(Bol03) or the URSA-scheme (LKZ+04)), TP now locates further trusted peers that build the quorum
(step 5). SP is not allowed to choose the quorum of trusted peers itself. This alleviates the problem
of potential collusion. The number of required trusted peers to sign a token is determined by the used
secret sharing scheme. The system’s trustworthiness increases with the size of the quorum of trusted
peers.
TP sends the new tokens (Un1, ..., Unm) to this quorum of trusted peers (step 6). Each peer of the
quorum now checks the validity of the token aggregation process and then signs the tokens with its part
of the scheme’s private key (step 7). The quorum peers send the identification of the signed tokens to the
swapping peer’s aggregation account, in order to allow the control of double spending of these tokens
(step 8). The resulting partial tokens (Pn1, ..., Pnm) are transmitted back to SP (step 9). Finally, SP
combines the partial tokens to new complete tokens (Tn1, ..., Tnm) (step 10).
In the token-aggregation aggregation protocol there are two possibilities for misbehaviour.
First, the trusted peer TP could create the wrong number of new tokens. In such a case, the swapping
peer SP will contact the quorum and send to it a copy of the message it sent to TP in step 2. The
quorum peers will validate the number of tokens created and if TP created a wrong number of tokens,
the quorum peers will report this to the reputation system.
Second, one or more quorum peers could sign no token or only part of the tokens with its part of the
scheme’s private key. In this situation SP will send a complaint to TP , which checks SP ’s aggregation
account. Quorum peers that did not sign the tokens and did not send the token identification to the
aggregation account can be identified here. TP will contact each quorum peer that did not sign the
tokens and requests a justification. If the quorum peer did violate the rules of the token-based accounting
scheme, it is reported to the reputation system. Furthermore, if a quorum peer does not respond to the
request, it is also reported to the reputation system, as an objective observation for the cause for the
misbehaviour cannot be achieved.
Here, a different rating of deviations from protocol is required. Deviations where the cause cannot be
determined have to be rated lower than proved violations. This way, trusted peers that fail too often to
accomplish their tasks (without proving a deviation from protocol) will be downgraded to normal peers.
If SP did not receive enough new own tokens it will initiate another token aggregation process.
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It is important to mention that the aggregation function adds an additional degree of freedom to the
system. With an appropriate aggregation function, specific economic systems can be implemented.
Before the number of new tokens is calculated, the validity of the foreign tokens is checked. Here, it
is important to check the tokens for double spending. This process is described in the following section.
3.6 Double Spending Detection Protocol
To check for double spending, a token must be clearly identifiable. To facilitate the check in an efficient
manner, for every peer (the account owners) there is an aggregation account located at a set of account
holding peers, called the account holder set. The account holder peers are organised in a DHT manner,
such as Chord (SMK+01), Pastry (RD01), or Kademlia (MM02) (see Figure 3.10). A requirement for
the detailed mechanism is that the applied DHT builds a ring topology (see Section 4.2 for details). If
the selected overlay protocol does not provide a ring topology, one has to be added to the protocol.
Account holders hold a list of tokens currently issued to the account owner. The list is filled with the
required information during token aggregation. After new tokens have been created (Figure 3.9, step
3), TP sends a list of these new tokens to the exchanging peers account holders (Figure 3.10, step 3).
During the token validity check of the token aggregation process, TP will ask the account holders
responsible for a token, if the token is valid (Figure 3.10, step 2). The account holders will remove the
token from the list. However, if the token is not in the list, it is an invalid token. TP will discard such a
token and the p2p system’s reputation mechanism will be informed about the incident.
In order to avoid message manipulation, every message sent to the account holders must be signed
with the sender’s private key. To keep the list between the account holders consistent, all account holders
for one specific account exchange the list whenever the set of account holders changes. This takes place
only when peers of that set join or depart from the system. Consistency checks are necessary if the
sender does not receive all confirmation messages (for details see Section 4.2). These mechanisms are
described in detail in the following chapter.
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3.7 Trustworthy Transaction Protocol
Depending on the application scenario, a more trustworthy settlement process might be required, e.g.,
if tokens are used as a virtual currency. Here, the transaction party that delivers last has an incentive
to cheat the other party. It still receives the full benefit, but does not have to deliver its part of the
deal. Therefore, a trusted payment procedure was designed that eliminates the incentive to cheat for
the transaction partners. In addition, double spending of tokens is not only detectable, but can also be
prevented. Figure 3.11 shows the procedure.
After a service request is received, P notifies C about the terms and conditions of the transaction,
including the required number of tokens. C answers with the tokens’ IDs of the tokens it intends to
spend for the transaction. Then P contacts the account holders responsible for C (AH(C) ) and checks
if the tokens are valid. In the token list AH(C) mark these tokens as “planned to spend”. Using the
same tokens in another transaction becomes impossible. If all tokens are valid, P informs C that the
transaction phase can begin. C starts the transaction by sending an unsigned token to P. C loses the
token. However, since it is not signed by C, P cannot swap it for own tokens. P has no incentive to not
provide the service. Therefore, P now provides the agreed service. Because C already lost the token, it
has no intention keeping the token for itself. C will sign the token and send it to P. If C should fail to
send the signed token, P can present the unsigned token to AH(C). The possession of the token proves
that the transaction had started and the token will be removed from the list and is finally lost for C. The
aforementioned reputation system provides further incentives against such malicious behaviour. On the
other hand, if both peers are consenting to cancel the transaction, C does not lose its tokens. P informs
AH(C) in order to remove the “planned to spend”-mark in the token list.
Peers that do not fulfil their tasks of a transaction will be reported to the reputation system.
3.8 The Aggregation Function
The aggregation function adds another degree of freedom to the token-based accounting scheme, be-
cause it can take any form. In this way, different rules can be realised, e.g., to implement specific
economic mechanisms or norms of behaviour.
Simple forms of the aggregation function manipulate only the swapping ratio between foreign tokens
and new own tokens. This is meaningful, for example, if the token-based accounting scheme is used as
an incentive system. Due to the existence of altruistic peers, some peers might collect a lot of own tokens
but will not spent them. If the aggregation function implements a swapping ratio of 1:1, the number
of tokens available to peer will drop over time. This would result in a a deflation-like effect, which
can reduce the overall system performance. Therefore, here different swapping ratios are appropriate.
Obviously, the aggregation function can also be used to control the number of tokens that are available
in the system.
Other aggregation functions can take other information into account. For example, the accounting
information stored in the tokens could be evaluated. Such an aggregation function could, e.g., give
priorities to specific services. For example, in file sharing systems files with high demand or files with
very few copies could be prioritised. Tokens can be used as a means to incite users to provide accounted
resources and services. Therefore, the aggregation function can also be used to coordinate the resources
and services according to the demand. If demand is distinctively higher than supply, an appropriate
aggregation function can be used to even out the difference.
Information about peers can also be taken into account. Peers that have a very high reputation value
can be rewarded. The opposite is also possible in order to punish malicious behaviour. Another alterna-
tive is to give a bonus to the 10% of peers that provided the most service.
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This short discussion shows that there is an unlimited number of alternatives for defining the aggre-
gation function and for implementing different rules, preferences, and economic mechanisms.
3.9 Summary
This chapter presents the system architecture of the token-based accounting scheme. First, the design
decisions leading to the system architecture are presented, and then each of the resulting building blocks
is described.
The goal of this dissertation is to build a p2p accounting system with intrinsic cooperation control.
Based on the requirements and design goals stated in Chapter 1, the system framework is deduced
step-by-step. For each design step, the design alternatives are evaluated.
Accounting requires receipts for transactions that were performed by the system’s peers. Decentralised
cooperation control requires permission objects; peers are permitted to receive accounted resources
and services only if they are in possession of permission objects. The derived solution combines the
transaction receipts and permission objects into one object called a token. Tokens are issued to peers
using a fully decentralised process. Peers spend tokens for consuming accounted resources or services.
Furthermore, tokens are allowed to be used only once. When a peer runs out of tokens, it cannot
consume any further resources or services. A peer can request additional tokens by swapping foreign
tokens it received for providing resources or services for new tokens. The system-wide aggregation
function computes the number of new tokens a peer will receive. This combination implements effective
decentralised cooperation control based on accounting data.
The aggregation function adds another degree of freedom to the token-based accounting scheme and
can take any form. In order to implement different rules and policies in the p2p system, it can, for
example, consider accounting information, reputation values, etc.
The system architecture that results from this framework consists of four building blocks: token struc-
ture, transaction protocols, token aggregation, and detection of double spending. The token structure
ensures information integrity so that tokens cannot be forged or stolen. Therefore, in order to issue
it, it contains a signature with a system-wide private key. The transaction protocols define the process
how peers “spent” tokens in order to receive accounted resources or services. A trustworthy transac-
tion process was developed that removes the benefits for peers that defraud their transaction partner.
Token aggregation is the process that enables peers to swap foreign tokens they received for providing
resources or services for new own token. In token aggregation using the aggregation function, the num-
ber of new tokens is computed that the swapping peer will receive. Then, each token is signed with
the scheme’s private key by a quorum of trusted peers using threshold cryptography. Peers might be
tempted to spend tokens several times in different transactions. Therefore, detection of double spending
maintains for each peer an aggregation account at remote peers. This aggregation account receives in-
formation during token aggregation about which tokens are issued to the peer. Also during transactions,
the aggregation accounts are updated concerning which tokens have been spent. Thus, double spending
can efficiently be detected.
In conclusion, the token-based accounting scheme consists of four building blocks that are closely
interlinked. This combination allows trustworthy accounting with intrinsic cooperation control. In the
following chapter further details about the protocols are presented. These details are important to
demonstrate the viability of the token-based accounting scheme, as they further enhance the scheme’s
trustworthiness.
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4 Relevant Details About Protocols
Chapter 3 described the token-based accounting scheme’s architecture. Understanding the
basic processes, there are still several open issues and new challenges arise. This chapter
presents the solutions and detailed protocols to these issues and challenges. The focus here
is on detecting and eliminating fraud.
Section 4.1 discusses how peers can be clearly identified permanently and how their peer id
can be tied to a real world identity.
The usage of account holder sets was introduced in the previous chapter: The account holder
set requires a number of mechanisms in order to demonstrate the viability of this concept.
These mechanisms are the location of the account holder set, assignment of peers, access to
account holder set information, and maintenance of account holder set. The maintenance
mechanisms ensure consistent long-term remote storage of dynamic data in DHT-based p2p
overlays. A special challenge was to find trustworthy access mechanism to remotely stored data
in DHT-based p2p overlays. These challenges and mechanisms are covered in Section 4.2.
Trusted peers and the aggregation protocol build the basic concept for building a distributed
basis of trust in the token-based accounting scheme. Section 4.3 discusses the selection and
organisation of trusted peers. The aggregation protocol requires enhancements in order to
ensure rule compliant execution of aggregation tasks in the presence of incentives for defraud.
A new mechanism is presented that allows a random selection of a group of trusted peers
where the randomness can be verified by any peer afterwards. This prevents collusion.
In order to guarantee the secrecy of the scheme’s private key, proactive secret sharing mecha-
nisms can be applied. Section 4.5 presents the proactive mechanism that can be applied to the
two selected threshold cryptography schemes and analyses the traffic created by these mech-
anisms. Section 4.6 uses these findings in order to analyse different strategies for distributing
update shares to the trusted peers. Together with the selection of appropriate threshold
cryptography schemes performed in Section 3.2.2, this builds a distributed basis of trust in
distributed autonomous systems.
Finally, Section 4.7 discusses how failures occurring during transactions can be handled by
the transaction partners.
4.1 Peer Identification
For trustworthy accounting, peers must be clearly and permanently identified. This eliminates poten-
tial Sybil attacks (Dou02), whitewashing, and allows for the identification of those who try to cheat,
collude, or act maliciously. Therefore, as described in Section 3.1, each peer possesses a private/public
key pair issued by some certification authority. This key pair serves as basic peer identification. The
certification authority is responsible for guaranteeing that peers will not change their identification, and
is also maintaining the appropriate controls thereof.
In order to identify peers in a peer-to-peer overlay network the hash value h = H(PKi) of the peer i
public key PKp is used. For this, it is assume that H is a one-way secure hash function and that there
are no collisions for the peer IDs.
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4.2 Account Holder Set
The account holder set serves the purpose of enabling an efficient detection of double spending and
ensuring that only valid tokens are used in the token-based accounting scheme. Thus, it is an additional
security mechanism. In order to achieve this goal an account holder set holds account information
for a specific peer; this account information is called a peer’s aggregation account. The mechanisms
designed around the account holder set must achieve two sub-purposes. These are the availability of the
information and the correctness of the information.
A certain availability will be achieved using replication of the information on a set of peers. The
required number of replicas is determined in Section 5.2.2.
The correctness of the information can again be split into two sub-challenges. They are achieving trust-
worthiness of the information (avoid its manipulation), and achieving the consistency of the different
copies of the information.
The assignment process of peers to account holder sets and the information storage and retrieval
mechanism of account information were designed in order to achieve trustworthiness of the information.
These two mechanisms are explained in detail. Afterwards the consensus protocol is explained, which is
used to achieve consistency of the account information at the different account holders.
4.2.1 Peer Assignment, Information Storage and Retrieval
In order to achieve trustworthiness of information it must be impossible or at least sufficiently hard for
an adversary to control a complete account holder set.
There are two mechanisms applied in order to achieve this. First, an adversary should not be able to
influence the assignment of the account holders for the account owning peer. This is discussed in Section
4.2.1.2. Second, in order to avoid cheating, e.g., by bribing of account holders by an adversary, an
adversary should not be able to detect the position of an account holder set. Thus, the account holders in
the token-based accounting scheme should be anonymous. Anonymity in communication networks can
be split into sender anonymity and receiver anonymity. Here, receiver anonymity is required. However,
sender anonymity has advantages and disadvantages.
If the sender is anonymous, it is hard for both the sender of account information and the account
holder to collude in order to manipulate the account information. However, then the account holder set
might be a target of denial of service attacks or of false account information as it cannot be traced to the
responsible peer. A peer could do that in order to paralyse an account holder set for a specific time. Also,
a peer could try to harm another peer by guessing the token IDs of another peer and claiming these have
been spent.
If the sender is not anonymous, denial of service attacks or false account information could be traced
back to the sender. However, an account holder could contact a sender in order to ask if the sender is
willing to defraud the system. This attack requires the collusion of a specific number of account holders,
so that the false information will prevail when executing a consensus protocol on the account holder set.
False information is either missing information in order to prevent the early detection of potential
double spending or additional information in order to insert forged tokens into system. Double spending
will be detected in the token aggregation phase at the latest. Therefore, such an attack will not succeed.
For successfully inserting forged tokens into the system it is required that the defrauding peers are able
to forge the tokens’ system signature.
Accordingly, the described trade-off between the different possible autonomy choices has to be evalu-
ated. In case of sender anonymity, the attacks are initiated by peers requesting information storage in an
account. If the sender is not anonymous, the attacks have to be initiated by an account holder. Table 4.1
summarises these potential cheating and collusion attacks.
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Table 4.1: Potential Attacks Involving the Account Holder Set
Attacks in presence of sender anonymity Attacks in absence of sender anonymity
Denial of Service Collusion in order to inject false information
False account information
Guessing token IDs, claiming they have been spent
In conclusion, the attacks in the presence of sender anonymity outweigh the attacks in the absence
of sender anonymity. Therefore, for the token-based accounting scheme, a solution should be applied
where the account holder set is anonymous, but the sender of messages to an account holder set can be
clearly identified.
For anonymity in structured p2p systems different solutions have been proposed, which are reviewed
now.
4.2.1.1 Anonymity in Structured P2P Systems – Related Work
A traditional idea how to provide anonymity is mix systems. The idea was first presented in (Cha81).
Messages are routed over a multiple of hops, where each hop can determine just the previous hop
and the next hop the message travels. Therefore, an intermediate hop can not conclude the sender or
receiver. Furthermore, the sender sends the messages encrypted with each hops public key. At each
hop one encryption is removed. Therefore, the message appears different at each hop and an adversary
cannot observe which way a message is travelling. In (Cha88) an extension is presented that ensures
unconditional sender anonymity.
A variation of mixes is called Onion Routing and presented in (RSG98). Onion Routing aims at
hiding the sender and the receiver of real-time bidirectional communication and at protection against
eavesdropping. Onion Routing uses connections through a sequence of machines called onion routers.
Each onion router just knows its predecessor and its successor in a connection. Thus, sender and receiver
of data remain anonymous and can not be determined by observing the path a packet travels through the
network. Furthermore, data passed along the connection appears different at each hop. This is achieved
by encrypting the original message with several layers of encryption. Each packet p is encrypted with the
hops hi public key khi . A sender sends the encryption block {{...{{p}khl}khl−1 ...}kh2}kh1 . At each hop,
one layer of encryption is removed.
Tarzan (FSCM02) is a peer-to-peer based anonymous network layer. In a structured peer-to-peer
system, peers are used as proxies to create a tunnel with its endpoint being a NAT gateway1 to the IP
network. Each hop in the tunnel uses symmetric encryption. Furthermore, the onion routing mechanism
is also used. Therefore, data passed along the connection appears different at each hop.
In (HW02) Achord is presented, a variant of Chord (SMK+01) that supports anonymity in a DHT.
In Achord it is possible to insert data into the DHT or retrieve data from the DHT without revealing
the identity of the inserter or the retriever and that without revealing the identity of the peer storing a
document. In order to achieve this, the basic mechanism is tunnelling queries and the query responses
over several peers serving as proxies. A peer can not determine if the peer from which it receives a query
or query response is the originator of this message.
The AP3 architecture (MOP+04) uses a similar approach to Tarzan for achieving message anonymity.
Messages are forwarded over multiple peers to the target peer. The receiver is not able to determine
the sender. An anonymous return path is created in order to allow communication with the anonymous
sender. Secure anonymous pseudonyms ensure that both sender and receiver are anonymous. AP3 is
used for anonymous group communications.
1 NAT: Network Address Translation. For more details on NATs and firewalls see (Röd02).
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In (SL04) Agyaat is presented. It uses unstructured topologies over a structured p2p overlay to ensure
anonymity. Agyaat uses groups, clouds, that are connected with one group member to the DHT. A query
originates from a group of peers, but it cannot be determined from which peer exactly. The same is true
for a query receiver. Only the group identification will be know by other peers, however the exact peer
will not be identifiable.
(Cia05) focuses on recipient anonymity, which is much harder to achieve in a DHT then sender
anonymity. The presented solution subtracts a random value from the lower bound of its own address
interval. This is used to create imprecise fingers. This will not allow an adversary to map the address
space of the DHT. However, the author uses a different definition of the chordal ring DHT. A factor C
is introduced, called cutoff, which is the largest possible distance of a peer’s first finger from it self. It
becomes clear, that C is dependent on how dense the DHT ring is populated with peers. This, however,
cannot easily be determined exact in a p2p system. Therefore, this approach is difficult to deploy in an
actual p2p system. Furthermore, it only hides the exact overlay identification of nodes. However, it does
not provide real recipient anonymity.
A Stealth DHT is presented in (BMR+05). Nodes in the network join the DHT, however there are two
groups of nodes. Service nodes are normal DHT nodes as known from other DHTs like Pastry (RD01)
or Chord (SMK+01). Stealth nodes join the DHT but do not complete the full join process. Therefore,
they are invisible to the other nodes in the DHT. Stealth nodes can publish and search objects in the DHT,
however they do not receive and forward query messages. Also, they do not store references to objects.
As a result there is a super-peer network, but using only one DHT.
After reviewing the related work it remains an open issue how the requirements laid out in the previous
section could be met. The basic reason is that all of the presented mechanisms assume that the message
sender wants to stay anonymous, and only then can the recipient be anonymous. However, this violates
the requirements for the access of aggregation accounts as derived before. Hollick discusses in (Hol04)
solutions for dependable routing in cellular and ad hoc networks. However, anonymity is not part of his
solution. Thus a new mechanism must be developed. Potential solutions to this challenge are discussed
now.
4.2.1.2 Account Assignment
For the token-based accounting scheme, there are two options for which peers could be account holders,
either all of the peers or just the trusted peers can be account holders. The advantages of using all peers
as account holders are a more evenly distributed traffic load, and a higher number of peers involved
when new tokens are created and have to be added to an account. Then, in order to defraud the system
a much higher number of peers have to collude. According to the above security discussion, just using
trusted peers also has some advantages. In the absence of sender anonymity it is more unlikely that
trusted peers will collude in order to inject false account information into the system.
Due to these considerations, the advantages of using all peers as account holders outweigh the disad-
vantages.
In order to further minimise the possibility of collusion, two further prerequisites should be fulfilled.
First, the peers belonging to the same account holder set should be selected randomly. Second, the
account holders should not know whose aggregation account they are administering.
The random account holder set selection can be achieved in the token-based accounting scheme by
selecting a start peer for an account holder set and then selecting the k − 1 successor peers in the DHT
as further account holders for this aggregation account (k denotes the account holder set size). This
process is random, as the secure peer identification scheme presented in Section 4.1 is applied.
In order to avoid that an account holder easily learns whose aggregation account it is administering,
an account holder just knows the aggregation account identification (aggregation account ID). The ag-
gregation account ID is calculated using a one-way secure hash function of either the accounts owner’s
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Figure 4.1: Allowed account holder set positions
public key2 or the account owner’s overlay address (which is also derived from the peer’s public key and
therefore it is static). In order to avoid a peer becoming the account holder for its own account, a system
rule will be introduced, that the distance on the DHT between peer ID and aggregation account ID (and
between aggregation account ID and peer ID for DHTs with unidirectional distance measurement, like
in Chord (SMK+01)) should exceed a specific threshold. This threshold can be system size dependent,
that is, it becomes (absolutely) smaller the more peers are present in the system (see Figure 4.1). The
threshold a is set to a fraction r of the key space of the DHT S (a = Sr ). r is chosen in dependency of
the system size N to r = Npk , where k denotes the account holder set size and p is a security factor that
determines the distance in the DHT between the forbidden account positions and the allowed account
positions. How p is chosen depends on the assumption as to how evenly the peer IDs are distributed
over the ring. Thus, in a DHT where the nodes are completely evenly distributed, it is p = ak . For a
relatively even distribution p is set to 2 and accordingly r is set to r = N2k . In an evenly distributed DHT
the threshold would have to be the double size of the potential account holder set involving the account
owner.
4.2.1.3 Information Storage and Retrieval
As described above, when storing or retrieving information in or from an account holder set, it is crucial
that the actual location of the account holder set is kept secret from the peer accessing the account.
However, as indicated in the related work about anonymity in structured p2p systems, the requirements
of the token based accounting system are not met by any system discussed there. Therefore, a new
solution is required.
The basic goal of a solution sufficient for the problem of keeping the account holder set anonymous is
to decouple the aggregation account ID from its actual location in the structured p2p system. However,
there must still be a way to find the aggregation account in the structured p2p system.
2 Here it is crucial that two different one-way secure hash functions are used for the peer identification in the overlay and
the account identification
Chapter 4. Relevant Details About Protocols 71
PB
CP
1
1
PH1
accountholder set 2
3
3
4 }
x hops offset
PC
A
PA
Finger of PB
Figure 4.2: Aggregation account position and routing to an account
For the solution to this problem, it is assumed that the p2p overlay used for the account holder peers is
a DHT applying a ring topology. In order to decouple an account holder set location from the aggregation
account ID, the property of a DHT is used so that the peers are not completely evenly distributed over
the DHT ring and therefore, it is hard to predict the exact allocation from key ranges to peers.
Basic Mechanism
The solution that keeps the account holder anonymous from a peer requesting or sending information
to it is depicted in Figure 4.2. The first peer of an account holder set is not the peer responsible for the
aggregation account ID in the DHT, instead it is the peer following x hops this peer on the DHT. The value
x is called the Account Shift Value. Accordingly, whenever a peer PB sends a message the aggregation
account of a peer PA with aggregation account ID AAPA , the six steps of Algorithm 4.1 are executed:
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Algorithm 4.1 Information Storage and Retrieval for Aggregation Accounts
This algorithm is used for storing or retrieving information in an aggregation account given its aggregation
account ID AAPA .
1. PB sends an aggregation account message to the peer responsible on the DHT for AAPA . This peer
is PC .
2. PC receives the message. In its aggregation account query table it stores the query ID. It checks
whether this message is a valid message. If not, the message is discarded. If the message is valid,
it forwards the message to its successor peer on the DHT, PD.
3. PDreceives the message. It checks, whether this message is a valid message. If so, it checks if it is,
itself, an account holder for aggregation account AAPA . If so, it proceeds to step 5. Otherwise, it
forwards the message to its successor peer on the DHT, PE .
4. Step 3 is repeated until the message reaches the first peer in PA’s account holder set (denoted
PH1).
5. PH1 processes the message using Algorithm 4.11. If a response is required, the response message
is sent to PH1’s predecessor peer on the DHT.
6. A peer receiving a response message checks whether it has the query ID stored in its aggregation
account query table. If so, it sends the response back to PB, using the information stored in the
table. Otherwise, it forwards the message to its predecessor on the DHT.
Determination of the Account Shift Value x
The consequence of this mechanism is that a peer cannot determine which peer exactly processes an
aggregation account message. It also helps to avoid that a peer trying to access its own account, because
multiple of peers have to forward the message to the account. They check whether the account message
contains an operation valid in the token-based accounting scheme. If they discover an operation against
the rules of the system, they discard the message and send an accusation to the reputation system.
In order to ensure that this mechanism achieves its goal of message receiver anonymity, a peer (or
a multiple of peers in cooperation) mapping the DHT must be avoided. Accordingly, strict rules on
DHT-related messages must be applied. Achord (HW02) applies several techniques in order to achieve
this goal. When a node joins, Achord only allows it a modified version of the recursive method of
find_successor. During stabilisation only peer n is allowed to call find_successor(n), and here it is only the
interactive version. During lookups, a anonymity mechanism does not allow a peer receiving a lookup
message to determine the sender. Due to the anonymity and limited knowledge about the network, these
mechanisms are also well suited for the handling of aggregation accounts in the token-based accounting
scheme.
There are different alternatives for determining the account shift value x.
• System-wide fixed number: x is constant for all accounts in the p2p system and never changes.
x can be determined using trustworthiness considerations. The more hops a message has to be
forwarded to the account holder set, the higher is the probability that there is at least one good
peer that will discard messages that breach the system rules.
• Account specific fixed number: For each aggregation account i, an own value xi is determined
when the account in created. The account holder set also stores xi in order to ensure that the
account holder set can be located at the correct position in the DHT when the account holder
set moves due to peer joins and peer leaves. xi will be calculated using information stored in
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the aggregation account initially, that the account owning peer cannot know (see also Section
4.2.1.5). This information I is hashed and used to calculate xi using Equation 4.1, where d is the
average number of hops an aggregation account position can vary and o is the minimum offset of
an aggregation account position from the peer on the DHT responsible for the aggregation account
ID.
xi = o+ (hash(I) mod d) (4.1)
In order to initially create an aggregation account at the correct account holder set position, I must
be determined in a way that the account owning peer cannot learn it. Therefore, whenever a new
peer joins the system and an aggregation account needs to be created, the new peer will contact a
trusted peer. The trusted peer first will calculated the peer’s aggregation account ID xi. xi is then
used in the aggregation account creation mechanism, described in Section 4.2.1.5.
• Account specific variable number: In contrast to the second alternative, here xi is variable over
time. Thus, it is harder to determine the actual position of an account holder set. However, this also
means that the aggregation account has to be moved whenever xi changes. Therefore, the created
traffic overhead is higher. If xi changes over time, xi will be recalculated using the actual account
information as I in Equation 4.1. A recalculation can take place either periodically or with specific
accounting events. Such an event could be a token aggregation of the account owning peer. Each
time new own tokens are stored in the account, xi will be recalculated based on the new account
information. The exact information stored in the aggregation account cannot be determined by the
account owner. Therefore, it is also not able to calculate xi. Only account holders are able to do
this.
In order to determine the account shift value that x resp. xi should take, a probability-based solution is
applied. The aggregation account shift by value x serves the purpose of x peers checking whether the
message sent to the account holder set is an allowed message before the message reaches the account
holder set. Accordingly, x can be determined by calculating the probability that the message has to travel
over a least one good peer. Therefore, the Hyper-geometric distribution (BGG94) can be applied.
For the application of choosing x the probability pk>0 results in 1 − p(0,K, z, Z). Furthermore, there
must be an assumed specific ratio r of good peers in the p2p system (r = Z/K). Assuming there are Z
peers in the p2p system, the probability pA that the message is travelling over at least one good peer if
the account holder set position is shifted by x hops results in Equation 4.2.
pA(Z, r, x) = 1−
(
Z · (1− r)
x
)
(
Z
x
) (4.2)
Some results for pA are listed in Table 4.2.
In order to determine a good account shift value x, the ratio r of good peers in the system must be
estimated. There are no studies investigating how many peers in a p2p system act honestly and how
many peers do not, because this question has not arisen in p2p systems so far. As the token-based
accounting scheme is targeted for serious applications that include commercial applications, it can be
assumed that the majority of peers is interested in a trustworthy system. Accordingly, a value for r of
50% is assumed in the following.
Which value of x should be chosen is a trade-off between the achieved trustworthiness of the account
holder set lookup mechanism and the created traffic. When x is increased, the average number of hops
a lookup message travels is also increased. However, the complexity of a lookup operation remains at
O(logN).
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Table 4.2: Required Hops for Aggregation Account Shift for Z = 10000
pa r x
0,699281447 33% 3
0,865053996 33% 5
0,959449229 33% 8
0,981812011 33% 10
0,991843863 33% 12
0,996343223 33% 14
0,99836082 33% 16
0,99926537 33% 18
0,999670826 33% 20
pa r x
0,875037504 50% 3
0,937537502 50% 4
0,968781248 50% 5
0,984398433 50% 6
0,9922039 50% 7
0,99610468 50% 8
0,9980539 50% 9
0,999027826 50% 10
0,999757467 50% 12
pa r x
0,66 66% 1
0,884422442 66% 2
0,96071889 66% 3
0,986652202 66% 4
0,995465274 66% 5
0,99845969 66% 6
0,999476905 66% 7
0,99982239 66% 8
0,999939706 66% 9
A peer trying to find out the actual position of an account holder set has to assume that there is
a good peer in the lookup chain with a certain probability, and that this good peer will report the
attempted cheating to the reputation system. In order to avoid such an attempt it is sufficient to make
the probability of discovery sufficiently high so that no peer will try it. Therefore, a probability of larger
than 95% should be sufficient. Accordingly, for a ratio of 50% of good peers choosing 5 ≤ x ≤ 7
should be sufficient. For a less trustable system with a ratio of only 33% good peers x should be chosen
8 ≤ x ≤ 12.
For efficiency reasons a value Xmax (called Maximal Account Shift Value) should be known to the
system that is used when a specific account is accessed. Xmax specifies the maximum number of hops a
message should be forwarded when searching an account. If Xmax is reached before an account is found,
it is assumed that the account does not exist. Xmax should be set to a factor a > 1 of the maximum value
x can take (Xmax = a∗xmax). a is chosen greater 1 because an aggregation account can be shifted along
the DHT a few hops from its optimal location due to peer joins. For this mechanism to work efficiently
(i.e. an account is found if it exists and not too many messages are used if the account does not exist, a
value between 2 and 3 are reasonable).
Trustworthiness Discussion
The information storage and retrieval mechanism enables access to aggregation accounts where the
receiver is anonymous and the sender can clearly be identified. This is achieved by shifting aggregation
accounts a specific number of steps along the DHT-ring away from the peer responsible for the account
ID.
The anonymity of the storage and retrieval mechanism is not complete, and the location of an aggre-
gation account can be roughly estimated by other peers. However, an adversary that plans to cheat by
bribing or manipulating an account holder set, has either to send messages using the mechanism or to
try several peers until it finds the account. In both alternatives, an adversary cannot know if it will send
the message to a good peer that will report this to the reputation mechanism. This is the basic concept
of a mechanism. As an adversary must be afraid of being detected with a very high probability, it will
not start an attack.
One problem with the mechanism is the hop-by-hop forwarding along the ring. Malicious peers could
simply not forward these messages. An extension to the storage and retrieval mechanism can be applied
in order to detect such behaviour. A peer forwarding the access messages along the ring will send two
messages, one message to its first successor, another one to its second successor.3 If the second successor
does not receive a copy of the message from its predecessor, obviously it did not forward the message.
This behaviour should be reported to the reputation system and when repetitions occur, the malicious
peer should eventually be removed from the system.
3 In a chord ring, typically each peers stores ten successors.
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This mechanism can be applied for all protocols that apply forwarding along the DHT ring, like check-
ing for account existence (see below), etc.
4.2.1.4 Account Holder Set Size
For aggregation accounts, the position and the basic information storage and retrieval mechanisms have
been discussed. Still to be determined is the size of an account holder set storing an aggregation account.
An aggregation account is replicated over a set of account holders in order to ensure that in presence of
churn, the account information is not lost. The account holder set size is an additional security mecha-
nism. A peer is not allowed to access its own aggregation account, but can assume that its aggregation
account is available in order to avoid attempts at cheating.
In the related work different solutions have been researched for replica management in p2p systems.
On defines in (On04) availability in a redundancy-based system like the account holder set consisting
of peer as Availability = 1 − (pf )k, where pf is the probability of failure of one peer and k is the num-
ber of replicas, which is the account holder set size. Furthermore, On researches two different replica
placement strategies, proactive placement and on-the-fly placement. Proactive placement uses a priori
determined replica locations. On-the-fly placement uses a peer’s online time and uptime probability to
decide at which peers to replicate. Unfortunately, in the token-based accounting scheme these mecha-
nisms cannot be applied due to the mechanisms that increase the scheme’s trustworthiness.
Kneževic´ researches in (Kne07) a decentralised and self-adaptable replication protocol that is able
to guarantee high data availability and consistency in dynamic distributed hash tables. The protocol
measures the availability of peers and adapts the number of replicas according to this measurement. In
the researched protocol, mechanisms like account handover are not considered. Also, the churn model
applied does not conform to measurement results, e.g., like presented in (BQ04, SENB07b, SENB07a)
(BQ04, SENB07b, SENB07a). Therefore, it is not clear if this protocol could be successfully transferred
to the token-based accounting scheme.
Kangasharju presents in (KRR02) different heuristics for object replication in content distribution
networks. However, this problem is not closely related to the account holder set concept. Therefore,
these heuristics cannot be applied here.
Kneževic´ also studies in (Kne07) the related work in p2p replication management extensively. He
concludes that most approaches assume that peer availability is fairly high, stable, and known in advance.
However, this cannot be assumed. Also, due to these assumptions, there is no replication mechanism
that conforms with the requirements of the token-based accounting scheme, which arise mainly from the
mechanisms for enhancing the scheme’s trustworthiness.
Kneževic´ protocol seems to be interesting to adapt it to the token-based accounting scheme. However,
for evaluation purposes of the token-based accounting scheme, a specific account holder set size needs
to be assumed. Therefore, in Chapter 5, the required account holder set size will be determined in the
presence of the mechanisms maintaining the account holder sets, which will be discussed within this
chapter. Using a mechanism that adapts the account holder set size according to churn can be added to
the token-based accounting scheme in a further step.
4.2.1.5 Aggregation Account Creation
Having solved the problems where the account holder set should be located, how large the account
holder set should be, and how peers can submit and request account information, there are two questions
remaining.
1. How is a new account for a new peer created?
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2. How can a peer determine if it should belong to a specific account holder set? And as a sub-
question: How can a peer determine if it is still the first peer of a specific account holder set?
However, before a new aggregation account will be created, a peer must first detect that this account is
missing.
Checking for Account Existence
A peer P1 (for example a trusted peer) that requires knowledge as to whether the aggregation account
for a peer PC exists will use Algorithm 4.2 (see Appendix D.1.1.1 of details). P1 sends a
check_aggregation_account-message to the peer responsible for PC ’s aggregation accountID AAIDC . This
message contains a hopcounter, initially set to -1. First, the message receiver checks if it is responsible for
this account. If not, it starts forwarding the message along the DHT ring, into both directions (because
the account could have shifted behind this peer). Each message receiver increases the hopcounter by one
before forwarding the message to its successor on the DHT. The message is forwarded either until a peer
receives the message that is responsible for the account, or until the hopcounter reaches its predefined
maximum Xmax (see Section 4.2.1.2). In the latter case it is assumed that the account does not exist.
Then, the peer increasing the hopcounter to its maximum will create an aggregation_account_failure-
message and send it to P1. Now, P1 can request the creation of the aggregation account for PC .
If the aggregation account exists, P1 will receive an aggregation_account_status-message from a peer
hosting the account. In order to keep the account location confidential it is important that this message
is sender anonymous, i.e. it is a UDP-based message.
Aggregation Account Creation
In order to understand how a new account for a peer is created it must first be understood when this
is required and which instance of the p2p system is triggering an account creation.
A new peer can exist in the p2p system without owning an aggregation account. It can offer services
and receive foreign tokens in return. Only if a peer wants to have own tokens it requires an aggregation
account. Accordingly, the mechanism described in Algorithm 4.3 (see Appendix D.1.1.1 for details) is
applied in order to create an aggregation account. The mechanism achieves the goal of a trustworthy
account creation, that is, the exact account position will be only be known by the trusted peer requesting
the account creation. Figure 4.3 depicts Algorithm 4.3.
In the first step, a peer Pnew, which does not own an aggregation account yet, requests new tokens. In
order to do that the token aggregation protocol is applied. The trusted peer responsible for creating the
new tokens, TP1, will check if Pnew ’s aggregation account exists already using Algorithm 4.2 (step 2). If
this account does not exist (step 3), the TP1 will first calculate the aggregation accountID for Pnew (see
Section 4.2.1.2) (step 3a). Then, TP1 looks up the peer responsible for this ID in the DHT, PC (step 3b).
The next steps should now determine the exact account position on the DHT, but without compromising
the position to the other peers, and without enabling TP1 to map big parts of the DHT. Therefore, the
trusted peer has to determine the account position in several steps (step 3f). The exact account position
depends on the account shift value x, which TP1 has to calculate first. Strategies for determining x have
been discussed in Section 4.2.1. First, TP1 will send a request_peer-message to P ′Cs successor on the DHT.
PC ’s successor will be determined by executing a lookup on the DHT of PC ’s peerID plus a small integer
value, e.g., 1, in order to get an ID in the successor’s ID range. The message requests PC ’s y1-th successor
on the DHT, where y1 is a random value between 0 and x-2. This message contains a hopcounter set to
yi. PC will decrease the hopcounter by 1 and forward the message to its successor. Each peer receiving
the request_peer-message will decrease the hopcounter by one and forward the message to its successor.
The peer that receives a request_account-message with a hopcounter of 0 sends its successor’s peerID
(peerID of Pk) to TP1. In order to conceal as much of the account creation process as possible, now TP1
sends another request_peer-message to Pk ’s successor containing a hopcounter set to y2. This is done by
increasing Pk ’s peerID by a small value, at least by 1. This is repeated until TP1 locates the peer that is
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Figure 4.3: Aggregation account creation algorithm
located at x hops distance from PC . TP1 has to chose the y-values according to the Equation 4.3, where
r is the number of request_peer-messages sent.
1 + 2r +
∑ r
i = 1
yr = x (4.3)
According to Equation 4.3 x is restricted to a specific set of values. Especially for small x, Algorithm
4.3 can be modified in step 3(6)2 that Pi is used as Pj and not Pi’s successor.
When TP1 has located the peer with x hops distance from PC , TP1 sends an init_aggregation_account-
message to it (step 3g). This peer is called PAH1, as it will be the first account holder in the ac-
count holder set of that account. This message contains the aggregation account ID of the aggrega-
tion account to be created. After creating the account using Algorithm 4.4, PAH1 sends an aggrega-
tion_account_confirmed-message to TP1, confirming that the account was created (step 3h). In the last
step of the algorithm, Pnew ’s account is ready to be used and TP1 will create the requested tokens for
Pnew and store the corresponding information in the aggregation account using Algorithm 4.11.
When a new aggregation account is to be created, the account has to be initialised after the posi-
tion of the account was determined. The aggregation account initialisation describes Algorithm 4.4
(see Appendix D.1.1.1 of details). After the first peer of the future account holder set has received
the init_aggregation_account-message containing the aggregation account ID (step 1), it has to form the
account holder set. Therefore, it creates an create_aggregation_account-message and forwards it to its
successor on the DHT (step 2). This message contains the aggregation account ID, its peerID, and a hop-
counter set to 1. The hopcounter has the job of keeping track of the account holder set size. Furthermore
the peer remembers the hopcounter position as its position within the account holder set. This is required
for Algorithm 4.6. The peerID is the first entry in a list that will contain all account holders at the end
of step 4. A peer receiving the create_aggregation_account-message will add its peerID to the list and
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increase the hopcounter by one. It remembers the hopcounter’s value as its own position within the ac-
count holder set. Then it will forward the message to its successor on the DHT (step 4). This is repeated
until the hopcounter reaches the preferred account holder set size (see Section 5.2.2) or until the mes-
sage has traversed the complete DHT ring. The latter situation happens only in very small systems. This
peer is the last peer in the account holder set. It will create an aggregation_account_complete-message.
This message announces the membership in account holder set to all account holders. It contains the
list of peerIDs from the create_aggregation_account-message. The message is sent back hop by hop over
all account holders to the first account holder PAH1 (step 5). Each peer instantiates a new aggregation
account and stores the list of peerIDs as current account holder set in the account. When PAH1 receives
the message it additionally creates an aggregation_account_complete-message for the trusted peer that
initiated the account creation (step 6).
Trustworthiness Discussion
The account creation mechanism uses a multi-lookup approach executed by a trusted peer in order to
approach the account position. This way no normal peer learns the exact account position.
During the account creation process a trusted peer learns the position of the aggregation account
created. Also, it gains partial knowledge about the area of the DHT-ring where the aggregation account
is located. An adversarial trusted peer could exploit this knowledge in order to directly address an
aggregation account. However, the exact position of the account in the DHT-ring changes as soon as a
peer joins or leaves between the account ID and the aggregation account position. Furthermore, each
account holder will check if messages sent to the aggregation account are valid messages or not. As the
account holders are selected randomly, an adversarial trusted peer has to assume that its attack will be
reported to the reputation system. This aggravates all attempts at forming a coalition of colluding peers.
Also, at account creation time it is not interesting to try to take control over an aggregation account,
because it does not contain a lot of information. If an adversarial trusted peer generates an account at
a wrong position, account management will repair that. As a result, there are no serious trust issues
during an account creation process.
4.2.2 Account Holder Set Maintenance
Whenever a peer joins or leaves the p2p system account holder sets may be affected and aggregation
accounts might have to be moved. There are four different cases that might occur:
• A new peer joins the system at a position in the DHT between the peer responsible for an aggrega-
tion account ID and the account holder set. Accordingly, the distance of the account holder set to
the peer responsible for the aggregation account ID increases.
• A new peer joins the system at a position in the DHT between the first and the last peer of an
account holder set. Accordingly, the account holder set is not a continuous chain of peers anymore.
• A peer leaves that is located in the DHT between the peer responsible for an aggregation account
ID and the account holder set. Accordingly, the distance of the account holder set to the peer
responsible for the aggregation account ID decreases.
• An account holder leaves the system. Accordingly the aggregation account is one replica short.
All these cases need to be handled. Obviously, the latter case is the most critical one. If such events
accumulate, an aggregation account might be lost. In order to handle these cases, the aggregation
account management can be structured in three algorithms: Detection of replica numbers, detection of
correct account holder set position, and account movement. Keeping the replicas consistent is discussed
in Section 4.2.4.
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4.2.2.1 Detection of Replica Number
Before any of the other two algorithms are executed, an account holder set has to determine if it is still
complete, i.e. if an account holder left the system without a handover of the aggregation account to
another peer. In order to check if the account holder set is still complete, Algorithm 4.5 is applied. The
algorithm can be initiated by any account holder. In order to keep track of an aggregation account, the
algorithm needs to be executed periodically. Thus, any account holder that did not receive a detect_AHSS-
message for a specific time span will initiate Algorithm 4.5. The algorithm uses reliable authenticated
connections, as all account holders must know each other and anonymity is not desired within an account
holder set.
As explained in Algorithm 4.4, each account holder holds a list of all current account holders in the set.
The account holder initialising the algorithm sends a message to all account holders it currently knows,
containing the list of current account holders. Each peer receiving this message will update the received
list according to its current knowledge and replies with an updated list. Finally, the initialising account
holder composes the actual list of account holders according to the received responses, distributes this
to the other current account holders, and informs peers which are not an account holder anymore. If
the number of current account holders is below the target account holder set size, it initialises adding an
account holder or the detection of the correct account position algorithm (Algorithm 4.6).
For details about this algorithm see Appendix D.1.1.2.
Trustworthiness Discussion
The mechanism to detect the current account holder set size uses one-to-all communication within
the set in order to count how many peers respond. In this mechanism, there is no possibility for a
cheating peer to influence the resulting account holder set size. If the account holder administering
this mechanism is malicious, it could send a wrong table of actual account holders to set. However, any
account holder is free to check if the old account holders still exists. If this is performed on a random basis
a malicious peer could be detected and reported to the reputation system. Furthermore, the overhead is
kept low.
Account holders could also try to free-ride and not respond to any access requests. However, it could
still respond to the detect_AHSS-Algorithm in order to hide its free-riding. Such free-riding is best de-
tected by the first account holder, because it detects account holders different response behaviour to
different message types. Free-riding peers will be reported to the reputation system.
In conclusion, the detect_AHSS-Algorithm does not raise any trust issues.
4.2.2.2 Detection of Correct Account Holder Set Position
Each account holder set must check periodically whether the aggregation account is still located at the
correct position in the DHT. The position changes through joins and leaves of peers that are located
between the peer responsible for the aggregation account’s account ID and the actual account position
(which is determined by the account shift value x).
In order to determine if an account needs to be moved, Algorithm 4.6 is applied. The first account
holder PAH1 of an aggregation account send a message containing a random value to the peer that is
responsible for the aggregation account’s accountID in the DHT. The random value serves as hopcounter
and PAH1 remembers the value. The peer receiving the message increases the hopcounter by one and
forwards the message along the DHT ring. Each peer receiving the message will do the same. When PAH1
receives the message again, it can compute the current account offset using the current hopcounter value
of the message and the initial hopcounter value. If the result differs from the account shift value x, then
PAH1 initialises Algorithm 4.8 for moving the aggregation account.
For details about the algorithm see Appendix D.1.1.3.
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Trustworthiness Discussion
This mechanism determines the current account offset uses a random counter in order to count the
hops between the peer responsible in the DHT-ring for the account holders account ID and the current
first holder. This mechanism does not introduce any trust issues, because manipulations of the hop-
counter by malicious peers would be repaired when the account is relocated.
4.2.2.3 Account Holder Set Locking
Before an account can actually be moved, it has to be ensured that the account holder set is not processing
any aa_write_requests in parallel. Otherwise, inconsistencies within the account holder set cannot be
avoided. An aa_write_request is used to add new accounting information to an aggregation account (see
Algorithm 4.11). The challenge to solve is that even in the presence of competing lock requests from
different peers, an unanimous result is achieved. In order to achieve this, a variation of the Strawman
Protocol presented in (LLZ04) is applied.
First, the peer requesting a lock PAHX creates a request_account_lock-message, which it forwards to all
account holders of aggregation account AAID. All account holders receiving this message will respond
with a lock-message to all other account holders in order to confirm the lock request. When an account
holder has received more than 50% of the potential lock-messages, it sends a lock-confirm message to
the initialising peer PAHX . When PAHX received more than 50% of the potential lock-confirm-messages
the account is locked and PAHX can continue with the next action, account movement.
This algorithm has a message complexity of O(k2); thus, it is desirable to find another, more efficient
locking algorithm. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
For further details about the aggregation account locking algorithm see Appendix D.1.1.4.
4.2.2.4 Account Movement
The account movement algorithm is used for two purposes. First, it moves an aggregation account to
the correct location on the DHT. Second, it creates a subsequent account holder set with the correct size.
In order to achieve this, the algorithm is split into two parts. The first part verifies the location of the
first account holder. The second part actually moves the aggregation account to the new position. The
algorithms are similar to the account creation (Algorithm 4.6) described in Section 4.2.1.5.
The first part, Algorithm 4.8, is executed by the first account holder of the set, PAH1 . However,
the consistency of all account holders must first be ensured. Otherwise, during the account movement
existing inconsistencies could increase.
When the new account holders are determined, each new account holder will receive the account data
from the corresponding peer in the old account holder set.
Details about the two algorithms are described in Appendix D.1.1.5.
Trustworthiness Discussion
The account-movement algorithm moves an aggregation account from one account holder set to an-
other account holder set. In order to do that, first the new account position is determined using a trusted
peer, because otherwise normal peers could learn the exact start position of the account.
A cheating trusted peer could exploit the mechanism for determining a new account position (Al-
gorithm 4.8) for mapping parts of the DHT-ring. Specifically, a trusted peer could start Algorithm 4.8
without the request for this. Repeating this algorithm for the same part of the DHT-ring will finally re-
veal its complete structure. This would enable it to initialise a collusion attack on specific aggregation
accounts. Therefore, it is crucial that peers receiving messages of Algorithm 4.8 repeatedly with in a
short period of time, request a confirm for this action from the first account holder.
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4.2.2.5 Graceful Aggregation Account Handover
In order to avoid a completely new account assignment when an account holder leaves the p2p system,
an account holder should handover the accounts it hosts to another peer. Whenever an account holder
plans to leave the system it will execute Algorithm 4.10 in order to do a clean log off. This is called
Graceful Handover. In order to do this, the peer leaving the p2p system Po contacts the last account
holder in the set Pk. Pk will send an account handover request to its successors until it finds a peer that
is available Pk+1. Pk will inform Po about Pk+1 and Po sends its account data to Pk+1. Then all account
holders are informed about the change in the set.
The peer leaving the p2p system Po has to perform the graceful handover for all the aggregation
accounts it hosts.
Further details about the algorithm are described in Appendix D.1.1.6.
Trustworthiness Discussion
The graceful handover algorithm allows a peer that goes offline to transfer its account information to
a new account holder before it leaves the system. This is a slim mechanism in the sense that there is no
consistency within the aggregation account achieved. It is assumed that the handing over peer hands
over the account truthfully, i.e. does not manipulate the account information. The algorithms presented
in the following will achieve consistency for an aggregation account, i.e., it would repair potential false
information injected by a cheating peer. As these mechanism will be executed periodically, potential
inconsistencies can be tolerated here.
4.2.3 Information Storage
In the previous sections the location, the creation, and the management of an account holder set has been
described. Now, it will be explained how account information is stored in an account holder set. This is
composed of two parts. These are the process of posting new information into an aggregation account,
and the process of querying an account for information. It is also the structure of the information stored
in an aggregation account.
4.2.3.1 Storing Information in an Account Holder Set
There are two situations when information is stored at an account holder set. The first situation is a
token aggregation, when the information about the new tokens issued to the account owner has to be
submitted. The second situation is during a transaction when tokens are transferred. Here, different
types of information can be stored.
For both situations, it is important that the information is stored in a trustworthy manner. It must be
clear which peer is submitting information. Only this allows for checking whether the message is sent
by a peer that is allowed to submit information to the account holder set.4 Furthermore, the submitted
information must be correct, i.e. it must be ensured that it has not been altered. Due to these two
reasons, all messages sent to account holder sets must be authenticated and the messages’ integrity must
be ensured. That is, it is required that the messages are signed by the sender (submitter).
In order to ensure that no conflicts occur within an aggregation account replica, each account holder
maintains a FIFO-queue for requesting and posting account information. The FIFO-queue, which is part
of the account information, is also transferred with any account movement. Algorithm 4.11 is used
for both account information requests and account information posts. The algorithm’s first message is
4 Account owners are under no circumstances allowed to store information in their own account. Other peers are only
allowed to store information at the mentioned situations.
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chosen according to the purpose of the algorithm execution. The peer PA requesting information or
posting information from /to aggregation account AA
ID
will create an a_request-message and send it to
peer PC , which is responsible for AA
ID
on the DHT (steps 1- 3). From PC the message is routed hop
by hop along the DHT until an account holder for aggregation account AA
ID
is reached (step 4). While
the message is forwarded, each peer receiving the message will check if it is an allowed action for the
querying/posting peer. Peers may not query/post to their own aggregation account. A message for an
action that is not permitted will be dropped and a reputation report will be filed about it.
When the aa_request-message reaches an account holder, it will create an enqueue_aa_request-message
from the request message, and forward it to all account holders. This message is identified by the account
holder sending the message in a time stamp it adds. This message is used to enqueue it in each account
holders event queue. This is required in order to achieve consistency within the account holder set. Thus,
each account holder has the same set of events enqueued in its event queue, although not necessarily
in the same order. Therefore, a consistent locking of the accounts for account management operations
using Algorithm 4.7 is possible.
The account holder receiving the aa_request-message first, PAH1 , will distribute the created
enqueue_aa_request-message to the remaining account holders. Each account holder will enqueue the
contained aa_request into its event queue (step 5). The event queue is a FIFO queue. When the
aa_request is processed, a response is generated. The response is either the response to a query or it
is a post confirmation.
For a write request, it must be ensured that all or at least the majority of the account holders write the
new information into the account. For account queries this is not required. Therefore, aa_read_responses
are send back directly to peer PA. However, aa_write_responses are sent to PAH1 (step 6).
PAH1 collects all responses. If it receives consistent responses from more than half of all account
holders (step 6.b.i), the information was successfully posted into the account holder set. Then, PAH1 will
forward the aa_response-message to PA, using an anonymous connection, e.g., UDP (step 6b). However,
PAH1 may have received inconsistent messages. If this is the case, it executes Algorithm 4.12.
If PAH1 receives response messages from less than half of the account holders (step 6.b.ii), the infor-
mation could not be successfully posted into the account holder set. Therefore, it is necessary for the
account holder set to be re-established using Algorithms 4.5, 4.6, and 4.8. Therefore, PAH1 creates a
re-enqueue_aa_request-message. This is used to undo the effects of the aa_write_request and execute it
again after the account holder set is re-established. Therefore, the re-enqueue_aa_request-message locks
the account holder set in order to execute an account management round. After the round, the account
holders process the aa_write_request again and send an aa_response (step 8).
The last case that may occur is that PAH1 is receiving response messages from more than half of the
account holders, however, less than half of all account holders send consistent messages (step 6.b.iii).
That is, there are still enough account holders active, however their accounts are inconsistent. Then
PAH1will also send a re-enqueue_aa_request-message to all account holders and execute afterwards the
account consistency algorithm, Algorithm 4.12. This will ensure that the aa_write_request is reprocessed
on a consistent account holder set.
The detailed mechanism is stated in Appendix D.1.2.1.
Trustworthiness Discussion
The algorithm for posting and querying information from an aggregation account extends Algorithm
4.11. Request messages are sent to the peer responsible for the account ID. From there, the message
is forwarded along the DHT-ring to the first account holder of the corresponding aggregation account.
The forwarding peers as well as the account holders check if the message initiator is allowed to query
or post information. There are two situations when information can be posted to a peer’s aggregation
account. Transaction partners are allowed to post information during the transaction, and trusted peers
are allowed to post information during an aggregation process.
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Table 4.3: Account Holder Set Information
General Information
Account ID Account
holder set
Event queue
Tokens
Issuing Information Usage Information
Date & Time Serial
Number
remarks
(intended to
spend)
Receiver Date & Time Submitter
... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 4.4: Aggregation Information Stored In Aggregation Accounts
Token Aggregations
Date & Time Administrator
Hash
Administrator
Peer ID
Quorum Hash Quorum
Peers IDs
In the trustworthy transaction process, first the tokens intended to spent will be reported to the account
holder set. As the tokens’ serial numbers are random, the transaction partner can only report these
tokens if a trustworthy transaction process is ongoing. During an aggregation process the account holder
set first determines the aggregation administrator and afterwards the quorum (the exact mechanism
will be described below). The quorum peers also get notified about the aggregation administrator so,
quorum peers can determine if the message sender of partial tokens is the aggregation administrator.
Furthermore, the account holder set can determine if the quorum reporting the new tokens to it is the
selected one.
Posting information to an aggregation account is only possible for allowed situations. Posts in all
other situations will be reported to the reputation system. Cheating and collusion can be successfully
prevented.
4.2.3.2 Structure of the Aggregation Account Information
The information stored in an aggregation account serves the purpose of administering in a trustworthy
manner, which tokens have been issued to the account holder, and which tokens the account holder
has sent. Furthermore, some remarks need to be stored, for example, for the Trustworthy Transaction
Protocol (3.7), a token must be able to mark as intended to spent.
Thus, Table 4.3 shows the structure of the information stored in an aggregation account. It is split
into two parts. The general information is required for managing the aggregation account. The token
section stores for each token the issuing information required for clearly identifying a token. The usage
information is added or modified with each transaction or token aggregation that the token is used in.
Consistency of the aggregation account information refers to the token section. Each line (i.e. each
token) can be observed individually by the consistency mechanism.
In order to enhance the trustworthiness of the issuing information, the quorum and aggregation ad-
ministrator could also be stored for each aggregation process. If it would be controversial if a token was
created according to the aggregation protocol, this information can be used to contact the trusted peers
to determine if they took over the stated role in this aggregation process. The required information is
stated in Table 4.4. It is important to note, that the account holders fill in this information by themselves.
Other peers cannot influence this information.
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4.2.4 Consensus Mechanism
The consensus mechanism is responsible for keeping the information stored in one aggregation account
consistent over all account holders. In this section, first the prerequisites for the consensus mechanisms
are explained, then the related work about consensus protocols is presented, and then the selected
protocol is explained. Finally, it is explained when this protocol is to be executed and how this is
triggered.
4.2.4.1 Prerequisites and Requirements
The data stored at the account holders is a list of tokens issued to the account owner. In this list,
additional information is added each time a token is used. As explained before, each entry contains a
time stamp of the peer’s local time submitting the entry. Furthermore, it contains the submitters ID.
4.2.4.2 Related Work on Consensus Protocols
The literature distinguishes three kinds of consensus protocols (CDK02).
The first one is the normal consensus. Here all participating processes suggest a value and all of these
processes have finally to agree which value is the correct one.
The second type is the Byzantine Generals problem (LSP82), where one process is suggesting a value
and all other processes have to agree on that value. Another consensus protocol type that has been
suggested recently is the Paxos protocol (Lam01, Lam98). Like in the Byzantine Generals problem,
here one process suggests a value and all other participating processes have to agree to this value. The
original protocol does not work with Byzantine failures; however it was extended to do this in (Mar05).
The third type is the interactive consistency, where each participating process is suggesting a value.
The goal is that all correct processes agree on a vector with the suggested values. Obviously, for keeping
an account holder set in the token-based accounting scheme consistent, the normal consensus is required.
Furthermore, different failure models are used. In the normal failure, model processes can fail, how-
ever, they cannot act maliciously by adopting a faulty value. The Byzantine failure model is extended to
the possibility.
Surprisingly, the most successful consensus protocols in the distributed systems area are not the results
of modern research, but have been invented early in the first millennium. Accordingly, these protocols
have been named after their ancient archetypes. They are the already mentioned Byzantine consensus
protocols and the Paxos consensus protocols. The Byzantine consensus protocol can be further divided in
the contributions that build on Practical Byzantine Fault-tolerance, first presented by Castro and Liskov
in (CL99), and the contributions that reduce the number of communication steps, which started with
the work by Malkhi and Reiter (MR97).
However, there are two major problems when these consensus mechanisms should be applied to p2p
systems. First, in (FLP85) it is proved that there is no algorithm that guarantees consensus in an asyn-
chronous system where processes might fail. Second, the theoretic lower bound of required processes is
3f + 1,where f is the number of faulty processes involved in the consensus mechanism (PSL80). That
means for p2p systems, it must be guaranteed that in an account holder set of four peers at most one
is faulty; in an account holder set of seven peers at least 2 must be faulty. Depending on the ratio of
dishonest peers in the p2p system the probabilities for achieving this requirement are relatively low (see
Table 4.5). For larger systems sizes the probabilities of Table 4.5 only change marginally. These probabil-
ities are not sufficient for p2p systems as it must be assumed that the good peers in the system represent
not more than 50% of the total peers. Also, here the highest probabilities can be achieved for small ac-
count holder sets. This result is contrary to the availability requirement of an account holder set, which
improves with larger account holder sets. Furthermore, these mechanisms are relatively expensive, as
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Table 4.5: Probabilities for Byzantine Consensus Compliant Account Holder Sets for System Size of 1000
Peers
Percentage of Good Peers
Account
Holder
Set Size
33,33% 50% 66,67% 80%
4 11,04% 31,21% 59,32% 82,10%
7 4,45% 22,57% 57,14% 85,44%
10 1,90% 17,06% 56,02% 88,19%
13 0,84% 13,18% 55,31% 90,40%
16 0,37% 10,32% 54,81% 92,16%
19 0,17% 8,15% 54,43% 93,58%
22 0,08% 6,48% 54,14% 94,73%
their message complexity has typically the complexity of O(k2), where k is the account holder set size.
Accordingly, it is questionable if Byzantine consensus protocols should be applied in the p2p context.
Nevertheless, in (TBLB06) PaxonDHT is presented that builds the Paxos consensus protocol on top
of Pastry (RD01) in order to achieve total order agreement. Byzantine failures are not considered.
Therefore, in the probabilistic analysis only peer departures are considered, not potential opportunistic
or malicious peer behaviour. If the probabilities in Table 4.5 are also considered, the probability for an
account holder set that fulfils the requirements for Paxos is too low. Therefore, this approach cannot be
used for the token-based accounting scheme.
Due to the lack of a consensus algorithm that matches the requirements of the token-based accounting
scheme, a simple majority-based approach was selected that is presented now. This approach can be
replaced with an improved algorithm as the research in the field progresses.
4.2.4.3 Account Holder Set Consensus Mechanism
The consensus mechanism creates consensus between the account holders’ token sets. One account
holder takes the lead for achieving consensus in the complete set. The peer PAH1 first creates an ag-
gregation account summary (step a). It serves the purpose of enabling quick line-by-line comparisons.
For each token line, it builds the hash value over the issuing information as line index and another hash
value over the usage information as line value. This account summary is sent to all account holders
in order to request a consistency check using request_consistency_check-messages (step b). The account
holders receiving a request_consistency_check-message (PAHX ) will also build an account summary (step
c). They will compare the account summaries line-by-line. If both account summaries are consistent,
peer PAHX will respond to PAH1 with a consistent_account-message. When there inconsistencies PAHX
creates a differences report, diff(SID1 , S
ID
X ). This report contains the full information of the token line
that differs and not the hash values. Otherwise the account holders cannot evaluate which entry is the
correct one. The report is sent to all account holders using request_update-messages.
Each account holder will collect the consistent_account-messages and the request_update-messages
from all account holders (step d). As this algorithm is only executed either if the account holder set
was re-established, or if more than half of all account holders answered to an aa_write_request, at least
half of all account holders should reply. Also, PAH1 will send a difference report to the other account
holders.
If differences exist in the usage information of a token, it must be decided which entries are correct
(step e). A line’s correct usage information is determined based on simple majority. If an account holder
is missing token lines it means that it is missing the existence of this token. In order to avoid peers easily
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adding forged tokens to their aggregation account, additional lines are only accepted if at least a specific
ratio of account holders pnl of account holders contain already this line. If this is not the case, the line
must be deleted (step f).
Each account holder accepts changes to its account based on a local decision. Therefore, after the
peers have updated their aggregation account, the consistency algorithm needs to be repeated, until
consistency is achieved.
The probability of adding a new line to an aggregation account pnl is a critical system variable. If it is
set close to one, the possibility of adding forged tokens to an account is almost eliminated. On the other
side, a peer might lose correct tokens, because they are being deleted when only one or two account
holders are accidentally missing this line in the account. A good value for pnl is application dependent.
Though, as a reference point it should not be smaller than 50% in order to offer higher requirements
for adding additional tokens to an account. Also, depending on the preferred account holder size, pnl
should be also chosen. That way, that there is at least one peer tolerated that differs in the tokens stored
in the account.
The consistency algorithm is critical to the purpose of the account holder set. Therefore, in general
account holders that do not follow this algorithm are reported to the reputation system.
For cases when a decision about which token line is the correct is ambiguous (such cases cannot be
ruled out), the consistency mechanism can be extended by a call back function. The leading account
holder tries to contact the peer stated as receiver of the token and request information as to whether
it really owns this token. The message is sent anonymously containing just the account ID as response
address. The token receiver is able to respond to the message using an aa_request-message.
The exact consistency mechanism is stated in Appendix D.1.3.1.
Trustworthiness Discussion
The aggregation account consistency mechanism is executed by one account holder that sends its
account summary to all other account holders. The account holders respond with the differences or with
a confirm. The consistency is achieved using simple majority.
As simple majority is used to achieve aggregation account consistency the token-based accounting
scheme requires that there are at least 3 account holders present when the consistency mechanism
is executed. With only two account holders present, a decision about the correct account status is
impossible. However, missed transactions can be reconstructed, because aggregation accounts store a
history of changes. The history can be verified by contacting transaction partners.
A potential attack of an adversary could be to gain control over a majority of peers in an account
holder set. Then it could manipulate this aggregation account. However, this requires knowledge by
the adversary about the peers in the account holder set. This is difficult to achieve due to the access
mechanism that provides a certain degree of anonymity to account holders. Therefore, an attack from
inside an account holder set is the most likely scenario. Here, the adversary could change the status
information of tokens. If there are inconsistencies between the existing tokens and the aggregation
account the correct status can still be accomplished, although this requires effort and time, as it is
unlikely that all transaction partners are online when account information is to be reconstructed. Hence,
even if such an attack is successful, in order to have impact on the token-based accounting scheme, the
existing tokens would also have to mirror the information in the aggregation account.
In conclusion, an attack on the consistency of an aggregation account can be seen as malicious be-
haviour, as repairing the account information generates high effort. Cheating using the mechanism is
only possible in combination with forgery of tokens.
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(a) Trusted peers in both overlays (b) Simplified depiction
Figure 4.4: Trusted peer overlay and system overlay
4.3 Trusted Peers
The trusted peers are an important concept of the token-based accounting scheme. In the token-based
accounting scheme, the operations requiring a high degree of security and trust are delegated to the
trusted peers. Therefore, it is important that the trusted peers are protected against unauthorised in-
truders. Thus, a peer must earn its place as trusted peer by achieving a high reputation value. In the
following the organisation of the trusted peers, the assignment process for a normal peer to become a
trusted peer, and the exclusion of untrustworthy peers is discussed. As a conclusion, the incentives for
being a trusted peer are briefly described.
4.3.1 Organisation
In the token-based accounting scheme the trusted peers are mainly used for creating and signing new
tokens. The shared scheme’s private key used for this requires key maintenance, which again requires
that the trusted peers are able to exchange messages between them. It is preferable that normal peers do
not get involved in this process for security reasons. The less knowledge normal peers have about these
activities, the smaller is the risk of misuse of this knowledge.
Thus, trusted peers are organised in their own overlay network. As it is required by the key mainte-
nance algorithms to route to specific peers efficiently, a structured p2p overlay is chosen. A trusted peer
is always a member of both overlays, so it can take part in transactions and token aggregations as normal
peer. Figure 4.4 a) depicts both overlays, where the black nodes are trusted peers, that are present in
both overlays. However in the following, the idealised depiction of Figure 4.4 b) is used in order to
explain the concepts that use both overlays. This figure implies that trusted peers have the same order
in both overlays, but this is not the case.
It enhances the security of the system if peers cannot simply map trusted peer overlay addresses
to normal overlay addresses, because it increases the difficulty of cooperation between trusted peers
outside the trusted peer overlay, which is not planned by the token-based accounting scheme. Therefore,
the trusted peer overlay uses different overlay IDs, so a trusted peer cannot be reached at the same
overlay address in both overlays.
In order to allow that actions in the trusted peer overlay are clearly attributable to trusted peers, secure
overlay addresses are also applied here, as described in Section 3.1.
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4.3.2 Number of Trusted Peers
For the token-based accounting scheme it would be helpful to determine how many peers should become
a trusted peer or which ratio of trusted peers to normal peers is optimal. The optimal ratio could be
determined by finding the ratio where the average traffic for a single trusted peer is minimal. The traffic
increases with the number of token aggregations the trusted peers is involved in. This number decreases
with an increasing number of trusted peers, as the probability for being selected as a quorum peer or
aggregating peer decreases. On the other hand, the more trusted peers exist, the more costly the system
key maintenance becomes (see Section 4.5).
Determining this ratio is possible, however it is application dependent as the token aggregation be-
haviour depends on the average frequency peers are involved in transactions and how many tokens are
aggregated on average per transaction between the transaction partners. Furthermore, to apply the op-
timal ratio of trusted peers to normal peers the actual number of peers online in both overlays must be
determined.
In structured overlays like Chord (SMK+01), a peer can estimate the number of peers by analysing
its successors and fingers, and concluding how densely the Chord ring is populated. The accuracy of
this method depends on how evenly the peers are distributed over the ring. In general, it is assumed
that random unique identifiers are distributed relatively evenly over the key space. In the token-based
accounting scheme, the peer IDs are a hash value of the peers public key. Also, the hash functions
generate values that are distributed relatively even over the key space. Therefore, the requirements to
apply these methods are met.
A further mechanism for aggregating information in peer-to-peer systems, like determining the number
of peers present in the system, was presented by Kempe in (KDG03). This mechanism can be applied in
unstructured overlay networks, however it relies on propagating messages through the complete overlay
network.
Using the presented alternatives, in the token-based accounting mechanism a trusted peer can estimate
the number of normal peers and trusted peers in present in the system, and thus, can decide if additional
trusted peers are required.
4.3.3 Assignment
Only peers that have a reputation value above a specific threshold are allowed to be trusted peers. This
threshold is reputation system dependent.
For assigning a new peer as trusted peer, first an active trusted peer has to decide which normal peer
should become a trusted peer.
The trusted peer to administer this process can be decided, e.g., by a simple rule. For example, the
active trusted peer with the highest trusted peer ID should monitor the number of trusted peers in the
system. In a structured overlay system like Chord, a peer can decide which peer should be promoted
by analysing its successor list. There is no harm to the system if even a small number of trusted peers
monitor the number of trusted peers and assign new trusted peers as necessary, because it is not possible
to create more than the targeted number of trusted peers. Another alternative to determine the trusted
peer with the highest peer ID in the trusted peer overlay is to apply Kempe’s mechanism to aggregate
information (KDG03).
There are two alternatives for deciding which normal peer should become a trusted peer. If the
reputation system allows the searching of peers by reputation, a normal peer with one of the highest
reputation values existing in the p2p system is selected. Otherwise, trusted peers learn another peer’s
reputation value when they engage in transactions with the peer. This way, a trusted peer gets to know
a normal peer with very good reputation, it can be assigned as trusted peer.
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To become a trusted peer, the existing trusted peer has to first disclose the function that determines a
trusted peer’s overlay address to the normal peer. Then, the new trusted peer is inserted in the trusted
peer overlay. As last step, the new trusted peer must request a part of the shared private key, as described
in Section 4.5.2.
The key assignment requires a group decision of t trusted peers, where t is the threshold value of the
applied proactive threshold cryptography scheme. Accordingly, at least t trusted peers have to agree that
further trusted peers are required. Simply accepting a normal peer in the trusted peers’ overlay is not
sufficient.
4.3.4 Exclusion
Whenever a trusted peer’s reputation falls below the threshold required for being a trusted peer, they
must be excluded permanently from the trusted peer overlay. Therefore, it must be stored somewhere
that this peer is not allowed to log on to the board overlay anymore. The expelled peer cannot be simply
published in the trusted peers’ overlay’s DHT as the peer would be responsible for storing its own peer ID
as sign for exclusion. Therefore, as a simple alternative, the inverted peerID of expelled peers is stored
in the trusted peer overlay. For this purpose, the trusted peers’ overlay is required to provide redundant
caching in order to avoid stored keys getting lost when peers leave the overlay. As an alternative, the
peerIDs of expelled trusted peers could also be stored in the account holder sets, where mechanisms for
conserving account information exist and could also be applied for expelled trusted peers.
In the trusted peer overlay, each peer periodically looks up all of its connections on the DHT to see if
one of these peers has been published on the DHT. Such a peer should be disconnected from the trusted
peer overlay as quickly as possible. Therefore, a trusted peer TP discovering that another peer TPE is to
be expelled, closes the connection to this peer. In order to accelerate the exclusion, it also informs TPE ’s
predecessor on the DHT about the exclusion. TPE ’s predecessor typically maintains a finger to TPE ’s
successor, so that also this peer can close the connection to TPE . This process is continued, until TPE is
isolated in the trusted peer overlay.
With each forced disconnect of an expelled peer a system key update phase (see Section 4.5.4) is
started in order to invalidate the expelled peer’s system key share.
When a peer Pr requests a re-connect to the trusted peer overlay, the peer contacted Pc for joining will
check if Pr ’s trusted peerID was published as expelled. If this is the case, Pc will not respond to Pr so
that Pr cannot connect to the overlay.
4.3.5 Incentives
Being a trusted peer in the p2p system basically higher traffic for the node. If bandwidth is a scarce
resource for a peer, it is probably not willing to take on the additional resource consumption of a trusted
peer. Therefore, incentives should be created for being a trusted peer.
A clear incentive within the token-based accounting scheme are tokens. Therefore, for each token
aggregation process, the peer aggregating foreign tokens could receive an extra number of tokens. This
extra number should be distributed among the peers that participated in creating and signing its new
tokens.
Furthermore incentives could be application specific, like better positions in the transaction partners
queues or the exclusion from other application specific duties like cashing, replication, or relaying.
90 4.3. Trusted Peers
4.3.6 Finding Trusted Peers
Several protocols of the token-based accounting scheme require that a normal peer contacts a trusted
peer. Normal peers do not have access to the trusted peer overlay for security reasons. Therefore, trusted
peers must be found on the system overlay. To do the lookup of a trusted peer efficiently on the system
peer overlay an additional functionality is required. Each peer maintains a finger to the next trusted peer
on the DHT. This information is maintained with a few simple operations. When a new normal peer Pn
joins the system overlay its successor will send Pn the overlay address of the next trusted peer it knows.
Pn will store it. When a new trusted peer joins the system overlay, it will send its own overlay address as
next trusted peer to its predecessor in the DHT. The predecessor will forward this information backwards
along the DHT until the next trusted peer is reached. This can efficiently be done within normal overlay
maintenance messages. Leaves of trusted peers are handled similarly. When the trusted peer TP1 left the
system, the peers maintaining a finger to that trusted peer will lookup TP1’s overlay address. The result
is TP1’s successor in the DHT, will respond with the overlay address of the trusted peer TP2 it maintains
a finger to. Now the peers can update their finger to TP2. This is the Locate Trusted Peer Algorithm
(Algorithm 4.13) described in Appendix D.2.1.
Depending on the applied DHT, the finger to the next trusted peer will either be an extra finger (e.g.,
in Chord (SMK+01)) or it also can be one of the normal fingers a peer maintains in more flexible DHTs
like Kademlia (MM02).
The Locate Trusted Peer Algorithm is most frequently used during the token aggregation process. Next,
an extension to this protocol is described that further enhances its trustworthiness.
4.4 Secure Aggregation Protocol
The token aggregation protocol as presented in Section 3.5 has a security weakness. The trusted peer
creating the new tokens can create any number of new tokens. The aggregating peer might bribe the
trusted peer in order to get additional tokens. In order to avoid this, a simple solution could be applied.
The foreign tokens that are to be aggregated are sent to all quorum peers. They will verify that the
number of new tokens created is correct. However, this is expensive in terms of the required traffic,
as the complete foreign tokens are required to be sent. The quorum peers are required to check the
signatures to validate the tokens. Furthermore, the quorum peers should also check for double spending.
A second approach that produces less traffic uses the organisation of the trusted peers in a separate
overlay. The idea is to use a step of indirection to conceal from the aggregating peer the trusted peer
that is creating the new tokens. The aggregating peer should not select the trusted peer that is creating
the tokens, nor should it be able to influence the selection. Therefore, a process that randomises the
selection of the aggregation peer and the quorum is integrated in the protocol.
4.4.1 Protocol Details
The secure token aggregation protocol starts like the normal aggregation protocol. The swapping peer
SP sends the tokens it plans to aggregate for new own tokens to a random trusted peer TP1 of its
choices (step 1). However, because SP chooses this peer, it cannot be trusted. For example, SP could
have bribed TP1. Therefore, TP1 will forward the tokens to another randomly selected trusted peer
TP2. The challenge is, that the random selection must be verifiable in a later step of the protocol.
Otherwise, SP could simply select a colluding peer. Thus, in step 2 TP1 will contact SP ’s account holder
set by sending a request_account_stamp-message. Each peer in SP ’s account holder set will receive the
message and will calculate a hash value hSP of the current account information. This hash value is
random and its result cannot be influenced, as the content it is created from is fixed for this point of
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Figure 4.5: Secure token aggregation protocol - part 1
time. Using Algorithm 4.13 described in Appendix D.2.1 the account holder set locates the next trusted
peer of hSP in the system overlay. If it is TP1 (the peer it received the request_account_stamp-message
from), it inverts the result and repeats Algorithm 4.13. The resulting trusted peer is TP2. TP2 is called
the aggregation administrator. The account holder set is responding to TP1 with TP2’s peerID.
TP1 receives TP2’s peerID and forwards SP ’s aggregation request to TP2 (step 3). TP2 will calculate
how many tokens SP should receive and create this number of fresh tokens (step 4).
Now, like in the normal token aggregation protocol, TP2 sends the new tokens’ issuing information to
SP ’s account holder set (step 5). The account holders will check if the message was sent by the peer
they selected before as TP2. If not, they will file a reputation report against the sender. Otherwise,
the account holders add the tokens to the account with the remark “preliminary”, because it will be
confirmed later by the quorum that these tokens are correct.
In step 6 TP2 will send the fresh tokens to the quorum in order to let them partially sign. Equivalent
to selecting randomly TP2, in this step it is also crucial that the quorum be selected randomly. For this
purpose a hash of the account information is used. The account information has been updated with the
new tokens. The resulting hash value is denoted h′SP . In the response to the aa-write-request TP2 sent to
the account holder set in step 5, the account holder set will send a list of t trusted peers to SP2, where
t is the quorum size. The quorum is selected by locating the t next trusted peers of h′SP . The quorum
peers are denoted QP1 to QPt. In the quorum TP1 and TP2 may also take part, as the peers are selected
randomly and the quorum as a whole can be trusted.
In step 6 TP2 sends the fresh tokens to the selected quorum peers. For a system with very high
security requirements the responsibility of calculating how many new tokens should be created cannot
be assigned to a single peer. In such application scenarios, the foreign tokens are also sent to the quorum
peers. The quorum peers can now verify the number of new tokens created. The distribution of the
foreign tokens to the quorum peers consumes a lot of bandwidth at TP2 as the foreign token message is
the largest message transferred in the token aggregation protocol and this message must be sent t times
by TP2.
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Figure 4.6: Secure token aggregation protocol - part 2
The quorum peers receive the fresh tokens and send the token IDs to SP ’s account holder set in order
to verify the new tokens. The account holder set will only accept the verifications from the trusted peers
it selected in step 5.
In step 8 the quorum peers sign the fresh tokens partially and send them to SP . SP will combine the
token’s signature and create new own tokens.
The detailed algorithm is stated in Appendix D.3.1.
4.4.2 Trustworthiness Discussion
According to the assumption the token-based accounting scheme is built on, Sybil attacks (Dou02) and
whitewashing can be successfully prevented. Therefore, this discussion concentrates on the remaining
attacks by cheating and collusion. Because tokens are the means for controlling access to accounted
resources and services, cheating and collusion have as their aim either the injection of forged tokens into
the system or the double spending of tokens.
The secure token aggregation protocol offers the ability to select a random peer as aggregation ad-
ministrator that will create the new tokens and the ability to select a random quorum that signs the
new tokens. The randomness of the aggregation administrator selection can be verified by the quorum.
The randomness of the quorum selection can be verified by the account holder set. This has the goal of
making it sufficiently hard to create forged tokens.
When all mechanisms for enhancing the trustworthiness of the token-based accounting scheme are
applied, there remain two different situations wherein a peer could defraud the system.
• The cheating peer’s account holder set is colluding and the defrauding peer has the knowl-
edge of the scheme’s private key. Here, the cheating peer can itself create tokens. However, in
order to inject these into the system, it requires a colluding account holder set that will omit the
checks of the sender, and simply add the tokens to the cheating peer’s aggregation account.
• The cheating peer’s account holder set colludes and t trusted peers are colluding with cheat-
ing peer. The new tokens are signed by the colluding trusted peers and sent to the account holder
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Figure 4.7: Secure token aggregation protocol - part 3
set. The account holder set will omit the checking of the senders, and simply add the new tokens
to the cheating peers aggregation account.
In both settings fraud can be detected if the account information is checked frequently and the trusted
peers that were supposed to act as aggregation administrator or quorum are not colluding. It is assumed
that the account information cannot be manipulated in a way that a hash collision is created that has the
aggregation administrator and the quorum as result, which is valid as a secure hash function is assumed.
Section 4.2 explained that a peer is not allowed to contact its account holder set and that the messages
sent there are inspected by a number of other peers. Also, the location of the account holder set has a
certain degree of anonymity and it changes frequently with joins and leaves of peers. Therefore, it is
very hard for a peer to make its account holder set collude in the fraud.
Also, the key management protocols described in the next section aim at avoiding the system key from
being compromised.
4.5 System Key Maintenance Protocols
System Key Maintenance is a collection of protocols for initially assigning shares of the scheme’s private
key to an initial set of peers during bootstrapping (Initialisation Phase), creating new key shares for new
trusted peers or for trusted peers that have lost their share due to missed updates (Recovery Phase), and
share updates in order to keep the private system key secure over a longer period of time (Update Phase).
In order to keep the scheme’s private key secret, all these mechanisms are performed in a separate
overlay network. Thus, each trusted peer owns two peer IDs, a normal peer ID and a trusted peer ID in
the trusted peer overlay network. The selection of trusted peers was already discussed in Section 4.3.
The phases differ depending on the cryptography scheme used. As described above, either the Thresh-
old BLS-scheme (Bol03) or the URSA-scheme will be applied. As Threshold BLS is the preferred solution,
the detailed key maintenance protocols for it will be described here first, and afterwards the adaptations
of the URSA scheme will be covered. The protocols are described in detail in the literature and will be
discussed here briefly in order to understand the requirements and the resulting traffic.
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Table 4.6: Notation for Analytical Comparison of Share Distribution Strategies
Variable Description Size [Byte]
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit on Data Link Layer 1500
r Length of a modulo
l Message information
v Traffic volume
rRSA Length of RSA modulo 128
rBLS, q Length of BLS modulo q 20
rBLS, p Length of BLS modulo p 64
lID Length overlay ID 16
ldel Delimiter. Used in messages to delimit application
level information fields
2
lTCP Length of TCP header 10
lIP Length of IP header 10
ldouble Length of a double value 8
llong Length of a long value 8
T Total number of trusted peers 1000
t Threshold of token-based accounting scheme 17
β Size of update group
τ Number of partitions in tree-based distribution
In general in this section, the group of peers generating update shares will be denoted as B of size β.
A group of trusted peers recovering another peers Pr ’s share will be denoted D.
4.5.1 Assumptions
For an analytical traffic evaluation of the protocols presented below, it is assumed that all trusted peers
own a 1024 bit RSA key pair, that can be used for signing and encrypting message content. BLS is a pure
signature scheme and therefore it is inapplicable as a key pair for trusted peers.
For BLS, the typically applied modulo length of modulo q = 160bit and modulo p = 512bit are used.
As message delimiter of message fields 2 Bytes are used.
For the evaluation the messages sent on the application layer are analysed. Furthermore, message
fragmentation into IP packets is considered. Below the network layer, the IP packets may travel over
many different data link technologies. Due to this heterogeneity, headers from the data link layer are no
longer taken into consideration.
For the analysis, it is assumed that TCP and IP are used for the data transfer. In order to take message
fragmentation into IP packets into account, an MTU of 1500 Bytes is assumed.
Table 4.6 summarises the notation used for the analysis as well as the remaining assumptions.
4.5.2 Initialisation Phase
In the initialisation phase, each trusted peer Pi receives a share xi. For both threshold schemes applied,
it required that each trusted peer has a unique ID i that serves as the x-value in Shamir’s secret sharing
that is applied by these schemes. The peer IDs must be in accordance to the applied scheme, i.e. peer
IDs must not be larger than the order of the share generator polynomial. For Threshold BLS the peerIDs
must be of order Zq, where q typically is a 160 bit number. For URSA the peer IDs must be of order
ZN , where N is typically 1024 bit or larger. Accordingly, when building the trusted peer overlay, the
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key space used when Threshold BLS is applied must not be larger then q. In order to ensure that the
key space should be distinctively smaller then q, e.g., for a q of 160 bit a key space of 128 bit should
be chosen. For URSA these restrictions are not important as typically DHT-key spaces are distinctively
smaller than 1024 bit.
For the initial key generation and assignment, both schemes have in common that a group of peers is
required that have to collaborate. For this purpose they require knowledge of the group’s peer IDs. For
bootstrapping it can be assumed that this group exists; e.g., the application developer provides a group
of peers in order to start-up the system. The minimum size of the group depends on the initial threshold
tinital of the accounting scheme.
4.5.2.1 Initialisation Phase with Threshold BLS
Threshold BLS-scheme (Bol03) applies (GJKR99) for a distributed generation of the initial shares xi of
the private key x.
The group of peers generating the initial shares xi first perform a Pedersen-Verifiable Secret Sharing of
a random value zi. The algorithm is described in detail in (GJKR99). Using polynomials of degree t− 1
the minimum size of the group of peers is t in order to reconstruct the shares xi.
Each peer Pi selects two random polynomials fi(z) and f ′i(z) over Zq of degree t − 1 and computes
the shares sij and s′ij for all other peer Pj . Then each Pi distributes these values together with the
verification values Cik to all Pj . If there are any complaints two additional broadcasting rounds are
required. Each Pi can now compute its shares xi and x′i using xi =
∑
j sji and x
′
i =
∑
j s
′
ji. In order to
compute the public key y = gx mod p each player exposes its yi = gxi mod p using Feldman Verifiable
Secret Sharing. Then the public key is computed using y =
∏
i yi mod p.
In summary, the initialisation phase for Threshold BLS requires two broadcasting rounds. Assuming
a modulus p of length rBLS, p = 512 bit and an exponent x of length rBLS, q = 160 bit (as suggested in
(STY07)), the messages in the first round have the size of three times 512 bits (plus message delimiting
headers fields of length ldel). In the second broadcasting round each message has to carry a verification
value of 512 bits.
Accordingly, the total upload traffic generated during this phase results in:
VBLS, init = t(t− 1) · (2rBLS, q + rBLS, p + 3ldel) + t(t− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel)
This is 3,38 kBytes using a threshold of t = 17 and the assumptions in Table 4.6.
Thus, the overall traffic grows with O(t2). The upload traffic per peer generated results in:
vBLS, init = (t− 1)(2rBLS, q + rBLS, p + 3ldel) + (t− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel)
This corresponds to 57.38 kBytes.
Thus, the traffic per peer grows linearly with O(t).
In conclusion, the Threshold BLS initialisation is an efficient way to compute a shared secret private
key for the token-based accounting scheme.
4.5.2.2 Initialisation Phase with URSA
URSA is based on RSA signatures. Creating a shared RSA key in a distributed way is very costly compared
to generating a shared key in BLS. The reason is that RSA requires a secret pair of prime p and q. Boneh
and Franklin presented a mechanism to generate a shared RSA key in (BF01).
The distributed RSA key generation according to (BF01) uses four phases. In the first phase, shared q
and p are generated using polynomial secret sharing. Also, q and p are tested with trial divisions if they
are prime. This requires a broadcasting round by each Pi for distributing the individual qij and pij to all
Pj and another broadcasting round to distribute the results of the trial division. This phase is repeated
until a q and a p are found that are not divisible by any prime less than some bound B1.
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Using the qi and pi from the first phase in the second phase, N is computed using a distributed
mechanism that does not reveal knowledge about qi and pi. In order to share qi and pi, each peer Pi
again uses polynomial secret sharing. This requires one broadcasting round and another one for sharing
the computed Ni.
In phase three, the found N is tested to understand whether or not it is divisible by small primes in
the range [B1, B2] for some bound B2. If this test fails the protocol is restarted from phase one. In this
phase, first all peers agree on a random value g ∈ Z∗N . Here we assume that one party selects this value
in order to avoid another round of polynomial secret sharing. All peers now have to compute a value vi
and share it will all other peers in the group. This is another broadcasting round. vi is required for the
first test if N is a prime. For the second test (a Fermat test) each peer computes a value ui and shares it
with all Pj . This is another broadcasting round.
If the first three phases were successful, in phase four the public exponent is computed in a distributed
way, again using a round of polynomial secret sharing and one round of additive secret sharing.
As shown in (ABF+99) the generated traffic is not deterministic due to the distributed guessing of
primes. As several broadcasting rounds are used to check if a number is prime, the generated traffic
grows exponentially with an increased group size t.
In conclusion, when URSA is used, an application developer should consider generating the system
key and the initial set of shares on a trusted server and creating additional shares using the recovery
phase.
4.5.3 Recovery Phase
The recovery phase is used to create a new share xj for a peer Pj using a group of peers of minimum
size t. The recovery phase can be used for recovery a lost share of Pj or generating a completely new
share for a new trusted peer. This is possible if the threshold scheme applied is based on Shamir’s Secret
Sharing and not on additive sharing. Both Threshold BLS as well as URSA meet this requirement.
As in p2p systems peers are subject to churn they might miss a share renewal. In order to make the
version of a share obvious to peers in all messages of the protocols described below we add a version
number.
4.5.3.1 Recovery Phase with Threshold BLS
The recovery phase is used to create a new share xj for a peer Pj using a group of peers of minimum
size t. The recovery phase can be used for recovery a lost share of Pj or generating a completely new
share for a new trusted peer. This is possible if the threshold scheme applied is based on Shamir’s Secret
Sharing and not on additive sharing. Both Threshold BLS as well as URSA meet this requirement.
As in p2p systems, peers are subject to churn meaning they might miss a share renewal. In order to
make the version of a share obvious to peers in all messages of the protocols described below, we add a
version number.
Simple Recovery
For recovery a share xr of peer Pr a group of a trusted peers D of minimum size t is required. The
simple protocol requires four steps. First each Pi ∈ D picks a random (t − 1)-degree polynomial δi(·) ∈
Zq [z] such that δi(r) = 0. In step 2, each Pi distributes the individual values δi(j) to all other peers Pj in
D. In step 3, each peer Pi now computes its new share of xr by adding the received values to its share
xi: x′i = xi +
∑
j∈D δj(i). In the final step 4, all peers Pi send their x
′
i to Pr. Pr can now reconstruct its
share xr by interpolating the received x′i.
Accordingly, for an update group of size t, there are t(t−1)+t messages required to recover one share;
each of the messages carries a payload of rBLS, q = 160 bit plus the version number (ldel + ldouble).
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Using the assumptions from Table 4.6, this is 0.86 kBytes upload traffic per peer Pi for a threshold
t = 17, taking IP and TCP headers into account. The complete upload traffic created over all peers results
in 14.68 kBytes.
Verifiable Recovery
In the version of the protocol enabling share verification in step 2 each peer also broadcasts the t − 1
verification values gδim together with the shares to the recovery group. The verification values are
also sent to Pr. Therefore, the payload of each message sent to the recovery group in step two is
t · rBLS, p + rBLS, q = (t · 512 + 160) bit plus formatting headers. The messages sent to Pr have the
payload of t · rBLS, p = t · 512 bit plus formatting headers. Furthermore, the payload should be signed by
Pi with its private key.
In order to verify the received shares and verification values, each peer Pi performs two local tests. If
there are any accusations, the accused peers are now excluded from the recovery group.
Step three remains unchanged, except all messages are also signed by the sender. In step four, us-
ing the verification values Pr can verify the shares received from the recovery group. It uses only the
shares it could validate for reconstruction. Like in the simple recovery Pr reconstructs its share xr using
interpolation.
The upload traffic per peer Pi results in
vBLS, recovery = (t− 1)(t · rBLS, p + rBLS, q + rsig + (t+ 2)ldel + ldel + ldouble)
+(t · rBLS, p + rsig + (t+ 1)ldel + (rBLS, q + rsig + 2ldel + ldel + ldouble)
Using a threshold t = 17 and the assumptions from Table 4.6, this is 21.68 kBytes.
Accordingly, the overall upload traffic generated results in
VBLS, recovery = t(t− 1)(t · rBLS, p + rBLS, q + rsig + (t+ 2)ldel + ldel + ldouble)
+t · (t · rBLS, p + rsig + (t+ 1)rheader + t(rBLS, q + rsig + 2ldel + ldel + ldouble)
This corresponds to 368.59 kBytes.
Conclusion
This recovery protocol was not designed for p2p systems but for much smaller systems, i.e. a small
set of servers. However, BLS verifiable share recovery is not prohibitively expensive in p2p systems. In
(HJJK97) it is assumed that the initial recovery group consists of all system peers that do not need to
recover a share. This assumption is not required for p2p systems. The minimum group size is t. In order
to have some redundancy the group can be chosen to be larger. The overall traffic grows with O(t3), the
total amount of messages grows with O(t2). The traffic per peer grows with O(t2), and the number of
messages grows linearly with O(t).
4.5.3.2 Recovery Phase with URSA
Simple Recovery
In URSA, basically the same recovery method (LKZ+04, HJKY95, HJJK97) is applied as is used for
Threshold BLS. Here also, the minimum group size of peers Pi recovering a share for peer Pr is t. There is
only one difference introduced (KZL+01, LL00). In (HJKY95, HJJK97), recovery polynomials are used
with δi(r) = 0. URSA uses random values, shuffling factors, instead. This way it can be avoided that Pr
can learn any xi. The t trusted peers in D communicate in advance and exchange shuffling factors dij in
pairs (Pi, Pj). Within one pair, the peer with the higher peer ID treats a shuffling factor as positive, the
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peer with the lower peer ID adds the numbers as negative. Each peer in the recovery group D receives
t − 1 shuffling factors dij . Each peer Pi computes its modified share x′i = xi +
∑t
j=1,j 6=i sign(i − j)dij ,
where sign(x) = 1 if x > 0 and sign(x) = −1 if x < 0. Then, each Pi sends its x′i to Pr. Pr can now
recover its share xr using interpolation.
Assuming, the shuffling factors have a maximum size of the RSA-modulus N, the upload traffic gener-
ated by this mechanism results in:
vURSA, recovery = (t− 1)(rRSA + ldel) + (rRSA + ldel)
Using the assumptions from Table 4.6, this is 2.66 kBytes of traffic for a threshold t = 17, taking IP
and TCP headers into account.
Accordingly, the complete upload traffic created results in:
VURSA, recovery = t((t− 1)(rRSA + ldel) + (rRSA + ldel))
Accordingly, this is 45.16 kBytes of traffic.
Verifiable Recovery
In (LL00, KZL+01, LKZ+04) it is stated that either Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (Fel87) or
Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (Ped91b) can be applied. However, this is not true, because:
gsi mod N = g
∑t−1
j=0 δj(i
j mod N) mod N 6= g
∑t−1
j=0 δji
j
mod N
Possibly, there are ways to circumvent this problem in URSA. However, this is not focus of this disser-
tation. Accordingly, here URSA is considered without share verification.
Conclusion
The key recovery using URSA creates more traffic than the Threshold BLS alternative. This is due to
the larger size of the RSA modulus. The number of messages sent is the same.
Share verification is not yet available for URSA. Accordingly, when doing share recovery it can be
meaningful to use groups larger then t for key recovery, in order to add redundancy for malicious peers
in the group.
4.5.4 Share Renewal in the Update Phase
The purpose of the update phase is to keep the scheme’s private key secret over a longer period of time.
In threshold cryptography, adversaries try to get knowledge of at least t shares in order to learn the secret
key x. A key update will change all key shares. Therefore, learnt key shares are useless for an adversary
after an update phase. Share updates are a basic requirement for keeping a shared key secret over time.
During an update phase, each share of the private key is changed in such a way that the private key and
the corresponding public key will not be affected. However, each share xi will change. The basic idea in
order to achieve this is to update the private key’s sharing polynomial by adding to it new polynomials δ
with δ(0) = 0.
Also, verification values will be updated using gf
new
k = gfk ·∏∀i∈B gδik(modp), where B is the group
of trusted peers generating share updates and i are their peer IDs, and k is the index of the parameters
of the sharing polynomial f(x) = s+
∑
fkx
k or update polynomial δ(x) =
∑
δkx
k.
Due to missed key updates, a trusted peer’s share can become outdated rendering it useless for the
trusted peer. In this case, a trusted peer can use the recovery phase describe above in order to retrieve
again its valid share. In order to make peers aware if they missed a renewal, version numbers are
included in the messages.
It is important to note that with an update phase the threshold t of the applied threshold scheme can
be increased. Due to the use of polynomial sharing, by adding an update polynomial δ with δ(0) = 0 of
degree (tnew − 1) > (t − 1) the new sharing polynomial will have degree (tnew − 1) and the threshold
will increase to tnew. This is an elegant way to adjust a low threshold during bootstrapping over time
according to number of trusted peers in the system.
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The new verification values can be computed, by assuming that the sharing polynomial coefficients
fk for (t − 1) < k < (tnew − 1) were 0 before. Accordingly, the new verification values result in∏
∀i∈B g
δik(modp) for (t− 1) < k < (tnew − 1).
Here, the protocols for share renewal are presented. The related literature on proactive secret sharing
(e.g. (HJKY95, HJJK97, FGMY97a, FGMY97b, Rab98, SW99, FMY99, CKLS02, NNPV02b, NNPV02a,
Bol03, NN04, JSY04, JS05)) typically assumes a small scale scenario with only a few servers that will
receive a key renewal. Accordingly, the distribution of the share update is not discussed in here. However,
the update distribution strategy is a highly relevant challenge when proactive secret sharing is applied
to p2p systems. Therefore, this is discussed in below in Section 4.6
4.5.4.1 Share Renewal with Threshold BLS
Threshold BLS supports a simple share renewal protocol that is secure against passive attackers and a
verifiable share renewal protocol that is also secure in the presence of active attackers.
Simple Share Renewal
The share renewal protocol requires a group B of trusted peers of size β to compute and distribute the
update shares. This group can have any size. The simple share renewal protocol consists of three steps.
In the first step, each peer Pb in B picks a random polynomial δb in Zq of degree t− 1 with δb(0) = 0. In
step 2, each Pi computes ubj = δi(j)(modq) for all other peers Pj that should receive an update. Then,
each Pb sends these values to all Pj secretly. In the last step, all peers Pi wait to receive all ubi from B.
Then they compute their new share x(k)i = x
(k−1)
i + (u1i + ...+ uβi), where k denotes the update phase.
Then they erase all variables they used (except of its current share x(k)i ).
The traffic generated per peer Pb in B depends on the number of peer to be updated n:
vBLS, renewal = n ∗ (rBLS, q + ldel)
Total traffic generated also depends on the size β of the group of updating peers B:
VBLS, renewal = β · n ∗ (rBLS, q + ldel)
Verifiable Share Renewal
In verifiable share renewal, each update peer Pb in B also distributes the verification values bm =
gδbm(modp) for its update polynomial δb together with the update shares ubj (where δbm are the coeffi-
cients of δb). Also, each Pb signs the messages with its own private key. When a Pj receives all update
shares it verifies them using the verification values. If Pj could verify all shares, it will broadcast an
acceptance message. Otherwise it will file an accusation.
Using verification values does not increase the number of messages sent during an update phase. It
only increases the message sizes. The traffic generated per peer Pb in B results in
vBLS, renewal = n ∗ (rBLS, q + ldel + (t− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel) + ldel)
Total traffic generated also depends on the size β of the group of updating peers B:
VBLS, renewal = β · n ∗ (rBLS, q + ldel + (t− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel) + ldel)
Conclusion
The cryptographic operations within an update phase are the least demanding of all proactive phases.
However, the amount of information to distribute is the highest. Accordingly, it must be decided, if each
peer Pb within the updating group of peers B should send individual messages to all n peers that should
receive an update, or if another method for distributing the information is more efficient. This issue will
be discussed in Section 4.6.
Also, in a p2p system it is an open issue how efficiently accusations could be resolved and therefore, if
the use of verification values during an update phase will add significant security. This will be addressed
in Section 4.5.5.
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4.5.4.2 Share Renewal with URSA
Share renewal with URSA uses the same mechanism as Threshold BLS for renewing shares (LKZ+04,
HJKY95, HJJK97). The version numbers we introduced for Threshold BLS will also be used here. Fur-
thermore, as described above, verification cannot simply be applied.
The traffic generated per peer Pb in B depends on the number of peer to be updated n:
vURSArenewal = n ∗ (rRSA + ldel)
Total traffic generated also depends on the size β of the group of updating peers B:
VURSA, renewal = β · n ∗ (rRSA + ldel)
Conclusion
Verification of shares for share renewal cannot be yet applied. However, as discussed below, it is
questionable if verification of updates is meaningful at all in p2p system. URSA based share renewal
generates more traffic than Threshold BLS share renewal due to the larger modulus of RSA.
Also, for URSA the best way of distributing updates, and the most efficient ratio of key updates and
key recovery in a p2p system are open issues. Fortunately, for share renewal the message flow is the
same as for Threshold BLS share renewal. Therefore, the same distribution strategy can be applied for
both proactive threshold schemes.
4.5.5 Handling Accusations in the Update Phase
During system key maintenance accusations are used to detect, advertise, and exclude peers that violate
the protocols. When an accusation is filed during any of the system key maintenance protocols, according
to (HJJK97) two actions are planned: The first action is not to use the polynomial δi and its resulting
shares provided by peer Pi. It is important that all peers that plan to use δi are informed about the
accusation. The second step is to “alert system management” in order to take measures to rectify the
misbehaving peer.
As there is no central system management in the token-based accounting scheme, both actions must
be merged. This is done via filing a complaint to the reputation system if the verification fails. Before
computing the new share, peers have to wait a small period of time in order to allow potential complaints
to be filed. Then peers could query the reputation system. This is efficient for share recovery, however
in case of share renewal it implies heavy load for the reputation system. Therefore, it depends on the
number of trusted peers as well as the reputation system if this method can be applied. If for key update
distribution, a tree based distribution strategy is applied complaints could also be distributed with the
updates along the tree (see next Section 4.6).
Nonetheless, in a p2p system an intelligent active attacker within the updating peers is hard to identify
and to distinguish from malicious peers being updated. An attacker with the group of updating peers
B could distribute false shares to only some peers. In this case it is hard to decide if the attacker is the
updating peer, or the updated peer that just claims it received a false share in order to attack the update
process.
Therefore, it could be the best alternative not to actively use accusations to exclude peers and their
polynomials from a share renewal process. Accusations are files and are reflected in the peers’ reputation
value. Peers that could not correctly compute their new share will not try to renew their share by
resolving the accusation but will use share recovery instead.
The distribution of the verification values is meaningful despite of not actively resolving accusations.
It is not individual information, and could therefore be distributed efficiently. Also, it eliminates some
straight forward attacks and also could increase the psychological barrier a user has to cross in order to
become an attacker in the share renewal process.
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4.6 System Key Update Distribution
For the maintenance of the system key share, renewal is a core concept. The required cryptographic
protocols have been described above. Both considered schemes, Threshold BLS and URSA, require the
same message flow for a share renewal or a share recovery. When the shares are distributed, each
peer requires an individual share. Accordingly, updating large systems is expensive traffic-wise. This
section deals with alternative update distribution strategies. In order find an efficient update distribution
strategy, there are two basic questions to be asked:
• Should all trusted peers be updated or should only a specific ratio of trusted peers be updated and
the remaining trusted peers will recover their share? What is this ratio? In (LL00, LKZ+04) such
a scheme is suggested for the URSA update phase.
• Should the group of trusted peers computing the updates send individual messages to all other
trusted peers or is it more efficient to build a distribution tree? That implicates additional informa-
tion included (in particular the peer ID), as well as individual encryption of the update information
in order to achieve confidentiality.
When designing an updated strategy, it can also be expected that there will arise a conflict of objectives
because when traffic per individual peer is minimised, load is transferred to other peers, which can
increase the system-wide traffic generated. When evaluating an update strategy this conflict is to be
examined closely.
According to the questions asked above, there are three basic update alternatives:
• Direct update distribution: Here the updates are sent individually to all online trusted peers.
• Tree-based update distribution: Here, update information is individually encrypted and grouped
together. Then, the update information is distributed over a distribution tree. This method will
reduce the messages sent by peers generating the update shares. However, it is to be determined if
the traffic for these peers can also be reduced.
• Limited Update and Self-Initialisation: In URSA it is proposed to update only a small number of
peers. Using the updated peers, the shares of other peers will be recovered. This is continued and
the swarming effect is exploited.
In the following, the selection of trusted peers that will start an update phase and selection of the group
B that will generate the update shares are discussed. Then, the different strategies are described in more
detail, and an initial analytical evaluation is performed.
The notation and assumptions in this section is consistent with the previous section (see Table 4.6).
The group of peers generating update shares will be denoted as B of size β. A group of trusted peers
recovering another peers Pr ’s share will be denoted D.
The results of the simulative evaluation will be discussed in Chapter 5.
4.6.1 Trusted Peer Selections for an Update Phase
In order to avoid chaotic update phases, there must be self-organising rules defined when and by which
trusted peer an update phase should be initialised, and which group of trusted peers D should be re-
sponsible for generating the update shares. Also, when recovering a peer, it also must be determined
which group of peers should be responsible for it.
When selecting an update group or a recovery group, it must be ensured that the selected trusted
peers do not conspire in order to achieve knowledge that can be used to weaken the secrecy of the
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scheme’s private key. A group conspiring would exchange the information used to compute the update
shares or the partial shares for a recovery - that is, peers would exchange the polynomials they chose
for the computations. If in such a group there is only one peer that does not conspire, the knowledge
of the other parts does not help an attacker to acquire some addition knowledge on the private system
key. Accordingly, the update group size should be chosen according to the same considerations about
the quorum size. However, here the created traffic has potentially system-wide effects. Therefore, the
optimal update group size also depends on the chosen update strategy.
A way to achieve such a group is to randomly select the group peers. This concept was already applied
before for the quorum selection.
4.6.1.1 Starting an Update Phase
Updates should be performed on a regular basis. In order to decide when exactly an update phase
should be started, a simple rule can be applied. The rule specifies an exact period and time when an
update phase should be started. An example is each Sunday, 20.00 CET, and a time server that is used
as reference time.
In order to decide which trusted peer should then initialise the update phase, another simple self or-
ganising rule will specify that peer. If a Chord-Overlay (SMK+01) is applied as trusted peer overlay, e.g.,
the active trusted peer with the highest ID could be responsible for initialising the update phase. Each
peer knows its successor and predecessor and therefore can determine if it is the peer that should ini-
tialise the update. Furthermore, the neighbour peers can also determine that this peer is the responsible
one. This way, even if the selected peer goes offline soon the correct replacement peer can be selected.
4.6.1.2 Selection of Update Group B
The problem of selecting the update group is similar to selecting a random quorum for signing tokens
in the secure aggregation protocol (see Section 4.4). The goal of the group selection mechanism is that
each trusted peer can reproduce the random number. This way, each trusted peer can check that the
mechanism was executed correctly and that there is no attack on the update mechanism.
The difference from the secure aggregation protocol is that, here a swapping peer and the correspond-
ing aggregation account is missing as a base for the computation of a random value. As a replacement,
the initialising peer will query a pre-defined time server and request a millisecond-exact time stamp. As
the message delay varies, the value of the time stamp will also vary. Therefore, the Hash-value of the
time stamp is truly random. It can be used to determine the random update group according to the
secure aggregation protocol (see 4.14).
4.6.1.3 Selection of Recovery Group D
The selection of a recovery group can be performed similar to the selection of a random quorum de-
scribed in Section 4.4, with some small adaptations. The system key maintenance is performed entirely
in a separate overlay network with its own ID space. In this overlay network, there are no aggregation
accounts that can be used as a source to generate a truly random number.
The random quorum selection in Algorithm 4.14 uses the aggregation account of the swapping peer for
generating a random number that determines the quorum. An adaptation to this mechanism, requires
that first there be a random peer determined in the normal peer overlay that exists, because then an
aggregation account for that peer also exists. First, the trusted peer to be recovered Pr, will lookup
its trusted peer ID in the normal peer overlay. The responding peer will be selected as the aggregation
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account to be queried in order to determine a random number. Pr will use this number in order to
determine D.
Each trusted peer in D can repeat this process in order to determine the correctness of D′s recovery
group selection. In order to allow a repetition of the process, the aggregation account will buffer the
resulting random number for a short period in time.
If the trusted peer overlay uses a different ID space then the normal peer overlay, Pr will pad its trusted
peer ID with zeros in order to allow a lookup in the normal peer overlay.
4.6.2 Direct Update Distribution
4.6.2.1 Direct Distribution Strategy
Each peer in B computes all shares for all trusted peers in the system. Then it sends individual messages
to all T trusted peers over encrypted channels.
The advantage of this solution is its simplicity in the protocols.
4.6.2.2 Analytical Evaluation of Direct Distribution
Obviously, the traffic generated by this strategy is highly uneven. Also, the system-wide traffic grows
linearly with the update group size.
Unverified Update Distribution
Each peer in B will have to send n− 1 messages of with payload (r+ ldel + ldouble + ldel) including the
update share and the update version number. For unverified updates, one IP packet can carry all of the
payload. Accordingly, the overall traffic per peer in B results in:
vupdate,nv = (T − 1) ∗ (lIP + lTCP + (r + ldel + ldouble + ldel))
This is 50.78 kBytes per peer Pb in B for Threshold BLS updates using the settings in Table 4.6.
Assuming an update group size β = 5, this results in 253.35 kBytes total traffic.
If the messages are not distributed over an encrypted channel, the updated information must be trans-
ferred encrypted. The traffic for a peer Pb within B results in (because rRSA > rBLS, q):
vupdate,nv,enc = (T − 1) ∗ (lIP + lTCP + (r + ldel + ldouble + ldel))
This is 156.25 kBytes per peer Pb in B for encrypted Threshold BLS as well as for unencrypted and
encrypted URSA updates using the settings in Table 4.6. Assuming an update group size β = 5 this
results in 780.47 kBytes total traffic.
Verified Update Distribution
For a verified update, using Threshold BLS the message payload results in
lBLS, renewal = rBLS, q + ldel + (t− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel) + ldel + ldouble + ldel + rRSA + ldel. This results in
(22 + (t − 1) · 66 + 142) Bytes for the settings given in Table 4.6. Accordingly, in Threshold BLS up to a
threshold t of 21 all update information can be sent within one IP packet. This maximum threshold can
be considered sufficient for the token-based accounting scheme (see Section 5.2.1). The traffic per peer
in B for verified updates results in
vupdate,v = (T −1)∗ (lIP + lTCP +rBLS, q+ ldel+(t−1)(rBLS, p+ ldel)+ ldel+ ldouble+ ldel+rRSA+ ldel)
This is 1.18 MBytes per peer Pb in B for the chosen settings in Table 4.6.
The system-wide traffic is the individual peer’s Pb traffic multiplied by the update group size β. As-
suming an update group size β = 5 this results in 5.91 MBytes total traffic.
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Figure 4.8: Tree-based system key update distribution strategy
4.6.3 Tree-based Distribution
4.6.3.1 Tree-based Update Distribution Strategy
In the tree-based distribution, each peer Pb in the update group B first computes the shares for all peers
Pi. It encrypts each share with the corresponding peer’s Pi public key ei. Thus, there is no difference in
traffic between URSA and BLS. Then it creates messages that contains the update information for several
peers. The update information per peer consists of the peer’s ID and the encrypted share.
Pb now divides the trusted peers’ overlay into τ ID-ranges that should have the same size. Then it
partitions the update information accordingly, and sends each of the partitions to one peer within the
ID-ranges. Also, it includes the ID-range and the update version as information.
The receiving peers will extract their share, distribute the received ID-range into τ sub-ranges and
distribute parts of the update information accordingly. Figure 4.8 depicts the tree-based distribution
strategy.
Using this method, it can be expected that the load for the peer Pb in B can be reduced.
4.6.3.2 Analytical Evaluation of Tree-based Update Distribution Strategy
As the information in the tree-based distribution strategy will be distributed encrypted with RSA, there is
no difference in the created update traffic between Threshold BLS and URSA. There is only a difference
if verifiable updates are done. Here the most traffic reduction for Pbs is expected.
Unverified Tree-based Distribution
The traffic per peer Pb results for τ partitions to:
ltree,nv(τ) =
(T−1)
τ (lID + ldel + rRSA + ldel) + 2lID + ldel + ldouble + ldel
vupdate,nv = τ(ltree,nv(τ) + ceil(
ltree,nv(τ)
MTU )(lIP + lTCP ))
where ceil(x) is he smallest integer not less than x; formally: ceil(x) = min {n ∈ Z|x ≤ n}.
Verified Tree-based Distribution
Verified update traffic additionally contains t− 1 verification values.
ltree,v(τ) =
(T−1)
τ (lID + ldel + rRSA + ldel+) + 2lID + ldel + ldouble + ldel + (k− 1)(rBLS, p + ldel) + ldel +
rrsa + ldel
vupdate,v = τ(ltree,v(τ) + ceil(
ltree,v(τ)
MTU )(lIP + lTCP ))
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System-Wide Traffic Optimisation
It is obvious that the traffic is lowest for Pb if τ = 1, because here the verification information needs to
transferred only once. However, if each peer Pi had to forward almost the complete update information
to the next peer (it does not need to forward its own update share information) this solution would
create the most traffic system-wide. Therefore, modelling this scenario, it can be determined the optimal
τ where system-wide traffic is minimised. The analytical model yields a τ = 9 for T = 1000 trusted peers
and the settings from Table 4.6 for t = 7, 10, 24, 17.
For distributing unverified shares of one peer Pb this is 147.04 kBytes upload traffic for Pb and system-
wide upload traffic of 307.52 kBytes. Using τ = 9 is only a 0.34% upload traffic increase for Pb compared
to the peer-minimum upload traffic with τ = 1.
Assuming an update group size β = 5 the system-wide unverified update traffic adds up to 1.50
MBytes.
For distributing verified shares for one peer Pb with t = 17 the upload traffic results in 157.49 kBytes
for Pb and system-wide upload traffic of 639.22 kBytes. Using τ = 9 is only a 6.57% upload traffic
increase for Pb compared to the peer-minimum upload traffic with τ = 1. Furthermore, in comparison
to direct verified share distribution for Pb 87.80%, traffic could be saved and system-wide 47.21% traffic
could be saved.
Assuming an update group size β = 5 the system-wide verified update traffic adds up to 3.12 MBytes.
The tree-based update distribution requires many RSA encryptions. In (BKLS02) signing with a 1024
bit RSA key took 7.9 ms on a PIII 1GHz machine. As encrypting information shorter than the RSA
key length is the same operation as signing in RSA, on modern desktop type computers, the tree-based
update is possible to compute in a reasonable time for the token-based accounting scheme.
4.6.4 Limited Update and Self-Initialisation
The URSA update concept was presented in (LKZ+04, LL00).
4.6.4.1 Limited Update and Self-Initialisation Strategy
The URSA strategy is first to update an initial set of peers Pi. This initial group is denoted E of size ε.
Note that ∀Pb ∈ E. Each peer Pb generates an update polynomial and computes the update shares for
all Pi and distributes their shares to them. Each Pb now updates its share and deletes its old share as
well as the received update shares and its update polynomial.
In the second step of the update phase, group I recovers the new shares of other trusted peers. As
soon as a peer is recovered, it can also help to recover other peer. This way a kind of a swarming effect
of share recoveries is initialised. Figure 4.9 depicts this strategy. The update traffic is distributed fairly
among the trusted peers. Also, the protocol has natural robustness against offline trusted peers.
4.6.4.2 Analytical Evaluation of Limited Update and Self-Initialisation
This strategy employs direct distribution for the update group B of size β to all peer Pi in E. For
example, for  = 17 for each Pb this traffic results in 0.81 kBytes for unverified Threshold BLS updates,
19.38 kBytes for verified Threshold BLS updates, and 2.50 kBytes for URSA updates.
Afterwards, the swarming recovery process is started. For traffic analysis it is assumed that depending
on the number of peers that have already been updated each of them is chosen with an equal probability
to recover the next trusted peer. For example, with  = 17 the Pbs will on average participate in 70
recoveries. Accordingly, using unverified Threshold BLS each Pb has to upload in total (update and self-
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Figure 4.9: Limited update and self-initialisation distribution strategy
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Table 4.7: System Key Update - Maximum Peer Traffic Comparison for T = 1000 and t = 17
Direct Tree-based Limited &
Self Init.
Improved
Limited &
Self Init.
URSA 156.03 KB 326.50 KB 188.44 KB
BLS UV 50.73 KB 307.52 KB 61.24 KB
BLS V 1209.73 KB 157.49 KB 1537.09 KB 380.73 KB
initialisation) 61.24 kBytes. With verified BLS the traffic results in 1537.09 kBytes. This is due to the
verification values that are different for each recovery. Using URSA, the traffic per Pb results in 188.44
kBytes.
If a recovery group recovers several peers at the same time, traffic could be reduced because the
verification values need to be exchanged only once within the recovery groupD. Also, if the initial update
group updates more than just the required quorum size the overall traffic can be reduced. Furthermore,
the robustness of the recovery process will be increased. For example, if the initial update group updates
2t peers and also each recovery group always recovers 10 peers using the same generating polynomials,
system wide traffic results in 380.87 kBytes for verified BLS. This is a reduction of 70.66%.
Furthermore, it is not fair to compare these values with the other two distribution strategies, because
for them, the traffic of using only one update polynomial was presented; the size of the update group β
was not considered. However, share recovery is independent of the size of the update group β.
4.6.5 Summary
In summary, the three different update strategies – direct distribution, tree-based distribution, limited
update and self initialisation – the system wide traffic for an update group sizes of β =5, 10, 15 will be
compared. The trusted peer system has a size of T = 1000; the threshold is set to t = 17. The initial
group size  for the limited update and self initialisation strategy is set to ε = 50.
Table 4.7 shows the resulting traffic for a peer Pb in an update group B. However, as mentioned
above, this comparison is not fair for the “limited update and self initialisation” strategy, because all peers
(apart from the initial updated distribution group E) have received their complete new share, whereas
for the other strategies, only the update of one peer in B was considered. Also, it has to be taken into
account that this strategy distributes the generated traffic over a larger period of time than the other two
strategies. Furthermore, the improved limited self initialisation strategy creates significantly less traffic.
The tree-based distribution especially creates all traffic immediately.
The system-wide traffic is compared in Table 4.8. Here, the “limited update and self initialisation”
strategy creates the most traffic; the improved version creates significantly less traffic. Also, this strategy
is only marginally sensitive to the update group size β. Therefore, for large β it can be the best solution.
The tree-based distribution is the best alternative for verified updates. Direct distribution should only be
chose for small update sizes and unverified traffic.
This analysis shows that the “limited update and self initialisation” strategy seems to create the most
traffic by far. However, the other update strategies require the knowledge of all system trusted peers;
tree-based distribution also requires the knowledge of all trusted peers’ public keys. This assumption
seems to be quite hard to actualise. In order to collect this information, additional traffic in the overlay
is required. Such information could also be collected over time when trusted peers interact with each
other. However, each peer in the update group meets different trusted peers over time; and a consistent
knowledge is required with the update group. Especially for the tree-based distribution, the required
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Table 4.8: System Key Update - Complete Traffic Comparison for T = 1000 and t = 17
β Direct Tree-based Limited &
Self Init.
Improved
Limited &
Self Init.
URSA 5 0.76 MB 1.59 MB 2.56 MB
BLS UV 5 0.25 MB 1.50 MB 0.83 MB
BLS V 5 5.91 MB 3.12 MB 20.91 MB 5.74 MB
URSA 10 1.52 MB 3.19 MB 2.57 MB
BLS UV 10 0.50 MB 3.00 MB 0.84 MB
BLS V 10 11.82 MB 6.24 MB 21.00 MB 5.93 MB
URSA 15 2.29 MB 4.78 MB 2.59 MB
BLS UV 15 0.74 MB 4.5 MB 0.84 MB
BLS V 15 17.72 MB 9.36 MB 21.10 MB 6.13 MB
Legend: V = Verified, UV = Unverified
knowledge of the trusted peers’ public key does not enable information collection over time. Public keys
must be verified before usage with the owner, in order to guarantee an attack free update distribution.
The improved version of the “limited update and self-initialisation” strategy is a compromise here. It
does not require the encryption of information, which is why it is the preferred strategy over tree-based
distribution.
In conclusion, the “limited update and self initialisation” strategy seems the most realistic one to apply
for the token-based accounting scheme.
4.7 Failure Recovery in Transactions
During transactions there are several non-standard situations that can happen. In such situations it can
appear that one peer tries to defraud the other peer, although both peers acted in good faith. In this
section, it is discussed how these situations should be handled.
4.7.1 Service Delivery Interruption
A service delivery can be interrupted for several reasons where no transaction party acts in bad faith.
Such reasons are crashed computers, broken Internet connection, DSL-logout after the maximum session
time and re-login assigning a different IP-address, electricity failure, etc. All of these things could happen
at either transaction partner. Such failures can be of very short duration or of longer duration. The result
is that there is no communication possible between the transaction partners for the duration.
4.7.1.1 Failures with Duration
In order to cope with short duration failures, there are timeouts implemented with the transaction pro-
tocol. If the failure is resolved within the timeout, the service delivery can be continued or restarted. In
case of a restart, the service receiver will re-use the tokens it used before in this transaction, but it will
update the transaction related information contained in the token. The service provider has to delete
the tokens it received before. If the receiver does not trust the provider to do so, it can demand that the
provider to add a note to the old tokens stating that they will be resent by the receiver due to a failure
and sign the tokens with its private key. Then it will send these tokens back to the receiver. Accordingly, if
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the receiver will be accused of double spending later, it can present the signed statement of the provider
that will annul the accusation.
4.7.1.2 Failures with Long Duration
Failures with longer durations have the effect that a agreement between the transaction partners about a
continuation of the service cannot be reached. If it is a commercial service that is provided, it should be
agreed before within the Service Level Agreement (SLA) how to deal with such a situation. Depending
on the service – commercial, non commercial, main characteristic of the service (file transmission, higher
valued service like x-ray diagnosis) and on the agreed payment methodology (pre-, post payment, trust-
worthy transaction with partial payments), different alternatives can be chosen. A service provider could
be responsible for delivering the service again, or the service receiver could loose the tokens it already
paid. In general in such situations, it is important that potential double spending situations are resolved.
Therefore, tokens should not be re-used. Instead, a service provider should re-fund any overcharged
tokens to the service receiver by sending the receiver own tokens with the appropriate accounting data.
Then, the service receiver can swap these tokens with the ratio 1:1 in the next token aggregation.
In general, if any peer feels that the rules have been breached, it should report that to the reputation
system.
4.7.2 Service Cancelled
Each transaction party can cancel the transaction while it is ongoing. Typically, applications implement
a method to cancel the service delivery from both sides. Therefore, a service cancellation can be clearly
distinguished from a failure. Typically, the SLA should contain terms how paid tokens are to be handled.
The service receiver could loose these tokens or a re-fund of part, or all of the tokens (see above).
4.7.3 Disagreement About the Transaction Status
There can exist situations where the transaction partners disagree about the status of a transaction:
• The service receiver claims that the service was not completely delivered although it was fully paid.
• The service provider claims that the service was not fully paid although it was fully delivered.
Generally, the usage of the trustworthy transaction protocol is strongly suggested, as it can avoid many
such situations.
Both situations may not be able to be resolved. If such a situation exists, the transaction partners have
to file a complaint with the reputation system. Peers that are involved more often in such situations will
eventually have a degraded reputation value. The conclusion is that these peers create problems in the
system, and they can be punished by the system in some way.
Resolving Situations Where Service Was Not Delivered Completely
In situations where the service receiver claims a service was not delivered completely, either the service
receiver received the service and wants to defraud the provider, or the other way around. Using the
trustworthy payment process, the complete service delivery can be comprehended except for the last
part of the delivery. Here, the service provider can send this part again. Typically, this should only cost
bandwidth resources, as a result of a higher level service, the service receiver should still cache. This is
not too expensive. If this is not successful, probably both transaction parties will file a complaint with
the reputation system.
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Resolving Situations Where Service Was Not Fully Paid
Payment can be comprehended much easier than service delivery due to the information stored in
the aggregation accounts. In a trustworthy transaction, the tokens to be used in a transaction are pre-
registered. If a service receiver does not pay some of these tokens, it has to re-send them. The service
provider can also notify the aggregation account about a received token only once. Double spending
within one transaction is not possible. A malicious service provider could not notify the aggregation
account about the received tokens and claim it never received them. However, a token it does not
identify to the aggregation account can also not be swapped for new tokens. Therefore, the aggregation
accounts should un-block tokens that have not been brought to the notice of the service provider after a
specific period of time.
Accordingly, using the trustworthy transaction protocol it can always clearly be decided if the service
was paid for or not.
4.8 Summary
This chapter presented the details of the protocols of the token-based accounting scheme. It covers seven
different parts of the token-based accounting scheme: Peer identification, the account holder set, trusted
peers, the security extensions to the aggregation protocol, system key maintenance protocols, system key
update distribution, and failure recovery in transactions.
In the first section, it was discussed how peers get assigned a permanent overlay ID. This is resolved
by using a hash value of a peer’s public key.
The second section is concerned with mechanisms required for a viable operation of the account
holder set. It is divided into four parts. In the first part it is discussed where account holder sets are
located, how peers are assigned to an account holder set, and how peers access and post information to
aggregation accounts. These mechanisms form a novel anonymous access mechanisms to aggregation
accounts where the account holders of aggregation accounts stay anonymous, even as the accessing
peer can be clearly identified. If the receiver is hidden from a message sender, trials of cheating and
collusion attacks as well as malicious behaviour are impeded, and as such can be traced back to its
source. Existing solutions in the area of anonymous communication could not be applied, because these
require that both sender and receiver are anonymous. The developed protocol for receiver anonymity
with sender identification is applicable to all structured p2p overlay networks that form a ring topology.
The second part presents the protocols used to maintain account holder sets under churn. Here, the
protocols are described that detect the actual size and location of an account holder set, that lock an
account holder set so maintenance actions can be performed without creating inconsistencies, that move
an account to a new position, and how peers perform a graceful handover of their accounts before they
log off. The third part describes the information stored in an account holder set and how it is accessed.
The fourth part discusses the alternatives for consistency mechanisms used for aggregation accounts. A
majority-based consistency mechanism is selected.
The third section is concerned with trusted peers. It discusses how trusted peers are organised, as-
signed and excluded from the trusted peer overlay network. Trusted peers are organised in a separate
overlay network in order to allow efficient key maintenance operations. Also, a mechanism is presented
that is used to find trusted peers in the general system overlay. It is also discussed how incentives can be
given to peers to motivate them to act as trusted peers.
The fourth section presents an extension to the aggregation protocol, that enhances its trustworthi-
ness. The trustworthy aggregation protocol includes a novel mechanism that selects the aggregation
administering peer as well as the quorum randomly, and permits to verify the randomness of the se-
lection afterwards by any peer, although the result of the selection process cannot be determined in
advance. This allows the system to review whether the protocol review was truthfully executed. This
prevents cheating and collusion during token aggregation.
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The fifth section discusses the usage of proactive secret sharing techniques in order to ensure the
secrecy of the scheme’s private key over a longer period of time. Proactive secret schemes are discussed
for the two selected threshold cryptography schemes Threshold BLS and URSA. This section presented
the distributed key generation and share assignment phase, the share recovery phase that is used to
create new shares for new trusted peers as well as to recover trusted peers that possess an outdated
share, and the update phase where update shares of the system key are distributed. For the different
phases an analytical traffic assessment is performed for both threshold schemes. In general, URSA
currently does not provide the possibility of using verified sharing techniques. Therefore, BLS is the
preferred threshold scheme that should be applied.
The sixth section analyses different key distribution strategies in terms of generated traffic. The strate-
gies are used to update the complete trusted peer overlay with update shares. The best strategy was an
improved version of the limited update and self initialisation method used for URSA was identified.
The seventh section discusses failure recovery in transactions. Here situations of recovery during a
transaction where the service delivery is interrupted or cancelled, as well as situations where there are
disagreements about the transaction status are discussed.
In general, this chapter focused the trustworthiness of the token-based accounting scheme. If all
mechanisms presented are applied in the token-based accounting scheme, there remain two situations
where fraud is possible by injecting forged tokens. Either a peer receives knowledge of the scheme’s
private key and can control the majority of its account holder set, or a peer achieves the dishonest
cooperation of t trusted peers5 and the majority of its account holder set. However, in both situations, the
required and verifiable randomness of the aggregation administrator and quorum is violated. Therefore,
this fraud is recognisable, even though this requires some effort.
5 t denotes the threshold of the applied threshold cryptography scheme.
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5 System Evaluation
When designing a mechanism for peer-to-peer systems, it must be shown that this mechanism
will work as conceptualised and further what the mechanism’s performance will be. The
communication such mechanisms employ is asynchronous. Therefore, it is hard to observe
and control such a system. This makes the performance analysis of a real life system difficult.
Hence, it is important for mechanisms designed for decentralised autonomous systems to be
evaluated before roll-out, using a suitable evaluation technique.
This chapter presents the in-depth evaluation performed on the token-based accounting
scheme using analytical techniques as well as simulations. Using analytical techniques the
performance of the token-based accounting scheme is assessed depending on the configura-
tion parameters. Furthermore, the traffic created by the developed protocols is estimated.
Using detailed simulations the traffic generated by the token-based accounting scheme is
investigated and the influence of the configuration parameters is analysed. The analytical
results serve as control for the simulation results.
This chapter is structured into eight sections. First, the evaluation goal is stated and the
evaluation criteria and metrics are developed. From this the required evaluation methods are
deduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents analytical results about the message overhead of the
developed protocols. Section 4 describes the simulation model and the simulation scenario
employed to evaluate the token based accounting scheme. Then the in-depth analysis of
the simulation results is presented. Section 5 describes the simulation model and simulation
scenario used to evaluate the overhead introduced by the system key management protocols.
Section 6 presents an analytical comparison with KARMA, which is the related work most
similar in its performance to the token-based accounting scheme. Section 8 concludes this
chapter.
5.1 Evaluation Criteria and Methodology
When evaluating a mechanism in the context of multimedia communications the efficiency of the mech-
anism must be assessed. The efficiency is expressed as the ratio of performance to costs (SHL+06).
Looking only at a mechanisms performance might lead to a system with excellent performance but pro-
hibitive high costs for real world deployment. Accordingly, for the token-based accounting scheme two
main criteria exist in order to assess its efficiency.
For an accounting scheme for decentralised autonomous systems the trustworthiness of the infor-
mation administered by the scheme presents the systems performance. Parameters and metrics about
trustworthiness are discussed in Section 5.1.1.
The costs introduced by the accounting scheme are the communication costs created. Accordingly, for
a given level of performance, the introduced costs must be determined in order to evaluate the token-
based accounting scheme. Furthermore, within peer-to-peer research the most important evaluation
criterion for a mechanism is its scalability. Scalability describes the quantitative adaptability of a system
or mechanism, i.e. the adaptivity to a changing number of entities/nodes or offered services in the
system (SHL+06). Thus, a main parameter for the scheme’s evaluation is the system size and how the
costs develop with changing system size. Obviously, both communication costs and scalability, are closely
related. Their parameters and metrics are discussed in Section 5.1.2.
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5.1.1 System’s Performance
The token-based accounting scheme’s mechanisms for achieving trustworthiness have been discussed
in depth in the preceding chapters. Here, the main concepts are summarised in order to conclude the
crucial parameters and metrics for evaluating the system’s trustworthiness.
The trustworthiness of information administered by the token-based accounting scheme depends
mainly on three elements:
• the usage of threshold cryptography for creating system’s signatures under issued tokens using the
Token Aggregation Protocol,
• periodical updates of the key shares distributed,
• the account holder set, that holds information about which tokens have been issued, have been
spent, are intended to be spent.
5.1.1.1 System’s Performance Parameters
Token Aggregation Protocol
Issued tokens must be signed with a system wide key by a quorum of trusted peers using threshold
cryptography. Using threshold cryptography, only unanimous quorum decisions lead to valid token sig-
natures. Therefore, the probability of false positive signatures, i.e. falsified signatures, decreases with
increased quorum size. Thus, the first parameter for influencing the token-based accounting scheme’s
trust is the quorum size t. How the optimal quorum size t can be determined will be discussed in Section
5.2.1.
As the token aggregation protocol is the scheme’s main mechanism in order to avoid forged tokens,
avoiding false positive signatures has absolute priority over avoiding false negative signatures, i.e. tokens
that should have been issued were not issued due to a false decision of a quorum member. If a peer does
not receive tokens through a token aggregation process due to a false negative decision, the peer can
always repeat the aggregation process, when the second time, the quorum will consists of different peers,
due to the quorum selection process, described in Section 4.4.
Periodic Key Shares Updates
A key share update invalidates old key shares. With a mixture of old shares and new shares tokens
cannot be signed. How often a key share update should be carried out depends on the minimum time an
attacker would require to receive knowledge of t− 1 key shares. Determining this time is a very complex
task and it requires many assumptions that are application dependent. Thus, determining the optimal
frequency of key share updates is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Account Holder Set
The account holder set has the task of checking for behaviour against the rules. In particular, double
spending and introducing tokens that have been signed not using the Token Aggregation Protocol. Ac-
count information is replicated over a set of peers. Therefore, another performance parameter of the
scheme is the Account Holder Set Size k.
As described in Section 4.2, transactions are possible even when account information might be lost.
Thus, information held in an account holder set must be available for the vast majority of time. In
conclusion, another performance parameter in the context of the account holder set size is the probability
pahs an account is available.
The consistency mechanism for the account holder sets depends on simple majority. In order to have a
clear decision about account information an account holder set requires at least two peers with consistent
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account information. We define account availability as at least two peers must holding consistent account
information. Accordingly, the account holder set size k must be chosen in a way that accounts are
available at least with probability pahs.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the account holder sets performance, it must be determined with
which probability pcor information held at a set is correct. Incorrect information can occur due to lost
information due to churn that the mechanisms built around the account holder sets cannot resolve. An
example is the execution of the consistency mechanism that leads to false account information.
5.1.2 System’s Cost
The costs that token-based accounting scheme bears are the communication costs between the partic-
ipating nodes, the computation costs, and the storage costs at the participating nodes. Measurements
with the token-based accounting prototype showed that 50 foreign tokens require a storage space of
approximately 53 kBytes. Creating and verifying RSA signatures creates negligible computational costs.
So if we assume that the token-based accounting scheme will be coupled with peer-to-peer application
that typically run on desktop class PC, computation and storage cost can be disregarded. In conclusion,
in this dissertation only the communication costs in terms of created traffic will be analysed.
When analysing the traffic created, two different perspectives are important. The first is the relation of
the overall peer-to-peer traffic created by the application to the traffic generated by accounting services.
The second is the impact of accounting traffic on an individual peer. It must be analysed whether peers
can become overloaded by the accounting traffic. Therefore, the traffic generated at single peers must
be analysed.
5.1.2.1 System’s Cost Parameters
The parameters influencing the performance of the token-based accounting scheme also will influence
the traffic created. The larger the quorum, the more traffic is created during an token aggregation
process. The larger the account holder set, the more traffic is generated at transactions and token
aggregation. The number of trusted peers T determines the traffic created during for key share updates
and also influences the distribution of traffic among the peers. The more trusted peers there are, the less
likely a specific trusted peer is selected for aggregation, etc. Therefore, it can be expected that the traffic
will be distributed more fairly among the peers with a larger number of trusted peers. Accordingly, an
important system parameter is the ratio ptp of normal peers to trusted peer in the system.
There are further system parameters that influence the amount of traffic created. The overlay network
used for lookups creates traffic for lookups and for maintenance. Furthermore, peer behaviour also
has influence on the amount of maintenance traffic created by the overlay network and by the account
holder set. churn is especially important here. Churn is influenced by whether the peers conduct a
graceful handover of information to other peers before they leave, or if they just vanish from the system.
The size of the peer-to-peer system also influences the traffic stemming from these sources.
Other user behaviour also influences the amount of traffic generated, however this is largely indepen-
dent of the system size. This is the frequency users perform transactions and token aggregation.
5.1.3 Evaluation Techniques
According to Jain (Jai91), the alternative evaluation techniques are analytical modelling, simulation,
and measurement. The discussion of the parameters show that potentially different evaluation tech-
niques should be applied.
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Performance Parameters
The exact value of the quorum size can be calculated using an analytical model. This will be presented
in Section 5.2.1.
The account holder set size could also be determined using an analytical model. Here, queueing
models could be applied. However, these models are well understood for problems that can be modelled
by the exponential probability function for inter-arrival and service process. However, in peer-to-peer
systems, several measurement studies have shown that the inter-arrival and also the service process are
not exponentially distributed (see e.g (BQ04), (SR05), (SENB07a)). Accordingly, for this problem
simulation is the appropriate evaluation technique (see Section 5.2.2).
Cost Parameters
The traffic generated by the token-based accounting scheme varies in the way it can be analysed.
Traffic generated from transactions and token aggregation is largely independent from complex influ-
ences like churn or system size. Thus, it can be determined quite exactly using an analytical model. As
a prerequisite, the token-based accounting scheme’s performance parameters must be known. They will
be determined in Section 5.2.
The remaining elements of the token-based accounting scheme, i.e. all mechanisms in the context of
the account holder set, have closer interdependencies with the overlay network and churn. Here, due to
the difficulty in modelling the account holder set under churn (see above), an analytical model cannot
be applied.
Furthermore, if the whole system should be evaluated, a technique should be chosen that is able to
capture all elements of the accounting scheme.
One goal of the evaluation is also to determine the scheme’s scalability. Therefore, we prefer simulation
over measurements using a prototype as evaluation technique.
5.1.4 Selected Metrics
Performance Metrics
As the quorum size determines the trustworthiness of the aggregation protocol, there are no perfor-
mance parameters that will be evaluated in context of the token aggregation protocol.
In context of the quorum size, there are several parameters that determine the performance of this
mechanism. The account holder set varies over time due to churn, but consistency of the information
held is required. As described in Section 5.1.1.1 an account holder set size of at least 3 is required with
two of the accounts being consistent. In the evaluation it is to be determined at what percentage this
condition is violated. This should be measured with different parameters influencing it, as described in
Section 5.1.1.1.
Cost Metrics
The basic cost metric is the traffic created. It is to be determined system-wide in total and split up
for the different mechanisms of the token-based accounting scheme. Furthermore, the traffic per peer
should be determined in order to understand how fair the traffic is distributed. In addition, peers could
be overloaded. Therefore, their download queue and upload queue is relevant.
Finally, a comparison between the accounting traffic and the traffic the services accounted for create,
is meaningful.
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5.2 Trustworthiness Analysis
In this section the values for the performance parameters of the token-based accounting scheme are
derived. These are the quorum size and the account holder set size.
5.2.1 Quorum Size
The quorum of size t is randomly chosen from all trusted peers T . In order to avoid false positive
signatures, at least one trusted peer must be chosen who behaves according to the rules. We call such
peers “good peers” in the following. The percentage of good peers among all trusted peers is denoted
pg. pg is a system variable that needs to be estimated.
The hyper-geometrical distribution describes the problem of randomly choosing a quorum out of all
trusted peers, where only a specific percentage of trusted peers is good. The resulting Equation 5.1
describes the achieved Trust Level L for given total number of trusted peers T , a specific percentage of
good peers among them pg, and a given quorum size.
L(T, t, pg) =
(
T · (1− pg)
t
)
(
T
t
) (5.1)
where
T number of trusted peers
t quorum size
pg percentage of good peers
Figure 5.1 a - d summarise the resulting quorum sizes for example values. These results will be used
to determine the quorum size for the complete system evaluation.
5.2.2 Account Holder Set Size
The determination of the optimal account holder set size is crucial for the availability of aggregation
accounts as well as for the reduction of costs stemming from the maintenance of account holder sets. As
discussed in Section 4.2.1, the protocol research by Kneževic´ in (Kne07) could be applied as an adaptive
mechanism. However, this mechanism does not currently consider account maintenance mechanisms
like those applied in the token-based accounting scheme. Therefore, these results cannot be applied to
determine an account holder set size to be used in the evaluation of the token-based accounting scheme.
Also queueing theory is not yet applicable to model the account holder set maintenance mechanisms
using actual churn models resulting from measurements (see (BQ04, Dar05, SENB07b, SENB07a));
these suggest modelling churn using either a mixed log-normal distribution ( (Dar05)) or a Weibull
distribution (SENB07a, SENB07b)).
Accordingly, in order to determine the optimal account holder set size the mechanisms for maintaining
its size were simulated in the presence of churn. An abstract simulation model was created simulating the
core maintenance mechanisms for checking the account holder set size, moving accounts, and handover
of accounts.
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Figure 5.1: Required quorum size according to equation 5.1
5.2.2.1 Simulation Model
The simulation models the following mechanisms under churn:
• Graceful handover: when a peer leaves, a new account holder is selected for all accounts it is
responsible for.
• Peer leaves without graceful handover: the peer will not be replaced.
• Detection of replica number: If an account has less then the default number of account holders,
the missing number of holders is added.
• Detection of correct account holder set position: The account holder set is relocated and the correct
number of account successive holders is assigned.
The graceful handover happens when a peer leaves with probability pgh. The replica number of any
account is checked with a frequency tcz. The correct account holder set position is checked with a
frequency tcp.
In the simulation tcz was set to 5 minutes, and tcp was set to 10 minutes. A peer performed a graceful
handover with pgh= 90% or pgh= 50%.
For churn two different models were applied. Due to measurements from (SENB07b) both peer
lifetime and peer offline time are Weibull distributed. The corresponding distribution fit is given in Table
5.1. The second churn model stems from the measurements from (BQ04). Here, the fit from (Dar05)
consisting of a mixture of two log-normal distributions is applied for lifetime and offline time. The
corresponding distribution fit is given in Table 5.2. In order to analyse a broader set of churn scenarios,
both churn models are modified with the churn factors dvar =
{
1, 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
4
}
.
In order to fully observe the effects of churn, each experiment simulated one week of real time.
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Table 5.1: Churn According to (SENB07b): Weibull Distribution Parameters
scale λ shape k
Lifetime 0,61511 169,5385
Offline time 0,47648 413,6765
Table 5.2: Churn According to (BQ04, Dar05): Mixed Log-normal Distribution Parameters
Life time & Offline time
Weight µ σ
0.8 8.39 0.97
0.2 9.57 1.67
As scalability does not have an effect on the results for this simple simulation model, only one system
size of 1000 was simulated.
Each experiment was repeated 20 times.
5.2.2.2 Simulation Results
The account holder set is an additional security mechanism. It is sufficient if users have to assume that
account holder set information is available. Thus, a very high availability must be reached by the account
holding set mechanisms, but not complete availability. Therefore, the goal was a probability that at least
3 account holders exist for each account pahs = 99%.
Table 5.3 summarises the simulation results, where k denotes the configured account holder set size
and ak˜n denotes the accumulated time a specific account holder set size n was observed in the simula-
tions. Furthermore details are listed in the Appendix in Section E.1.
Table 5.3 lists the accumulated time an account holder set size of 3 and 4 were observed on average.
This is summed over all account holder sets. Accordingly, a value of 139.25 seconds can mean that either
one account holder set had a size of 3 for this time or there were several account holder sets that had a
size of three for a shorter time, which in sum results in 139.25 seconds. Figure 5.2 shows for example,
the average number of account holder sets with size 3, 4, and 5 for the experiment Weibull, dvar = 0.5,
pgh = 0.9.
In the experiment for Weibull, pgh = 0.9, dvar = 1 an account holder set size of 3 did not happen;
however a set size k˜3 did happen so often, that an account holder set size of 6 is the more reliable result.
5.2.2.3 Summary
In order to determine the required account holder set size, an abstract simulation model was built. It
simulates churn, as well as the account holder set size maintenance mechanisms that repair account
holder sets. Eight different churn models have been simulated with two different probabilities for ac-
count handover when a peer leaves.
The result is that depending on the churn model, the account holder set size should be configured to
values from k = 6 to k = 10.
5.2.3 Summary
In this section the two main configuration parameters of the token-based accounting scheme were ob-
served that influence its performance and costs.
Chapter 5. System Evaluation 119
Table 5.3: Required Holder Set Sizes For Different Churn Models
Distribution pgh dvar k ak˜3[sec] ak˜4[sec]
Weibull 0.9 1 6 0 14511.2
1
2 6 139.25 60536.15
1
3 6 839.05 125505.1
1
4 7 4.2 2751.8
0.5 1 7 91.3 6551.35
1
2 8 20.9 2001.8
1
3 9 0 479.3
1
4 10 0 137.4
Mixed Log-normal 0.9 1 6 21.1 16484.4
1
2 6 301.1 66831
1
3 7 47.2 2089.1
1
4 7 4.35 4554.2
0.5 1 7 52.5 7318.5
1
2 9 0 92.5
1
3 9 0 545.75
1
4 9 44.3 2220.7
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Figure 5.2: Account holder set size simulation results for dvar = 0.5, pgh = 0.9
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The quorum size influences the trustworthiness of the token-based accounting scheme. The trustwor-
thiness that can be achieved with a specific quorum size depends further on the number of trusted peers
present in the system, and the probability that a trusted peer acts honestly. For systems with 500 to
10,000 trusted peers, quorum sizes from t = 7 to t = 17 are required to achieve a trustworthiness of 99%
to 99.999%, if at least 50% of the trusted peers act honestly. Trustworthiness of the quorum is defined
as the probability that a randomly selected quorum consists only of peers that are willing to defraud.
The account holder sets host the aggregation accounts. The aggregation accounts are a mechanism
that further enhances the token-based accounting scheme’s trustworthiness. Therefore, this information
must not be lost. In order to determine the optimal number of replications of an aggregation account the
relevant maintenance mechanisms for account holder sets have been simulated in the presence of churn.
The goal of the simulation was to determine the required account holder set size, so that at least three
peers host a specific aggregation account. This way, the consistency mechanism that is built on majority
decisions can still find the consistent aggregation account state if there is one account storing deviating
account information. As result of eight different churn models combined with two different probabilities
for peers handing over their account when leaving, it was found that the account holder set size k should
be set to values between 6 and 10.
5.3 Analytical Traffic Analysis
Most important for the evaluation of the token-based accounting scheme is the traffic the scheme intro-
duces into the system. Before the traffic will be simulated, a worst case assessment will be performed.
There are three parts in the token-based accounting scheme that can be assessed separately. The first part
is traffic created by transactions between peers, i.e., when a peer requests and receives a service from
another peer, and the token aggregation processes conducted due to these transactions. The second part
is the traffic created from managing account holder sets. The third part is the key management traffic
created when the key shares owned by the trusted peers are updated.
For the analytical assessment, the number of messages required will be calculated. Message sizes will
be regarded in the scheme’s simulation.
5.3.1 Analytic Transaction Traffic Assessment
In the token-based accounting scheme, traffic created due to transactions and token aggregation pro-
cesses is relatively deterministic since the majority of messages created is independent of current system
size and of churn. However, the number of hops a lookup message travels in the overlay depends on
system size and churn rate.
Considering the token-based accounting messages (and not considering the overlay messages) the
important parameters are:
• Number of Transactions n
• Quorum Size t
• Account Holder Set Size k
• Average Transaction Value s: The average number of tokens spent by a peer in one transaction.
• Batch Size b: The average number of tokens swapped in a token aggregation process
Transaction
Messages required to request a service will not be considered in the analytical assessment, as these
messages belong to the application and not directly to the token-based accounting scheme.
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The traffic for one transaction using the trustworthy transaction protocol is composed of the following
number of messages:
• Requester sends unsigned tokens to provider: 1
• Provider checks these tokens with the account holder set: 1 + 2k
Now the provider starts the service provisioning.
• During the service provisioning, the requester sends token by token to the provider: s
• Optionally, the reception of a token could be approved by the provider: s
Accordingly, for one transaction the number of messages created results in: MTrans(k) = 2 + 2k + 2s.
Token Aggregation
For assessing the traffic of one token aggregation process, it is assumed that the peer swapping tokens
provided each service to a different peer. Accordingly, there must be bs aggregation accounts checked for
double spending. Like for transactions, the overlay lookup operations are not considered in this analysis.
A token aggregation process requires the following number of messages:
• Swapping peer sends b foreign tokens to random trusted peer: 1
• The trusted peer queries the account holder set in order to determine the administrating trusted
peer: 1 + 2k
• The trusted peer forwards the foreign tokens to the aggregation administrator: 1
• In order to detect double spending, the aggregation administrator queries all aggregation accounts
of the owners of the foreign tokens: bs(1 + 2k)
• The administrator forwards the fresh tokens to the quorum: t
• The quorum peers update the swapping peer’s aggregation account: t(1 + 2k)
• The quorum sends the partially signed tokens to the swapping peer: t
For one aggregation process, the number of messages created results in: MAggr(k, t, b) = 2 + (1 + t +
b
s)(1 + 2k) + 2t
Complete Transaction Dependent Traffic
The traffic created due to transactions and aggregation processes is not dependent on time but solely
on the number of transactions performed by the system’s peers. An aggregation process will be performed
on average every nsb transactions. Accordingly, the number of messages can be assessed using Equation
5.2, where n is the number of transactions performed.
M(n, k, t, b) = n(2 + 2k + 2s) +
ns
b
(3 +
b
s
+ 3t+ 2tk + 2k(
b
s
+ 1)) (5.2)
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5.3.2 Analytic Account Holder Set Management Traffic Assessment
Unlike the transaction related traffic, the account holder set management traffic depends on churn of
peers and on time, because accounts are handed over when peers leave and there are frequent actions
controlling and repairing account holder sets.
As described above, churn in p2p systems can not be described using exponential functions. Therefore,
Markov Chains and queueing theory cannot be applied to model the traffic created from churn. This part
of traffic will only be regarded in the simulation.
Account holder set management consists of two mechanisms.
• Detection of replica number and adding account holders if necessary.
• Detection of correct account holder set position and moving it, if necessary.
Apart from the account holder set size (k) there are two frequencies to be determined as system param-
eters.
• fck is the frequency an aggregation account’s set size is checked.
• fcp is the frequency an aggregation account’s position is checked.
5.3.2.1 Simple Mechanism Analysis
For managing the account holding sets the following mechanisms are used: Detection of replica number,
detection of correct account position, account holder set locking, account consistency, account move-
ment, and graceful account handover. The message created by the mechanisms is summarised now.
The number of messages stated here is only correct if the overlay’s structure is completely correct, and
no involved peers fail or go offline during runtime of such a mechanism. Lookup operations are not
considered.
Detection of Replica Number
• One account holder to the first account holder administering the detection: 1
• The administering account holder to all other account holders: k − 1
• The other account holders to the administering account holder: k − 1
The sum of messages created results in: MRN (k) = 2k − 1
Adding a New Account Holder
• Administering account holder to last account holder: 1
• Last account holder to new account holder: 1
• Response of new holder to administering holder: 1
• Transfer of account data: 1
• Confirm transfer: 1
The sum of messages created results in: MAdd(k) = 5
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Detection of Correct Account Position
• One account holder to the first account holder administering the detection: 1
• Administering account holder to a random trusted peer: 1
• Steps of account position detection: number of messages is approximately the account offset x
• Response from trusted peer to administering account holder: 1
The sum of messages created results in: MP (k, x) = 3 + x
Account Holder Set Locking
• The administering account holder to all other account holders: k − 1
• The other account holders to all other account holders: (k − 1)(k − 1)
• All other account holders confirm to the administrating account holder: k − 1
The sum of messages created results in: ML(k) = 2(k − 1) + (k − 1)2.
Account Holder Set Un-Locking
• The administering account holder to all other account holders: k − 1
Account Consistency
• One account holder to the account holder administering the process: 1
• The administering account holder to all other account holders: k − 1
• The other account holders to all other account holders: (k − 1)(k − 1)
• All other account holders confirm to the administrating account holder: k − 1
The sum of messages created results in: MC = 2k + (k − 1)2 − 1.
Account Movement
• Account holder to the new first account holder position: 1
• Forward to other new account holders: k
• From new last account holder to all other new account holders: k − 1
• From new first account holder to all old holders: k
The sum of messages created results in: MM (k) = 3k
Graceful Account Handover
• Leaving account holder to last account holder: 1
• Last account holder to new account holder: 1
• Response of new holder to leaving holder: 1
• Transfer of account data: 1
• Confirm transfer: 1
The sum of messages created results in: MGHo(k) = 5
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5.3.2.2 Joint Mechanisms Analysis
If one of the main maintenance mechanisms (detection of replica number or detection of new account
holder set) comes to the conclusion that the account holder set must be repaired, a sequence of mecha-
nisms is executed.
Account Replica Repair
Repairing the replica number of an account holder set requires running detection of the replica number,
account holder set locking, account consistency, add account holder, and account holder set unlocking.
This sequence of mechanisms results in:
MRR(k) = 2(k − 1)2 + 7k
Account Position Repair
Repairing an account holder sets position requires to run detection of correct account position, account
holder set locking, account consistency, move account, account holder set unlocking. This sequence of
mechanisms results in:
MPR(k, x) = 2(k − 1)2 + 8k − 1 + x
5.4 Token-based Accounting Simulation
For simulating the token-based accounting scheme, as a basis the peer-to-peer simulator PeerfactSim.KOM
(Mul, KKM+07) in version 2 was applied. PeerfactSim.KOM was developed at our institute and pro-
vides implementations of several peer-to-peer overlay networks such as Chord (SMK+01) and Kademlia
(MM02) as well as an underlay model that provides an end-to-end delay for each individual connection
in the overlay. Furthermore, its layered and modular architecture enables the easy expansion of the
simulator for the purpose of simulating the token-based accounting scheme. An architectural overview
of PeerfactSim.KOM is depicted in Figure 5.3.
In PeerfactSim.KOM in order to enable peers to communicate each peer possesses a unique identifica-
tion, the GUID. A GUID has to be implemented specifically for the corresponding overlay network. Each
peer implements several roles, and each role presents a distinct part of functionality the peer possesses.
A specific message type is associated with each role in order to enable the simulator to deliver a message
to the correct role. In each layer, multiple roles can exist. Sending messages to different roles is possible.
Measuring Traffic and Peers’ Queues
Each message type provides a getSize()-method, that calculates the size of an individual message and
returns it. This way the traffic created by the token-based accounting scheme can be measured.
In order to measure the download and upload traffic on a per peer basis, each peer instantiates a
MessageMeterRole. For each message that is sent or received by the peer the MessageMeterRole logs the
message.
The MessageMeterRole also instantiates a download queue and an upload queue. A queue calculates
for each message the caused queue length, that is the time required to send or receive all Bytes in the
queue. Using the queue length a peer’s link load can be determined. In order to configure the queues
there exist the parameters cnup and c
n
dl for the upload and download link capacity of peer n.
In order to evaluate the token-based accounting scheme, the overlay layer, transport layer, and network
layer of the simulator were not adapted. The token-based accounting scheme was implemented into the
application layer. A completely new user layer was implemented in order to simulate only behaviour
relevant to the token-based accounting scheme. The details are discussed in the following section. After,
the experiments simulated will be explained and finally the simulation results will be presented.
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Simulation Engine
Network Layer
Transport Layer
Overlay Layer
Application Layer
User Layer
Figure 5.3: PeerfactSim.KOM: Layered architecture
5.4.1 Simulation Model
The simulation model of the token-based accounting scheme was implemented into PeerfactSim’s user
layer to model the users’ actions and the application layer to model the token-based accounting scheme’s
protocols. For the overlay network, the existing Chord implementation was applied as required by the
account holder set mechanisms.
Implemented Roles
The simulation model is structured according to the different building blocks of the token-based ac-
counting scheme. The TokenAccounterRole implements the token-based accounting core component of
the token-based accounting scheme’s architecture (see Figure 3.5). The TrustedPeerRole implements the
additional functionality required by trusted peers for issuing tokens (the TokenAggregation component
within the architecture in Figure 3.5). The AccountHolderRole implements the protocols for checking dou-
ble spending (the Aggregation Accounts sub-component of the Double Spending Detection component
within the architecture in Figure 3.5). The AccountHolderSetRole implements all mechanisms required
for maintaining an account holder set in presence of churn (the Account Holder Set Maintenance sub-
component of the Double Spending Detection component within the architecture in Figure 3.5). Finally,
the TokenUserRole implements the users’ behaviour. The application scenario’s functionality was also
implemented here, as it was kept very simple.
In order to keep the token-based accounting simulation adaptable to different overlay networks and
network layer implementations, there are two classes connecting the application layer with the overlay
layer and the network layer. The ChordFindingStrategies implements all lookup variants required, that
is, to lookup a specific GUID, find the next trusted peer starting from a specific GUID, and find a random
trusted peer. Furthermore, the ChordFindingStrategies implements methods to return the peer’s successor
or predecessor, which is required for all routing processes along the ring.
5.4.1.1 TokenAccounterRole
The structure of the TokenAccounter-implementation with its core, the TokenAccounterRole is depicted
in Figure 5.4.
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TokenAccount
Each peer implements the TokenAccounterRole. With the TokenAccounterRole a peer has a TokenAc-
count storing its own and foreign tokens. The foreign tokens are stored in an account stored by the
foreign peers.
Requesting Starting Tokens and a Token Aggregation
The TokenAccounterRole is responsible for requesting the starting number of own tokens from a
trusted peer. The SwapAgent waits to receiving partially signed tokens and stores the new own to-
kens in the account when all token parts were received. The same process takes place when the peer
requests a token aggregation. A token aggregation is also started by the TokenAccounterRole by sending
a swap message to a random trusted peer. A random trusted peer is found by using the ChordFind-
ingStrategies. A lookup message for a random GUID returns the GUID of the responsible peer B to the
ChordFindingStrategies. Then a NextTrustedPeer message is sent to that peer B. B will check if it is a
trusted peer. If it is, it will respond with its GUID to the initiating peer. If not, it will forward the message
along the Chord ring to its successor. The TokenAccounterRole of B’s successor will repeat this process,
until a trusted peer is found. The TokenAccounterRole can now send the swap message to the found
trusted peer. A SwapAgent is instantiated and will wait to receive the partially signed tokens. The signal
Tokens() serves as a dispatcher to forward messages concerning tokens to the correct agent.
Transactions
For each transaction, a PayTokensAgent is responsible for sending the correct number of tokens to the
provider. On the provider side, a ReceivePaymentAgent will receive the tokens. The signal Tokens() at
the TokenAccounterRole is responsible for initially receiving the corresponding messages and forwarding
them to the correct agent. The TokenUserRole is responsible for initiating a transaction (see below). On
the service provider side, the TokenUserRole calls the provideService()-operation of the TokenAccoun-
terRole. This operation sends a service message to the service requester. The service message contains
specific information about the size of the service provided. Furthermore details about the service were
omitted, as the service does not influence the operations of the token-based accounting scheme.
The requester starts the payment process with the startPayment()-operation. On the provider side
the token IDs will be sent to the corresponding account holder set in order to check their validity using
the sendAHUpdate()-operation. The answer is received by the signal AHSUpdateReply and forwarded
to the corresponding ReceivePaymentAgent. The agent checks if sufficient tokens were accepted by the
account holder set. If so, a TokenRequestMessage is sent to the requester, containing the “complete”
statement. If not a sufficient number of tokens could be accepted, the provider will request further
tokens using also a TokenRequestMessage containing status information about all tokens the requester
sent. On the requester side, the Tokens() signal receives TokenRequestMessages and forwards them to
the corresponding PayTokensAgent. If additional tokens are requested, the requested number of tokens
is retrieved from the TokenAccount and send to the provider using the anotherPayment()-operation.
Furthermore Considerations
Malicious behaviour was not implemented, as this would involve the reputation system. The traffic
generated from updating a peer’s reputation value mainly depends on the applied reputation scheme.
5.4.1.2 TrustedPeerRole
The structure of the TrustedPeerRole and its sub classes is depicted in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.4: TokenAccounterRole implementation
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Trusted Peer Selection
The process of determining a new trusted peer depends on the applied reputation scheme. Therefore,
in the simulation of the token-based accounting scheme this process was not implemented. A simple
mechanism was applied in order to select trusted peers. As a global simulation parameter the ratio ptp
of trusted peer to normal peers can be configured.
Whether or not a peer is a trusted peer is set by the parameter “trustedPeerInitialized” in the Toke-
nAccounterRole. When a peer comes online, the number of online peers is determined using the central
simulator’s class PeerManager. It keeps track of which peers are online and which are offline. When the
actual trusted peer ratio p
′
tp is below the target ratio ptp the peer will instantiate the trusted peer role.
Token Aggregation
When a peer SP requests starting tokens or a token aggregation, it will send this request to a random
trusted peer TP1. The trusted peer TP1will receive this message via the signal processSwapMessage().
TP1 will now send a request message to the SP ’s account holder set in order to determine the trusted
peer that is to administer the token aggregation. The signal selectAggregationAdminReply() receives the
response. At the selected administering trusted peer TPAdmin the tokens to be aggregated are received by
the signal processSwapMessage(). At TPAdmin, a new AggregationTask is instantiated that will manage
the remaining aggregation process. The AggregationTask starts with the doInitialChunk()-operation.
Using the requestAHCheckTokens()-operations, TPAdmin will send a query message to each owner peer
of the foreign tokens to be aggregated. The AccountHolderCheckRequester will collect the responses.
Now the doTask()-operation is initiated. Using the lookupTPQuorum()-operation the, request message is
sent to SP ’s account holder set. The account holder set’s reply will be received by the tpQuorumFound()-
signal. The number of new tokens to be created is determined and created according to the aggregation
function A(Fn1, ..., Fnn) using the newTokens()-operation. Tokens are identified by a centrally assigned
tokenID. This is performed by the getFirstFreeToken()-operation in the AccountHolderMap (see below).
When all these task have been accomplished, the operation doFinalChunk()-operation sends the new
tokens to the quorum peers using the sendToQuorum()-operation.
At the quorum peers the signal processSwapMessage() receives the NewTokensMessage. The quorum
peers will use the sendAHUpdate()-operation to update the aggregation account. Then they use the
sendPartiallySignedTokensToSwappingPeer() to send the tokens to SP .
Determining Aggregation Account Positions
The DetermineAccountStartPosition class is responsible for determining the first account holder of a
specific aggregation account, as described in Section 4.2.1.2. The process is started by the signal ac-
countPosition(). The findAccountPosition()-operation performs the first lookup step. This operation also
determines if another lookup step is required. This is done using the anotherLookupStep()-operation.
5.4.1.3 AccountHolerRole
The account holder set required the most complex implementation. It consists of four core parts. The
AccountHolderRole is responsible for storing aggregation accounts and replying to queries and updates
of aggregation accounts. The AccountHolderSetRole implements the mechanisms required to maintain
an account holder set in the presence of churn. The AccountHolderSetMaintainer controls the sequence
of mechanisms executed by the AccountHolderSetRole. The AccountHolderSetMap is a central class that
stores the account holders for each aggregation account and controls the frequency of account mainte-
nance operations executed by the AccountHolderSetMaintainer. Note that both the AccountHolderSet-
Maintainer and the AccountHolderSetMap are not roles, as they are not sending or receiving messages.
The structure of the account holder set implementation is depicted in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: TrustedPeerRole implementation
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AccountHolderRole
The main responsibility of the AccountHolderRole is to forward query and update messages to the
first account holder of an aggregation account and from there the send the message to the complete
account holder set. This happens via the signal processAccountHoldingMessage(). It also processes
messages that are used for determining the correct account position. These messages are received via the
signal processLocationMessage(). The AccountHolderRole also sends response messages from individual
account holders to the first account holder using the sendAHSResponseMessage(). The first holder sends
the result of any query or update message to the initiating peer using the different confirm-operations.
The AccountHolder-Class is responsible for processing all queries and updates. There have been two
alternatives for handling tokens in the simulation implemented. The simple query and simple update do
not check individual tokens. They simply compare if the number of tokens are consistent. The advanced
query and update method compare each token by token ID and status. For each token an integer value
as status is administered. The status gives information if a token is unused and from how many quorum
peers a token update about this new token was received. Furthermore, a “planned to spend” and “spent”
status exist. This way double spending etc. can be detected by an account holder. In both alternatives
a token is removed from an aggregation account when it was swapped by a foreign peer. The simple
alternative was implemented in order to speed up the simulation.
Furthermore the AccountHolder-Class of the first account holder is responsible for collecting the re-
sponse messages of the remaining account holders and checking the consistency of these messages. If
more than 50% of the messages to be received are consistent, the AccountHolder triggers the Accoun-
tHolderRole to send a confirm message.
Two query types are processed in a special manner for reasons of expediency. The queries for determin-
ing an aggregation administrator and for determining a quorum are only processed at the first account
holder; the remaining account holders deliver meaningless results in the first holder. Simulating the real
processes would require calculations, but no further message transfer. Therefore, these simplifications
were chosen. In theses queries, the first holder will lookup a random trusted peer as administrator re-
sponsible for a quorum of random peers when it has received more than 50% of the possible response
messages from the quorum peers. Then the first account holder delivers the result to the query initiator.
AccountHolderSetRole
The account holder set role implements the mechanisms for maintaining the account holder sets as
discussed in Section 4.2. Similar to the account query and update processes, the consistency mechanism
also supports two alternatives. The simple version checks only the consistency of the number of tokens
in each account holder’s aggregation account. The advanced version, also checks the consistency of the
tokens’ stati. In the advanced version the token’s status held in the majority of peers is set as the new
token status. The simple version builds the resulting number of tokens based on simple majority.
For two mechanisms separate classes are instantiated when they are executed.
The CheckAHSResponseCollector collects all the responses of a checkAccountHolderSize()-operation
started at the AccountHolderSetMaintainer. When the collector has received responses from all account
holders of the corresponding set or a timeout occurs, the actual account holder set is determined from
the responses and distributed to all account holders. Peers that responded, but are no longer account
holders for that account are informed in order to remove that aggregation account.
The ConsistencyReponseManager is instantiated at each peer of an account holder set for which
a runAccountConsistency()-operation was started by the AccountHolderSetMaintainer. Each account
holder collects all responses from the other holders. When all responses are received or a timeout oc-
curs, the responses are compared and the resulting account information is updated and distributed (see
above).
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AccountHolderSetMaintainer
AccountHolderSetMaintainer accesses the AccountHolderRole in order to perform the account holder
set maintenance processes. The two main operations are checkAccountHolderSize() and
checkAHS_Position(). The first will determine the actual account holder set size. If the account holder
set is short in size, the account will be locked using the lockAccount()-operation and then account
consistency is achieved using the runAccountConsistency()-operation. Now, the addAccountHolder()-
operation is executed as many times as account holders are missing in the account. Finally the ac-
count will be unlocked. The checkAHS_Position()-operation will determine the optimal position of the
first holder of an aggregation account. If this position deviates from the actual position by more than
two hops, the account is locked, consistency achieved, the account moved using the moveAccount()-
operation, and finally the account is unlocked.
AccountHolderSetMap
The AccountHolderSetMap was created in order to consolidate information that normally would be
stored with account holder sets redundantly: This way the simulation saves memory.
The AccountHolderSetMap stores for each peer its account holder. Each time an account holder detects
a change in an account holder set, it informs all other account holders of this set about it. Therefore,
the AccountHolderSetMap can be applied to model the status of account holder sets. The account holder
map is a current view, and might deviate from the actual situation in the simulation i.e., an absent
account holder will not be reflected in the AccountHolderSetMap until another account holder detects
this.
The AccountHolderSetMap controls when checkAccountHolderSize()-operations and
checkAHS_Position()-operations are executed for an account. A random account holder of an account
holder set is chosen to start the maintenance operation. This models the decentralised monitoring in
an account holder set the last time a specific operation was executed. This implementation also saved
memory in the simulation.
5.4.1.4 TokenUserRole
The tasks of the TokenUserRole are twofold. The TokenUserRole implements the user’s behaviour as well
as the application that the token-based accounting scheme accounts for.
Application Model
As the application, a file sharing scenario was selected where peers request complete files from each
other. In this scenario, searching for a specific service and the kind of service delivery do not influence
the token-based accounting scheme. Therefore, the file sharing service can be modelled in a simple
way, so search for service, as well as chunking files are not considered in the simulation. Furthermore,
individual files and their distribution in the network are not simulated, as the distribution of files in the
system is not in focus of the evaluation.
In the resulting simulation model, each file has a specific size in MBytes. For each MBytes file size s
the requester peer has to pay one token. The service delivery is simulated by sending one message of the
specific file size as payload. The file size si for transaction i is selected at the time of the service request
using a probability distribution s. Also, a random online peer is selected as service provider. Note, the
file size distribution s also corresponds to the transaction value.
Application Operations
When a user requests a service, it sends a serviceRequestMessage to the selected service provider.
Their message is received via the serviceRequestReceived()-signal. If the service provider is available for
transactions (see below) it will accept the service request; otherwise it will deny it. At the requester the
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signal requestAcceptanceReceived()-signal receives the provider decision. In case of denial, the service
requester selects another peer. In case of acceptance the acceptance message contains the price of the
service. The requester peer will request the service if it has sufficient number of own tokens available.
It will then call the payTokens()-operation of the TokenAccounterRole; if not, it will deny the service.
The final requester’s decision is received at the provider via the providerDecisionReceived()-signal. The
provider will call the provideService()-operation at the TokenAccounterRole in order to instantiate a
ReceivePaymentAgent, and to provide the service.
In the case the requester does not have sufficient tokens for the transactions, the peer will swap its for-
eign tokens using the swapTokens()-operation - if the peer has more foreign tokens then the lower swap
threshold bmin. A new transaction will be performed when the aggregation is completed. Otherwise,
another transaction will be scheduled.
User Behaviour
The first time a user joins the system it will request a starting number of tokens bstart. bstart is an
application dependent parameter. If no aggregation account exists yet for this peer, it will be created by
the trusted peer before the starting tokens are issued using the initializeNewAccount()-Operation of the
TrustedPeerRole.
When a peer receives its starting tokens it will start to request services. Using a probability function,
the time of the next transaction is determined and the transaction is scheduled using the
scheduleNextTransaction()-operation. After the transaction finished, the next transaction is scheduled.
If after a peer provided a transaction the swap threshold b of foreign tokens is exceeded, a peer will swap
all its foreign tokens for new tokens using the swapTokens()-operation.
Churn
When churn is simulated there are several parameters to be determined. The peers’ lifetime distri-
bution and offline-time distribution are the core parameters to be defined. Furthermore, a user can log
off from the system or can simply disappear from the system. When a peer logs off, it will transfer its
aggregation accounts to another peer using the gracefulHandover()-operation of the AccountHolderSet-
Maintainer. When a peer joins the system, the lifetime is determined and whether the peer will log off
or leave. Accordingly, a log off or an offline will be scheduled using either the scheduleLogOff() or a
scheduleOffline()-operation. The decision if a peer logs off depends on the probability plog−off . When
a peer leaves the system, the peer’s offline time is determined and the next join is scheduled using the
scheduleOnline()-operation.
For each peer, a period before leaving the system is determined when peers will not get involved in
any transactions. This period is referred to as “dead-period-before-leave”. The dead-period-before-leave
simulates how when a user closes a peer-to-peer application, it will not close until all current transactions
it is involved are finished. This period typically lasts some seconds. During this period, a peer will not
accept transactions as provider, to become an account holder, or to administer a token aggregation or an
account holder set maintenance operation.
5.4.2 Experiments
Simulated is the file sharing scenario described above. 5.4 summarises the simulation parameters. The
core interests of the simulation is the influence of the quorum size t, the account holder set size k, and
of churn on the traffic created by the token based accounting scheme.
In order to analyse the influence if these parameters on the created traffic, the measurements for four
different parameter values will be analysed. Using four measuring points, it can be analysed whether
the created traffic develops in a linear way or in different way. In order to analyse the effects of one
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parameter on the token-based accounting scheme, a base scenario is defined and the experiments will
vary only one parameter at a time (ceteris paribus).
Now the base scenario is described.
5.4.2.1 Experiment Parameter Overview
Basic Settings
• Duration: The selected scenario will be simulated for the time of one day (24 hours).
• System Size (N): The system size N is 1000 peers. A larger system size led to a simulation that
exceeded the selected duration.
• Used Overlay: For the peer-to-peer system the Chord implementation in PeerfactSim.KOM was
applied.
• Peer Bandwidth (c): All peers have the same bandwidth available. A typical DSL-link with 128 kBit
upstream (ciup = cup = 128 kbit) and 1024 kBit downstream (c
i
dl = cdl = 1024 kbit) was selected.
• Key Length (r): The key length of the peers’ key and the system key pair. Since the hypothetical
TWIRL machine can factorise RSA-keys within one year (ST03), today a length of 2048 bit is
suggested. Although the BLS-threshold scheme uses shorter signatures, as a worst case decision
in the simulation r was set to 2048 in order to reflect the traffic that the use of the URSA-scheme
would introduce.
• Trusted Peer Ratio (ptp): The trusted peer ratio was set to ptp = 33.33%. The selected churn (see
below) means that approximately 30% of all peers are concurrently online. In order to enable a
varying quorum for the largest quorum size t = 17, a total number of T = 100 trusted peers seemed
a reasonable base value. Accordingly, ptp was selected.
• Trusted Peers’ Trustworthiness (pg): It is assumed that the ratio of good peers among the trusted
peers is at least pg = 50%. This value is required in order to calculate the required quorum size.
• Account Holder Set Maintenance (fck, fcp): The account holder set methods depend on the fre-
quency the account holder set size is checked fck and the frequency the account position is checked
fcp. For the simulation fck is set to 300 seconds and fcp is set to 600 seconds, likewise for the sim-
ulation for determining the optimal account holder set size.
Quorum Size
For the quorum size, different performance values of the token-based accounting scheme are applied.
The scheme is evaluated with Trust Levels L = 99%, 99, 9%, 99,99% and 99,999%. This results for the
selected pg = 50% in quorum sizes t = 7, 10, 14, and 17.
Account Holder Set Size
Because the preferred account holder set size k’s influence of different account holder set sizes on the
created traffic, the account holder set size will be varied k = 6, 8, 10, and 12, as these are the results
from the simulation of the account holder set maintenance mechanisms (see above).
Churn
Churn is modelled using the results from (SENB07b).
• Online Time (don): The base peer lifetime is a Weibull distribution with α = 0, 61511 and β =
169, 5385, measured in minutes. For the simulation, we assumed that peers are online at least
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don,min = 30 seconds. This assumption helped to keep the Chord ring more stable. Also, as
DSL-connections are typically reset after 24 hours, the maximum possible online time was set to
don,max = 24 hours. The maximum simulation time was 24 hours. A longer online time could not
be reflected in the simulations.
• Offline Time (doff): The base peer offline distribution is a Weibull distribution with α = 0, 47648
and β = 413, 6765, also measured in minutes. The same minimum doff,min = 30 seconds and
maximum doff,max = 24 hours have been applied to the offline time distribution.
In order to analyse churn, both distributions are multiplied with factors dvar of 1.0, 0.5, 0.33, 0.25.
At the beginning of the simulation ,all peers are offline. In order to bring the peers into the system,
each peer will join after half of an offline time period. That simulates that the system was pre-existing.
• Log Off Behaviour (plog−off): The basic probability for a log off (in contrast to a leave) was set to
plog−off = 90%. As users typically close the application when they leave the system, the remaining
10% are thought to reflect crashes, connection failures, etc.
Application Parameters
Note that the application parameters are required to create traffic for the token-based accounting
scheme. It is not used to evaluate the efficiency of a file sharing application. This is beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
Moreover, there are no measurements of the transaction frequency and file size distributions for the
scenarios where the churn was measured. As it is more important for the simulation of the account
holder set to use a realistic churn model in the simulation, it was decided to apply a realistic churn
model, and create distributions for transaction frequency that model meaningful user behaviour in a
scenario where the token-based accounting scheme is applied.
• Transaction Frequency (ft): A peer will request services according to a normal distribution ft with
a mean µ = 1800 seconds (30 min) and a standard deviation σ = 1800. The distributions minimum
was set to 60 seconds and maximum to 7200 seconds (2 hours).
• File Size and Transaction Value (s): The distribution of file sizes is thought to model an mp3-file
sharing scenario. Accordingly, a normal distribution was applied with µ = 6 and σ = 6. Also for
this distribution a minimum of smin = 1 and a maximum of smax = 13 was set in order to reflect
typical file sizes for such an application type in MBytes.
• Dead Period Before Leave (ddead): When closing an application, the time that is required to finish
all open tasks. This period was set to 20 seconds.
• Aggregation Function M = A(Fn1, ..., Fnn): In the file sharing application a peer receives as many
new tokens as old tokens were aggregated. M = n, where n is the number of foreign tokens sent
for aggregation.
Token-Accounting User Behaviour
• Swap Threshold (b): User exchanged all their foreign tokens when they collected more then 25
foreign tokens.
• Lower Swap Threshold (bmin): When a user is in need for tokens in order to do further transactions,
it collects at least 3 foreign tokens before swapping them. This is also the minimum value of a
transaction.
• Starting Tokens (bstart): At the beginning of the simulation each user receives 50 own tokens.
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Table 5.4: Simulation Scenario Parameters
Parameter Description Values
N Total number of peers in the system. All peers in the
system are normal peers. 1000
ciup Upload link capacity of peer i 128 kBit
cidl Download link capacity of peer i 1024 kBit
r Length of used keys 2048 bit
ptp Target ratio of trusted peers to normal peer in the system 33,33%
T Total number of trusted peers in the system; results from
ptp.
≈ 300
t Quorum size 17, 14, 10, 7
L Trust Level, depending on T , t, pg
99%, 99.9%, 99.99%,
99.999%
k Preferred Account Holder Set Size 6, 8, 10, 12
x Account Shift Value 5
fck Frequency account holder set size check 300 sec
fcp Frequency account holder set position check 600 sec
ft Frequency a user requests a service NormDist(1800; 1800),
min = 60 sec, max = 7200
sec
s File size distribution resp. service value distribution NormDist(6; 6),
min = 3, max = 13
b Swap threshold 25
bmin Lower swap threshold 3
bstart Number of starting tokens 50
A(Fn1, ..., Fnn) Aggregation function A = n
don Peers’ lifetime distribution Weibull(0,61511;
169,5385);
min = 30 sec, max = 86400
sec
doff Peers’ offline time distribution Weibull(0,47648;
413,6765);
min = 30 sec, max = 86400
sec
dvar Churn modification factor 1
plog−off Probability for logoff 90%
ddead Dead period before a peer leaves 20 sec
V System-wide traffic volume
v Traffic volume per peer
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Table 5.5: Simulation Message Size Parameters
Parameter Parameter Size [Byte]
MTU lMTU 1500
Overlay Address lID 20
I²P Header lIP 10
Transport Header lTCP 10
Key length r 256
Delimiter ldel 2
Response Identifier lresp 4
int value lint 4
long value llong 8
double value ldouble 8
Token Parameter Size [Byte]
Fresh unsigned U 282
Partially Signed P 540
New Own Token T 540
Used Foreign Token F 1096
5.4.2.2 Message Sizes
Calculating Message Sizes
Each message sent in the token-based accounting simulation has a specific size. The size is composed
of the basic required headers of the IP- protocol and the TCP or UDP-protocol, as well as the information
the message carries. Each information field is delimited by a delimiter. All message types can carry
different amount of information. Depending on the information carried, a message’s size is calculated in
the simulation. Table 5.5 describes the assumed sizes of different types of information.
The message sizes are considered fixed parameters in the simulation and result from either the applied
overlay network or the messages used in the token-based accounting scheme. They will not be varied in
the simulation.
The MTU is used in order to calculate the number of fragments a message is split into, and with this
to calculate the actual traffic sending a specific message creates because per fragment IP- and TCP/UDP
headers are required to be added.
Token Sizes
There are four different kind of tokens used inside the token-based accounting scheme. When tokens
are created in the first place they contain the information required to identify it. These fresh unsigned
tokens are composed of a date (type: long), a serial number (type: int), an owner ID (type: key), an
account ID (type: int), and the required five delimiters. This results in 282 Bytes. Partially signed tokens
also contain a signature (type: key), as well as a further delimiter. This results in 540 Bytes. New own
tokens have the same size. Used tokens additionally contain transaction ID (type: int), transaction time
(type: long), transaction object (type: overlay ID), provider ID (type: key), owner signature (type: key),
and six delimiters. This results in a size of 1096 Bytes. Furthermore accounting information added to
used tokens was not considered in the simulation.
5.4.2.3 Experiment Overview
This section gives an overview on the performed experiments and the base experiment the other experi-
ments are derived from.
Performed Experiments
The basic experiment uses the values given in Table 5.4 for the parameters of the token-based ac-
counting scheme. All experiments use as traffic parameters the values given in Table 5.5. Three main
influencing factors on traffic generated by the token-based accounting scheme will be analysed: The
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Table 5.6: Experiments Overview
t k dvar
Base 17 10 1
Quorum 14
10
7
AHSS 12
8
6
Churn 12
1
3
1
4
influence of the quorum size t, the influence of the account holder set size k, and the influence of churn
by varying the churn modifier dvar. For each factor, four different scenarios were simulated; this allows
for further understanding of how traffic develops; i.e., is the traffic growth linear, exponential, etc.
In order to analyse the influence of the main parameter of the token-based accounting scheme on the
created traffic, one parameter at a time is varied and all other parameters are kept constant (ceteris
paribus).
The influence of the quorum size t on the traffic created is analysed by using different Trust Levels
L(T, t, pg) = {99%, 99.9%, 99.99%, 99.999%}. It is assumed that at least pg = 50% of the trusted peers act
honestly. For the system size of N = 1000 peers and a trusted peer ratio ptp > 10%, the required quorum
sizes result in t = {7, 10, 14, 17}.
The account holder set size k depends on the churn in the system. Accordingly, the account holder set
would be increased with stronger churn. However, in order to be able to analyse the influence of the
account holder set size k on the traffic generated, churn has to be kept constant. Otherwise it would
interfere with the results. The simulated values are deduced from the simulations of the account holder
sets, presented in Section 5.2.2. Set sizes of k = {6, 8, 10, 12} will be simulated in order to cover a broad
range of churn scenarios.
In order to analyse the influence of different churn, a basic churn model is used and this is modified
by the churn factor dvar. In the basic churn model the results from (SENB07b) are applied, which have
also been applied for the account holder set size simulations (see Section 5.2.2). Both, peer lifetime
and peer offline time, are distributed according to Weibull distributions with parameters listed in Table
5.1. Likewise, the analysis of the account holder set size, both distributions are modified with the churn
factor 0 < dvar ≤ 1, which increases the influence of churn, as peer lifetime and peer offline time are
reduced. dvar is chosen as dvar =
{
1, 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
4
}
.
Furthermore, in order to study the scalability of the token-based accounting scheme, i.e. the effect of
different system sizes, the system sizes of N = {1000, 250} are used.
Base Experiment
The base experiment uses the highest trust value L(T, t, pg) = 99.999%, which results in a quorum
size of t = 17. The base account holder set size is set to k = 10, in order to allow conduct the churn
experiments ceteris paribus. As base churn the churn factor is set to dvar = 1.
Table 5.6 summarises the performed experiments.
Number of Repetitions per Experiment
In order to determine the required number of repetitions per experiment, the central limit theorem
(BGG94) is applied. Each experiment runs with either 1000 or 250 peers. Thus, according to the the
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central limit theorem, it can be assumed that the average traffic created per time period is normally
distributed. For computing meaningful confidence intervals, the sample size should be at least ten.
Therefore, each experiment is repeated 12 times.
As the traffic is normally distributed for computing the confidence intervals, the student t-distribution
has to be applied for the given experiment size (cf. (BGG94)).
5.4.3 Simulation Results On Transaction Traffic
5.4.3.1 Graph Configuration
System-wide Traffic Graphs
Each data point in the graphs represents a 20 minute time period in the simulation. For each data
point, the average amount of traffic generated in the complete system during one minute of simulation
time is plotted. Twenty minute plot intervals were chosen, as with smaller time intervals error bars could
not clearly be depicted. The error bars represent the 90% confidence interval.
System-wide Traffic Ratio Graphs
The system-wide traffic ratio graphs represent the same amount of traffic like the system-wide traffic
graphs. Also, the error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
There are two types of ratios computed. The first ratio type is the ratio of the traffic generated by
a specific mechanism divided by the total amount of traffic generated in the experiment. These ratios
allow understanding the cost of using the token-based accounting scheme in a specific usage scenario.
The graphs show if usage bears prohibitive high costs or not.
The second ratio type is the ratio of the traffic generated by a specific mechanism of the token-based
accounting scheme divided by the complete traffic generated by the token-based accounting scheme.
These ratios show which mechanisms have the strongest influence on the traffic generated by the token-
based accounting scheme.
5.4.3.2 Base Experiment Result
The traffic generated in the base experiment with a quorum size of t = 17, an account holder set size
k = 10, and a churn factor of dvar = 1 is depicted in Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. In the beginning of the
simulations peers join the system the first time distributed with half of the offline time distribution. The
average join time is 1.5 hours; however, as the join time is Weibull distributed the majority of peers join
up to 1.5 hours. Afterwards the joins diminish. As the first step when going online for the first time,
each peer requests its starting tokens. Therefore, at this time also the peer’s aggregation account has to
be created. When both tasks were completed, the peer schedules its first transaction.
In this section the figures show per data point the average upload traffic per minute generated over a
20 minute time period. The error bars represent the 90% confidence interval. Within each time period
the number of active peers was recorded in order to determine the average traffic per peer. A peer is
active within a period if it sent a message.
Overall Traffic Observations
Figure 5.8 a) shows the complete system-wide traffic versus the system-wide token-based accounting
traffic. At first the complete traffic increases sharply. This is due to the increasing number of online
peers that start to consume services. The token-based accounting traffic is highest in the beginning
with 22.07 MBytes per minute. This is due to the newly joining peers that request the starting tokens
and get an aggregation account initialised. Then token-based accounting traffic decreases, because the
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Figure 5.8: System-wide traffic for t = 17, k = 10, dvar = 1
number of new joins per minute also decreases. The token-based accounting traffic then levels off at
approximately 13.4 MBytes per minute, which is per active peer on average approximately 30.31 kBytes
per minute. After service traffic levelled, approximately 75 MBytes service traffic per minute is created.
The ratio of service traffic to token-based accounting traffic is approximately 5.6 in the simulated file
sharing scenario.
The token-based accounting traffic is flat most of the time. However, in between there are traffic
increases. Figure 5.8 b) shows the explanation for this increased traffic. The reason is an increase in
lookup traffic. The Chord overlay causes this. Lookup messages have a time-to-live of 100 hops. When
the Chord-ring has a falsely set successor, a message might be rooted to a node that is not responsible
for a key, because it knows a predecessor that should be responsible for it. Then the message is rooted
again along the ring. If the falsely set successor is not repaired, the lookup message travels its 100 hops
before it is discarded. In such a situation in the token-based accounting scheme, timeouts become active
and repeat the lookup four times. Accordingly, instead of one lookup message travelling a maximum of
ten hops in a system of 1,000 nodes, this lookup message travels now 500 hops in total also considering
the repeated lookups. Accordingly, the lookup traffic increases by more than a factor of 50, because on
average, a lookup message travels less then ten hops. When the Chord ring operates correctly, lookups
create on average approximately 0.4 MBytes of traffic per minute. The peak average traffic is 15.47
MBytes per minute. This is an increase by a factor of almost 40. Furthermore, it must be considered that
this traffic has to be shared among a small number of peers, as routing around the ring requires log(N)
at maximum, which is ten peers in the simulations. Obviously, this is a malfunction of the implemented
Chord protocol. This deviation from normal operation will not be considered in the further analysis,
as for a real world deployment an improved version of Chord or a different overlay network would be
employed.
Traffic Breakdown Observations
Figure 5.9 shows the breakdown of the traffic into the main groups of the token-based accounting
scheme - Payment, Token Aggregation, Account Holder Set Maintenance, Lookup, and Chord Overlay
Maintenance. Figure 5.9 a) shows the system-wide traffic, Figure 5.9 b) shows the average traffic per
active peer.
Analysing this traffic breakdown shows that Chord maintenance creates the largest amount of traffic,
not considering the lookup traffic in the presence of failures in the Chord ring. After the join process,
Chord maintenance traffic is almost constant with approximately 6.8 MBytes per minute of system-wide
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traffic on average. For an active peer this relates to 15.95 kBytes traffic per minute on average. Not
considering the service provisioning traffic, this is about 52% of the overall traffic (see Figure 5.10 b).
Lookup traffic is the traffic that stems from lookups done on peers and trusted peers by the token-based
accounting scheme. System-wide lookup traffic is approximately 0.4 MBytes per minute on average,
when the Chord ring is working correctly; this is minor compared to Chord maintenance traffic. Per
active peer, this is on average 0.91 kBytes per minute (see Figure 5.9 b)). The proportion of lookup
traffic within all token-based accounting traffic is approximately 3%.
Maintenance of the account holder sets generates the largest proportion of traffic among the token-
based accounting mechanisms with approximately 2.95 MBytes system-wide traffic per minute on aver-
age. Per active peer this is on average 6.96 kBytes per minutes. Figure 5.10 shows that the maintenance
mechanisms consume 21.71% of the generated traffic, not considering service traffic.
The largest percentage of traffic is created by token aggregation. This traffic is highest in the beginning
due to the large number of peers requesting their starting tokens. Figure 5.11 b) shows that in the first
20 minute time period on, average 296.15 token aggregation processes are completed per minute, which
have a total value of 14592.46 tokens on average (see Figure 5.11 a)). This creates a system-wide traffic
of 14.75 MBytes on average during the first 20 minutes of the simulation. This is 79.22 kBytes per
active peer per minute on average, and proportion of 66.83% of all token-based accounting traffic. After
this start-up phase, aggregation traffic is decreases slightly over time due to fewer aggregations (see
Figure 5.11 b)). The maximum system-wide traffic after the start-up time is 3.12 MBytes per minute on
average. This relates to 6.63 kBytes per minute per active peer. After 24 hours simulated time system-
wide token aggregation traffic is 2.31 MBytes per minute on average; this relates to 5.40 MBytes per
peer per minute. Not considering service provisioning traffic after the start-up phase token aggregation
consumes on average a proportion between 21.89% and 15.75% of all token-based accounting traffic.
Observing the traffic generated per token aggregation process results in 541.70 kBytes on average; at the
beginning of the simulation the token aggregation processes are more expensive, because this includes
the creation of aggregation account at the account holders. Here, a maximum traffic of 1019.91 kBytes
per token aggregation process can be observed.
Payment creates the smallest amount of traffic; at the beginning of the simulations, there are less
services requested and paid for, because few peers joined the system. The maximum payment traffic is
approximately 0.12 MBytes per minute of system-wide traffic on average. This is approximately 0.29
kBytes per active peer per minute on average. Like token aggregation traffic, payment traffic also de-
creases slightly over time due to a slight decrease in the number of transactions performed (see Figure
5.11 b)). After 24 hours simulated time, system-wide payment traffic is 0.11 MBytes per minute on av-
erage. This is 0.26 kBytes per peer per minute on average. On average payment consumes a proportion
of 0.83% of traffic among the token-based accounting traffic. Payment traffic per transaction is constant
over the simulation time- approximately 5.55 kBytes per transaction.
Both the payment and the token aggregation protocol require access to aggregation account. One
query and response of an aggregation account consume 76.45 kBytes.
In summary, there is payment traffic and token aggregation that depends on the number of transaction
performed in the system. Maintenance traffic is constant per transaction as well as Chord maintenance
traffic. Lookups are mainly used within payment and token aggregation processes. Also, lookups are
required for determining a new position of an account holder set within maintenance. Analysing the
purpose of lookups, 41.65% are used within maintenance mechanisms, and 58.35% are used within
payment and token aggregation. Not considering the lookups due to malfunction of Chord described
above, on average one transaction creates approximately 293.58 kBytes of traffic, which is distributed
over the peers participating in the transaction and the corresponding token aggregation process; this
is at least 20 peers for transaction and aggregation, plus 20 account holders. This traffic is distributed
unevenly among the peers. In the scenario this is 56.22 kBytes of variable traffic per peer per minute
on average. Constant traffic due to account holder set maintenance and Chord maintenance is approx-
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Figure 5.9: System-wide token-based accounting traffic breakdown for t = 17, k = 10, dvar = 1
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Figure 5.10: System-wide traffic ratios for t = 17, k = 10, dvar = 1
imately 9.96 MBytes per minute system-wide, which is per active peer approximately 22.77 kBytes per
minute.
Maintenance Traffic Observations
The breakdown of the account holder set maintenance traffic into the different mechanisms can be
observed in Figure 5.12.
The highest amount of traffic stems from the account holder set check size mechanism. It increases
with the number of aggregation accounts existing. System-wide traffic levels at approximately 1.16
MBytes per minute on average. At the end of the simulation this is approximately 2.87 kBytes traffic per
minute per active peer on average.
Account movement creates the second highest amount of traffic among maintenance functions. Similar
to the check size mechanism, account movement traffic increases with the number of existing aggregation
accounts. System-wide account movement traffic levels at approximately 0.80 MBytes per minute on
average. Per peer traffic is 1.98 kBytes per minute on average at the end of the simulation.
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Figure 5.11: Token statistics, transactions, token aggregations for t = 17, k = 10, dvar = 1
The account locking and account consistency mechanisms create the third highest amount of traffic
within account holder set maintenance. This traffic is closely related, because the mechanisms are
executed consecutively. Due to the strong churn at the beginning of the simulation there are many
changes in the Chord ring. Accordingly, the account holder sets hosting the aggregation accounts have
to be adapted more often at the beginning of the simulation than afterwards. Account locking creates
an average maximum system-wide traffic of 0.60 MBytes per minute; account consistency creates 0.54
MBytes. This is per peer, an average account locking traffic of 3.20 kBytes per minute and for account
consistency 2.89 kBytes per minute. After the start-up phase, system-wide account locking traffic is 0.40
MBytes per minute on average; system-wide consistency traffic is 0.41 MBytes per minute on average.
This results for account locking in a per peer traffic of 0.95 MBytes per minute on average, and 0.97
MBytes per minute on average for account consistency.
Traffic for checking the account positions is almost flat over the simulation time, only in the beginning
it is slightly increased. Here, here are two effects that almost neutralise each other. In the beginning,
there are fewer accounts that require position check, however this check is required more often due
to system start-up and the related strong number of joins. Checking the aggregation accounts positions
creates at a maximum, 0.23 MBytes system-wide traffic per minute on average. The maximum of average
per peer traffic per minute is 0.79 kBytes.
Account handovers create the least traffic with a average maximum of 0.07 MBytes system-wide per
minute and 0.18 kBytes per peer per minute.
When the members of an account holder set change, update messages are sent to the old and new
account holders. At the end of the simulation, the average update traffic per minute is 0.74 MBytes and
per peer 2.87 kBytes per minute.
Observation of Single Peers
In order to observe the development of the peers’ upload and download queue, the following results
for the simulation runs that did not show any malfunction in Chord are presented, because these mal-
functions would distort the results. In order to observe the traffic load that the token-based accounting
scheme imposes on peers, for each peer the average queue length per minute was logged in the simula-
tions without considering service traffic.1
1 Averaging the results across the peers does not deliver more insights than observing the averaged traffic over the system
or over several simulation runs, as a peer’s online and offline time differs over the simulation runs.
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Figure 5.12: Maintenance traffic breakdown for t = 17, k = 10, dvar = 1
Figure 5.13 presents the proportions of the peers’ average upload queue length per minute in seconds
over the simulation runs that did not show the malfunction of Chord. Peers’ upload bandwidth was set
to 128 kBit per second. The results show that 97.85% of time, a peer has an upload queue length less 10
msec. In 1.21% of the time, the peers’ upload queue length is smaller than 50 msec, and equal or larger
than 10 msec. In 99.35% of time the upload queue length is below 1 second. Accordingly, peers have a
very even traffic distribution.
The times when a peer had an upload queue longer than one second for all simulation runs (excluding
the simulation runs with malfunction of Chord) is shown in Figure 5.14. The very high peer loads happen
at the beginning of the simulation, when many peers join, and their aggregation accounts and starting
tokens are created. In a real life system such a strong join of new peers is highly unlikely; a system would
grow slower. Accordingly, these high loads above 40 seconds upload queue lengths do not need to be
considered further.
This analysis also shows that there are many queue lengths for peers in the range from one to ap-
proximately 15 seconds. All these queue lengths (but two) happened for trusted peers. Accordingly, the
selection criteria for trusted peers should also take their capabilities into account, especially in terms
of upload bandwidth. Still, a peers trustworthiness remains the primary selection criteria. Also, the
impression that the graphs give might be misleading. The plotted queue length represents only 0.65%
of all observations.
Finally, the peers’ download queue lengths were observed in the same way as the upload queue length.
A download bandwidth of 1024 kBit/sec was assumed for all peers. 99.43% of the time peers have a
download queue length less than 10 msec. 99.96% of the time the download queue lengths were below
100 msec. The longest download queue length observed was between 0.7 seconds and 0.8 seconds.
Graphs for these results have been omitted, as these do not add further insights to the pure numbers
given.
Summary
The analysis of the base experiment shows that the average traffic created by the token-based account-
ing scheme system-wide per transaction is approximately 293.58 kBytes. This traffic is distributed over
several peers, as on average per transaction (apart from payment) there is an aggregation process and
account holder set update to be considered. In the base experiment, there are at least 20 peers involved
in all these processes, the 2 transaction partners, the token swapping peer, the aggregation administra-
tor, the quorum, and one account holder set. Accordingly, the traffic is distributed widely among the
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Figure 5.13: Upload queue lengths percentage for the base experiment
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Figure 5.14: High peer loads by simulation time
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Figure 5.15: System-wide aggregation traffic by quorum size
participating peers. This also explains the low average queue length observed at the peers. Constant
maintenance traffic per peer is approximately 22.77 kBytes per minute.
Furthermore, the peers’ traffic load is very evenly distributed. Only trusted peers have to bear from
time to time a load higher than their upload speed, however this happens only 0.64% of the time.
Overall, it can be noted, that the token-based accounting scheme can be used in this scenario to ac-
count for even services with low resource requirements because the induced traffic overhead per peer is
low. Additionally, the highest proportion of traffic within the token-based accounting scheme is induced
by Chord maintenance. This could be reduced using a different overlay network with less maintenance
overhead. In the base experiment, the account holder set size is set larger then required for this churn.
Accordingly, for a scenario with churn typically observed in p2p systems, this account holder set mainte-
nance traffic would be reduced.
How the traffic overhead is develops with the changing scheme parameters will be discussed now.
5.4.3.3 Influence of the Quorum Size on Traffic Overhead
The quorum is only used with the token aggregation protocols. Accordingly, when the quorum size is
altered, only the amount of token aggregation traffic and lookup traffic is changing, as token aggregation
requires lookups.
Aggregation Traffic
Figure 5.15 shows the system-wide token aggregation traffic created on average per minute for the
quorum sizes t = {17, 14, 10, 7}. The traffic development is approximately linear. With a quorum size
of t = 17 the maximum system-wide aggregation traffic after the start-up phase is 3.06 MBytes per
minute. With a quorum size of t = 14 the maximum system-wide aggregation traffic is approximately
2.52 MBytes per minute, with a quorum size of t = 10 the maximum system-wide aggregation traffic is
approximately 1.86 MBytes per minute, and with a quorum size of t = 7 the maximum traffic is only
1.32 MBytes per minute. After the start-up phase the average token aggregation traffic per transaction
for t = 17 results in 237.71 kBytes, for t = 14 in 196.64 kBytes, for t = 10 in 141.97 kBytes, and for
t =7 in 111.46 kBytes. Analysing system-wide aggregation traffic results in a weak quadratic fit with
Vaggr(t) = 0.0011t2 − 0.1281t+ 0.2769 MBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 1.
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Figure 5.16: System-wide lookup traffic by quorum size
Lookup Traffic
Analysing the development of the lookup traffic for the quorum size is complicated by the malfunc-
tion of Chord described above. Figure 5.16 a) shows the lookup traffic for the different quorum sizes.
Figure 5.16 b) gives a clearer presentation for points in time when Chord is working correctly. Not
considering the times where Chord malfunctions, with a quorum size of t = 17 the system-wide lookup
traffic after the start-up phase is approximately 0.40 MBytes per minute. For lower quorum sizes lookup
traffic decreases; this was expected. With a quorum size of t = 14 the system-wide lookup traffic is
approximately 0.37 MBytes per minute, with a quorum size of t = 10 the system-wide lookup traffic is
approximately 0.34 MBytes per minute, and with a quorum size of t = 7 the traffic is only 0.30 MBytes
per minute. Lookup traffic per peer for t = 7 is 13.63 kBytes per minute on average, for t = 10 is
15.62 kBytes per minute, for t = 14 is 16.75 kBytes per minute, and for t = 17 is 17.89 kBytes per
minute on average. Analysing system-wide lookup traffic results in a almost linear quadratic fit with
Vlookup(t) = 0.0001t2 − 0.0079t+ 0.2472 MBytes, with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9999.
Overall Traffic
The overall traffic splits into variable traffic per transaction and fixed traffic that happens due to
system maintenance. Traffic per transaction is composed of payment traffic, aggregation traffic and the
corresponding ratio of the lookup traffic. Fixed traffic is the remaining traffic.
Figure 5.17 shows the comparison of the variable traffic per transaction by quorum size. Due to
the malfunction of Chord this traffic varies strongly. Lookup traffic belonging to transactions is for
t = 17 56.37%, for t = 14 52.23%, for t = 10 44.77%, and for t = 7 37.02% of all lookup traffic.
At simulation time from 4 hours, 20 minutes to 6 hours, 20 minutes the variable traffic is on average
336.45 kBytes for t = 17, 281.60 kBytes for t = 14, 206.28 kBytes for t = 10, and 158.37 kBytes for
t = 7. However, the variable traffic is still decreasing at that time. At a simulation time of 12 hours and
20 minute, where the variation is low, the variable traffic is is 280.45 kBytes for t = 17, 222.58 kBytes
for t = 14, 194.37 kBytes for t = 10, and 150.05 kBytes for t = 7. This results in a best fit curve of
Vtrans(t) = 0.3224t2 + 4.478t+ 107.04 kBytess with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9723; thus the
development of variable traffic is linear. This is in accordance with the theoretical results from Section
5.3.
Figure 5.18 the average fixed traffic per minute per peer by quorum size. It does not vary by quorum
size, because the quorum size does not influence the maintenance traffic, as mentioned above. This is in
accordance with the theoretical results from Section 5.3. At simulation time from 4 hours, 20 minutes
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Figure 5.17: Variable traffic by quorum size
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Figure 5.18: Fixed traffic by quorum size
to 6 hours, 20 minutes fixed traffic is approximately 22.13 kBytes per minute per peer. Later in the
simulation at 12 hours, 20 minutes it is approximately 23.21 kBytes per minute per peer.
Peer Load
The analysis of the peers’ upload queues for the base experiment showed that trusted peers might
experience a short congestion with up to 15 seconds upload queue length. Figure 5.19 shows the relevant
statistics for the peers’ upload queue length by quorum size. Figure 5.19 a) shows the proportions of
upload queue length equal to or longer than 100 msec and from 1 second to 16 seconds. The increase
of this proportion gets smaller with larger quorum size. For t = 7 99.32% of time peers have an average
upload queue less than 100 msec per minute. For t = 10 this is 99.28%, for t = 14 this is 99.24%, and
for t = 17 this is 99.20%. The best fit curve for to this is pUpQL<100msec = 0.000002t2−0.0002t+0.9942%
with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9947. Accordingly, the proportion of low upload queue length
decreases very little, almost linearly with increased quorum size. Analysing the peers’ queue lengths from
one second to 16 seconds shows that for t = 7 this queue length happens at 0.37% of time, for t = 10 at
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Figure 5.19: Peers’ upload queue length proportions by quorum size, k = 10
0.53% of time, for t = 14 at 0.60% of time , and for t = 17 at 0.64% of time. The best fit curve for this
is p1sec≤UpQL<16sec = −0.00003t2 + 0.0009t− 0.0012% with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9875.
The proportion of this upload queue length range increases less with increasing quorum size. However,
Figure 5.19 b) shows the distribution of upload queue length within this range. A border can be observed
in the graphs where above it, upload queue length becomes distinctively more unlikely. For t = 7 this
boarder is at approximately 3 seconds of upload queue length, for t = 10 the border is at approximately
5 seconds of upload queue length, for t = 14 the border is at approximately 9.5 seconds of upload queue
length, and for t = 17 the border is at approximately 14 seconds of upload queue length. The best fit
curve for this is p100%≤UpQL<1600% = 0.0006t2 − 0.0033t+ 0.0234 sec with a coefficient of determination
R2 = 0.9999. Accordingly, the border upload queue length increases with increasing quorum size.
Summary
The experiments varying the quorum size shows the influence of the desired Trust Level of the token-
based accounting scheme on the traffic induced by it. The simulation results support the results from
the analytic evaluation. Apart from token aggregation and lookups, traffic remains constant. Both
aggregation traffic and lookup traffic increases only slightly with a weak quadratic factor with increased
quorum size. Overall, system-wide aggregation traffic with 237.71 kBytes of traffic per transaction for
the maximum traffic scenario t = 17, k = 10 is a practical value, because this traffic is distributed among
the peers participating in a token aggregation process. In this scenario there are 29 different peers
involved (swapping peer, aggregation administrator, quorum peers, and account holders).
For an increased quorum size the load of the peers expressed by their upload queue length increases
only slightly on average. However, trusted peers might experience maximum upload queue lengths of
several seconds, with a low proportion of 0.64%. This upload queue length increases from 3 seconds for
t = 7 to 14 seconds t = 17. Accordingly, for systems that require a very high Trust Level, and systems
where the ratio of honest trusted peers is estimated to be low, it is important that the upload capability
of peers is also taken into account, when trusted peers are selected.
Accordingly, the token-based accounting scheme can be used accounting services that consume small
amounts of a peer’s resources.
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Figure 5.20: Total token-based accounting traffic by AHS size
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Figure 5.21: Total traffic per peer and per transaction by AHS size
5.4.3.4 Influence of the Account Holder Set Size on Traffic Overhead
The account holder sets which store the aggregation accounts are involved within the token-based ac-
counting scheme in token payment and token aggregation and also have their own maintenance pro-
tocols. Account holder set maintenance creates within the token-based accounting scheme the largest
proportion of traffic (see above). In the following, the traffic development for the different mechanisms
is analysed.
Total Token-based Accounting Traffic
Figure 5.20 shows the total traffic created by the token-based accounting scheme for the account
holder set sizes k = {12, 10, 8, 6}. With a growing account holder set, the traffic grows slowly expo-
nentially. This was expected according to the analytical traffic assessment of the account holder set
maintenance mechanisms, because some of them have a traffic complexity of O(k2). In detail, on aver-
age over the simulation time, per minute the system-wide 14.22 MBytes traffic is created for an account
holder set size of k = 12, 13.39 MBytes for a k = 10, 12.23 MBytes for a k = 8, and 11.67 MBytes for a
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Figure 5.22: Reasons for volatile aggregation traffic for AHS size k = 6
k = 6. The average traffic per minute per peer for k = 12 is 32.37 kBytes, for k = 10 is 30.10 kBytes, for
k = 8 is 27.22 kBytes, and for k = 6 is 25.55 kBytes (see Figure 5.21 a)). Thus, although the account
holder set size is doubled, the traffic does not double. A functional fit to the traffic development in
Figure 5.20 b) results in V (k) = 0.0167k2 + 0.1404k + 10.182 MBytes with a coefficient of determination
R2 = 0.9893.
The outliers which can be observed in Figure 5.20 result from the described malfunction of the Chord
overlay, as can be observed in Figure 5.22 a).
Figure 5.21 b) shows the traffic generated by transactions. The average amount of traffic generated
per transaction is approximately 1.37 MBytes for k = 12, 1.27 MBytes for k = 10, 1.20 MBytes for k = 8,
and 1.17 MBytes for k = 6. This, per peer, is 3.27 MBytes for k = 12, 2.97 kBytes for k = 10, 2.80 kBytes
for k = 8, and 2.69 kBytes for k = 6. These figures also consider Chord maintenance traffic.
Analysing the peers’ loads by observing their upload queue length shows that there is only a small
influence of the account holder set size. Figure 5.23 a) shows the proportions of upload queue length
equal to or longer than 100 msec and from 1 second to 16 seconds. The increase from account holder set
size 6 to account holder set size 12 decreases with larger account holder set size. For k = 6 99.25% of
time peers have an average upload queue less than 100 msec per minute. For k = 8, this is 99.20%, for
k = 10, this is also 99.20%, and for k = 12, this is 99.17%. The best fit curve for this is pUpQL<100msec =
0.000008k2 − 0.0003k + 0.9937% with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.8991. Accordingly, the
proportion of low upload queue length decreases very little, almost linearly with increased quorum size.
Analysing the peers’ queue lengths from one second to 16 seconds shows that for k = 6 this queue length
happens at 0.61% of time, for k = 8 at 0.62% of time, for k = 10 at 0.63% of time , and for k = 12 at
0.62% of time. The best fit curve for this is p1sec≤UpQL<16sec = −0.00005k2 + 0.0002x + 0.0052% with
a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.7617. The proportion of this upload queue length range increases
less with increasing account holder set size and cannot be recognised between k = 10 and k = 12.
Figure 5.23 b) shows the distribution of upload queue length within this range, which does not change
in a significant way over the account holder set sizes. Accordingly, the account holder set size has only a
very small influence on the peer’s load, which is insignificant compared to the influence of the quorum
size.
Payment
As mentioned, token payment traffic is influenced only marginally by the account holder set size,
as Figure 5.24 confirms. For all account holder set sizes the average amount of traffic created per
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Figure 5.23: Peer’s upload queue length proportions by AHS size, t = 17
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
Payment Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
k = 12
k = 10
k = 8
k = 6
(a) Payment traffic by AHS size
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 110
 120
 130
 140
 150
 6  8  10  12
Tr
af
fic
 [k
B/
mi
n]
Account Holder Set Size k
Payment Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
2h
8h
14h
20h
(b) Payment traffic development by AHS size
Figure 5.24: Payment traffic by AHS size
transaction is between 0.106 and 0.115 MBytes per transaction during the simulation time. The best fit
curve for the traffic development in Figure 5.24 b) is V (k) = 0.00005k2 − 0.0009k + 0.0983 MBytes with
a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9576.
The increased payment traffic for account holder set size k = 8 between 17 and 20 hours of simulation
time and the increased payment for account holder set size k = 6 between 13 and 15 hours of simulation
time is due to timeouts during the payment process. Figure 5.22 shows this. The timeouts lead to a
repeated sending of messages. The strong increase in traffic is due to an unresolved bug in the simulation
where nested timeouts call methods that re-send payment messages.
Figure 5.25 shows the average payment traffic generated per minute, per peer, and per transaction.
Not considering the traffic due to the timeouts, the average payment per peer per minute is between
0.24 kBytes for k = 6 and 0.27 kBytes for k = 12. Payment traffic per transaction is depicted in Figure
5.25 c) and d). Per transaction 10.13 kBytes of payment traffic is generated for k = 6 and 11.28 kBytes
for k = 12.
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Figure 5.25: Payment traffic per peer and per transaction
Chapter 5. System Evaluation 155
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
Aggregation Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
k = 12
k = 10
k = 8
k = 6
 Nr. Timeouts k=8 in 1,000
(a) Token aggregation traffic by AHS size
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 6  8  10  12
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
Account Holder Set Size k
Aggregation Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
2h
8h
14h
20h
(b) Aggregation traffic development by AHS size
Figure 5.26: Token aggregation traffic by AHS size
Token Aggregation
Figure 5.26 shows the aggregation traffic created by account holder set size. The volatile results of
the simulations for k = 8, which result in an increased traffic, have been explained above. The average
system-wide aggregation traffic per minute between 3 hours and 6 hours simulation time is 2.85 MBytes
for k = 6, 2.88 MBytes for k = 8, 2.93 MBytes for k = 10, and 2.94 MBytes for k = 12. During this
simulation time the average aggregation traffic per minute per peer for k = 6 is 3.36 kBytes, for k = 8 is
6.55 kBytes, for k = 10 is 6.75 kBytes, and for k = 12 is 6.84 kBytes.
During this simulation time the average aggregation traffic per transaction is 277.44 kBytes for k = 6,
284.21 kBytes for k = 8, 285.55 kBytes for k = 10, and 289.32 kBytes for k = 12.
All Account Holder Set Maintenance Mechanisms
The account holder sets are maintained using a collection of mechanisms. Accordingly, the account
holder set size has direct influence on the traffic generated by these mechanisms. Figure 5.26 shows
how the traffic develops for the set sizes k = {6, 8, 10, 12}. The maintenance traffic increases over the
simulation time due to the increase in number of aggregation accounts. The maintenance traffic flattens
after approximately 20 hours of simulation time. When the maintenance traffic flattens, all maintenance
mechanisms create in total an average with k = 6 of 1.38 MBytes system-wide traffic per minute, with
k = 8 of 2.15 MBytes system-wide traffic, with k = 10 of 3.08 MBytes system-wide traffic, and with
k = 12 of 4.22 MBytes system-wide traffic. Overall, that is an increase of factor 3.06 for a doubled
account holder set size. Figure 5.26 c) shows the traffic development more clearly. A fit to this results
in VAHSMaintenance = 0.0225k2 + 0.0674k + 0.1647 MBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 1.
The maintenance traffic per peer is depicted in Figure 5.26 c). On average per minute per peer for k = 6
there are 3.35 kBytes, k = 8 there are 5.30 kBytes, k = 10 there are 7.70 kBytes, k = 12 there are 10.74
kBytes of maintenance traffic created.
Maintenance traffic is also effected by churn, which will be analysed later. It is important to note that
for the base churn scenario, an account holder set size of k = 6 is sufficient.
The different mechanisms of account holder set maintenance are analysed now.
Account Holder Set Check Size Mechanism
The check of the size of the account holder set size is executed periodically for each set. The traffic
created by account holder set size is depicted in Figure 5.29. The flat check position traffic at the end
of the simulation time is on average per minute for k = 6 0.56 MBytes, for k = 8 it is 0.84 MBytes , for
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Figure 5.27: Token aggregation traffic per peer and per transaction by AHS Size
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(a) AHS maintenance traffic by AHS size
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [k
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
AHS Maintenance Traffic Per Peer by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
k = 12
k = 10
k = 8
k = 6
(b) AHS maintenance traffic per peer by AHS size
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 5
 6  8  10  12
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
Account Holder Set Size k
AHS Maintenance Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
2h
8h
14h
20h
(c) Maintenance traffic development by AHS size
Figure 5.28: Account holder set maintenance traffic by AHS size
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 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 5
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [k
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
AHS Check Size Traffic Per Peer by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
k = 12
k = 10
k = 8
k = 6
(b) Account holder set check size traffic per peer by
AHS size
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 6  8  10  12
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
Account Holder Set Size k
AHS Check Size Traffic Comparison by AHS Size, t=17, dvar=1
2h
8h
14h
20h
(c) AHS check size traffic development by AHS size
Figure 5.29: Account holder set check size traffic by AHS size
k = 10 it is 1.16 MBytes, and for k = 12 it 1.51 MBytes. The traffic increases by factor 2.7 for a doubled
account holder set size. This development is depicted in Figure 5.30 c). The curve fit for this results
to VAHS CheckPosition = 0.0045k2 + 0.0779k − 0.074 MBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 1.
This shows that there is quadratic factor in the curve, which can also be estimated from the figure. The
average traffic per peer per minute is depicted in Figure 5.30 b). For k = 6 1.35 kBytes of traffic are
created, for k = 8 2.07 kBytes of traffic are created, for k = 10 2.89 kBytes of traffic are created, and for
k = 12 3.85 kBytes of traffic are created per peer.
Account Holder Set Check Position Mechanism
Like the check size mechanism, the check position mechanism for account holder sets is executed
periodically for each set. Similar to the check size traffic, the check position traffic increases over the
simulation time due to the increase in the number of aggregation accounts and it flattens after approxi-
mately 20 hours of simulation time.
The system-wide average traffic created per minute is depicted in Figure 5.30 a). The flat check
position traffic at the end of the simulation time on average per minute for k = 6 is 0.18 MBytes, for
k = 8 it is 0.21 MBytes , for k = 10 it is 0.22 MBytes, and for k = 12 it is 0.24 MBytes. The traffic
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Figure 5.30: Account holder set check position traffic by AHS size
increases by a factor of 1.3 for a doubled account holder set size. This development is depicted in Figure
5.30 c). The best fit curve for this results in VAHS CheckPosition = −0.0005k2 + 0.0172k + 0.0988 MBytes
with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9985. The check size per peer is highest at the beginning of
the simulation and approximately half that at the end of the simulation. At the end of the simulation, the
check position traffic per peer on average for k = 6 is 0.45 kBytes per minute, for k = 8 is 0.51 kBytes
per minute, for k = 10 is 0.55 kBytes, and for k = 12 is 0.60 kBytes.
Lock Aggregation Account Mechanism
The mechanism locking an account holder set is only executed if required. Furthermore, the message
complexity of this mechanism is O(k2). Therefore, the traffic for this mechanism can be more volatile
than for other maintenance mechanisms. Figure 5.31 a) depicts the average system wide traffic created
per minute by the aggregation account locking mechanism. The locking traffic is highest at the beginning
of the simulation, because due to the high number of joins at the beginning of the simulation, a higher
number of aggregation account repositions are required than during the remaining simulation time. At
the end of the simulation on average with k = 6 there is 0.12 MBytes of system-wide traffic created per
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Figure 5.31: Lock aggregation account traffic by AHS size
minute by aggregation account locking, with k = 8 there are 0.25 MBytes created, with k = 10 there
are 0.41 MBytes created, and with k = 12 there are 0.65 MBytes created. Accordingly, traffic increases
by a factor of 5.4 for a double account holder set size. Figure 5.31 b) shows this development in more
detail. The best fit curve results in VAHS Locking = 0.0066k2− 0.0319k+ 0.0724 MBytes with a coefficient
of determination of R2 = 0.9997. Also, the lock aggregation account traffic per peer is highest at the
beginning of the simulation and approximately one third of that at the end of the simulation. At the end
of the simulation the account locking traffic per peer for k = 6 is 0.29 kBytes per minute, for k = 8 is
0.61 kBytes per minute, for k = 10 is 1.03 kBytes per minute, and for k = 12 is 1.65 kBytes per minute.
Aggregation Account Consistency Mechanism
Similar to account locking, the account consistency mechanism has a message complexity of O(k2).
This mechanism is only executed on demand and in sequence with account locking. Therefore, its traffic
is highest at the beginning at the simulation. The traffic generated by this mechanism is depicted in
Figure 5.32 a). At the end of the simulation the average system-wide traffic for k = 6 is 0.12 MBytes
per minute, for k = 8 is 0.25 MBytes per Minute, for k = 10 is 0.42 MBytes per minute, and for k = 12
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(c) Aggregation account consistency traffic develop-
ment by AHS size
Figure 5.32: Aggregation account consistency traffic by AHS size
is 0.66 MBytes per minute. Overall, aggregation account locking traffic is increased by a factor of 5.4
for a doubled account holder set size. This development is depicted in more detail in Figure 5.32 b).
The best fit curve for this is VAHS Locking = 0.0066k2 − 0.0303k + 0.0693 MBytes with a coefficient of
determination R2 = 0.9996. Also the account consistency traffic per peer is highest at the beginning of
the simulation and approximately more than double as high as at the end of the simulation. At the end
of the simulation the account consistency traffic per peer for k = 6 is 0.30 kBytes per minute, for k = 8 is
0.25 kBytes per minute, for k = 10 is 0.42 kBytes per minute, and for k = 12 is 0.66 kBytes per minute.
Aggregation Account Handover Mechanism
Account handovers are performed when a peer does a clean logoff. Due to the analytical traffic estima-
tion a linear increase in traffic is expected because with growing account holder set size, more handovers
have to be performed at the same churn rate.
The traffic created by handovers is depicted in Figure 5.33 a). It increases over time, because an
increasing number of peers perform handovers. Figure 5.11 shows that the number of peers decreases
over time. At the end of the simulation time for k = 6 handovers create 0.04 MBytes per minute of
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(c) Aggregation account handover traffic develop-
ment by AHS size
Figure 5.33: Aggregation account handover traffic by AHS size
traffic, for k = 8 they create 0.06 MBytes of traffic, for k = 10 they create 0.07 MBytes of traffic, and for
k = 12 they create 0.08 MBytes of traffic. Overall handover traffic approximately doubles for a doubled
account holder set size. The detailed traffic development over the account holder set size is shown in
Figure 5.33 b). The best fit curve results in VAHSHandover = 0.0001k2 + 0.0044k + 0.0139 MBytes with a
coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9997. The quadratic factor here is negligible. The average handover
traffic per peer is for k = 6 is 0.11 kBytes per minute, for k = 8 is 0.14 kBytes per minute, for k = 10 is
0.17 kBytes per minute, for k = 12 is 0.21 kBytes per minute at the end of the simulation.
Aggregation Account Movement Mechanism
Similar to the previous mechanisms, accounts are moved on demand. The traffic created is similar
to that of the account handover traffic, because the mechanisms are executed consecutively. First, the
traffic is lower, because the check for account positions starts after a specific period after an account was
initialised. Account movement is not executed that often in the beginning. Figure 5.34 shows the traffic
generated by the account movement mechanism for the different account holder set sizes.
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Figure 5.34: Account movement traffic by AHS size
At the end of the simulation the average traffic per minute is 0.35 MBytes for k = 6, 0.55 MBytes for
k = 8, 0.80 MBytes for k = 10, and 1.08 MBytes for k = 12. Overall, the traffic increased by a factor of
approximately 3.1 for a doubled account holder set size. Figure 5.34 b) shows the development of traffic
in more detail. The best fit curve for this development results in VAHSMovement = 0.0005k2 + 0.0301k −
0.0159 with a coefficient of determination R2 =1. At the end of the simulation account movement traffic
per peer for k = 6 is 0.85 kBytes per minute, for k = 8 is 1.36 kBytes per minute, for k = 10 is 1.99
kBytes per minute, k = 12 is 2.76 kBytes per minute.
Lookup Traffic
Lookup Traffic is constant, because lookups are performed per account holder set. Figure 5.35 shows
the traffic generated by lookups. The volatile traffic is due to the malfunction of Chord. Not considering
the traffic generated due to this malfunction, average per minute lookup traffic is approximately 0.38
MBytes system-wide and 0.90 kBytes per peer. Of the lookups approximately 43.5% are created due to
system maintenance and 56.5% are created due to transactions.
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(c) Lookup traffic development by AHS size
Figure 5.35: Lookup traffic by AHS size
Average Chord maintenance traffic per minute is, over all these experiments, constant at approximately
on average 6.67 MBytes system-wide and 15.86 kBytes per peer.
Overall Traffic
Figure 5.36 shows the comparison of the variable traffic per transaction by account holder size. Due
to the malfunction of Chord this traffic varies strongly over time. However, variable traffic is almost
constant with varying account holder set size. At simulation time from 4 hours, 20 minutes to 6 hours,
20 minutes, the variable traffic is on average 338.10 kBytes for k = 12, 336.45 kBytes for k = 10, 334.78
kBytes for k = 8, and 322.83 kBytes for k = 6. However, the variable traffic is decreasing at that time.
At a simulation time of 12 hours and 20 minute, where the variation is low, the variable traffic is 290.19
kBytes for k = 12, 280.45 kBytes for k = 10, 260.68 kBytes for k = 8, and 268.53 kBytes for k = 6.
Fitting a trendline does not lead to meaningful results, as the variations are stronger than the difference
in traffic due to the account holder set size. However, it is clear that the development of variable traffic is
linear with an increasing account holder set size. This is in accordance with the theoretical results from
Section 5.3.
Figure 5.37 shows the average fixed traffic per minute per peer by account holder set size. It is slowly
growing over time with increasingly active aggregation accounts. At simulation time from 4 hours, 20
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Figure 5.37: Fixed traffic by AHS size
minutes to 6 hours, 20 minutes fixed traffic is approximately 24.38 kBytes per minute per peer for k = 12,
22.13 kBytes for k = 10, 20.24 kBytes for k = 8, and 18.64 kBytes for k = 6. Later in the simulation at
12 hours, 20 minutes, it is approximately 25.80 kBytes per minute per peer for k = 12, 23.07 kBytes for
k = 10, 20.83 kBytes for k = 8, and 19.46 kBytes for k = 6. Towards the end of the simulation, from
19 hours, 20 minutes to 19 hours, 40 minutes it is approximately 27.33 kBytes per minute per peer for
k = 12, 25.60 kBytes for k = 10, 21.86 kBytes for k = 8, and 20.45 kBytes for k = 6. On average over
these simulation times, fixed traffic results in a best fit curve of vfixed(k) = 0.0619k2 − 0.0309k + 17.413
kBytes per minute per peer with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9962. Accordingly, the fixed traffic
is increasing with a weak quadratic factor with increased account holder set size. This is in accordance
with the theoretical results from Section 5.3.
Summary
The account holder set size experiments show overall a strong increase of the related traffic with an
increased account holder set size. These are mainly the account holder set maintenance mechanisms.
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Overall account holder set maintenance traffic increases by a factor of 3.06 for a doubled account holder
set size. This is because most maintenance mechanisms’ traffic grows by a quadratic factor when the
account holder set size is increased; still the quadratic factor is smaller than the linear factor. The
most traffic within the maintenance mechanisms is created by account locking and account consistency.
Both mechanisms have large quadratic factors in the best fit curve for the traffic development. This fits
to the analytic results; both mechanism have a message complexity O(k2). The query and update of
aggregation accounts traffic grows almost linearly. It grows only by a very small quadratic factor when
the account holder set size is increased.
Aggregation traffic and payment traffic do not vary distinctively for different account holder set sizes.
Aggregation is effected the most by failures in the overlay network. It uses lookups heavily to determine
the aggregation administrator and the quorum peers.
Account holder set size did not show a relevant influence on peers’ upload queue length.
Overall, account holder set maintenance has a stronger influence on the created traffic then the quo-
rum size. Therefore, the professional must pay close attention to the correct configuration of the account
holder set size when the token-based accounting scheme is deployed in practise. For the simulated sce-
narios, system-wide traffic varies between 11.67 MBytes per minute for k = 6 and 14.22 MBytes per
minute for k = 12 in a system of 1000 peers. This is on average, per active peer approximately 25.55
kBytes per minute for k = 6 and approximately 32.37 kBytes per minute for k = 12. This does not
consider the traffic stemming from the malfunction of the Chord overlay. It is to be noted that for the
churn used in these simulations an account holder set size of 6 is sufficient.
In conclusion, although the account holder set size k has the strongest influence on the traffic created
by the token-based accounting scheme, the generated traffic is small compared to service traffic with only
32.37 kBytes per minute on average per peer. The actual amount of traffic created in a real deployment,
even for peers with low bandwidth connections, only consumes a low percentage of the available upload
bandwidth.
5.4.3.5 Influence of Churn on Traffic Overhead
In order to evaluate the scalability of the token-based accounting scheme, two different kinds of exper-
iment variations have been analysed. The first one varies the churn factor dvar. The second simulates
different sizes of the p2p system, which is presented in the next section.
Total Token-based Accounting Traffic
The peers’ online and offline times are multiplied by the churn factor dvar. For example, with a churn
factor of dvar = 0.25, the online and offline times are quartered.
Figure 5.38 shows the results for the complete token-based accounting traffic. Figure 5.38 a) shows an
increase by a factor of approximately 30 from the normal churn model to the churn model with quartered
online and offline time of peers. As Figure 5.38 c) shows, at the end of the simulation, approximately
98% of this traffic stems from lookups. This is due to the described malfunction of Chord. This also
shows that the Chord protocol requires improvements if it is to be applied in scenarios with strong churn.
Obviously, these results are not representative. Therefore, the total token-based accounting traffic has
been analysed without considering lookup traffic. Figure 5.39 shows these results.
Figure 5.39 a) shows that the traffic at the beginning of the simulation is the higher the stronger the
churn is. The reason is that due to the shorter offline time the peers are joining faster. Therefore at the
beginning more aggregation accounts have to be created than in scenarios with weaker churn. However,
at the end of the simulation total traffic is lower for stronger churn than for weaker churn. The reason
is that the number of transactions decreases more quickly over time for stronger churn (see Figure5.39
d). Accordingly, for analysing the influence of churn on the traffic created, transaction dependent traffic
and non-transaction dependent traffic have to be analysed separately. It is not meaningful to give a
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Figure 5.38: Total token-based accounting traffic by churn factor dvar
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Figure 5.39: Total token-based accounting traffic without lookup traffic by churn factor dvar
general traffic development by churn factor, because the results are distorted by the different number of
transactions per experiment.
The reason for the stronger decrease of transaction traffic for a stronger churn is the frequency users’
request a service. If a peer’s next request time is after its logoff time, the request is discarded. This
happens more often in higher churn situations.
Payment Traffic
The malfunction of Chord led to increased payment traffic in the account holder set size experiments.
This was in correlation with the number of timeouts happening within the simulation. These effects are
most easily observed within the churn experiments. Payment requires updating aggregation accounts.
When the lookup of an aggregation account fails during payment due to the malfunction of chord, further
timeouts trigger sending further messages in order to request the status of the payment process. This
way, the cascaded timeouts lead to a traffic increase that can be observed in Figure 5.40.
Figure 5.40 a) shows the system-wide average payment traffic per minute by churn factor. As discussed
above, this is not meaningful, as the number of transactions decrease over time. The average payment
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Figure 5.40: Payment traffic by churn factor
traffic per transaction is depicted in Figure 5.40 c). It shows that payment traffic per transaction does
not differ with varying churn factor, and is on average 10.9 kBytes per transaction.
Token Aggregation Traffic
Token aggregation traffic depends on the number of transactions performed in the system. Figure
5.41 a) shows the average system-wide token aggregation traffic per minute. The stronger the churn,
the higher the initial token aggregation traffic, due to the larger number of initial joins that require the
creation of an aggregation account and the starting tokens. Figure 5.41 b) shows the system-wide token
aggregation traffic focused on the time after the start-up phase. Here outliers for dvar = 0.25 can be
observed. This is due to timeouts that require resending messages. Figure 5.41 c) depicts the average
token aggregation traffic per transaction, as well as the timeouts, where the upper four series depict the
average token aggregation traffic per transaction and the lower four series depict the average number of
timeouts. The presentation of the individual churn factors is the same as in Figure 5.41 a) and b).
After the start-up phase, token aggregation traffic per transaction is constant and does not differ by
churn factor. The timeouts are responsible for the observable differences, as can be seen in Figure 5.41 c).
In an overlay network working correctly, these timeouts would not occur. Observing token aggregation
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Figure 5.41: Token aggregation traffic by churn factor
traffic at points of time where the influence of timeouts is minimal, the average token aggregation traffic
for all churn factors is on average approximately 239 kBytes per transaction. Note that this traffic is
distributed among all peers participating in the token aggregation process.
All Account Holder Set Maintenance Mechanisms
Figure 5.42 shows the traffic created by all account holder set maintenance mechanisms. From the
beginning of the simulation, the maintenance traffic increases and then flattens at the end of the sim-
ulation, after all aggregation accounts have been initialised. Account holder set maintenance traffic
increases with stronger churn. At the end of the simulation time, system-wide account holder set main-
tenance traffic on average for dvar = 1 is 3.08 MBytes, for dvar = 0.5 is 3.74 MBytes, for dvar = 0.333 is
4.72 MBytes, and for dvar = 0.25 is 5.50 MBytes. This per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 7.70 kBytes,
for dvar = 0.5 is 10.15 kBytes, for dvar = 0.333 is 13.73 kBytes, and for dvar = 0.25 is 15.68 kBytes,
which is shown in Figure 5.42 b). The best fit curve for the traffic development at 20 hours simulation
time is VAHSMaintenance = 0.0482d2var + 0.5771dvar + 2.4294 MBytes with a coefficient of determination
R2 = 0.9962.
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(c) System-wide maintenance traffic development
Figure 5.42: Account holder set maintenance by churn factor
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Figure 5.43: Account holder set check size traffic by churn factor
Account Holder Set Check Size Mechanism
Similar to the overall account holder set maintenance traffic, the account holder check size traffic
increases with the number of initialised aggregation accounts and then flattens. At the end of the simu-
lation the traffic decreases slightly for dvar = 0.25. This is caused by the strong churn, which decreases
the average account holder set size. Furthermore, the check size mechanism is called with a constant
frequency, which is independent of churn. The result is a reduced traffic that can be observed at the end
of the simulation time for the dvar = 0.25 scenario.
Check account holder set size traffic is highest a approximately from 17 hours to 18 hours simulation
time. At that time the average system-wide the traffic for dvar = 1 is 1.16 MBytes per minute, for dvar =
0.5 is also 1.16 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 1.18 MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is
1.19 MBytes per minute. This per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 2.85 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is
3.10 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 3.39 kBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 3.40 kBytes per
minute. The best fit curve for the system-wide traffic is VAHS CheckSize = 0.001d2var + 0.006dvar + 1.1495
MBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.99772.
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Figure 5.44: Account holder set check position traffic by churn factor
Account Holder Set Check Position Mechanism
The system-wide account holder set check position mechanism traffic is lowest at the beginning of the
simulation. In increases until the end of the simulation, where it flattens for dvar = 1 and dvar = 0.5.
For the other two churn factors, the traffic is still increasing at the end of the simulation. The reason
is the strong churn that requires many repositions. However, the repositions depend on lookups, which
are less successful at the end of the simulation due to the malfunction of Chord (see Figure 5.38 c)).
Therefore, timeouts occur during checking and determining new account holder set positions, which
results in increased traffic. Between simulation time of 20 hours and 22 hours the system-wide check
position traffic on average for dvar = 1 is 0.21 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.26 MBytes per
minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 0.32 MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 0.38 MBytes per minute. This
is per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 0.53 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.70 kBytes per minute,
for dvar = 0.333 is 0.92 kBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 1.09 kBytes per minute. The best fit
curve for the system-wide traffic results in VAHS CheckPosition = 0.0029d2var + 0.0396dvar + 0.172 MBytes
with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9999.
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Figure 5.45: Locking aggregation account traffic by churn factor
Lock Aggregation Account Mechanism
The aggregation account locking mechanism traffic is flat after the start-up phase for dvar = 1 and
dvar = 0.5. For dvar = 0.333 the traffic increases slowly, and for dvar = 0.25 the traffic increases
distinctly at the end of the simulation time. At the end of the simulation time, system-wide aggregation
account locking traffic on average for dvar = 1 is 0.41 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.67 MBytes
per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 1.04 MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 1.46 MBytes per minute.
This per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 1.02 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 1.80 kBytes per minute,
for dvar = 0.333 is 3.03 kBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 4.17 kBytes per minute. The best fit
curve for the system-wide traffic results in VAHS Locking = 0.0404d2var + 0.1511dvar + 0.2139 MBytes with
a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9995.
Aggregation Account Consistency Mechanism
The aggregation account consistency mechanism traffic develops similarly to that of the aggregation
account locking mechanism. At the end of the simulation time, system-wide aggregation account con-
sistency traffic on average for dvar = 1 is 0.42 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.67 MBytes per
minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 1.04 MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 1.53 MBytes per minute. This
per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 1.05 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 1.83 kBytes per minute,
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Figure 5.46: Aggregation account consistency traffic by churn factor
for dvar = 0.333 is 3.11 kBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 4.36 kBytes per minute. The best fit
curve for the system-wide traffic results in VAHS Consistency = 0.05d2var + 0.122dvar + 0.2419 MBytes with
a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9996.
Aggregation Account Handover Mechanism
Aggregation account handover traffic first increases with the increasing number of initialised aggrega-
tion accounts. Then the traffic flattens. For dvar = 0.25 the traffic decreases at the end of the simulation
time, similar to the check size mechanism. Failing peers reduce the average account holder set size. As
churn is constant over the simulation time, the handover mechanism is executed less frequently when
the average account holder set size is reduced. Thus, after the end of the start-up phase where joins were
more frequent, the account handover traffic decreases slowly again until the average account holder set
size stabilises. Figure 5.47 d) shows the average account holder set size by churn factor.
At the end of the simulation time system-wide aggregation account handover traffic on average for
dvar = 1 is 0.07 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.14 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 0.20
MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 0.23 MBytes per minute. This per peer on average for dvar = 1
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Figure 5.47: Aggregation account handover traffic by churn factor
is 0.17 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.39 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 0.59 kBytes per
minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 0.66 kBytes per minute. The best fit curve for the system-wide traffic
results in VAHSHandover = −0.0114d2var−0.1114dvar+0.0316 MBytes with a coefficient of determination
R2 = 0.9994.
Aggregation Account Movement Mechanism
Aggregation account movement traffic first increases with the increasing number of initialised ag-
gregation accounts. Then the traffic flattens. For dvar = 0.25 the traffic decreases at the end of the
simulation time, similar to the check size and the handover mechanism. The reason herefor is that over
time the average account holder set size is slowly decreasing. Also for dvar = 0.333, the traffic decreases
slightly at the end of the simulation time. At that time system-wide aggregation account movement
traffic on average for dvar = 1 is 0.80 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 0.83 MBytes per minute,
for dvar = 0.333 is 0.83 MBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 0.76 MBytes per minute. This per
peer on average for dvar = 1 is 1.99 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 2.24 kBytes per minute, for
dvar = 0.333 is 2.41 kBytes per minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 2.16 kBytes per minute. The best fit curve
Chapter 5. System Evaluation 177
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
AHS Account Movement Traffic Comparison by Churn Factor, t=17, k=10
dvar=1dvar=0.5dvar=0.333dvar=0.25
(a) System-wide AHS movement traffic by churn fac-
tor
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0  5  10  15  20
Tr
af
fic
 [k
B/
mi
n]
time [h]
AHS Account Movement Per Peer Traffic by Churn Factor, t=17, k=10
dvar=1dvar=0.5dvar=0.333dvar=0.25
(b) AHS movement traffic per peer by churn factor
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
1.0 0.5 0.33 0.25
Tr
af
fic
 [M
B/
mi
n]
Churn Factor dvar
AHS Account Movement Traffic Comparison by Churn Factor, t=17, k=10
2h
8h
14h
20h
(c) AHS movement traffic development by churn fac-
tor
Figure 5.48: Aggregation account movement traffic by churn factor
for the system-wide traffic results in VAHSMovement = −0.0257d2var + 0.1168dvar + 0.7048 MBytes with a
coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9678.
Chord Maintenance
Chord Maintenance traffic first increases sharply at the beginning of the simulation and then decreases
again. This is due to the join process, because peers join the first time after half the offline time. There-
fore, at the beginning more peers join than on average will be online after the system stabilises. However,
chord maintenance traffic still decreases after the average number of active peers has stabilised. The
reason is in the Chord stabilisation implementation that does not take further actions when a timeout
happens. If a stabilisation query message cannot be delivered to its destination, the destination peer is
simply added to the sender’s list of non-available peers. The stabilisation query message is not re-sent to
a different peer. The missing response messages reduce the Chord maintenance traffic.
At the end of the simulation time system-wide Chord maintenance traffic on average for dvar = 1 is
6.51 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 5.47 MBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 4.07 MBytes per
minute, and for dvar = 0.25 is 3.09 MBytes per minute. This per peer on average for dvar = 1 is 16.23
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Figure 5.49: Chord maintenance traffic by churn factor
kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.5 is 14.88 kBytes per minute, for dvar = 0.333 is 11.83 kBytes per minute,
and for dvar = 0.25 is 8.79 kBytes per minute. The best fit curve for the system-wide traffic results in
VAHS ChordMaintenance = 0.0181dvar2 − 1.2567dvar + 7.7891 MBytes with a coefficient of determination
R2 = 0.9956.
Overall Traffic
For analysing the influence of churn on the variable and fixed traffic, lookup traffic was not considered
due to the intensive malfunctions of Chord.
Figure 5.50 shows the comparison of the variable traffic per transaction by churn factor. Here, the
volatile traffic stems from the high number of timeouts that increased aggregation and payment traffic
(see Figures 5.41 and 5.40). When these timeouts do not happen, variable traffic is approximately
constant over the churn factors. This is in accordance with the theoretical results from Section 5.3.
Then, variable traffic is on average approximately 273.22 kBytes per transaction.
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Figure 5.50: Variable traffic by churn factor
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Figure 5.51: Fixed traffic by churn factor
Figure 5.51 shows the average fixed traffic per minute per peer by churn factor. The development of
the fixed traffic over different churn factors differs over time, because of the Chord maintenance traffic
and the account holder set maintenance traffic that decreases over time for strong churn.
At simulation time from 4 hours, 20 minutes to 6 hours, 20 minutes fixed traffic is approximately 24.38
kBytes per minute per peer for dvar = 1, 21.64 kBytes for dvar = 0.5, 23.88 kBytes for dvar = 26.21, and
28.28 kBytes for dvar = 0.25. This results in a best fit curve of vfixed(dvar) = −0.042d2var + 2.4344dvar +
19.231 kBytes per peer per minute with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9997. This is slightly less-
than-linear development. During the last two hour in the simulation, it is approximately 23.07 kBytes
per minute per peer for dvar = 1, 25.15 kBytes for dvar = 0.5, 25.75 kBytes for dvar = 0.33, and 24.78
kBytes for dvar = 0.25. This results in a best fit curve of vfixed(dvar) = −0.5497d2var+3.0631dvar+21.378
kBytes per minute per peer with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9691. This would probably change
with a different Chord implementation that is more reactive to missing successors and fingers.
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Summary
As expected, churn has no influence on the payment traffic and token aggregation traffic created per
transaction. Overall, the number of transactions is reduced slightly with stronger churn, which is due to
the service request model, which is kept constant.
Churn influences the account holder set maintenance traffic. The stronger the churn, the more often
the account holder set maintenance mechanisms have to be executed. Overall, per peer account holder
set maintenance traffic increases from 7.70 kBytes per minute to 15.68 kBytes per minute when peers’
online time and offline time is quartered. This is an increase by a factor of 2.03. The best fit curve for the
per peer account holder set maintenance traffic is vAHSMaintenance = −0.036d2var + 0.3466dvar − 0.1432
kBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9961. Accordingly, the traffic increase has a quadratic
factor that is approximately half as strong as the linear factor.
The churn experiments show some unexpected behaviour of the traffic created. First of all, the mal-
function of Chord, which could be observed for dvar = 1, leads to a traffic increase in lookups that for
dvar = 0.25 at the end of the simulation time consumes 1.55 MBytes of traffic per minute per peer. This
traffic would completely congest a peer’s upload queue. The reason why the malfunction happens more
frequently is the Chord maintenance traffic, which decreases significantly for strong churn over the sim-
ulation time. For dvar = 0.25 the Chord maintenance traffic is only 44% of it maximum at the end of
the simulation time. When stabilisation does not succeed, the existing malfunctions in the Chord ring
will not be repaired. The lookup could be reduced, e.g., by limiting the lifetime of lookup messages to
a reasonable value. However, for strong churn scenarios, the Chord protocol has to be improved and
should also consider its predecessors and successors for routing lookup messages, not only the fingers.
The further unexpected result is the reduced traffic at the end of the simulation time for some account
holder set maintenance mechanisms. With strong churn, the average account holder set size is reduced.
Thus, mechanisms that create traffic that depends on the account holder set size might create less traffic
with stronger churn than with normal churn. For example, the check size mechanism is executed per ac-
count holder set with a constant frequency independent of churn; the amount of traffic created depends
on the current set size. Therefore, the traffic is reduced with strong churn. Furthermore, with a reduced
average account holder set size, the total number of account replicas existing in the system is reduced.
Therefore, account handovers and account movement traffic are also reduced. Overall, the effect of this
traffic reduction is compensated by the other account holder set maintenance mechanisms, which create
more traffic when the average account holder set size is decreased in order to repair the account holder
sets.
Although the Chord overlay had struggles operating under the strong churn, the number of transac-
tions and token aggregations performed did not suffer. Furthermore, the maintenance traffic created
grew less than linearly. Therefore, the robustness of the token-based accounting scheme against failures
could be demonstrated.
5.4.3.6 Influence of System Size on Traffic Overhead
In analysing the token-based accounting mechanisms, it was found that there are no protocols that are
influenced by the system size. Accordingly, it can be expected that payment and token aggregation traffic
should be constant per transaction, and the account holder set maintenance traffic should be constant
per peer. Lookup traffic should be reduced, because the lookup messages travel fewer hops on average
for a smaller system size.Chord maintenance traffic should be reduced, because fewer fingers have to be
maintained.
In conclusion, when comparing the traffic created by the token-based accounting scheme for different
network sizes, it should be considered without the overlay traffic, because this distorts the results.
Observing the percentage of active peers, forN = 250 the percentage was slightly higher (forN = 250,
44.3% of peers where active on average, for N = 1000, 43.3% of peers were online on average). The
percentage of online peers influences the created traffic per peer, because the number of online peers
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Figure 5.52: Token-based accounting traffic and AHS maintenance traffic per peer by system size
influences the number of transactions performed in the system, which influences the amount of payment
and transaction traffic. Furthermore, account holder set maintenance traffic is created by initialised
aggregation accounts. Accordingly, in order not to distort the per peer traffic results, the results for
N = 250 were normalised to the same percentage of online peers as for N = 1000. Figure 5.52 a) shows
the resulting average token-based accounting traffic per peer per minute. There is a very small difference
in the generated traffic. The average token-based accounting traffic per peer is 13.70 kBytes per minute
for N = 1000, and 13.28 kBytes per minute for N = 250. This is a difference of 3.14% on average after
the start-up phase. This difference stems from the different number of transactions executed per peer on
average, which are after the start-up phase for N = 250 on average 3.29% less than for N = 1000.
Figure 5.52 b) presents the average account holder set maintenance traffic per peer per minute; here
the traffic is very similar so that the difference cannot be determined with statistical confidence.
Figure 5.53 a) shows the average payment per transaction. The payment traffic for N = 1000 is more
even than the traffic for N = 250, because the average is calculated over a larger number of transactions.
At the end of the simulation (between 21 hours and 23 hours of simulation time) payment traffic for
N = 1000 is approximately 0.55 kBytes per transaction, which is slightly higher than payment traffic
for N = 250, which is 0.53 kBytes per transaction. This difference is 4.5% of the payment traffic for
N = 1000.
Figure 5.53 b) shows the average token aggregation traffic per transaction. Here, a difference is hard
to determine and cannot be concluded with statistical confidence.
In summary, it can be concluded that with an increased system size, only overlay traffic increases per
peer. The token-based accounting traffic is constant when the system size varies.
5.4.4 Summary
The simulation of the token-based accounting scheme analysed the influence of the quorum size t, the
account holder set size k, churn, and system size on the traffic generated by the scheme. As the base
experiment a quorum size of t = 17, an account holder set size k = 10, a churn factor dvar = 1, and a
system size of N = 1000 were selected. When the influence of one parameter was analysed, the other
parameters remained constant (ceteris paribus).
The results for the base experiment showed that the token-based accounting scheme creates approx-
imately 13.4 MBytes traffic per minute on average system-wide. Per active peer this is on average
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Figure 5.53: Payment and token aggregation traffic per transaction by system size
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approximately 30.30 kBytes per minute. Within the simulated music sharing scenario, the token-based
accounting scheme created approximately 17.86% of the traffic and 82.14% was created from simulated
services. The traffic breakdown showed that approximately 293.58 kBytes of traffic is generated per
transaction, which is distributed over the peers participating in the transaction and the corresponding
token aggregation. Furthermore, account holder set maintenance requires, on average, approximately
22.77 kBytes of traffic per peer per minute. Analysing the peers’ load by observing the upload queues
showed that most of the time (97.85%) peers have a load less than 1% of their upload capacity and in
99.35% of time, peers have a load less than 10% of their upload capacity, which was set to 128 kBit/sec.
0.65% of the time trusted peers have to bear a higher load of approximately 14 seconds queue length.
Accordingly, it is important to select trusted peers according to their upload capacity.
Variation of the quorum size only affected the traffic created by token aggregation. It increases nearly
linearly from approximately 6.45 kBytes per minute per active peer for t = 7 to approximately 15.21
kBytes per minute per active peer. Furthermore, token aggregation requires lookups, which increase in
number with an increase quorum size. For lookups with t = 7, 13.64 kBytes of traffic are created per
peer per minute on average and with t = 17, 17.89 kBytes per minute per peer. The maximum upload
queue lengths happen during token aggregation. The approximate maximum queue length for t = 7 is
3 seconds, for t = 17 is 14 seconds. The increase develops with a quadratic factor. Thus, the careful
selection of trusted peers is especially important for larger quorum sizes.
The variation of the account holder set size has only minimal influence on payment and token aggre-
gation traffic. Payment traffic per transaction increases from 0.24 kBytes on average for k = 6 to 0.27
kBytes on average for k = 12. Similarly, token aggregation traffic per transaction increases from 277.44
kBytes on average for k = 6 to 289.32 kBytes on average for k = 12. As expected from the analytical
results, the account holder set size influences mainly account holder set maintenance traffic. Account
holder set maintenance traffic per peer per minute increases from 3.35 kBytes on average for k = 6 to
10.74 kBytes on average for k = 12. The account locking and the account consistency mechanisms show
especially strong growth over the account holder set size , because traffic grows with a distinct quadratic
factor with an increase account holder set size. The largest proportion of account holder maintenance
traffic is created by the check-size mechanism and the account movement mechanism. The account
holder set size does not have a relevant impact on the peer’s upload queue lengths.
The variation of churn also mainly influences the account holder set maintenance traffic. For payment
and token aggregation traffic, an influence can hardly be noticed. Maintenance traffic is subject to two
influences. One is that the maintenance mechanisms e.g., account handover and account movement are
executed more frequently. The other is that the average quorum size is reduced due to churn. Therefore,
most maintenance mechanisms generate less traffic per execution. Overall, the more frequent distribu-
tion has the stronger influence. Maintenance traffic increases from 7.70 kBytes per peer per minute on
average for dvar = 1 to 15.68 kBytes per peer per minute on average for for dvar = 0.25. Furthermore,
Churn showed that the Chord overlay does not perform well for higher churns. Malfunctions that could
already be observed in basic churn (dvar = 1), happened so that frequently that lookup traffic grew
exponentially. Therefore, the churn experiments had to be analysed without regarding Chord lookup
traffic. Furthermore, this did not allow an analysis of the peers’ upload queues, as lookups could not be
filtered out afterwards. In relation to the Chord lookup traffic, the Chord maintenance traffic decreases
with stronger churn. The reason is in Chord’s stabilisation protocol that does not take any special actions
when lookups fail but adds the failed peer to the list of unavailable peers. Thus, it can be concluded that
the Chord protocol requires improvements when running it is systems with reasonable churn.
Overall, the churn simulations proved the token-based accounting scheme’s robustness. Peers could
always perform transactions and swap tokens even under strong churn.
During the evaluation of the token-based accounting scheme, several issues arose that led to further
findings not directly related to the token-based accounting scheme. The simulation contains three layers:
an overlay layer using Chord, the token-based accounting layer, and the application layer containing the
user model including churn. Simulating such a system requires that the lower layers are fully operational,
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otherwise it distorts the results of the upper layers. The existing implementation of Chord was according
protocols presented in (SMK+01, SMLN+03). The first simulation results under churn showed the
described malfunction of Chord in 17 - 32 occurrences. Due to failed lookups timeouts were triggered
on the upper layers. Often, these timeouts required repeat lookups that again, did not succeed. This
resulted overall in traffic that was too high and unrealistic. Therefore, Chord was improved in two
iterations under the requirement to retain the core Chord protocols. Still, as the experiments varying
churn show, Chord does not work well.
In conclusion, evaluating p2p mechanisms on top of a p2p overlay requires that the Chord overlay is
working correctly. The published protocols are not sufficient to re-engineer Chord in a sufficient way for
that purpose. Furthermore, p2p overlays have to be evaluated carefully and in long term simulations,
simulating one day or longer. The mentioned malfunction of Chord usually happened after 12 hours
simulated time. Much more attention has to be paid to unsuccessful messages in the overlay layer, which
have effects on the upper layers. When evaluating a pure lookup scenario, lost lookups seem not to have
any impact, because they do not influence the functionality of the overlay network. However, having
further mechanisms relying on the lookup results, failed lookups here led to a considerably increased
amount of traffic. Therefore, carefully tested overlay networks are a core requirement for evaluating the
mechanisms on top of them.
In conclusion to this section, the token-based accounting scheme creates on average approximately
30.31 kBytes of traffic per peer per minute in the simulated music sharing scenario. This is composed of
variable system-wide traffic per transaction of 293.58 kBytes and a constant traffic per peer per minute
of 22.77 kBytes. Therefore, the token-based accounting scheme is useful for all application scenarios
where bandwidth is not extremely scarce (which could be the case in emergency management situations
for example (BKM08b, BKM08a, BSPM08)). It could be shown that the costs as well as its robustness
make the token-based accounting scheme very well suited to typical application scenarios.
In order to guarantee trustworthy operations of the token-based accounting scheme it requires the
application of proactive secret sharing in order to ensure the secrecy of the system-wide private key. This
is analysed in the following section.
5.5 Simulation of Key Management Traffic
In this section, the simulation results of proactive secret sharing mechanisms which can be applied to en-
sure the secrecy of the system-wide private key are presented. These mechanisms have been intensively
discussed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. In this section, the results from the analytical traffic assessment and
the results from the simulation are compared.
In order to simulate key management, two parts of proactive secret sharing, namely the update phase
and the recovery phase were implemented in PeerfactSim.KOM (Mul). The objective of this simulation
was to assess the traffic created when all trusted peers receive an updated key share of the system-wide
private key. Key management takes place in the separate trusted peer overlay network. Therefore, the
simulation of system key maintenance was performed separately from the simulations of the remaining
token-based accounting scheme operations.
From the analytical evaluation in Section 4.6 it was concluded that limited update and self-initialisation
strategy known from URSA (LL00, LKZ+04) is the only strategy that can be applied in a distributed au-
tonomous system, because it does not require the knowledge of all trusted peers’ IDs. After presenting the
simulation setup, the executed experiments are described. Then the simulation results will be discussed.
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5.5.1 Simulation Setup
Within the simulation of the URSA update and self initialisation strategy each trusted peer has the same
functionality. Accordingly, there is only one main class responsible for fulfilling the tasks required by this
strategy. The implementation concept of the trusted peer communication as depicted in Figure 5.54.
Update Phase
The responsible peer starts the update process “UpdateAgent”. So, at the beginning of the simulation,
all peers join and the overlay network stabilises. When this process is completed, the UpdateAgent
chooses a peer and starts the update and self initialisation process. The update process is started by the
method update() within the URSASelfInitUpdater class. It initialises the lookup of a proximity group,
which is executing the update. The lookup is performed by the class DiscoverProximity. When the
discover process is completed, the method getUpdates() is used to look up a time in the local update
history, and it returns the update phase iteration. Now, the method sendUpdateRequest() is used to ask
all the trusted peers within the proximity group if they want to participate in this update-process. At the
receiving trusted peer, this request is processed within the method handleUpdateRequest(). A peer will
participate if it is in the correct update iteration and if it is not within the dead period before a peer leaves
ddead. The signal handleUpdateRequestReply() receives the response. When all peers for a proximity
group are found the method foundProximityToUpdate() is called.
A random polynomial is created and for all peers in the proximity group the update shares are com-
puted. 2 The peer will now update itself with its share using the method updateMySelf(). Also it
distributes the respective update shares to all peers in the proximity group. The method
handleUpdateShareMessage() within theBaseUpdater receives this message and adds the update share
to the peers share and destroys the old share.
Self Initialisation Phase
When a peer has updated its share successfully, it checks if it should now start to recover remaining
trusted peers. This is performed within the method amIinTheLookupGroup(). If so, it starts a new
discovery job finding a recovery group that can update its successor or predecessor peer, depending
on the direction the recovery process runs along the DHT ring. When the group is found, the peers
are asked if they are willing to participate in a recovery using the method sendRequestForRecovery().
The method handleRecoveryRequest() receives this message. The decision if the peer is willing to par-
ticipate is made like in the update phase. The response to this message is received by the method
handleRecoveryRequestReply(). Now, the required recovery information, like the recovery group mem-
bers, is sent to the recovery group by the method sendToHelpers(). This message is received by the
method handleInformToRecover(). Within this method the cryptographic mechanisms are performed
in order to create the partial shares required for a recovery. A recovery message is sent to each peer that
is to be recovered by this recovery group. At the peers to be recovered, these messages are collected by
the method handleRecover() and when all messages are received, the method doRecover() recovers the
share for this peer.
5.5.2 Experiments
When the proximity group is found the update shares have to be distributed among the peers in this
group. This traffic is fully deterministic, because only direct communication between the group members
is applied. Therefore, the general concept of the experiment is to perform the update using only one
update polynomial by one peer. This allows an exact analysis of the created traffic that can be easily
extrapolated to the use of more update polynomials.
2 All parts of the simulation concerning cryptographic operations are not depicted in Figure 5.54 for the sake of clarity.
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Figure 5.54: URSA update simulation implementation concept
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Table 5.7: Resulting Quorum Sizes t for System-key Maintenance Simulations
t L1 = 99.99% L2 = 99.999%
T/pg 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.50 0.70 0.90
100 13 8 4 15 9 5
500 14 8 4 17 10 5
1000 14 8 4 17 10 5
2000 14 8 4 17 10 5
Legend: L : Trust level, T : Number of trusted peers, pg: ratio of good trusted peers, t: Quorum size
Table 5.8: Experiments for System-key Maintenance
# T t β # T t β
1.1 100 13 26 2.1 100 15 30
1.2 500 14 28 2.2 500 17 34
1.3 1000 14 28 2.3 1000 17 34
1.4 2000 14 28 2.4 2000 17 34
Legend: T : Number of trusted peers, t: quorum size, β: Size of update group
The URSA update and self initialisation strategy uses in the beginning an update group B, called
proximity group with the simulation. Its size β must have at least the size t in order to enable recoveries
by that group. Within the simulation, the update group size β is set to β = 2t in order to achieve
redundancy.
5.5.2.1 Parameters
In order to evaluate the scalability of the update and self initialisation scheme, different numbers of
trusted peers T to be updated and recovered will be simulated. As the number of trusted peers is
limited, trusted peer system size is between T = 100 and T = 2000 trusted peers.
The experiments will be executed with different Trust Levels in order to observe the effect of a changing
quorum size t in the created traffic. The computation of required quorum size depending on Trust Level
L, number of trusted peer T , and ratio of good trusted peer pg was presented in Section 5.2.1. As the
required quorum size differs for one Trust Level depending on the number of trusted peers in the system
T , the number of examined Trust Levels can be reduced. The resulting quorum sizes for 100, 500, 1000,
and 2000 trusted peers is given in Table 5.7.
5.5.2.2 Experiments
The objective of the experiments is to assess the development of the created traffic. Therefore, four
different parameter values are simulated for the main parameters system size T and quorum size t.
This allows determining which kind the traffic develops for different parameter valued. Like for the
token-based accounting simulations, a ratio of good peer pg = 0.5 is assumed. Table 5.8 summarises the
executed experiments.
5.5.3 Results
The update and self initialisation mechanism is a very deterministic process compared to the simulations
of the token-based accounting scheme. The update and self initialisation simulation does not employ
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Figure 5.55: Durations for update and self initialisation
any probability distributions. Accordingly, the confidence intervals are very small and cannot be seen in
the figures.3
Duration of Update and Self Initialisation Process
Before observing the traffic created, the time required for completely updating the trusted peer system
is looked at. Figure 5.55 a shows the processes’ duration.4 The discovery of the initial update group
requires between 1.16 seconds and 1.36 seconds. The difference is due to message transmission delays.
The update phase required a bit less time and needed between 0.98 seconds and 1.18 seconds. the
reason is that lookup messages might require several hops on the way towards the peer, where update
requires direct communication. The recovery phase required 2.58 seconds for systems with T = 100
trusted peers and a quorum size of t = 13 and 68.3 seconds for a system size of T = 2000 and a quorum
size of t = 14 trusted peers. The average time for a quorum size of t = 17 trusted peers is here a bit
lower, which indicates that the quorum size has no influence on the duration of the recovery process.
The reason is that the number of communication steps required within a recovery of one trusted peer
is constant. Figure 5.55 b) shows the development of the recovery process durations more clearly. The
time grows linearly. In the case of a Trust Level L1 = 99, 99% the best fit curve is τUSI = 34.782T + 1911
with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9989; in the case of a Trust Level L2 = 99, 999% the best fit
curve is τUSI = 30.966T + 2004.1 with a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9989.
The difference in the duration stems from the different sizes of the beginning start-up group. With
a higher Trust Level, the update group in the beginning is larger; updating peers happens in parallel.
Therefore, the update duration does not increase with the update group size. However, with a larger
update group size less recoveries are required. Therefore, for L2 = 99.999% the update duration is
shorter.
Traffic Generated by Update and Self Initialisation
The traffic generated by the update and self initialisation process happens in a very short period of
time, compared to the token-based accounting simulation. Also, the traffic will be distributed over all
trusted peers. Therefore, showing the system-wide traffic of the complete process will not give deep
3 The figures in this section have been formatted differently then the figures presenting the traffic of the token-based
accounting scheme in order to make the recognition of the reference of a figure in the simulation easier.
4 Note that the simulator did not simulate computation time. The durations all stem from message transfer.
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Figure 5.56: Update and self initialisation traffic by message type
insights about the traffic load per trusted peer. Accordingly, the traffic will be observed on a per-peer
basis.
Figure 5.56 shows the traffic generated by the update and self initialisation mechanism per peer for
T = 100 and T = 2000 trusted peers and for Trust Levels L1 = 99.99% and L2 = 99.999% with the
corresponding quorum sizes. The x-axis represents the peers’ ID.5
It can be observed that the update group is symmetrically located around the peer ID 0. Especially in
the graphs for large system sizes with T = 2000, the recovery traffic is almost equal for all peers. Only
at the middle of the graph is the traffic distinctively lower, because here the two recovery fronts meet.
Recovery traffic is the major source for traffic, although it is below 60 kBytes in total per peer. It can
be seen that recovery traffic and overlay maintenance traffic have the lowest proportions of traffic load.
Overall, a very even distribution of traffic load over the trusted peers is achieved by the update and self
initialisation mechanism.
When observing the main source for traffic increase, it is obvious that the quorum size has an influence
on it, however the system size influence seems minimal. In order to observe that more clearly, Figure
5.57 shows the descriptive statistics for the different experiments. Figure 5.57 a) shows the complete
update and self initialisation traffic without the overlay traffic. Overlay traffic is depicted in Figure 5.57
b). Overall, the observations about the traffic distribution are confirmed. The average traffic of a trusted
peer slowly increases over the experiment. For T = 100 and t = 13 average peer traffic is 25.46 kBytes
for the complete process, with T = 2000 and t = 14 average peer traffic is 40.04 kBytes. For T = 100
5 For T = 2000 the ID space was increased in order to enable complete message logging. Therefore, peer IDs are distributed
from 0 to 224.
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Figure 5.57: Traffic statistics for the update and self initialisation strategy
and t = 15 average peer traffic is 27.17 kBytes and for T = 2000 and t = 17 average peer traffic is 49.10
kBytes.
It can be seen that there are very few peers with distinctively higher loads. The maximum load for
the complete update and self initialisation process is 240.13 kBytes, which happened in all experiments
with t = 17. Assuming for trusted peers a DSL-connection with 128 kBit upload, a trusted peer would
need 15.37 seconds to send this traffic. Accordingly, even the very few trusted peers with the maximum
load do not get overloaded by the update and self initialisation process. The statistics show that there
are only very few peers with a traffic load above 100 kBytes.
Observing the development of the maximum traffic, the best fit curve results in vURSA = 0.6374k2 +
2.9283k + 6.1428 kBytes with a coefficient of determination R2 = 1.
It is interesting to see that the overlay also created a very similar traffic load. In each experiment,
there was one peer that was distinctively higher loaded than the other peers. However, the highest
loaded peers by the update and self initialisation process and the overlay are not the same. Accordingly,
there is no relationship.
5.5.4 Summary
The simulations of the update and self initialisation mechanism, which was suggested as proactive mech-
anism for the URSA threshold scheme (LL00, LKZ+04), showed that updating a complete trusted peer
system is practical in terms of traffic load per peer, as well as the time required to perform the update.
Updating a system of 2000 peers required approximately 71 seconds. In terms of traffic, the highest
loaded peers had to bear a load of approximately 240 kBytes. Maximal traffic growth is mainly to an
increased threshold t of the threshold scheme. The best fit curve shows a small quadratic component.
The average traffic load per peer is distinctively lower and varied in the experiments between 25.46
kBytes for a threshold t = 13 and a system size of T = 100, and 49.10 kBytes for a threshold t = 17 and
a system size of T = 2000. Average traffic grows for smaller system sizes faster than for large system
sizes. The increase between T = 500 and T = 1000 is approximately 2 kBytes and between T = 1000
and T = 2000 it is only approximately 1 kBytes; thus, its influence quartered.
Comparing the simulation results with the analytical results from Section 4.6, the simulations showed
a slight increase in traffic. This is due to the increased details in simulations, like the considerations of
peer discovery.
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In summary, updating the shares of all trusted peers of the token-based accounting scheme is practical.
It creates a surprisingly low load for the trusted peers. Such an update could be executed very frequently,
for example once a day. Therefore, the secrecy of the private system key can be well protected.
5.6 Comparison with Karma
In Chapter 2, Section 2.3, it was concluded that Karma (VCS03) is closest to the goal of this dissertation.
Karma allows querying a bank set for complete accounting information about all transactions a peer did
system-wide. Furthermore, Karma allows cooperation control by introducing a virtual currency. Because
other accounting mechanisms for p2p systems have less similarity in functionalities, comparisons with
other systems are not appropriate.
This section will present a short comparison of the token-based accounting scheme with Karma. The
trustworthiness as well as the traffic generated by the two accounting scheme is compared analytically.6
5.6.1 Trustworthiness Comparison
The comparison about the trustworthiness of token-based accounting scheme and Karma discusses how
an adversary could enhance a peer’s account balance.
Token-based Accounting Scheme
The token-based accounting relies on two mechanisms that ensure the scheme’s trustworthiness; when
tokens are issued they must be signed by a quorum of trusted peers. The secrecy of the required private
key is guaranteed by using proactive secret sharing. Furthermore, information about all tokens issued to
a peer are stored in an aggregation account, which is hosted at an account holder set.
If an adversary wants to increase the tokens available to a peer against the rules of the scheme, the
adversary has to forge tokens and to put the information about these tokens into the corresponding
aggregation account. Forging tokens requires either the knowledge of t shares of the scheme’s private
key the control of a complete quorum. The base scenario uses a quorum size t = 17. The account
holder set hosting the aggregation account of a peer is an additional security mechanism. In order to
manipulate an aggregation account, the account information at more than half of the account holders
has to be manipulated. Also, the manipulation has to meet the specific requirements of the trustworthy
token aggregation protocol, which is hard to fake. In the base scenario the account holder set size k is
set to k = 10. Furthermore, the account holder set’s location is concealed.
In summary, an adversary has to successfully attack more than 22 specific peers in order to defraud
the system.
Karma
Karma’s only mechanism for achieving trustworthiness is the bank set. In Karma the bank set size is
denoted k. A bank set of a peer A is located at the leaf-set of the node closest in the nodeID-space to
HASH(nodeId(A)) (see (VCS03)). The consistency mechanism of the bank set is based on majority,
similar to the consistency mechanism of the token-based accounting scheme. Accordingly, an adversary
has to successfully attack half of a bank set in order to defraud the system.
Conclusion
In order to achieve trustworthiness in Karma similar to the token-based accounting scheme Karma
requires a larger bank set than the account holder set of the token-based accounting scheme. Assuming
6 There is only one publication about Karma (VCS03) that however omits many details. A comparison using simulations is
therefore not appropriate as too many assumptions would have to be made.
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in the token-based accounting scheme the key share is stored sufficiently securely so that trusted peers
cannot exchange their key share with other trusted peers, Karma would require a bank set size of at least
k = 44 in order to achieve the same trustworthiness as the token-based accounting scheme.
5.6.2 Traffic Comparison
The comparison of traffic created for both accounting schemes is performed on an analytical basis, since
there are no simulation results available for Karma. Further, insufficient information is available about
the account holder set maintenance in Karma. Therefore, in this comparison, the traffic per transaction is
being evaluated. For bank set maintenance, the token-based accounting maintenance traffic is assumed.
Token-based Accounting Scheme
In the base scenario of the token based accounting scheme with quorum size t = 17 and account holder
set size k = 10 a traffic per transaction of 293.58 kBytes on average is created. Furthermore, for locating
the account holder set, one lookup message is required, that travels at maximum log(N)+xi hops, where
xi is the account offset. The amount of lookups required does not increase with account holder set size.
Karma
In order to analyse the traffic created per transaction by Karma, the transaction procedure described
in (VCS03) is analysed, which is depicted in Figure 5.58 a). The messages of step 1 are signed by peer
A, the remaining messages are unsigned.
In order to do a fair comparison of the two accounting schemes, the message components used are
similar to the token-based accounting scheme. The base message size for IP and TCP headers, sender
and destination information, as well as further basic information is set to 805 bit. Additionally, unsigned
messages require the peer identifications. For this, their public key is used. The key size is set to 1024
bit, similar to the token-based accounting scheme. Two keys are required, A’s public key as well as B’
public key. Furthermore Karma requires a serial number for each transaction. For this, a 160 bit number
is assumed, as it is thought to be sufficient for avoiding message replay. For object id, SLA information
1600 bit are assumed, as it is for the token-based accounting scheme. Price information is an integer
with 32 bit. Furthermore, in order to divide this information in a message, five delimiters of 16 bits each
are required. Accordingly, an unsigned message has a size of 590.625 Bytes; a signed message has a size
of 720.625 Bytes.
For the process depicted in Figure 5.58 a) 204.14 kBytes per transaction with a bank set k = 10 were
used. This is almost 100 kBytes less than for the token-based accounting scheme. However, this does not
take into account lookups. As each bank node in bank set A is required to find the bank set B, k lookups
are required, each travels at maximum log(N) hops.
The comparison of the transaction traffic without lookups for different account holder set sizes in
Karma as depicted in Figure 5.58 b). Increasing Karma’s bank set size to 22 leads to 906.52 kBytes traffic
per transaction; this is an increase by a factor of 3.09. Furthermore, the bank set maintenance traffic
increases. It can be assumed that the maintenance traffic develops according to the best fit curve of token-
based accounting scheme’s maintenance traffic, which is VAHSMaintenance = 0.0225k2−0.0674k+0.1647
MBytes. This results in 12.54 MBytes system-wide traffic per minute for k = 22, compared to 3.09 MBytes
system-wide traffic per minute for k = 10. This is an increase by a factor of 4.06.
5.6.3 Summary
The analytical comparison of the token-based accounting scheme showed that the token-based account-
ing scheme offers a higher trustworthiness than Karma. In order to achieve a similar trustworthiness in
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(a) Karma transaction procedure
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(b) Comparison of traffic by bank set size
Figure 5.58: Karma transaction procedure (cf. (VCS03))
Karma, it requires a larger bank set size than the account holder set size in the token-based accounting
scheme.
If the bank set size in Karma and the account holder set size in the token-based accounting scheme
are both set to k = 10, Karma would create, per transaction, almost 100 kBytes less traffic. However,
if the bank set size is set to 22 in order to achieve similar trustworthiness in both accounting schemes,
Karma would require more than three times the traffic per transaction than the token-based accounting
scheme. Furthermore, the bank set maintenance traffic would be approximately four times higher for
k = 22 than for k = 10.
The improved efficiency of the token-based accounting scheme compared to Karma is achieved because
the token-based accounting scheme uses primarily local accounts; remote accounts are only used as a
mechanism for further enhancing the scheme’s trustworthiness. This allows the number of replicas to
remain small compared to accounting schemes that depend solely on remote accounts.
In summary, it can be concluded that for a similar trustworthiness the token-based accounting traffic
creates significantly less traffic. This is true for traffic per transaction, as well as for static maintenance
traffic.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter the token-based accounting scheme is evaluated using analytical methods and simula-
tions. The evaluation criteria and methodologies are deduced from the objectives. This chapter’s goal is
to evaluate the efficiency of the token-based accounting scheme and to demonstrate its feasibility in a
practical application scenario. Accordingly, the objectives are to evaluate the scheme’s performance and
costs.
In order to evaluate the systems trustworthiness, it is analysed which parameter setting of the token-
based accounting scheme leads to which level of trustworthiness. The required quorum size is de-
termined by concluding that the quorum selection process can be modelled by the hyper-geometric
probability function. The Trust Level L describes the probability that the quorum is not completely com-
promised. The required quorum size is deduced for a set of different values of the influencing factors.
Accordingly, for a Trust Level of 99% a quorum size of t = 7 is required, if at least 50% of the trusted
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peers act according to the rules. For a Trust Level of 99.999% a quorum size of t = 17 is required, if at
least 50% of the trusted peers act according to the rules.
Another core parameter influencing the token-based accounting scheme’s trustworthiness is the ac-
count holder set size. Due to churn, account holder sets are reduced in size over time. Here, the
mechanisms that repair the account holder sets’ size was simulated for a set of eight different churn
models and two different probabilities that peers handover aggregation accounts when they leave the
system. The churn models simulated are two models deduced from measurements. Both models are
modified with factors dvar =
{
1, 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
4
}
in order to simulate higher churn and test the mechanisms in
more difficult application scenarios. The results show that the account holder set size k should be set to
values from k = 6 to k = 10 for the simulated churn models.
In the third section of this chapter, the mechanisms of the token-based accounting scheme are analysed
in terms of their message complexity. The results show that the token-based accounting scheme’s main
mechanisms’ traffic costs are independent of the p2p system’s size. Both system-wide costs of the ag-
gregation and payment processes depend mainly on the number of transactions performed; the quorum
size t has further influence on the costs of aggregation. The account holder set size k has influence on
both, aggregation and payment traffic. All these influences are expected to grow linearly with increased
number of transactions or increased t or k. The account holder set maintenance mechanisms’ traffic also
grows with the p2p system’s size, because each peer in the system is expected to own an aggregation
account and account holder set maintenance is generated per account holder set. Part of these mecha-
nisms have a message complexity O(k2); thus the account holder set size is expected to have a strong
influence on the account holder set size.
In order to evaluate the token-based accounting scheme thoroughly, a simulation model is built us-
ing the PeerfactSim.KOM (Mul) simulator. PeerfactSim.KOM is specialised for simulating p2p systems
and contains an abstract underlay model with message transfer delays for each overlay connection. In
Section 4 the simulation model, simulation setup, experiments, and results of these simulations are de-
scribed. The simulations study the effects of the quorum size t, the account holder set size k, and churn
on the traffic created by the token-based accounting scheme. Overall, the generated traffic is moderate.
The base scenario has maximal trustworthiness (t = 17) and sufficient reliability of the account holder
sets for strong churn (k = 10). Here, the overall system-wide traffic generated by the accounting scheme
is approximately 13.4 MBytes per minute for a system size of 1000 peers. That is approximately 30.30
kBytes per minute per peer. Splitting the traffic according to its source, a variable amount of traffic is
created per transaction of approximately 293.58 kBytes. This traffic is distributed over the participating
peers. A fixed amount of approximately 22.77 kBytes traffic is created per peer per minute for mainte-
nance of the aggregation accounts. Observing traffic per minute, this represents the largest proportion
of traffic. The quorum size increases the token aggregation traffic almost linearly, having only a very
weak quadratic factor. For t = 7 aggregation traffic per transaction is on average 111.46 kBytes, for
t = 17 it is 237.71 kBytes per transaction. The account holder set size influences the account holder
set maintenance traffic. It increases for k = 6 from 3.35 kBytes per peer per minute to 10.74 kBytes
for k = 12. This increase is a factor of 3.2 for a doubled account holder set size, which results mainly
from the mechanisms with a message complexity if O(k2). These are in particular, the aggregation ac-
count locking mechanism and the aggregation account consistency mechanism. Churn also influences
mainly the account holder set maintenance traffic. It increases from 7.70 kBytes per peer per minute
for standard churn (dvar = 1) to 15.68 kBytes per peer per minute for a churn four times as intensive
as standard churn (dvar = 0.25). System size has no influence on the traffic generated per peer or per
transaction.
The peer’s load is analysed by observing the peers’ upload queue length. Assuming an upload band-
width of 128 kBit per second in 97.85% of time peers have a load less than 1% of their upload capacity,
and in 99.35% of time peers have a load less than 10% of their upload capacity. Trusted peers have to
bear sometimes (0.65% of the time) a higher load of approximately 14 seconds queue length.
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In conclusion, using simulations it is shown that the traffic overhead created by the token-based ac-
counting scheme is overall low compared to typical p2p service traffic like file sharing of mp3-files or
video-on-demand traffic. It is broadly applicable. The evaluation shows that within the account holder
set maintenance mechanism there is still potential for optimisation, especially at the mechanisms having
a message complexity of O(k2). For example, a locking mechanism better suited to p2p systems could
be found. The mechanism used here was selected for the purpose of demonstrating the feasibility of
the token-based accounting scheme. Researching an optimised locking mechanism is beyond the scope
of this dissertation. Similarly, the correctness of the consistency mechanism was not evaluated because
the research of consistency of replicas in p2p system also is beyond the scope of this thesis. Research
performed in this field is, e.g., (MVHE04, MLTS08).
Section 5 observes the traffic generated by management of the scheme’s private key also using sim-
ulations. A simulation model was implemented simulating the update and self initialisation strategy
for updating the private key’s shares within the trusted peers’ overlay. For example for a system with
T = 2000 trusted peers and a threshold t = 17 average traffic per peer of 49.1 kBytes is created. There
are very few peers that have to bear a traffic load higher than 240.13 kBytes. The account holder set size
has the strongest influence on the traffic generated per peer. The system size’s influence decreases when
the system size increases. An increase from T = 1000 to T = 2000 peers increases the traffic per peer
by only 1 kBytes on average. Furthermore, the update and self initialisation phase is completed quickly.
The complete update and self initialisation of T = 2000 trusted peers requires only approximately 68
seconds. Thus, in terms of traffic as well as in terms of time, updating the complete trusted peer system
has such a low overhead, that there is no constraint on how often it is performed. It could be even per-
formed once or twice per day, whatever the application developer believes is required in order to protect
the scheme’s private key’s secrecy.
In Section 6, an analytical comparison of the token-based accounting scheme with Karma (VCS03)
is performed. Karma is, in its functionality, the most similar accounting mechanism for p2p systems
compared to the token-based accounting scheme. It is shown that if Karma is configured to a similar
trustworthiness as the token-based accounting scheme, Karma creates 209% more traffic per transaction
and 306% more maintenance traffic than the token-based accounting scheme. The improved efficiency
of the token-based accounting scheme stems from the combination of using primarily local accounts for
storing tokens and remote accounts for enhancing the scheme’s trustworthiness. This keeps the account
holder set small compared to mechanisms for relying solely on remote accounts.
In this chapter it is demonstrated that the token-based accounting scheme is applicable for practical
p2p applications. Its novel architecture provides a unique combination of trustworthiness and small
traffic overhead, while offering trustworthy accounting functionality. The scheme is secured by applying
threshold cryptography in combination with aggregation accounts. Furthermore, the simulations showed
the schemes robustness. Peers could perform transactions and swap tokens even under strong churn.
In conclusion, the token-based accounting scheme is suited for many application scenarios. It can be
applied to p2p applications that provide high traffic volume services like video-on-demand as well as to
p2p applications with low traffic volume services, because it creates a low amount of steady background
traffic for account holder set maintenance.
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6 Deployment Issues
After evaluating the token-based accounting scheme, issues about the deployment of the
token-based accounting scheme in different application areas are presented in this chapter.
In the first section, it is discussed how the token-based accounting scheme could be boot-
straped in a fully decentralised environment. The minimum requirements that have to be
met for the start-up are derived, and it is shown how the scheme can be adapted to larger
system sizes over time.
In the Introduction, two abstract application scenarios for accounting and cooperation con-
trol in p2p systems were discussed and the required functionality for the token-based account-
ing scheme was derived. In Section 2 of this chapter, it is demonstrated how the token-based
accounting scheme could be applied in the first type of these application scenarios, commer-
cial p2p applications, is discussed. Three alternatives are presented for using the token-based
accounting scheme as basis for charging for commercial services.
The third section discusses the application of the token-based accounting scheme in the
context of the second type of application scenarios, a community file sharing application.
Using simulations, the effects that different aggregation functions have on communities are
analysed. For peers, different behaviour types are assumed and the development of tokens
available to peers File sharing behaviour and number of transactions performed are analysed
under usage of aggregation functions that value uploads and downloads asymmetrically.
With this chapter, the research of fully decentralised accounting with intrinsic cooperation
control in p2p systems closes the circle to the introduction. The two main application classes
used there to derive the requirements for the token-based accounting scheme are also used
in this chapter to discuss its deployment.
6.1 Bootstrapping the Token-Based Accounting-System
A p2p system requires a bootstrapping strategy, because many mechanisms in p2p systems assume the
existence of a specific minimum number of peers. For the token-based accounting scheme, constraining
factors for bootstrapping are the quorum size and account holder set size. Both mechanisms are built on
cooperation of peers. Accordingly, for bootstrapping a p2p system that uses the token-based accounting
scheme, three parts have to be considered. First, the overlay network for the token-based accounting
scheme and the trusted peer overlay network need to be initialised. Then aggregation accounts have to
be created for the first peers before they can receive the starting number of tokens.
6.1.1 Starting-up the Token-Based Accounting Scheme
The token-based accounting scheme applies two different overlay networks; the system overlay network
is used by all peers, and the trusted peer overlay network is used for system key maintenance.
Minimum Required Number of Trusted Peers
The first step of system key maintenance is the distributed creation of the scheme’s private key shares.
Accordingly, the minimum number of peers for the trusted peer overlay network is determined by the
scheme’s private key creation process. The minimum number of trusted peers for start-up is determined
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Figure 6.1: Required quorum size according to Equation 5.1
by the quorum size. The token aggregation process requires at least t+ 1 trusted peers (the quorum and
the token aggregation administrator). The quorum size depends on the number of trusted peers in the
system, as well as the desired Trust Level. The Trust Level was analysed in Section 5.2.
For the start-up phase, it can be assumed that an application provider makes some machines available
that may act as trusted peers. Accordingly, at the beginning, a very high proportion of honest trusted
peers (pg) can be assumed. Figure 6.1 depicts the required quorum size by number of trusted peers in
the system for Trust Levels L(T, t, pg) = {99%, 99.9%, 99.999%}. Accordingly, a initial quorum size of 5
to 6 is sufficient.
If only this small numbers of trusted peers exists at start-up, there should be at least one trusted peer in
the system whose trustworthiness is guaranteed. Then, the quorum selection process could be adapted
to always use that peer while the number of trusted peers is small. This way, a trustworthy quorum
can be guaranteed. Such a trusted peer could be operated by the application provider. If such a trusted
peer is not provided, in order to ensure a trustworthy quorum selection process, the starting number of
trusted peers should be at least 12 (see Figure 6.1).
The resulting quorum size can be increased over time in order to adapt to a changing ratio of honest
trusted peers.
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Minimum Required Normal Peers
The minimum number of peers in the system overlay is determined by the maximum of the initial
account holder set size k and the initial number of trusted peers required, because both should not com-
pletely overlap in token aggregation processes. A peer should not be responsible for its own aggregation
account. Therefore, the initial required number of peers is at least t+k+1. Furthermore, in order to use
the account offset mechanism, a larger initial system size is desired. However, the account ship value
can be set to a low value in the beginning (e.g., to x = 3) and can be increased with a growing system
size. If an account holder set size of 6 is chosen due to churn, a peer becoming responsible for its own
aggregation account must also be avoided. Therefore, assuming an account shift value of x = 3, and an
account holder set size k = 6, at least 18 peers should exist.
In summary, for starting-up the token-based accounting scheme, there should be at least approxi-
mately 20 peers in the system overlay; at least 12 of them should be trusted peers if there is no special
trustworthy peer provided by the application provider.
Start-up Client
In order to join a p2p overlay network, there must be at least one peer of the overlay network known
by the joining peer. Apart from the mentioned minimum numbers of peers in the system overlay, and
minimum of trusted peers, there exists no further constraint for starting up the token-based accounting
scheme.
6.1.2 Scaling the Token-based Accounting Scheme
After start-up, when more peers join the system, its trustworthiness parameters must be adapted in order
to guarantee trustworthiness.
The quorum size t can be increased by the trusted peers by running an update phase. Within the
update phase, at least one polynomial with a higher degree is used for generating the update shares.
This way the threshold of a threshold cryptography scheme can be increased. Unfortunately, decreasing
the threshold again is impossible. If this is desired, a new key pair must be generated and the new shares
must be distributed.
The account shift value is also increased by trusted peers when they perform a repositioning of an
aggregation account.
Both mechanisms require that peers are able to approximate the actual system size. If the peers are
organised in a structured p2p overlay network, this estimation can be performed by each peer individu-
ally. For example, in Chord a peer can estimate how dense the Chord ring is populated by observing its
successors and fingers. From this, the peer can conclude to a system size. For the token-based accounting
scheme, a coarse estimation of the system size is sufficient, because it is not used in any mechanism as
parameter.
6.1.3 Summary
Apart from a specific minimum number of normal peers and minimum number of trusted peers, there
are no additional constraints for starting up the token-based accounting scheme. Approximately 20 peers
are required for start-up. With growing system size, the quorum size and the account shift value can be
adapted.
The token-based accounting scheme could also be used with a central token aggregation server. Then
one highly trusted server can be used for issuing tokens. This can be also an attractive alternative for
starting up the token-based accounting scheme, because a smaller number of peers is required for start-
up. This server could also be replaced anytime with a quorum of peers. In order to enable that, the
method responsible for finding trusted peers must be adapted.
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6.2 Deployment Scenarios for Commercial Applications
As described in Section 1.2, commercial application scenarios require charging and billing functionality
in addition to accounting. Billing can be realised as an external application. In this section, there are
three charging alternatives presented that can be added to our token-based accounting scheme. These
alternatives are compared in terms of the transaction costs born by the peers.
6.2.1 Application Scenarios
This section covers three possible alternatives for charging within a p2p application where users pay
actual money for receiving services. Thus, a p2p application providing the functionality as described in
Section 1.2.1 is assumed. It is also assumed that each peer owns a private/public key pair which enables
it to legally provide valid signatures. This means that before a service session starts, the peers agree on
the service to be provided and a tariff for calculating the charge of the service.
In order to determine accounting information about the services and resources a peer provided, typ-
ically the foreign tokens a peer collected are used. Accounting information about the services and re-
sources are available through copies of spent own tokens a peer stores. This information can be verified
by the information stored in a peer’s aggregation account, as well as by querying the transaction partners.
This basic concept might be modified by in order to implement different accounting objectives.
6.2.1.1 Tokens as Receipts
Concept
The service requester (A) will send one or several tokens to the service provider (B) as receipt(s) for
delivered service. B can use these tokens to demand payment from A via a prior agreed billing and
payment system. Each peer can request any number of tokens using the token aggregation protocol.
Tokens are not exchanged, only new ones are created.
Discussion
Here, tokens serve the same purpose as receipts created by transaction partners without having to
be issued beforehand. Receipts not issued must remain non-forgeable and double spending has to be
detectable. This, however, does not have to be system-wide, but can remain between the transaction
partners. Both are easy to achieve through the use of signatures and unique receipt ID. Thus with the
token-based accounting scheme, it seems unnecessary to issue receipts.
However, such issuing of receipts offers the possibility of decentralised control within p2p systems. For
example, who is allowed to participate in the p2p system can be controlled. This can be used to exclude
peers with a bad reputation. Furthermore, the number of tokens available to a peer can be limited.
Thus, a peer can perform only a limited number of transactions between two token aggregations. This
limits the danger of misuse of the reputation system, as seen on eBay; A person could be well behaved
until he has a high reputation value; then suddenly he starts to defraud his customers by not sending
the purchased goods. The person could continue at this for some time until it becomes clear that he
is a fraud. The limitation of the number of tokens available to a peer is possible, because peers swap
tokens only after a transaction is completed to mutual satisfaction. To further limit possibilities of fraud,
for higher valued services, peers could agree on a higher number of tokens. The enhanced functionality
described is especially wise for p2p business applications, as there is no central instance which users
could contact in case of fraud (as there is in eBay).
In order to make fraud limitation effective for both the service requester and provider, the token-
based accounting scheme has to be adapted so that both transaction partners must spend tokens for a
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transaction. Both the requester when the service is received, and the provider when he receives the
payment must spend tokens. Otherwise, only service requesters could be excluded from the system.
Moreover, this allows efficient querying for accounting information, because each peer stores complete
information about each of its transaction in a trustworthy manner.
It is apparent that this charging scheme also requires a fast payment scheme. Should the payment
require, e.g., several days to arrive at the service provider (as in eBay), the p2p business application
would be a lot less attractive.
6.2.2 Tokens as Micropayment
Concept
When using tokens as micropayments such as eCash (Sch98), each token symbolises a specific amount
of money. Users use tokens to pay for receiving services.
Discussion
In comparison to existing micropayment schemes, tokens are not anonymous but can be modified to
be (see Section 3.7 and Figure 3.3.2 a). When using tokens as micropayment, protection against forgery
and double spending is highly important. The token-based accounting scheme provides these required
functionalities. Without a central bank it is not trivial problem to solve whom users should pay in order
to receive the tokens necessary for requesting services. A central bank to host the user’s accounts and
provide the token aggregation functionality would solve this issue. However, this compromises the p2p
paradigm.
A solution without a central bank would require the cooperation of several banks with the (manufac-
turer of the) p2p system. A user would pay money to a participating bank, which would in return create
a certificate that entitles the user to the receive a number of tokens. The peer (user) would present this
certificate to a trusted peer for token aggregation in order to receive the tokens. It is important that the
token-based accounting scheme ensures that certificates are redeemed only once. The peer’s account
holders can save this information in the peer’s aggregation account or a callback function with the banks
is possible.
An advantage of using tokens as a micropayment scheme is that peers could exchange foreign tokens
received against new own tokens by using token aggregation instead of exchanging them at the bank.
This reduces transaction cost.
6.2.3 Tokens as Bills of Exchange
Concept
Tokens can also be used as a bill of exchange. A bill of exchange is a written order in which one person
pays another person a specific sum on a specific date. It can be enforced easily without being subjected
to defences. In the past, the bill of exchange was a very important instrument for trading. Today, it used
primarily in international trade. A token is worth the amount of money stated in it. Further information
required for a bill of exchange (date of issue, drawee, recipient, and due date) must be contained in the
token.
In comparison to micropayments, when using tokens as drafts there is no fixed value assigned to a
token when issued. Like a normal draft, a token draft states the amount of money the drawee has to pay
to the recipient. It also states the date when the drawee has to pay the money. The advantage of a draft
is that it can be transferred by endorsement.
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Discussion
This concept is similar to the first alternative (Section 6.2.1.1), however the legal consequences here
are much more strict. Therefore, this concept has higher requirements on the peers’ signatures, because
they have the potential of being accepted internationally.
As an extended concept, a token used as a bill of exchange could be transferred by endorsement to
another peer. The old recipient would add the new recipient under the token and sign it. However,
now double usage of the token must be avoided (the old recipient could still claim the money from the
drawee if he keeps a copy of the token). Therefore, the drawee must be informed about a transfer. If he
is not available, the drawee’s account holder set must store the information.
Tokens as bill of exchange also offer the opportunity for peers to charge up the mutually "drawn"
tokens. This would save external transaction costs, which can be assumed to be higher than costs within
the system.
Tokens as bill of exchange could be handled similar to tokens used as receipts, because each peer
needs to get as many tokens as he requires for the services he requests (Section 6.2.1.1).
When applying this alternative, there is the danger of fraud by the transaction partner who has to
deliver second (as explained in Section 6.2.1.1). Therefore, it is more secure to use several tokens in
transactions if the service can be delivered in parts. To simplify the status quo of mutual debts, tokens
with fixed amounts of money are preferable. Furthermore, the control mechanisms presented in Section
6.2.1.1 should also be applied here.
6.2.4 Assessment
In order to evaluate if a charging scheme can be applied in practise, the two most crucial criteria are
scalability and security. The security of the presented alternatives for charging depends on the security of
the token-based accounting scheme, which was analysed in Section 5.2. According to the requirements
of the charging schemes, the trustworthiness parameters of the token-based accounting scheme are
configured and the consequential costs are compared.
6.2.4.1 Configuration According to Security Considerations
In the following the charging alternatives are analysed individually in terms of the required quorum size
and account holder set size for providing a sufficient secure token-based accounting scheme.
Tokens as Receipts
This alternative has the least security requirements compared to the other two alternatives. It is
sufficient, if a defrauding peer must assume that double spending will be detected. Therefore, the
account holder set can be kept small. An account holder set size k = 6 was selected for the traffic analysis.
In order to calculate the quorum size, pg = 67% is assumed and and a Trust Level of L(T, t, pg) = 99.9%
is required, which results in t = 7 for T > 100. If the total number of trusted peers is below 100 the
required quorum size is t < 7.
Tokens as Micropayment
In order to enable enforceability of sale agreements, strong peer IDs are required. This scheme requires
very tight security against forgery and double spending as this is equivalent to creating money. Further-
more, after foreign tokens have been swapped for new own tokens, it is much harder to prove that these
tokens were created in the legal way. Therefore, known security mechanisms must be sufficient to ensure
security of token creation. Some micropayment schemes introduce a lifetime of the virtual currency. For
the token-based accounting scheme this is not required, because the lifetime restarts for tokens when
they are swapped in the token aggregation process.
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Assuming that 50% of the peers are bad and a Trust Level L(T, t, pg) = 99.999%, a quorum size t = 17
is required. In order to prevent double spending in scenarios with stronger churn, the account holder set
size should be increased to k = 10.
In order to make forging the initial tokens created from a bank certificate impossible, these can contain
information of this certificate, which can also be held by the account holders. For any tokens created
hereafter, the other security mechanisms must be sufficient.
Tokens as Bills of Exchange
In this alternative, the transfer by endorsement is the most critical part, because different scenarios
for cheating exist here. First, receiver B transfers a token to receiver C. Then B agrees with the drawee
A to be paid 50% of the cost of the token. A would save 50% and B gains another 50% and C would
not be able to collect the money from A. As time stamps can be easily forged, it is hard to decide which
happened first, the token transfer or the payment of A to B. In order to prevent such fraud, strong peer
IDs are required. Furthermore, the account holder set must always note the actual holder of a token and
after each clearing of a token, remove it from its list. Accordingly, it is important that the account holder
set is available and therefore its size needs to be increased to k = 10.
As token aggregation is primarily used for the limitation of fraud as in the "tokens as receipts" alter-
native, the quorum size is similarly configured to t = 7. In order for an effective limitation of fraud in
this scheme, it is required that the service provider sends an own token to the service requester. These
tokens are not allowed to be transferred as they are not bills of exchange.
6.2.4.2 Scalability
The overhead traffic for the three charging alternatives is analysed using the simulation results presented
in the last chapter; for each charging scheme the different required configurations of the token-based
accounting scheme are considered.
It is assumed that peers swap tokens in batches, and that on average after four transactions, a peer
swaps its foreign tokens. This is approximately the same as in the simulation scenario; this is required
to assume the same number of tokens swapped on average per token aggregation process, because this
influences the traffic.
The variable and constant traffic of the token-based accounting scheme are compared. Variable traffic
is the payment and token aggregation traffic. The remaining traffic classes (account holder set mainte-
nance, Chord lookups, and Chord maintenance) represent the constant traffic.
Tokens as Receipts
The scalability of charging based on receipts is evaluated using the simulation results of the scenarios
for t = 7, k = 10, dvar = 1 and t = 17, k = 6, dvar = 1, because the required scenario t = 7, k = 6,
dvar = 1 has not been simulated. For payment traffic 10.13 kBytes per transaction is assumed, which
was the result for the scenario t = 17, k = 6, dvar = 1. This can be applied because the quorum size does
not influence the payment traffic. For token aggregation traffic, the ratio of token aggregation traffic
of the two scenarios is calculated and then the traffic for t = 7, k = 10, dvar = 1 is multiplied with
this ratio. This results in 474.33 kBytes traffic per token aggregation. In comparison to a file sharing
scenario, double the number of token aggregation processes will have to be executed, because both the
requester and receiver use tokens in these transactions and both have to swap them. Accordingly, the
variable traffic results in 257.42 kBytes per transaction.
The remaining traffic classes (account holder set maintenance, Chord lookups, and Chord mainte-
nance) represent the constant traffic; here the simulation results for t = 17, , k = 6, dvar = 1 are applied,
as these are not influenced by the quorum size. This results in 20.05 kBytes per minute per peer traffic.
The resulting traffic compared to the other charging alternatives is depicted in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Generated overhead traffic
Tokens as Micropayment
When using tokens as micropayment, the traffic created by the token-based accounting scheme is
comparable to the traffic generated when tokens are used, as an incentive in a file sharing scenario (see
(LDMS05)). However, the system parameters have to be adjusted according to the security requirements
(see last section). Accordingly, for the results presented in Figure 6.2 b) a quorum size of t = 17 and an
account holder set of k = 10 was assumed. The resulting variable traffic is 279.64 kBytes per transaction
process and a constant traffic of 24.50 kBytes traffic per peer per minute.
Tokens as Bills of Exchange
The traffic overhead of this alternative is similar to the file sharing scenario of (LDMS05), however,
the possibility of token transfer by endorsement has to be considered. Paying for a service with a token
that the requester received as bill of exchange means that message sizes are larger, but fewer token
aggregations are executed. The effect of this coherence is shown in Figure 6.2 a), where w is the average
number of transfers by endorsement.
Using tokens as bills of exchange, only one token is required per transaction. Accordingly, the simu-
lated payment traffic of 10.83 kBytes per transaction has to be reduced by approximately 5 token sizes.
In the simulation, one foreign token has a size of 1096 Bytes. Assuming endorsements, tokens grow in
size. Added to a token are a receiver ID, a signature, and further information. Here, it is assume with
each endorsement, a token grows by 375 Bytes (two 1024 bit values for receiver ID and signature plus
additional information). This also has to be taken into account for token aggregation.
Without endorsement, the variable traffic is approximately 117.63 kBytes per transaction. If each
token is endorsed on average once (w = 1), the approximate traffic per transaction is reduced to 59.18
kBytes, because only half of the token aggregations processes are performed. For w = 2, the traffic per
transaction is 39.82 kBytes, for w = 3, the traffic per transaction is 30.23 kBytes.
The constant traffic is 24.31 kBytes per minute per peer.
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6.2.5 Summary
This section presented three alternatives for charging based on the token-based accounting scheme. In
general, the use of tokens has its advantages compared to using simple receipts. Particularly, the number
of tokens available to a peer can be limited. This can be used either as a mechanism to resolve market
failure, or as a mechanism for limiting fraud possibilities, as the number of transactions which a peer may
execute can be limited. In a p2p environment, this is especially important as the transaction partners are
widely anonymous and therefore mechanisms which build trust are required. Identity management plays
an important role as it is required in order to be able to identify defrauding peers clearly. The additional
functionality and controlling the token-based accounting scheme offers results in the generation of higher
traffic overhead. For using simple transaction receipts as a variable traffic of approximately 9 kBytes per
transaction can be assessed; here no constant traffic is created.
The advantage of charging based on micropayments or bills of exchange is the possibility for peers
to charge up mutual debts and by doing so to save on banking fees. Especially when using tokens as
micropayment, peers receive their payment immediately. This means that customers can retrieve the
requested service immediately, and do not have to wait for a bank confirmation.
Security aspects become very important in p2p systems as soon as it involves real money. The charging
scheme presented using tokens as micropayments can be considered secure. However, there are some
limits which might influence the trust a user has in a micropayment scheme based on token-based ac-
counting. For example, tokens issued due to deposit of money in a users account contain a certificate
signed by a bank. However, after token aggregation, a new token cannot contain such a certificate any-
more. Therefore, it is questionable if users of banks would accept a micropayment scheme which relies
on a decentralised mechanism without a trusted third party.
6.3 Economics of Virtual Currency Based Incentive Systems
Community applications built on p2p systems create the largest amount of traffic in the Internet (Has05).
These are mainly file sharing applications. Furthermore, a decentralised video on demand, e.g., a p2p-
based YouTube can be envisaged. Here, it is important that the incentives for collaboration are configured
correctly. Otherwise the applications performance is reduced.
In (KSTT04) it was shown that in p2p file sharing, some free-riding can be tolerated in the social
optimum, which is not addressed by the proposed incentive mechanisms. A weaker incentive mechanism
would be appropriate where peers would not be required to provide as many resources as they consume.
However, it is a matter of fairness that every peer should contribute some resources to the system and
complete free-riding should not permitted.
In this section, the effects of different exchange ratios for new tokens against foreign tokens is re-
searched. The means for using different exchange ratios is the aggregation function within the token
aggregation process. However, if for each swapped foreign token more than one new token is created,
with every service provided more virtual currency is created. This will lead to inflation and could finally
result in a collapse of the incentive system when tokens are not scarce anymore.
In each community there exist altruistic peers that collaborate with other peers regardless of the ex-
istence of an incentive system. The basic concept to overcome the inflation effect is to capitalise the
altruistic peer behaviour. Altruistic peers would accumulate the additional created tokens and conse-
quently the system may stay in a steady state. This concept is researched using simulations.
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6.3.1 Simulation Model
The goal of the simulation model is to determine if, in a p2p file sharing scenario, asymmetric incentives
make sense. Thus, an asymmetric incentive system must fulfil two criteria. On the one hand, no inflation
must occur when asymmetric incentives are used in order to ensure that the incentive scheme is stable
over time and its effects are not diminished. On the other hand, it must be shown that the asymmetric
incentive mechanism is functioning, i.e., it has an affect on user behaviour. To implement asymmetric
incentives into a p2p system, we use the token-based accounting scheme by choosing an aggregation
function different than m = n, where M denotes the number of new tokens {T1, ..., Tm}created due to
aggregating n foreign tokens {F1, ..., Fn}. To value upload twice as much as a download, the aggregation
function would be set to m = 2n.
In order to assess if inflation occurs in the system, we have to define a condition to determine which
tokens are still used for trading in the system and which not. That is, we have to determine which tokens
belong to the cash flow in the system. In order to assess whether the incentive system is functional,
it has to be determined if peers’ file sharing behaviour is improved in comparison to peers’ file sharing
behaviour without incentive system. In order to accomplish that, peer behaviour models for strategic
peers, normal peers, and for altruistic peers are defined.
6.3.1.1 Peer Behaviour Models
In order to model realistic peer behaviour, three different file sharing behaviour models are used. Each
peer belongs to one of the following peer classes:
• Strategic peers that do not share any files voluntarily. They represent free-riders.
• Normal peers that merely share a small number of files. They correspond to peers that download
files and share them afterwards for some time.
• Altruistic peers that share all files they have.
In the model, it is assumed that peers upload all files that are requested from them. Therefore in the
model, the goal of an incentive system is to motivate normal peers and strategic peers to share more
files.
6.3.1.2 Inflation Detection
In order to determine whether inflation occurs in the system, the number of tokens available to the peers
targeted by incentive system must be calculated. If this number increases over time then inflation of to-
kens occurs. Typically, the peers targeted by the incentive systems are the strategic peers and the normal
peers. Altruistic peers share their files independently of the presence of an incentive system. Therefore,
altruistic peers are expected to accumulate tokens. These accumulated tokens are not available to the
system anymore. In order to decide which tokens are still available to the system, it is defined that the
tokens available to the systems are represented by the own tokens in the system. Furthermore, it is
defined that the tokens not available to the system are represented by the foreign tokens in the system.
Thus in the simulation, peers swap received foreign tokens immediately back to own tokens, if they plan
to spend them again. Therefore, for every behaviour model, a different token aggregation policy must
be defined:
• Strategic peers exchange all received foreign tokens immediately back to own tokens.
• Normal peers aim at having always a specific number of own tokens available.
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• Altruistic peers also want to download from the p2p system. Therefore, they also try to have a
specific number of own tokens available.
By applying these rules for file sharing and inflation detection, it can be argued that strategic peers
do not accumulate any tokens. They merely spend tokens for downloading files. However, they only
receive tokens when they share files (what they normally not do). On the other hand, altruistic peers will
accumulate tokens, while normal peers always share a small number of files. The purpose of the incentive
system is to motivate all peers to share more files. Therefore, normal peers could also accumulate
tokens. However, that would mean the incentive system is not working for the normal peers anymore.
Accordingly, the number of foreign tokens normal peers hold is a measure for the degree of inflation in
the p2p system.
Obviously, a metric for the efficiency of the incentive mechanism is needed. The purpose of the
incentive system is to motivate peers to share more files. Accordingly, the number of additional files
normal peers share and the number of files foreign peers share is the measure of the efficiency of the
incentive mechanism.
In order to evaluate the described peer behaviour model, a simulator was used that will be now
described in detail.
6.3.2 Simulator
The simulator implemented for this evaluation is round-based.
At the beginning of every round, each peer has a specific number of own tokens T and foreign tokens
F and shares a specific number of files ϑ. In addition, each peer belongs to one of the three behaviour
classes. The goal of the simulation is to assess for which percentages of altruistic and strategic peers
asymmetric incentives can be applied. Accordingly, the behaviour class is invariable for each peer.
During each simulation round for each peer, it is determined whether it wants to download a file based
on a predefined download probability. If so, it is determined which file the peer wants to download, as
well as the provider peer. Each file has a specific price s in tokens. In this simulation, the focus is
on the inflation of the system, not on file distribution. It is assumed that files are evenly distributed
among the behaviour classes according to their popularity, and that the interest in these files is also
evenly distributed among the behaviour classes. Therefore, it is concluded that file popularity does not
influence the inflation effect. Thus, file popularity is not modelled.
A download takes place if the requester peer has enough own token to pay the provider. Then the
provider receives a number of foreign tokens that is equal to the file price s. The same number of
own tokens is subtracted from the customer’s own tokens. If the customer does not have enough own
tokens to afford the download, the peer shares an additional number of files ϑ′ in order to receive more
upload requests. In the next round, the peer will try again to download the file. If it still does not have
enough own tokens, it will again share some more files. This continues until the download request is
successful. At the end of each round, peers’ foreign tokens are exchanged against own tokens according
to the peer’s behaviour class’ aggregation policy. In addition, the number of shared files is adjusted. If a
peer downloaded a file successfully, the file sharing policy according to the behaviour model is applied.
Otherwise, the peer will share additional files, as described before.
Finally, for each peer class, the number of tokens and shared files is calculated for evaluation purposes.
It is assumed that peers show the same up-time behaviour in all behaviour classes. Thus, on average the
percentages of peers of the behaviour classes in the system are invariable. Accordingly, peer up-time will
not have an influence on the inflation effect. Therefore, peer up-time is not modelled in the simulation.
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Figure 6.3: Simulation results for symmetric aggregation function
6.3.3 Simulation Scenarios
In every simulated scenario, peers start with 25 own tokens and no foreign tokens. Further, each peer
starts with a certain number of own files; this number is uniformly distributed between 5 and 100. The
files have a normal distributed price s with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 3. Altruistic peers
share all of their files. Normal peers share a random number of files, which has a Normal distribution
with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 5. Peers want to download a single random file in a
simulation round with a probability of 25%. Altruistic and normal peers exchange 15 foreign tokens to
own tokens as soon as their balance of own tokens falls below 20.
For the presented results, systems with 1000 peers have been simulated with varying ratios of altruistic,
normal, and strategic peers. In empirically observed file sharing systems, there are approximately 10%
to 20% altruistic peers according to (AH00, HLD+05). Strategically acting peers form the majority. In
the results presented below the simulated systems had 20% of altruistic peers, 30% normal peers, and
60 % strategic peers.
6.3.4 Simulation Results
Figure 6.3 shows the simulation results for a symmetric aggregation function. As expected, the number
of available tokens decreases sharply at the beginning. This is a strong deflation. After approximately
200 simulation rounds the development flattens and the number of tokens held by the altruistic peers
increases only slowly. The number of transactions performed by peer class is shown in Figure 6.3 b).
Compared to the symmetric case, with an aggregation function m = 2n strategic peers perform ap-
proximately three times as many transactions, normal peers a bit more than twice as many transactions.
This observation is presented in more detail in Figure 6.4 a). Here, the sum of number of transactions
for normal peers and strategic peers is depicted. An aggregation function m = 1.2n does not increase the
distribution speed in the file sharing scenario significantly. An aggregation function m = 1.3n approxi-
mately doubles the performed transactions, which can be interpreted as a doubled distribution speed in
file sharing applications. For m = 1.5n the distribution speed almost triples compared to a symmetric
aggregation function. For stronger asymmetric aggregation functions, the number of transactions still
increases, but not as strongly. In conclusion, in terms of distribution speed, the optimum aggregation
ratio is between m = 1.3n and m = 1.7n.
Figure 6.4 b) shows the number of shared files by normal peers and strategic peers for m = n and
m = 2n. In the symmetric case, peers share many more files than in the asymmetric case. This is because
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Figure 6.5: Development of own tokens
peers have very few tokens in this scenario. Obviously, the average number of shared files cannot be
applied as a metric for fast distribution of files in the system.
Figure 6.5 a) depicts the development of own tokens over time. For all aggregation ratios the number
of available tokens drops at first. After approximately 50 rounds, the number of tokens either starts to
stabilise or to increase again. For aggregation ratios m = 1.7n and m = 1.5n inflation can be observed
for normal peers. Accordingly, the incentive system will loose its impact on the behaviour of these peers
eventually. For m = 1.3n, the number of own tokens seems to stabilise, which would result in a sustained
incentive system. This is observed in more detail in Figure 6.5 b). The long term development shows
that for the scenario with m = 1.3n, there is still deflation existing. However, with m = 1.3n the number
of available tokens is stable.
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6.3.5 Summary
p2p systems are based on the assumption that participating peers share their own resources with other
peers. However, file sharing applications have shown that only a minority of peers share their resources
voluntarily. This reduces the system performance considerably, and the system operates below the social
optimum (KSTT04). Therefore, incentive schemes are needed. They motivate or even force users
to share more resources. However, at the social optimum, free-riding can be tolerated to a specific
degree. Therefore, an incentive scheme does not need to be strict, so that not all peers need to provide
at least as many resources as they consume. However, as a matter of fairness, every peer should still
contribute some amount of resources to the system and complete free-riding should not be permitted.
Further, today’s Internet connections are in their majority asymmetric. Thus, the rationale of introducing
asymmetric incentives to allow a specific degree of free-riding and to value an upload higher than a
download is obvious. However, inflation of the virtual currency used to introduce incentives might
occur. Due to the p2p paradigm, there is no central broker in the system that could control the virtual
currency supply. Altruistic peers that accumulate the surplus currency counteract the inflation effect.
In this section, it was shown how to configure asymmetric incentives in order to compensate the
inflation effect. The key finding of the conducted simulation is that the inflation effect for asymmetric
incentives with ratios of m = 2n and higher can not be compensated by realistic proportions of altruistic
peers. However, it was shown for asymmetric incentive ratios m = 1.3n that the inflation effect is
compensated, and the system evolves to a steady state. This is true for all different percentages of
altruistic peers we simulated. Thus, altruistic peers seem to offer a natural way to cope with inflation.
With different percentages of altruistic peers (and incentive ratios below m = 2n), the system evolves at
a steady state because the resulting sharing behaviour of the strategic peers differs. Further, it was shown
that even with higher asymmetric incentive ratios than m = 2n, peers show considerably improved file
sharing behaviour, which fulfils the main goal of an incentive system. However, it is possible that with
such asymmetry the inflation saturates the system and the incentive system looses its impact.
Also, this analysis shows that the aggregation function can be used to coordinate the amount of re-
sources available in a p2p systems, because an economy around tokens can be established. This can be
also used to control the incentives for resource provisioning.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter issues arising from deploying the token-based accounting scheme in a real-world scenario
were discussed.
In the first section, it was presented how the token-based accounting scheme can be started-up. There
are a specific number of peers and trusted peers required if all mechanisms ensuring the scheme’s trust-
worthiness are to be applied from start-up. Then, approximately 20 peers are required, of which at least
5 peers have to be trusted peers, because this is the minimum required quorum size. This assumes that
an application provider provides some trustworthy peers. If this is not the case, at least 12 trusted peers
are required. After start-up, the token-based accounting scheme can be adapted easily to larger system
sizes. Using the key maintenance protocols, the threshold of the applied cryptography scheme can be
increased. Also, account holder set size and the account shift value can be easily adapted by the peers,
according to estimations of the system size.
The second section is about how the token-based accounting scheme can be applied in commercial
p2p application scenarios. The requirements for the application of token-based accounting scheme in
commercial scenarios has been discussed in Chapter 1. The second section presents three different
alternatives for charging based on the token-based accounting scheme: Using tokens as transaction
receipts, using tokens as micropayments, and using tokens as bill of exchange. Using tokens as receipts
requires that both transaction parties have a receipt of the transaction. Therefore, both parties have to
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spend tokens in a transaction. Token aggregation enables additional control that pure receipts cannot
offer. Using tokens as micropayments enables banks to be included with the token-based accounting
scheme. Each token has a fixed value in a real world currency. A peer has to deposit money in a bank
account, and receives in return tokens that are created using the token aggregation process. A bill of
exchange is a traditional trade concept. Here tokens, have a flexible value and can be transferred by
endorsement to other peers. This saves costs. According to the security requirements of the alternatives,
their traffic costs were analysed.
The third section discussed the application of the token-based accounting scheme for p2p community
applications. Here, it was researched which effects different aggregation functions have on file sharing
communities with different classes of peers. Systems with three classes of peers were simulated – normal
peers, strategic peers and altruistic peers. It was shown that due to the existence of altruistic peers, a
symmetric aggregation ratio for tokens leads to a strongly decreased system performance. Altruistic
peers collect more tokens than they spend. Therefore, deflation occurs and the other peers do not own
enough tokens for buying services. This can be avoided by choosing an asymmetric aggregation function
with a ratio m = 1.3n. For higher asymmetry, the distribution speed in the system can further be
improved, however then inflation exists and finally the incentive system will loose its impact when the
system becomes saturated. This analysis shows that the aggregation function can be used to establish
an economy with tokens within a p2p system; the economy can be applied to control the incentives for
resource provisioning.
In summary, this chapter concluded the research of the token-based accounting scheme by demon-
strating its application in the case studies that were used in the beginning to deduce the requirements
for the token-based accounting scheme.
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7 Summary, Conclusion, and Outlook
This chapter concludes this dissertation. First, the content and main findings of each chap-
ter are briefly summarised. The second section summarises the contributions of the token-
based accounting scheme to the domain and draws conclusions. The last section gives an
outlook on new research challenges opened up by the work performed in this thesis.
7.1 Summary
Peer-to-peer (p2p) systems are still lacking mechanisms for trusted accounting and cooperation control;
however they are two core mechanisms required for a wide range of applications. Commercial applica-
tions require accounting functionality, and community applications require cooperation control, which
also requires accounting in order to attribute cooperation to users.
This dissertation demonstrates the feasibility of fully decentralised trusted accounting with intrinsic co-
operation control.
Chapter 1 “Introduction” shows that accounting as well as cooperation control are required as core
mechanisms for a wide range of p2p applications. Commercial applications need an accounting func-
tionality, and community applications require cooperation control, which also relies on accounting in
order to attribute cooperation to users. Accordingly, the goal was identified to demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of fully decentralised trusted accounting with intrinsic cooperation control.
Chapter 2 “Related Work” is structured into three sections. The first section gives relevant definitions
in the context of the dissertation. In the second section, the related work in the area of accounting in
computer networking (apart from p2p systems) is reviewed. Here, accounting functionality is performed
at a central trusted server, which is not compliant with p2p. In the third section, accounting mechanisms
specifically in p2p systems are reviewed in detail. A classification for p2p accounting mechanisms is
presented, and it is concluded that so far no trustworthy accounting mechanism for p2p systems existed.
Further, there has been no accounting scheme that stores accounting information using local accounts
in a trusted way. However, this would be required for O(1) messages during transactions. Furthermore,
such a solution would not rely on trusted peers during a transaction for correct accounting information.
In the fourth section, an in-depth analysis of security mechanisms suited for decentralised systems is per-
formed. Threshold cryptography was selected as the class of security mechanisms that fulfils the largest
set of requirements identified for applications within p2p systems. A thorough analysis of these cryptog-
raphy schemes revealed that most are limited to scenarios with a small number of key shares. However,
two threshold cryptography schemes are identified that fulfil the requirements for an application in large
p2p systems. These can be applied for building a distributed basis of trust in p2p system.
Chapter 3 “Token-based Accounting Principles and Architecture” introduces the design of framework,
system architecture, and protocols of the token-based accounting scheme step by step. For each step,
the design alternatives are analysed and a design decision is concluded. The result is the token-based
accounting scheme, which used tokens as a combination of permission objects for access to accounted
resources and services, and as transaction receipts. Tokens are issued to a specific peer. Peers spend
tokens in transactions with other peers. When a peer provides accounted resources or services, it col-
lects tokens issued to the receiver. Peers swap these collected tokens against new own tokens in the
fully decentralised token aggregation process. The token-based accounting scheme consists of the four
closely interlinked building blocks token structure, transaction protocols, token aggregation protocol, and
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detection of double spending. For each building block, the basic protocols are presented. The token struc-
ture ensures authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of accounting information. The trustworthy
transaction protocol removes the benefits of defrauding the transaction partner. Token aggregation en-
sures that tokens are created only according to the token-based accounting scheme’s rules and cannot
be forged. No central trusted entity is required, because a distributed basis of trust is used applying a
threshold cryptography scheme, which has been identified in Chapter 2. Further, the token aggregation
process introduces the aggregation function that determines the number of new tokens a peer receives.
With this function, another degree of freedom is introduced in the token-based accounting scheme that
allows implementing different rules and policies in the p2p system. Detection of double spending is per-
formed in a fully decentralised and efficient way by introducing aggregation accounts that are located at
a set of third party peers - the account holder set. The combination of the four building blocks prevents
cheating and collusion of peers.
Chapter 4 “Relevant Details about the Protocols” focuses on several parts of the token-based accounting
scheme and presents details about the developed mechanisms. The first section described the identifica-
tion scheme for peers, which ensures that peers can be clearly and permanently identified. This prevents
Sybil and whitewashing attacks. In the second section the location, creation, access, and maintenance of
account holder sets is discussed. For trustworthy access to aggregation accounts hosted at the account
holder sets, a novel routing mechanism was developed that achieves receiver anonymity in the presence
of sender identification. Existing mechanisms for anonymous communication assume that sender and
receiver of a message want to stay anonymous and break if any communication party must be identifi-
able. Clear sender identification is required as it impedes attempts at cheating, collusion, and malicious
behaviour, because such attempts can be traced back to its source. The novel mechanism can be applied
on any structured p2p overlay network building a ring topology. For the aggregation accounts, a mech-
anism for consistent long-term remote storage of dynamic data in DHT-based p2p overlays under churn
was developed. The mechanism consists of a set of protocols that detect the actual size and location of
an account holder set, that lock an account holder set so maintenance actions can be performed without
creating inconsistencies, that establishes consistency across account replicas, that move an account to
a new position, and that allows peers to perform a graceful account handover before they log off. In
the third section, the selection and organisation of trusted peers in a separate overlay was presented.
The fourth section extends the token aggregation protocol with mechanisms enhancing its security. A
mechanism was developed that assures rule compliant execution of peer tasks in the presence of in-
centives for fraudulent behaviour. The mechanism implements a random selection of the aggregation
administering peer as well as the quorum. It permits the verification of the randomness of the selection
of the peer by any peer, although the result of the selection process cannot be determined in advance.
Therefore, which peers participate in trustworthy actions cannot be influenced. Cheating and collusion
of the participating peers is impeded, and an adversary cannot take control of the participating peers
in advance. In the fifth section, the protection of the system-wide secret private key using proactive
secret sharing is presented using proactive secret sharing. The traffic created by these mechanisms is
analysed for both threshold schemes that were identified to be suitable for the token-based accounting
scheme. The sixth section analyses and compares alternative solutions for distributing the updates of
the key shares among the trusted peers. As the best strategy, an improved version of the limited update
and self initialisation method was identified. The final section of this chapter discusses failure recovery
during transactions. Strategies are presented for resolution of situations during a transaction where the
service delivery is interrupted or cancelled, as well as situations where there are disagreements about
the transaction status.
Chapter 5 “System Evaluation” evaluates the token-based accounting scheme. After presenting the
evaluation criteria and methodology, values for the parameters determining the token-based accounting
schemes trustworthiness are determined using analytical considerations. Then the message complexity
of the token-based accounting protocols is analysed, which are used to validate the simulation model.
Section 4 presents the simulation model and analyses in detail the simulation results of token-based
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accounting scheme. For each parameter influencing the created traffic (quorum size, account holder set
size, churn, system size) four different experiments are performed. Based on the results, the influence of
the parameters on the created traffic is derived. For the base scenario variable traffic per transaction is
on average, 293.58 kBytes. This traffic includes payment traffic during a transaction as well as a fraction
of token aggregation traffic. Further, this traffic is distributed among the peers participating in the trans-
action and token aggregation process. Constant traffic stems from maintenance of the account holder
sets and is on average per peer 22.77 kBytes per minute. Assuming an upload bandwidth of 128 kBit per
second in 97.85% of time peers have a load less than 1% of their upload capacity and in 99.35% of time
peers have a load less than 10% of their upload capacity. Trusted peers have to bear sometimes (0.65%
of the time) a higher load of approximately 14 seconds queue length. An analytical comparison with
Karma, another accounting mechanism for p2p system (which is the most similar accounting mechanism
to the token-based accounting scheme) shows that the token-based accounting scheme is distinctly more
efficient. With a similar level of trustworthiness, Karma creates approximately double the amount of
traffic per transaction, and approximately three times the amount of static maintenance traffic than the
token-based accounting scheme. This proves the efficiency of the design of the token-based accounting
scheme. Finally, the simulation model and the simulation results are presented for updating the key
shares in a complete trusted peer system. Updating a complete system of trusted peers is fast and creates
a low amount of traffic. Updating a system of 2000 trusted peers with a threshold of t = 17 requires
approximately 68 seconds and creates on average 49.1 kBytes per peer in total. The highest traffic load
per peer is 240.13 kBytes.
Chapter 6 “Deployment Issues” closes the research of the token-based accounting scheme by discussing
deployment issues. First, the minimal requirements for deployment were analysed. Then alternatives for
an deployment in commercial applications was presented. Three different charging alternatives, using
tokens as receipts, using tokens as micropayment, and using tokens as bill of exchanged, are presented
and analysed in terms of generated traffic depending on the required trustworthiness. The analysis
shows that bills of exchange is the most efficient charging alternative. Last, the deployment and effects
of using symmetric and asymmetric incentives in community applications like file sharing was analysed
based on simulations. Using simulations, it is shown that in the presence of altruistic peers symmetric
incentives lead to a distinctively lower system performance than asymmetric incentives. In order to keep
the number of available tokens in the system stable, slightly asymmetric incentives are required. The
degree of asymmetry depends on the ratio of altruistic peers in the system. The best system performance
is achieved with stronger asymmetry, however this leads to inflation, which can lead to a malfunction of
the incentive system.
7.2 Conclusion
Since the emergence of p2p systems is has been perceived that due to their decentralised and au-
tonomous nature, trustworthy and efficient accounting is hard to achieve (if not impossible). In fact,
in the early stages of the research presented in this thesis, many of these crucial challenges were identi-
fied and addressed.
Due to the novel token-based accounting scheme, it is demonstrated that these challenges can be
solved and fully decentralised trusted accounting with intrinsic cooperation control is feasible and
operational. This was achieved by
• Designing and developing framework, system architecture, and protocols of the fully distributed, trusted
token-based accounting scheme.
In order to collect accounting information, tokens are used as transaction receipts. The token-based
accounting scheme consists of four building blocks, where Token Structure, Transaction Protocols,
Token Aggregation, and Detection of Double Spending are the architecture’s core components.
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• Designing a fully decentralised mechanism that allows automatic cooperation control within the token-
based accounting scheme.
The possession of tokens gives the user permission to draw services from the p2p system. Within
transactions, peers “spend” tokens by handing them over to the service provider. Peers swap foreign
tokens for new own tokens in the token aggregation process. The aggregation function used to
determine the number of new tokens adds another degree of freedom and can be used to express
rules and policies in the p2p system.
• Designing fully distributed mechanisms that achieve the trustworthiness of the token-based accounting
without having to rely on a single trusted entity in the system.
Tokens are issued to peers in a fully distributed, trustworthy process using a quorum that estab-
lishes a distributed basis of trust in p2p systems. This distributed basis of trust is built by applying
threshold cryptography and proactive secret sharing to p2p systems and combining it with a novel
mechanisms that ensure random quorum peer selection. The efficient application of proactive secret
sharing techniques to p2p systems is demonstrated using simulations.
In order to prevent double spending, aggregation accounts are introduced that are replicated and
stored at third party peers – the account holder set. Aggregation accounts are protected from
cheating and collusion by concealing their location using a novel routing mechanism for structured
p2p overlays. Maintenance protocols prevent loss of data and ensure consistency of aggregation
accounts. The protocols have been proved to be efficient and robust under several scenarios of
churn.
Finally, a novel transaction process was developed that removes the benefits of defrauding the trans-
action partner. This ensures a trustworthy transaction process without using a third trusted party.
• Showing the feasibility of the scheme by demonstrating its viability, trustworthiness, scalability, and
efficiency using analytical assessments as well as simulations. The results show the applicability of
the token-based accounting scheme in a wide variety of scenarios. More specifically:
– The required protocols are designed in detail, implemented in the peer-to-peer simulator
“PeerfactSim.KOM”, and the token-based accounting scheme is evaluated with it.
– The trustworthiness of the token-based accounting scheme is demonstrated. The quorum size
determines the scheme’s trust level and is determined using a stochastic model. The required
account holder set size was determined for various churn scenarios using simulations.
– The token-based accounting scheme’s efficiency is demonstrated by evaluating the traffic gen-
erated using simulations.
The generated traffic is low compared to service traffic. Variable traffic per transaction in-
creases linearly with the quorum size. Fixed maintenance traffic increases with a weak
quadratic factor with an increase account holder set size.
The system key maintenance process, using proactive secret sharing is fast and inexpensive
traffic-wise. Therefore, it can be performed on daily basis, or even more often.
An analytical comparison with the most relevant related work shows that the token-based
accounting scheme is significantly more efficient, because it creates distinctively less traffic at
approximately the same trust level.
– The scalability of the scheme is evaluated by simulating different models of churn and systems
sizes. Churn has only a weak influence on the generated fixed maintenance traffic. System
size does not affect individual peer traffic. Therefore, there is no limit to scalability.
• Discussing the applicability of the token-based accounting scheme in two scenarios.
It is shown, that the token-based scheme can be applied in commercial scenarios with several
charging alternatives (such as receipts, micropayments, and bills of exchange). In community
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applications with the aggregation function, asymmetric incentives can be given to peers, which
influences their collaborative behaviour.
In the context of the project Market Management of Peer-to-Peer Services (MMAPPS) (MMA04) funded
by the European Union and in the context of the project “Preis- und Erlösmodelle für das Internet – Um-
setzung und Marktchancen” (PREMIUM) (Pro03) funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education
and Research (BMBF), a prototype implementing large parts of the token-based accounting scheme was
built and presented for example at CeBit 2006. A patent of the token-based accounting scheme has been
applied for and is in the process of being granted (LDM04).
7.3 Outlook
The contributions made in this dissertation enable the implementation of new application scenarios using
p2p systems, since the missing accounting functionality can now be feasibly provided. Furthermore, the
novel mechanisms presented allow building more trustworthy p2p systems, which distinctly lowers the
barrier for p2p systems to new application areas and towards seamless multimedia communications.
This reveals new avenues of research, not only in the field of communication networks. In the following
some of them are presented.
Like many other mechanisms for p2p systems presented in the literature, the token-based accounting
scheme relies on a reputation mechanism. Reputation mechanisms for p2p systems have been researched
for some years; however, no solution has been developed that would be broadly accepted. Furthermore,
most reputation mechanisms for p2p systems are designed as a means of cooperation control. This is
related to open research questions, if a reputation mechanism is required by the token-based account-
ing scheme, it has different requirements since the data it administers has a different context. Such a
reputation mechanism has to manage information about violation of rules and needs to evaluate this in-
formation. Designing such a reputation mechanism is an interesting and a highly relevant and research
topic.
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is thought to resolve many security concerns in information tech-
nology and especially in computer networking. Assuming the availability of the TPM at some peers or at
all peers of a p2p system might change the premises for the token-based accounting scheme fundamen-
tally. However, the autonomy of peers prevails; therefore, with TPM security and trustworthiness issues
will change, but will not be finally solved. Still, taking the existence of TPM into account when designing
mechanisms for trusted p2p systems has the potential to significantly enhance their efficiency.
The strong growth of p2p traffic is a challenge to ISPs (Hec04). This results in increased load on their
network and increased traffic across domain borders. Thus, p2p traffic is a considerable cost factor within
ISPs’ operational costs. It is a new and interesting research field how p2p traffic can be controlled and
guided. A solution to this challenge can be Economic Traffic Management, where ISPs give incentives
to users to act “ISP friendly”. An example for such an approach is the SmoothIT project (Smo08). The
token-based accounting scheme could be used for Economic Traffic Management by rewarding peers
with additional tokens for ISP-friendly behaviour. Thus, integrating the token-based accounting scheme
in the economic concepts of Economic Traffic Management could be a highly valuable contribution to
this field.
Using tokens in applications as means for incentives or as virtual currency, an economy of tokens
can emerge. Accordingly, there are economic aspects to be considered that are similar to the economic
challenges in the area of quantity theory of money. These concepts assume a central bank that controls
the volume of money available. Hence, if such economic mechanisms are be applied in an application
scenario there arise new technical challenges, e.g., how to determine the number of tokens available in
the system. Furthermore, it is an interesting question, whether the economic theory created for countries
and societies can be applied virtual communities. Thus, the combination of the token-based accounting
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scheme with virtual communities puts existing economic theory into a new context and raises interesting
new research challenges in the area of information management and economics.
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